Laura Hall Solomon v. T & M Contractors, Inc. D/B/A T & M Construction ( 2009 )


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  •                          COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 2-09-013-CV
    LAURA HALL SOLOMON                                                  APPELLANT
    V.
    T & M CONTRACTORS, INC.                                               APPELLEE
    D/B/A T & M CONSTRUCTION
    ------------
    FROM THE 48TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    ------------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ------------
    The trial court denied Appellant Laura Hall Solomon’s motion for new trial
    in her negligence suit against Appellee T & M Contractors, Inc. d/b/a T & M
    Construction (“T&M”), and she now appeals. In one issue, Solomon argues
    that the trial court erred by denying her motion for new trial because the jury’s
    1
    … See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We
    disagree, and, accordingly, we affirm.
    Solomon filed suit for damages against the Woods of Bedford, TMG
    Milestone Management, and T&M for injuries she sustained from falling into a
    hole at the Woods of Bedford apartment complex. She claimed that as an
    invitee, she was owed a duty of care by the defendants and that they were
    negligent by (1) creating and maintaining an unreasonably dangerous condition,
    (2) failing to warn her of the dangerous condition, (3) failing to place warning
    signs and barriers around the dangerous condition, (4) failing to correct the
    unreasonably dangerous condition, and (5) failing to properly maintain the
    premises.
    Solomon settled with the Woods of Bedford and TMG Milestone
    Management and proceeded to trial in her suit against T&M. The jury charge
    asked whether T&M and Solomon were negligent, and, if so, what percentage
    of negligence was attributable to each. The charge instructed the jury that
    T&M was negligent with respect to the condition of the premises if the
    condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; it knew or reasonably should
    have known of the danger; and it failed to exercise ordinary care to protect
    Solomon from the danger, by both failing to adequately warn her of the
    condition and by failing to make the condition reasonably safe. The jury was
    2
    further instructed that negligence as to Solomon meant the “failure to use
    ordinary care; that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence
    would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which
    a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar
    circumstances.”
    The jury found Solomon 80% negligent and T&M 20% negligent. The
    trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict, ordering
    that Solomon take nothing. Solomon filed a motion for new trial, which the trial
    court denied.
    Standard of Review
    When the party with the burden of proof appeals from a jury’s failure to
    find, the party must show that the failure to find is against the great weight and
    preponderance of the evidence. 2 A complaint that a jury answer is against the
    overwhelming weight of the evidence must have been raised in a motion for
    new trial.3 We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse
    2
    … Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
    754 S.W.2d 646
    , 651 (Tex. 1988);
    see Herbert v. Herbert, 
    754 S.W.2d 141
    , 144 (Tex. 1988).
    3
    … Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2)–(3); In re M.S., 
    115 S.W.3d 534
    , 547 (Tex.
    2003).
    3
    of discretion.4
    When conducting a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must
    not merely substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.5 The trier of fact
    is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to
    their testimony.6
    Analysis
    Contributory negligence is negligence with a “causal connection with the
    accident that but for the conduct the accident would not have happened,” as
    opposed to negligence that “merely increases or adds to the extent of the loss
    or injury occasioned by another’s negligence.” 7 In Texas, a plaintiff may be
    contributorily negligent and still recover, but not if her percentage of
    responsibility for her damages is greater than 50%.8 The jury “is given wide
    4
    … Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 
    288 S.W.3d 922
    , 926 (Tex. 2009);
    Hogue v. Propath Lab., Inc., 
    192 S.W.3d 641
    , 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    2006, pet. denied).
    5
    … Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 
    116 S.W.3d 757
    , 761 (Tex.
    2003).
    6
    … 
    Id. 7 …
    Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 
    503 S.W.2d 526
    , 528 (Tex.
    1974); see also Young v. Thota, 
    271 S.W.3d 822
    , 829–30 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth 2008, pet. filed) (discussing contributory negligence and causation
    versus exacerbation of injuries).
