Pekka Joki, as Trustee of the Joki Living Trust v. Albert and Julia Springer ( 2014 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00154-CV
PEKKA JOKI, AS TRUSTEE OF THE
JOKI LIVING TRUST,
Appellant
v.
ALBERT AND JULIA SPRINGER,
Appellee
From the 12th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25758
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pekka Joki, as Trustee of the Joki Living Trust, appeals the trial court’s grant of a
summary judgment against Joki. Because the trial court erred in ruling on the motion
for summary judgment before allowing Joki to conduct discovery, the trial court’s
judgment is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
After Albert and Julia Springer brought an action against Joki for trespass to try
title and for a declaratory judgment to determine ownership of a particular piece of
land, Joki and the Springers entered into a mediated settlement agreement where,
generally, Joki agreed to sell the disputed land to the Springers for $5,000. Later, Joki
refused to follow through with the agreement and the Springers amended their lawsuit
to include a claim for breach of contract for Joki’s breach of the mediated settlement
agreement. Joki filed an amended answer which denied the execution of the settlement
agreement and raised various affirmative defenses. Two business days later, the
Springers filed a motion for summary judgment. Joki responded, filing one document
in which Joki responded to the Springer’s motion for summary judgment, objected to
the Springers’ summary judgment evidence, presented a cross-motion for summary
judgment, presented special exceptions, and requested a continuance. The continuance
was requested to allow Joki the ability to conduct discovery. A month later, the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Springers.
Because it could be dispositive of this appeal, we address Joki’s third issue first.
In that issue, Joki contends the trial court erred in impliedly denying his motion for
continuance and granting summary judgment prior to any discovery regarding the
Springers’ breach of contract claim.
Like any other breach of contract claim, a claim for breach of a settlement
agreement is subject to the established procedures of pleading and proof. Ford Motor
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Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. 2009); Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925
S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Parties are "entitled to full,
fair discovery" and to have their cases decided on the merits. Ford Motor Co., 279
S.W.3d at 663; Able Supply Co. v. Moye, 898 S.W.2d 766, 773 (Tex. 1995) (orig.
proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies discovery going to the
heart of a party's case or when that denial severely compromises a party's ability to
present a viable defense. Ford Motor Co., 279 S.W.3d at 663; Able, 898 S.W.2d at 772; see
State v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1991) ("Only in certain narrow circumstances is
it appropriate to obstruct the search for truth by denying discovery."). The validity of a
settlement agreement cannot be determined without "full resolution of the surrounding
facts and circumstances." Ford Motor Co., 279 S.W.3d at 663; Quintero v. Jim Walter
Homes, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. 1983).
The Springers contend that the trial court did not err because Joki did not file an
affidavit explaining his need for discovery or a verified motion for continuance, citing
Joe v. Two Thirty Nine J.V., 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004). However, as the Texas Supreme
Court stated in Ford Motor Co., in the cases requiring a party to file an affidavit or a
motion for continuance, the parties had already conducted formal discovery and were
seeking time to conduct additional discovery. Ford Motor Co., 279 S.W.3d at 662. Like in
Ford, Joki is complaining that the trial court denied Joki any discovery on the Springers’
breach of contract action. And by granting the Springers’ motion for summary
Joki v. Springer Page 3
judgment without first permitting discovery, the trial court implicitly denied Joki’s
continuance to permit discovery. Accordingly, because Joki had not been able to
conduct any discovery on the Springers’ breach of contract claim, the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Joki that opportunity.
Nevertheless, even if the trial court abuses its discretion in a discovery ruling, the
complaining party must still show harm on appeal to obtain a reversal. Ford Motor Co.,
279 S.W.3d at 667; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). Harmful error is error that "probably
caused the rendition of an improper judgment" or "probably prevented the appellant
from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals." TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a).
The movant in a traditional summary judgment motion, as it appears the
Springers have filed, has the burden to show that no genuine issues of material fact
exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c);
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In determining whether
there are disputed issues of material fact, we take as true all evidence favorable to the
nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference in the nonmovant's favor. Nixon,
690 S.W.2d at 548-49. Once the movant establishes its right to summary judgment as a
matter of law, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to present evidence raising a
genuine issue of material fact which precludes the summary judgment. See City of
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979); Talford v. Columbia
Med. Ctr. at Lancaster Subsidiary, L.P., 198 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no
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pet.). Further, a party relying on an affirmative defense to defeat a motion for summary
judgment must raise a genuine issue of fact as to each element of the defense. Brownlee
v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); Birenbaum v. Option Care, Inc., 971 S.W.2d
497, 504 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. denied).
Joki questions the validity of the mediated settlement agreement itself and the
validity of the alleged “addition” of “Houston County” to the location of the property.
These questions go to the heart of Joki’s defense. And although Joki had made a
request for disclosures in its amended answer, the time had not yet run for those
disclosures to be made. And even if the Springers established a right to summary
judgment as a matter of law, a decision we do not make, Joki could not then sustain his
burden because he had not been permitted to conduct discovery. Thus, the trial court’s
implicit denial of Joki’s request for discovery was harmful. Joki’s third issue is
sustained, and we need not discuss his first and second issues.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Springers’ Motion for Expedited Consideration Without Oral Argument is
dismissed as moot.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
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Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Reversed and remanded
Motion dismissed as moot
Opinion delivered and filed November 13, 2014
[CV06]
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