Sheryl Johnson-Todd v. John S. Morgan ( 2015 )


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  •                                       In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-15-00073-CV
    ____________________
    SHERYL JOHNSON-TODD, Appellant
    V.
    JOHN S. MORGAN, Appellee
    _______________________________________________________            ______________
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 126,841
    ________________________________________________________            _____________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Sheryl Johnson-Todd asks that we dissolve a temporary injunction which,
    among other restrictions, prohibits her from filing, publishing, or distributing any
    documents, court papers, or pleadings from another case in which John S. Morgan
    was a party. The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes an appellate
    court to review a party’s appeal from a trial court’s decision to grant a temporary
    injunction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (West 2015).
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    Because the trial court’s order does not comply with the requirements of Rule 683
    of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a rule that governs the form and scope of
    injunctions and restraining orders, and because Morgan failed to plead or prove
    that he will probably prevail on the merits of his claims, we hold the trial court
    abused its discretion when it granted Morgan’s request for temporary injunctive
    relief.
    Background
    This interlocutory appeal arises from Morgan’s suit against Johnson-Todd
    for invasion of privacy and concerns matters that relate to a prior contested case
    that concerned the conservatorship of the Morgans’ children. In the
    conservatorship case, Johnson-Todd represented Morgan’s former spouse. After
    the family court resolved the disputed issues in the conservatorship case, Morgan
    sued Johnson-Todd claiming that she published or provided disparaging
    information about him to one of the judges who presided over the conservatorship
    proceedings and to an attorney appointed by the court to advise the court regarding
    the interests of the children. The information that Johnson-Todd disclosed in the
    course of the conservatorship proceedings, and which is now the subject of
    Morgan’s suit, is information that is subject to an order sealing matters in a case in
    which Morgan was a defendant.
    2
    After conducting a temporary injunction hearing, the trial court granted
    Morgan’s request for temporary injunctive relief. The trial court’s order restrained,
    prohibited, and enjoined Johnson-Todd from filing, publishing, or distributing any
    documents, court papers, or pleadings regarding Morgan’s criminal case, which is
    the subject of a sealing order. The temporary injunctive relief granted Morgan
    required Johnson-Todd to remove any pleadings or “file materials relating to” the
    criminal case found in “any court[.]”
    Standard of Review
    Johnson-Todd’s appeal challenges the trial court’s decision to grant
    Morgan’s request for temporary injunctive relief. We review a trial court’s
    interlocutory ruling on a party’s request for a temporary injunction for an abuse of
    discretion. Davis v. Huey, 
    571 S.W.2d 859
    , 861-62 (Tex. 1978). An abuse of
    discretion occurs when a trial court acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner.
    See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 
    701 S.W.2d 238
    , 241-42 (Tex. 1985).
    “An abuse of discretion does not exist where the trial court bases its decisions on
    conflicting evidence.” 
    Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 862
    .
    A temporary injunction hearing allows the trial court to determine whether
    the party who is seeking temporary injunctive relief is entitled to “preserve the
    status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru
    3
    v. Ford Motor Co., 
    84 S.W.3d 198
    , 204 (Tex. 2002). To obtain temporary
    injunctive relief, the applicant must plead and prove: “(1) a cause of action against
    the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable,
    imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” 
    Id. On appeal,
    the merits of the underlying case are not presented for appellate
    review, as a trial court’s ruling on a party’s request for temporary injunctive relief
    is a preliminary decision. See Tom James of Dallas, Inc. v. Cobb, 
    109 S.W.3d 877
    ,
    882-83 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Because the trial court is making a
    preliminary decision in a case without the benefit of the process of a trial, Rule 683
    of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the order granting a temporary
    injunction “shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; [and] shall be specific in
    terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or
    other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained[.]” Tex. R. Civ. P. 683.
    Analysis
    In three issues, Johnson-Todd argues that the trial court’s order should be
    dissolved. According to Johnson-Todd, the trial court’s order fails to comply with
    the requirements of Rule 683, the relief the trial court granted in the order
    constitutes a prior restraint and violates her right to due process, and Morgan failed
    to demonstrate during the hearing on the motion that he has a probable right to the
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    requested relief. In the first of the issues that she raises in her appeal, Johnson-
    Todd complains that the temporary injunction order does not comply with several
    of the requirements of Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R.
    Civ. P. 683 (Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order).
    Under Rule 683, an injunction order must set forth the reasons the order is
    being issued, the order must be specific with respect to the terms of the relief being
    granted, and the order must, in reasonable detail, describe the acts the order intends
    to restrain. 