    8
    … See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.001 (Vernon 2008).
    4
    latitude” in apportioning responsibility for an accident, and even if a different
    percentage could be allocated under the evidence, “an appellate court may not
    substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” 9
    The jury in this case found that both T&M and Solomon were negligent
    and apportioned 80% of the responsibility for the accident to Solomon.10
    Solomon argues that the jury’s finding was against the great weight and
    preponderance of the evidence because T&M failed to take measures to make
    the condition reasonably safe, failed to warn visitors at the complex about the
    dangerous holes by way of barricading the areas, and failed to give any other
    verbal or visual warning.
    At trial, the evidence established that T&M was hired to remove the
    Woods’ previously existing wooden carports and replace them with metal
    carports supported by steel beams. In order to set a new post, T&M would cut
    a 19"–22" square in the concrete and auger a four-foot hole inside the square.
    Upon leaving the work site each evening, T&M employees were supposed to
    9
    … Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 
    89 S.W.3d 643
    , 659 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied).
    10
    … See 
    Kerby, 503 S.W.2d at 528
    ; see also Elbaor v. Smith, 
    845 S.W.2d 240
    , 245 (Tex. 1992) (holding that the trial court should have included
    a requested contributory negligence question in the jury charge because there
    was some evidence that without the plaintiff’s conduct, the complained-of
    injury might not have occurred).
    5
    cover the holes with a four-by-four section of three-quarter-inch thick plywood
    and barricade the area using yellow caution tape and sawhorses or cones. The
    parties introduced conflicting evidence about whether this was properly done.
    Solomon testified that on June 28, 2005, some time after 5:00 p.m., she
    drove to the apartment complex to meet her then boyfriend (now husband),
    daughter, and son-in-law, all of whom lived in the complex. She testified that
    when she arrived at the Woods on the day in question, she noticed that “there
    was some construction project going on” involving the replacement of parking
    spaces. She also testified that even before she arrived at the Woods, she was
    aware that construction would be ongoing because she had seen signs to that
    effect.
    Solomon found an available parking space that was next to the space in
    which her boyfriend had parked his truck. She noticed in the spot a piece of
    plywood with nails sticking out of it.     There were other parking spaces
    available, but Solomon decided to park in the space with the board.        She
    testified that the parking space was not barricaded or taped off. The nails in
    the board were curved, but she believed they could do damage to her tires.
    She “possibly” could have parked in the space without driving over the board,
    but she decided to move the plywood before parking there. She stopped her
    car, got out, and lifted the plywood. Upon doing so, she stepped forward and
    6
    fell into a large hole that had been covered by the plywood, injuring herself. At
    trial, she acknowledged that she was holding the board in such a way that she
    could not see the ground in front of her as she walked. After her accident, she
    did not report what happened to anyone, never asked her boyfriend to report
    it to anyone, and never asked her daughter to report it to anyone.
    Solomon’s husband Jim testified on her behalf.       He stated that after
    Solomon’s accident, he took her to the hospital, and that when he returned,
    someone had covered the hole again with the same plank of wood. He did not
    see any caution tape or barricade marking the area.
    Trey Murchison, the T&M employee in charge of the T&M work crew,
    testified by deposition. He stated that at the end of every work day, he made
    sure that the crew cordoned off any area where holes had been dug and that
    he had checked the area before the crew left that day. Solomon’s attorney
    showed him a photograph taken by Carol Harms, the fiancée of a resident of
    the complex. The photograph showed a parking space with a piece of plywood
    in it that had no barricading or caution tape marking it off. When shown the
    picture, Murchison acknowledged that no barricades were visible in the picture
    but testified that such a hole is still secure as long as the plywood is covering
    it. T&M’s owner, Tim Giles, was also asked about the picture. He stated that
    the only time that the area was not barricaded or taped off was while his crew
    7
    was working. He asserted that Harms’s picture showed no barricades or tape
    because it was taken while the crew was there working.
