Daymond Lamont Stewart v. State ( 2014 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-13-00414-CR
No. 10-13-00415-CR
DAYMOND LAMONT STEWART,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 82nd District Court
Falls County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 9225 and 9226
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In one issue in both appellate cause numbers, appellant, Daymond Lamont
Stewart, challenges his convictions for burglary of a habitation and aggravated sexual
assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West Supp. 2014); see also id. § 30.02(c)(2)
(West 2011). Specifically, Stewart argues that the trial court denied his constitutional
right of confrontation by allowing evidence of a statistical “match” concerning DNA
evidence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On the night in question, Lynne Richnow was working as a nurse at the Falls
Community Hospital in Marlin, Texas. At around 12:30 a.m., Richnow received a
telephone call from her daughter, Lacy Johnson, who was upset. According to
Richnow, Johnson and Johnson’s husband were having “an argument, a dispute.”
Richnow received permission to leave work to “take care of [her] kiddos.”
Upon arriving at Johnson’s house, Richnow played the role of “mediator, trying
to calm everyone down.” During the night, Richnow drank a beer with Johnson’s
husband, and Richnow and Johnson smoked a marihuana cigar. About an hour later,
the dispute subsided, and Richnow left.
Richnow did not return to work because she had been drinking beer and
smoking marihuana. After driving to the hospital to retrieve Richnow’s wallet, Johnson
drove Richnow home. During the drive, Richnow recalled seeing “a black male
walking with a white wife beater,” but she did not think anything of it at the time.
When she returned home, Richnow began hanging blinds while drinking a beer
and smoking marihuana. Richnow recounted that, while sitting on her recliner, “a man
appears with white covering his face and a red do-rag.” The man told Richnow to give
him all of her money, to which Richnow responded, “I ain’t got no money, fool.” The
man then took Richnow’s marihuana and hit her when she tried to get out of the
recliner. Richnow recalled that the man continued to hit her and eventually pulled off
her pants. Thereafter, the man forced open Richnow’s legs and instructed her to play
with herself. When she refused to comply, the man hit Richnow again. Eventually,
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Richnow complied, and while doing so, the man pulled out his penis, briefly
masturbated, grabbed Richnow’s wallet, and took off running.
Once the man left her house, Richnow called 911 and provided dispatch with a
description of the man. Later, in a photographic lineup, Richnow identified Stewart as
the perpetrator of the offenses to a 70% degree of certainty. Richnow testified that her
identification of Stewart as the perpetrator was based on his “eyes, his glasses, the
width of his—the bridge of his nose.” At trial, Richnow stated that she was 100% sure
that Stewart was the perpetrator.
Stewart was charged by indictment with the offenses of burglary of a habitation
and aggravated sexual assault. Included in the indictments was an enhancement
paragraph referencing Stewart’s 1999 conviction for felony burglary of a habitation.
At trial, Serena Zboril, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public
Safety Crime Laboratory in Waco, Texas, testified that she took DNA samples from
Richnow’s underwear, which yielded a mixture profile of at least three people. Zboril
compared the profile from Richnow’s underwear to a buccal swab that had been
obtained from Stewart. Based on the comparison, Stewart could not be excluded as a
contributor to the profile. Zboril also compared Stewart’s DNA profile to a profile
obtained from Richnow’s wallet. The result of the test was a “single-source DNA
profile, and that profile is consistent with the DNA profile of Daymond Stewart.”
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Stewart guilty of the charged
offenses. Stewart admitted that the enhancement paragraphs contained in the
indictments were true, and the jury sentenced Stewart to sixty years’ incarceration in
Stewart v. State Page 3
the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the count of
burglary of a habitation. Stewart received a life sentence for the count of aggravated
sexual assault. The trial court ordered that the imposed sentences run concurrently.
These appeals followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court abuses its
discretion only if its decision is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within
which reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if any evidence supports its
decision. See Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We will
uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it was correct on any theory of law
applicable to the case. See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, Stewart contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence of a statistical “match” concerning DNA evidence. Specifically,
Stewart complains about Zboril’s testimony concerning DNA evidence because her
testimony described population ratios that were created by forensic experts of a FBI
laboratory who were not called to testify. Stewart asserts that his rights under the
Confrontation Clause were violated because he was unable to cross-examine the
forensic experts of the FBI laboratory regarding the formulation of the population
ratios.
