William B. Blaylock and Elaine C. Blaylock v. Thomas P. Holland and Kimberly Holland ( 2014 )


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  • REVERSE, RENDER, and REMAND, and Opinion Filed July 14, 2014.
    S    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-13-01197-CV
    WILLIAM B. BLAYLOCK AND ELAINE C. BLAYLOCK, Appellants
    V.
    THOMAS P. HOLLAND AND KIMBERLY HOLLAND, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 09-08910
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Fillmore, Evans, and Lewis
    Opinion by Justice Fillmore
    This appeal concerns a trial court’s denial of an award of trial court costs to appellants
    William B. Blaylock and Elaine C. Blaylock (the Blaylocks). In two issues, the Blaylocks assert
    the trial court was without jurisdiction to exceed the prior mandate of this Court by denying the
    Blaylocks their trial court costs and the trial court was without discretion to deny the Blaylocks
    their trial court costs because they were successful parties in their lawsuit. We reverse the trial
    court’s judgment, render judgment that the Blaylocks are entitled to their trial court costs, and
    remand the cause to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
    Background
    The lawsuit underlying this appeal involves a dispute over real property between
    adjoining landowners, the Blaylocks and appellees Thomas P. Holland and Kimberly Holland
    (the Hollands). The backyards of the Blaylocks and the Hollands share a common rear property
    boundary. Blaylock v. Holland, 
    396 S.W.3d 720
    , 721 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). After
    the Hollands built a chain link fence, the Blaylocks asserted the fence was on the Blaylocks’
    property and on or within an easement at the rear of the Blaylocks’ property. 
    Id. at 721–22.
    The Blaylocks filed suit against the Hollands to quiet title to the disputed property, and the
    Hollands filed a counterclaim asserting they were entitled to possession and title to the disputed
    property by adverse possession. 
    Id. at 722.
    The Blaylocks appealed the trial court’s judgment
    awarding the disputed piece of real property, which was originally part of the Blaylocks’ lot, to
    the Hollands by adverse possession. 
    Id. This Court
    concluded the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s
    finding that the Hollands acquired the disputed property by adverse possession. 
    Id. at 724.
    We
    reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of the Blaylocks. 
    Id. We remanded
    the cause to the trial court “for entry of judgment consistent with our opinion and for
    consideration of the Blaylocks’ request for attorney’s fees” pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
    CODE ANN. § 16.034.” 
    Id. The mandate
    provides that, in accordance with this Court’s opinion,
    the judgment of the trial court was reversed, judgment was rendered in favor of the Blaylocks,
    and the cause was remanded to the trial court “for entry of judgment consistent with our opinion
    and for consideration of [the Blaylocks’] request for attorney’s fees.”
    Following issuance of the mandate in the first appeal, the Blaylocks filed their request for
    attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 16.034 of the civil practice and remedies code and
    costs pursuant to rule 131 of the rules of civil procedure. The trial court conducted a hearing on
    the Blaylocks’ request for attorney’s fees and costs and rendered its Amended Final Judgment,
    denying the Blaylocks’ request for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 16.034(a)(2) of the civil
    practice and remedies code and denying the Blaylocks’ request for trial court costs.           The
    Amended Final Judgment provides, in pertinent part, that the Blaylocks’ request for trial court
    –2–
    costs is denied “because the Court of Appeals’ mandate makes no reference to the award of trial
    court costs.” 1 The Blaylocks filed this appeal of the trial court’s denial of their request for court
    costs. 2
    Discussion
    In their first issue, the Blaylocks assert the trial court was “without jurisdiction to go
    beyond this Court’s mandate and deny the Blaylocks their trial court costs on appeal.” In their
    second issue, the Blaylocks contend that “[a]ssuming the trial court had jurisdiction,” the trial
    court did not have discretion to deny the Blaylocks their trial court costs because they were
    successful parties in their lawsuit.
    Standard of Review
    An appellate court reviews a trial court’s award of costs for an abuse of discretion.
    Mitchell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
    156 S.W.3d 622
    , 630 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
    Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s assessment of
    costs. 
    Id. To determine
    whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the
    court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles, in other words, whether the act
    was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Downer v. Acquamarine Operators, Inc., 
    701 S.W.2d 238
    ,
    241–42 (Tex. 1985).
    Analysis
    In their first issue, the Blaylocks contend the trial court was without jurisdiction to
    exceed this Court’s prior mandate by denying their trial court costs on remand. Although parties
    and courts sometimes use the term “jurisdiction” to refer to the trial court’s authority on remand,
    1
    This Court’s judgment in the first appeal provides that the Blaylocks recover their costs of that appeal from the Hollands. In its Amended
    Final Judgment, the trial court ordered that “consistent with the Court of Appeals’ mandate,” the Blaylocks recover their costs of that appeal.