    Murchison further testified that on the day of Solomon’s injury, he
    received a call from Giles telling him that someone had reported an accident.
    He testified that he met the apartment complex maintenance man, Brian James,
    and the two men inspected the area where holes had been dug that day and
    found no uncovered holes and no evidence of an accident. When he went to
    the site, he saw that the barricades, cones, and plywood were all still in place.
    Lisa Crumpton, the community director of the Woods, testified that on
    the day of Solomon’s accident, a contractor in the complex to do countertop
    refinishing came into the office and mentioned an accident had occurred out on
    the property. He did not give an exact location or name of the injured person.
    Based on that report, Crumpton went out onto the property to see where the
    accident might have happened, but she did not see anyone or any problem.
    She called James and someone with T&M to report the possibility of an
    accident.   She testified that no one ever contacted the office to report
    Solomon’s accident.    She further stated that she periodically inspected the
    property during the time construction was ongoing and that she never saw any
    areas that should have been barricaded but were not.
    8
    James testified that he and Murchison inspected the area after learning
    that an accident had occurred and that he did not see any holes uncovered. He
    further testified that he had never seen any areas that had not been properly
    cordoned off during the time of the construction. He testified that there were,
    however, some holes in the street, that those were covered with plywood, and
    that some of those did not have barricades.
    Tommy Woodell, a former resident of the Woods, and Harms, his fiancée,
    testified by deposition. Woodell testified that he is involved in his own lawsuit
    resulting from injuries he allegedly suffered from falling into a hole in the
    parking lot two days before Solomon’s accident. Both Woodell and Harms
    testified that Woodell was injured when the two attempted to move a piece of
    plywood in a parking space with nails sticking out of it. Both testified that it
    was next to a space in which a neighbor with young children often parked, and
    that because they did not want anyone to get hurt by the nails, they decided
    to move the board.     Harms testified that the area with the board was not
    surrounded by barricading or caution tape. When Woodell lifted the board and
    took a step forward, he fell into the hole that the board had been covering.
    Harms admitted that Woodell had been drinking before his accident.
    Harms testified that the next day, she went out to the work crew and told
    the person pointed out to her as the foreman about what happened. She did
    9
    not describe Woodell’s injuries but did tell the person that Woodell had fallen
    into a hole. She testified that the man must have heard her because she was
    about four or five feet away but that he only stared at her and did not say
    anything to her. That same day, Harms took photographs of the hole in which
    Woodell allegedly fell, the board that had been covering it, and the area around
    it. She took pictures of the work crew about a week later.
    Both Harms and Woodell testified that they were aware of the work being
    done in the parking lot. Woodell testified that some areas were barricaded but
    that the area of the plywood-covered hole in which he injured himself was not
    barricaded or taped off. Harms also testified that the area was not barricaded.
    Woodell’s accident occurred on a Sunday, and he could not say whether tape
    had been up around the area earlier in the day or if someone had removed the
    tape. When asked if he would have stepped in the hole if he had not removed
    the plywood, Woodell responded, “There would be no way to fall in the hole if
    you didn’t move the plywood.”
    In Murchison’s deposition testimony, he denied that Harms told him about
    Woodell’s accident, testifying that he was not made aware of an incident taking
    place on June 26, 2005, until he received a call from Crumpton informing him
    that the apartment complex had received a letter from an attorney representing
    Woodell. Murchison testified that the company did not use plywood with nails
    10
    in it to cover holes and that he had never seen plywood with nails in it covering
    a hole at the job site. Murchison was shown a picture, taken by Harms, of a
    piece of plywood covering one of the holes, and the plywood had nails in it.
    Harms identified the board in the picture as the one that Woodell had moved.
    Murchison testified that he never saw such a board covering any of the holes,
    and if he had, he would not have allowed it because of the potential damage
    to his equipment.     When asked by T&M’s attorney, he agreed that the
    photograph did not show whether any of the nails actually protruded through
    the board.
