Vences, Rogaciano Estrada v. State ( 2006 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 13, 2006

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 13, 2006.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-05-00376-CR

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ROGACIANO ESTRADA VENCES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 183rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 976,667

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense of murder.  He was then convicted and the sentenced to sixty years= imprisonment.  In two issues, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.  We affirm.

Background

Appellant and Hilaria Perez were married and had three children.  During a separation in their marriage, Perez had an intimate relationship with Manuel Ruiz but eventually returned to appellant. Ruiz continued to pursue Perez and threatened to tell appellant about their relationship unless Perez returned to him.  Ruiz took Perez=s jewelry and purse and threatened to show them to appellant as proof that they had been seeing each other.  Ruiz called appellant and told him to ask Perez about her purse and about him.

Perez arranged to meet Ruiz at his apartment complex to retrieve her purse and jewelry.  She drove to Ruiz=s apartment complex in appellant=s van. When she arrived at the apartment complex, Ruiz got into the passenger seat of the van.  After they talked for a while, Perez saw appellant walk up to the van and heard gunshots.  Perez testified that appellant shot and killed Ruiz and then shot her.

Appellant testified that while he was at his office, he received a telephone call saying his wife had been in an automobile accident in the parking lot of an apartment complex.  Because his wife had his van, appellant borrowed a dark Ford Explorer from his co-worker, Juan Martinez, and drove to the apartment complex.  When he arrived, appellant saw that his wife had been shot, and he left the parking lot because he did not know what to do at the time. Appellant then picked up his children from school and went to Tennessee.  He claimed that he intended to return to Texas but did not have enough money.

Surveillance cameras at the gate to Ruiz=s apartment complex show a black Ford Explorer entering the complex at 1:50 p.m. on the day of the murder.  At 1:52 p.m., the same vehicle crashed through the gate and fled, damaging the driver=s side mirror and the gate.  Later the same day, appellant went to his office to pick up a paycheck. Appellant=s manager testified that appellant was visibly shaken said, AI told her.  I told her it was going to happen.  I warned her.@  Appellant was arrested in Tennessee approximately eight days later.

Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to prove he intentionally and knowingly (1) caused Ruiz=s death by shooting him with a firearm and (2) committed an act clearly dangerous to human life.  A factual sufficiency review begins with the presumption that the evidence supporting the jury=s verdict was legally sufficient.  Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We do not view the evidence Ain the light most favorable to the prosecution.@  Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  Instead, we view the evidence in a neutral light and inquire whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  We may find the verdict factually insufficient in two ways. First, when considered by itself, the evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. Second, after weighing the evidence supporting the verdict, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met.  Id.  We must discuss the evidence appellant claims is the most important in allegedly undermining the jury=s verdict.  Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  However, we must employ appropriate deference so that we do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.  Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 482.  Our evaluation should not intrude upon the fact-finder=s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any witness=s testimony.  Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407.

The State may prove the offense of murder by proving a defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of an individual or (2) intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of an individual. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 19.02(b)(1)‑(2) (Vernon 2003).  Perez testified that appellant walked up to the van in which she and Ruiz were sitting and shot Ruiz in the head.  The videotape shows the vehicle appellant drove entering the apartment complex parking lot shortly before gunshots were heard and crashing through the exit gate two minutes later.  The same day, appellant fled to Tennessee with his children, and he enrolled them in school there.

Appellant argues that because Perez=s testimony was not credible, the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we must take care to avoid substantially intruding on the jury=s role to determine the weight and credibility to be given to witness testimony and to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  See Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 410.  Although there was conflicting evidence, the jury chose to believe Perez=s testimony that appellant shot Ruiz.  Further, Perez=s testimony was corroborated by other inculpatory evidence at trial.  Juan Martinez testified that he lent appellant his black Ford Explorer on the day of the murder.  Surveillance cameras recorded a black Ford Explorer entering the apartment complex at the approximate time of the shooting.  The same vehicle crashed through the exit gate two minutes later. An apartment resident testified that at the time of the shooting, she saw a Hispanic male driving a dark-colored truck or sport utility vehicle near the van in the parking lot.  Martinez testified that appellant returned the Ford Explorer damaged and that Martinez called the police when he heard they were looking for his vehicle.  Finally, the jury could have inferred appellant=s guilt from his flight to Tennessee.  See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that evidence of flight is a circumstance from which the jury can infer guilt). Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the evidence is not too weak to support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the contrary evidence was not strong enough to conclude that the reasonable doubt standard could not be met.  We overrule appellant=s two issues.

We affirm the trial court=s judgment.

/s/      Leslie Brock Yates

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed June 13, 2006.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Yates and Anderson.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).