    2
    The Blaylocks do not appeal the trial court’s denial of their request for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 16.034 of the civil practice and
    remedies code.
    –3–
    “[i]n doing so . . . they are not referring to the trial court’s constitutional or statutory power to
    conduct the necessary proceedings or to enter a judgment, but are instead referring to the scope
    of the trial court’s authority in exercising that power.” Phillips v. Bramlett, 
    407 S.W.3d 229
    , 234
    (Tex. 2013) (citation omitted). The “issue is whether [a] trial court exceed[s] its authority in
    light of [an appellate] mandate, not whether it act[s] without jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at 243.
    “The
    appellate court’s mandate and judgment do not limit the trial court’s jurisdiction to preside over
    the case and enter a remand judgment, but instead limit the trial court’s authority in exercising
    that jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at 234.
    When an appellate court reverses a lower court’s judgment and
    remands the case to the trial court, as this Court did here, “the trial court is authorized to take all
    actions that are necessary to give full effect to the appellate court’s judgment and mandate.” Id.;
    see also Madeksho v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend, 
    112 S.W.3d 679
    , 686 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“Trial courts retain their constitutional jurisdiction to
    perform duties collateral to and consistent with [appellate] mandates.”).
    Here, the trial court had jurisdiction to conduct the necessary proceedings on remand and
    to enter a judgment consistent with this Court’s mandate. See 
    Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d at 234
    (to
    extent a trial court’s judgment exceeds the requirements of appellate judgment and mandate, trial
    court’s judgment will be reversed for error rather than vacated for lack of jurisdiction).
    Accordingly, we resolve the Blaylocks’ first issue against them.
    In their second issue, the Blaylocks contend the trial court abused its discretion by failing
    to award them, as successful parties, their trial court costs. At the trial court, the Blaylocks
    requested their trial court costs under section 16.034(a)(2) of the civil practice and remedies
    code 3 and under rule of civil procedure 131. On appeal, however, the Blaylocks argue the trial
    3
    Section 16.034(a) provides:
    –4–
    court erred by failing to award their trial court costs under rule 131 because they were the
    successful parties in the lawsuit with the Hollands.
    Rule 131 of the rules of civil procedure provides that “[t]he successful party to a suit shall
    recover of his adversary all costs incurred herein, except where otherwise provided.” TEX. R.
    CIV. P. 131. “Generally, a successful party to a suit is entitled to recover its court costs and fees
    incurred during the lawsuit.” 2920 Park Grove Venture, Ltd. v. LandAmerica Am. Title Co., 05-
    07-00090-CV, 
    2008 WL 650946
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also
    Sparks v. Booth, 
    232 S.W.3d 853
    , 872 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (taxing costs against
    successful party generally contravenes rule 131); City of Houston v. Woods, 
    138 S.W.3d 574
    ,
    581 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (successful party is “one who obtains
    judgment of a competent court vindicating a civil right or claim” (quoting Operation Rescue-
    Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & S.E. Tex., Inc., 
    937 S.W.2d 60
    , 86 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff’d as modified, 
    975 S.W.2d 546
    (Tex. 1998)). For costs to be
    taxed otherwise, the trial court must find good cause and state the reasons on the record. TEX. R.
    CIV. P. 141; see also Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 
    53 S.W.3d 375
    , 376–77 (Tex. 2001);
    
    Sparks, 232 S.W.3d at 872
    (“A trial court’s failure to state on the record a finding of good cause
    to vary from rule 131 constitutes an abuse of discretion.”).
    The appellate court’s mandate is “the official notice of the action of the appellate court,
    directed to the court below, advising it of the action of the appellate court and directing it to have
    In a suit for the possession of real property between a person claiming under record title to the property and one claiming
    by adverse possession, if the prevailing party recovers possession of the property from a person unlawfully in actual
    possession, the court:
    (1) shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if the court finds that the person
    unlawfully in actual possession made a claim of adverse possession that was groundless and made in bad faith; and
    (2) may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in the absence of a finding described by
    Subdivision (1).
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.034(a) (West Supp. 2013). At the hearing on the Blaylocks’ request for attorney’s fees and trial court
    costs, the Blaylocks acknowledged they were not asserting that the Hollands’ claim of adverse possession of the disputed property was
    groundless or made in bad faith under section 16.034(a)(1).
