Desiree Satterwhite v. State ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00223-CR
NO. 02-14-00224-CR
NO. 02-14-00225-CR
DESIREE SATTERWHITE APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1278943D, 1278944D, 1280742D
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
----------
Appellant Desiree Satterwhite appeals her three first-degree convictions of
aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. Satterwhite pleaded not guilty to
each indicted charge, but a jury found her guilty of each and assessed
punishment at forty years’ incarceration for each; the sentences run concurrently.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Satterwhite’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and
motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a
professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable
grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In compliance with
Kelly v. State, counsel notified Satterwhite of his motion to withdraw, provided
her a copy of the brief, informed her of her right to file a pro se response,
provided her a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that lacked
only her signature and the date, provided instructions to file the pro se form
within ten days and gave her this court’s address, and informed her of her pro se
right to seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeal to be
frivolous. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court afforded
Satterwhite the opportunity to file a brief on her own behalf, but she did not do so.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only
then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with
counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in
the record that arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
2
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and WALKER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: May 28, 2015
3