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Pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 702, before admitting expert testimony, the
trial court must be satisfied that three conditions are met: (1) that the witness qualifies
as an expert by reason of her knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2)
that the subject matter of the testimony is appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) that
admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the factfinder in deciding the case.
Jessop v. State, 368 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (citing Vela v. State,
209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000)); see TEX. R. EVID. 702. These conditions are usually referred to as (1)
qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131. Reliability
focuses on the subject matter of the witness’s testimony; the proponent of the expert
testimony must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the expert
testimony is reliable. Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Stewart’s complaints center on the reliability of the DNA evidence. To be
considered sufficiently reliable, scientific evidence must meet the following criteria: (1)
the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (2) the technique applying the theory
must be valid; and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in
question. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134; see Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992). Factors that could affect the trial court’s determination of reliability include, but
are not limited to: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique
are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be
ascertained; (2) the qualifications of the expert testifying; (3) the existence of literature
supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) a potential
Stewart v. State Page 5
rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the
technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can
be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied
the technique on the occasion in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573; see Jessop, 368
S.W.3d at 671.
The record in this case demonstrates that the State satisfied the three criteria to
establish the reliability of the DNA evidence. See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134; see also Kelly,
824 S.W.2d at 573. DNA evidence has been held admissible in Texas. Jessop, 368 S.W.3d
at 671 (citing Jackson, 17 S.W.3d at 672; Campbell, 910 S.W.2d 475, 478-79 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995); Hicks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 419, 423-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on
other grounds by Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at
573). At a hearing held outside the presence of the jury, Zboril testified regarding the
extraction of the DNA. Defense counsel asked Zboril about how Popstats, the computer
database used to analyze DNA samples, works and objected to Zboril’s testimony
regarding population ratios. In response to questioning by the trial court, Zboril noted:
“And all of our instruments are validated and our procedures are validated.” When
asked who validates the instruments, Zboril stated: “Our department, as well as
probably the manufacturers of the instrument. They make sure that before they release
it to their customers that they—that it does work.” Zboril also testified that she is
trained in the use of this program and that this program is widely used in the industry.
Stewart v. State Page 6
Zboril then described how she tested the DNA samples.1 Because Zboril’s testimony
touched on the three criteria used to establish the reliability of DNA evidence, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Zboril to testify about a
statistical “match” concerning DNA evidence.2 See Martinez, 327 S.W.3d at 736; De La
Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344; Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 538; see also Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134; Kelly,
824 S.W.2d at 573..
Nevertheless, at trial and on appeal, Stewart argues that the State should have
called an expert witness to demonstrate the statistical validity of the numbers generated
by Popstats. We disagree. Texas courts have held that “the State is not required to
present an expert on probability and statistics in order to show that DNA testing is
reliable. Neither Kelly nor Rule 702 requires such a showing as a prerequisite to
admission.” Jessop, 368 S.W.3d at 671-72 (citing Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 168
1 Later, in the presence of the jury, Zboril testified that: “There is a computer program that we
use called Popstats, [which] is generated by the FBI. And I take the profiles that I have generated and put
those numbers into the computer program and it will give me the random match probability.”
2We are not persuaded by Stewart’s reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011). In Bullcoming, the Court addressed the
following question:
We granted certiorari to address this question: Does the Confrontation Clause permit the
prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial
certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony
of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of
the test reported in the certification. Our answer is in line with controlling precedent: As a
rule, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced
against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and
the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.
Id. at 2722 (emphasis added). Here, Zboril testified that she performed the DNA analysis in the forensic
laboratory, and the record reflects that Zboril was subjected to cross-examination. Accordingly, we find
the Bullcoming case to be factually distinguishable. See id.
Stewart v. State Page 7
(Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d); Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 251 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Stewart’s
constitutional rights were violated. See id.; see also Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 168; Griffith,
976 S.W.2d at 251. We overrule Stewart’s sole issue in both appellate cause numbers.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed November 13, 2014
Do not publish
[CR25]
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