    –5–
    its judgment duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.” Lewelling v. Bosworth, 
    840 S.W.2d 640
    ,
    642 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding). A district court must observe and carry out the
    mandate of the appellate court, and the district court must observe the judgment as it was framed
    by the appellate court. Martin v. Credit Prot. Ass’n, Inc., 
    824 S.W.2d 254
    , 255–56 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.); see also Hudson v. Wakefield, 
    711 S.W.2d 628
    , 630 (Tex.
    1986) (in interpreting the mandate of an appellate court, lower courts should look not only to the
    mandate but also to the opinion of the appellate court).          When an appellate court renders
    judgment, the trial court has “no choice but to perform those ancillary acts necessary to
    implement that judgment and dispose of all matters still pending in the case.” Bayoud v. Bayoud,
    
    797 S.W.2d 304
    , 310 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied); see also 
    Martin, 824 S.W.2d at 256
    ; 
    Madeksho, 112 S.W.3d at 686
    .
    The first appeal in this case resulted in a complete reversal of the trial court’s original
    judgment.    See 
    Blaylock, 396 S.W.3d at 724
    (reversing trial court’s judgment in favor of
    Hollands and rendering judgment in favor of Blaylocks). We remanded the cause to the trial
    court for entry of judgment consistent with our opinion and for consideration of the Blaylocks’
    request for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 16.034. Id.; see also 
    Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d at 237
    (“By remanding the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with our opinion, we
    permitted the trial court to enter a final judgment that reflected this Court’s holding and the court
    of appeals’ holding on punitive damages.”).
    At the hearing on the Blaylocks’ request for attorney’s fees and trial court costs, the trial
    court noted this Court’s mandate did not specifically mention trial court costs. The trial court
    interpreted this Court’s “silen[ce] as to the issue of trial taxable court costs,” as limiting the trial
    court’s authority to award trial court costs. In its Amended Final Judgment, the trial court denied
    the Blaylocks’ request for trial court costs “because the Court of Appeals’ mandate makes no
    –6–
    reference to the award of trial court costs.” The Blaylocks argued at the hearing on their request
    for attorney’s fees and costs that the cause was remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment
    consistent with the court of appeals opinion, and the trial court had authority to award them trial
    court costs as the successful parties under rule 131 of the rules of civil procedure, separate and
    apart from their request for attorney’s fees under section 16.034(a)(1) of the civil practice and
    remedies code. We agree.
    The trial court must observe our judgment and mandate as they are framed. 
    Martin, 824 S.W.2d at 255
    –56. However, the trial court retains its constitutional jurisdiction to perform
    duties collateral to and consistent with our mandate, Madeksho, 112 S.,W.3d at 686, and must
    perform those ancillary acts necessary to implement our judgment and dispose of all matters still
    pending in the case. 
    Bayoud, 797 S.W.2d at 310
    . Awarding the Blaylocks their trial court costs
    is not inconsistent with our prior opinion, judgment, or mandate, 4 and is required by rule 131
    unless the trial court states on the record “good cause” for not awarding costs to the prevailing
    party, which did not occur in this case. As the successful parties, the Blaylocks were entitled to
    recover their trial court costs from their adversaries, the Hollands. Because the Blaylocks were
    successful parties in their lawsuit against the Hollands and “good cause” for not awarding costs
    to them is not stated on the record, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award them
    their trial costs pursuant to rule 131 of the rules of civil procedure. We resolve the Blaylocks’
    second issue in their favor.
    4
    As noted previously, because we reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the Blaylocks, we awarded the
    Blaylocks their appellate court costs. See 
    Blaylock, 396 S.W.3d at 724
    .
    –7–
    Conclusion
    We reverse the trial court’s judgment. We render judgment that the Blaylocks are
    entitled to their trial court costs, and we remand the cause to the trial court for entry of a
    judgment consistent with this opinion.
    /Robert M. Fillmore/
    ROBERT M. FILLMORE
    JUSTICE
    131197F.P05
    –8–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    WILLIAM B. BLAYLOCK AND ELAINE                        On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District
    C. BLAYLOCK, Appellants                               Court, Dallas County, Texas,
    Trial Court Cause No. 09-08910.
    No. 05-13-01197-CV         V.                         Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore,
    Justices Evans and Lewis participating.
    THOMAS P. HOLLAND AND
    KIMBERLY HOLLAND, Appellees
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    REVERSED. Judgment is RENDERED that William B. Blaylock and Elaine C. Blaylock are
    entitled to their trial court costs. This cause is REMANDED to the trial court for entry of a
    judgment consistent with this opinion.
    It is ORDERED that appellants William B. Blaylock and Elaine C. Blaylock recover
    their costs of this appeal from appellees Thomas P. Holland and Kimberly Holland.
    Judgment entered this 14th day of July, 2014.
    –9–