    Id. To comply
    with Rule 683’s requirements, an injunction order must
    do more than merely recite that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy and will
    suffer irreparable harm absent the trial court’s issuing an injunction. See Int’l Bhd.
    of Elec. Workers Local Union 479 v. Becon Constr. Co., Inc., 
    104 S.W.3d 239
    , 244
    (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.). If the temporary injunction order fails to
    identify the probable injury that will be suffered if the temporary injunction does
    not issue, the order is void and must be dissolved. 
    Id. at 243
    (citing Fasken v.
    Darby, 
    901 S.W.2d 591
    , 593 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no writ)).
    Here, the temporary injunction order does not recite that Morgan has no
    adequate remedy or that he will suffer irreparable harm; instead, the injunction
    states in a conclusory manner that “[a]fter considering the evidence and the
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    arguments of counsel, [the trial court] now enters this Temporary Injunction
    Order[.]”
    We conclude that the order fails to comply with the requirements of Rule
    683. Additionally, the order does not contain the trial court’s explanation of the
    reasons it issued the order. Therefore, because the order does not state that Morgan
    has no adequate remedy nor does it identify the probable injury he will suffer in the
    absence of the trial court’s granting his request, we need not address Johnson-
    Todd’s other arguments that address other requirements of Rule 683. See Tex. R.
    App. P. 47.1.
    In Johnson-Todd’s third issue, she argues that Morgan has not shown he has
    a probable right to recover on his claims. Specifically, Johnson-Todd asserts that
    the information that serves as the basis of Morgan’s complaint that she violated the
    order of nondisclosure in Morgan’s criminal case is information that she provided
    in the course of a judicial proceeding; she concludes that such information is
    protected by the absolute judicial communications privilege. We agree that Morgan
    failed to show that he will probably prevail against her on his claims in light of the
    privilege that she relies on in defending against Morgan’s claims.
    In James v. Brown, 
    637 S.W.2d 914
    , 916 (Tex. 1982), the Texas Supreme
    Court stated that “[c]ommunications in the due course of a judicial proceeding will
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    not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the
    negligence or malice with which they are made.” The Court indicated that the
    privilege “extends to any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or
    witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements
    made in open court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the
    pleadings or other papers in the case.” 
    Id. at 916-17.
    The privilege that protects the parties and their lawyers from being sued for
    statements made in judicial proceedings is broadly interpreted, and it includes all
    “communications that bear some relationship to pending or proposed litigation and
    further the representation.” Fitzmaurice v. Jones, 
    417 S.W.3d 627
    , 633 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see also Bell v. Lee, 
    49 S.W.3d 8
    , 11
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (holding that privilege attaches if
    statement has some relationship to contemplated proceeding regardless of whether
    it   actually   furthers   representation).   “Whether   an   alleged   defamatory
    communication is related to a proposed or existing judicial proceeding is a
    question of law.” Daystar Residential, Inc. v. Collmer, 
    176 S.W.3d 24
    , 28 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
    To determine whether a communication is related to a judicial proceeding,
    “‘the court must consider the entire communication in its context, and must extend
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    the privilege to any statement that bears some relation to an existing or proposed
    judicial proceeding.’” 
    Id. (quoting Russell
    v. Clark, 
    620 S.W.2d 865
    , 870 (Tex.
    Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). In this case, Morgan alleged that
    Johnson-Todd provided sealed information about Morgan during conservatorship
    proceedings that involved Morgan and his former spouse. Johnson-Todd
    represented Morgan’s former spouse in connection with the conservatorship
    proceeding. The record before us supports Johnson-Todd’s argument that the
    information forming the basis of Morgan’s complaint in the invasion of privacy
    case is information that bears some relationship to the conservatorship proceedings
    that involved Morgan and his former spouse.
    On this record, we conclude that Morgan failed to demonstrate that the
    information forming the basis of his complaint in the invasion of privacy case is
    information that is not subject to the judicial communications privilege. See 
    James, 637 S.W.2d at 916-17
    . We conclude that Morgan did not prove that he would
    probably recover on his claim1 against Johnson-Todd. In light of our resolution of
    Johnson-Todd’s issues in this appeal, we need not reach Johnson-Todd’s remaining
    1
    The application of the judicial privilege in a defamation action extends to
    all other torts pled by the plaintiff. See Wilkinson v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank Trust
    Servs., No. 14-13-00111-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7091, at **21-22 & n.10
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2014, pet. denied).
    8
    arguments. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Because the temporary injunction order is
    void, we order it dissolved.
    ORDER REVERSED AND DISSOLVED.
    _________________________
    HOLLIS HORTON
    Justice
    Submitted on May 11, 2015
    Opinion Delivered May 14, 2015
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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