    Solomon’s boss, Dr. Martin Wax, testified that she called him sometime
    after her accident to tell him about her injury and that she would not be coming
    into work the next day. He testified that she described what had happened as
    getting out of her car and “not hav[ing] solid ground where she exited”; that it
    was “a footing issue”; and that she never told him that she lifted a board and
    stepped into an exposed hole.
    The dangerous condition was the hole. A question at trial was whether
    T&M had taken steps to make the condition reasonably safe. T&M contended
    that it used new pieces of plywood to cover the holes and that it barricaded the
    area surrounding the hole. It also contended that even without barricades, the
    hole was safe as long as the board was covering it. Woodell supported that
    11
    claim when he admitted that there would be no way to fall in the hole without
    moving the board.
    Solomon argued that the hole was not made safe by T&M’s efforts
    because the area was not barricaded and the plywood had nails in it. But it
    was not the nails themselves that caused Solomon’s injury. Rather, it was her
    decision to move the board because of the nails so that she could park in the
    space where the board was located. She admitted at trial that other parking
    spaces were available and that if she had been worried about driving over nails
    in the board, she could have parked elsewhere without having to move the
    board. The picture of the nail-ridden board that Solomon used to show the
    reasonableness of her actions was taken the day before Solomon’s accident,
    did not show nails protruding through the board, and was not established as
    being the same board later covering the hole that caused her injury. Solomon
    acknowledged that it was possible that she could have parked in the space
    without driving over the board; rather than attempt it, she made the decision
    to move the board. Both Woodell and Solomon testified that they would not
    have fallen if they had not moved the boards covering the holes. The jury also
    heard Solomon agree with the statement of T&M‘s attorney that when she
    picked up the board, she held it in such a way that it obstructed her view of
    12
    where she was walking and that “it’s a good idea to be able to see where you
    are going and know where you are stepping before you start walking.”
    Solomon seems to argue that T&M should have known that covering the
    hole with a board with nails in it was not enough to make the area safe because
    by the time of her accident, another person had been injured when he
    attempted to move a board with nails in it, and T&M had been informed of the
    problem. Thus, T&M should have known that covering the holes with a board
    with nails would create a condition that could lead to injury. But even assuming
    that such knowledge would make T&M more negligent than Solomon, the jury
    heard conflicting testimony about what T&M knew and when, and the jury was
    free to accept one version and disregard another.        And although Solomon
    contends that T&M made the condition of the hole more dangerous because a
    person like her would see nails protruding from the board and believe that it
    constituted a dangerous condition for everyone at the complex, the evidence
    does not support a finding that she acted out of concern that third parties might
    be injured. Her professed concern was for her tires.
    The jury—the sole judge of the credibility of testifying witnesses 11 —heard
    conflicting evidence about whether T&M properly barricaded parking areas
    11
    … Golden Eagle 
    Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761
    .
    13
    where work was being done and whether it used new plywood or reused old
    plywood with protruding nails. From the evidence at trial, the jury could have
    concluded that although T&M should have done a better job with safety
    measures and was negligent in its failure to do so, Solomon would not have
    been injured absent her own negligence and that she was primarily responsible
    for her accident.   The jury could have believed, based on the evidence
    presented, that Solomon was aware of construction going on involving work on
    the parking spaces, that she had other parking spaces available to her, that the
    board was not dangerous to drive over, that if she had not taken it upon herself
    to move the board, she could not have fallen in the hole, and that she could
    have avoided the accident by watching her step. Its finding was not so against
    the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly
    unjust. 12 We overrule Solomon’s sole issue.
    Having overruled Solomon’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    PER CURIAM
    PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
    DELIVERED: December 31, 2009
    12
    … See 
    Rosell, 89 S.W.3d at 659
    (noting that jury has wide latitude in
    apportioning responsibility for an accident).
    14