in Re Filemon Martinez, Jr., Relator ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-14-00343-CV
IN RE FILEMON MARTINEZ, JR., RELATOR
OPINION ON ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
October 6, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Relator, Filemon Martinez, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting
this Court to order the “64th District [Court] of Swisher County [ ] [T]exas to enter an
order on applicant’s application for forensic DNA testing sent to the convicting court on
June 27 of 2014.” We deny the petition.
First, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3 identifies the requirements for a
petition for writ of mandamus filed in this Court. Rule 52.3(k)(1)(A) provides that the
appendix to a petition for writ of mandamus must contain a certified or sworn copy of
any order complained of or any other document showing the matter complained of.
Martinez has appended only an unsworn and non-certified copy of a motion requesting
forensic DNA testing. Nothing indicates that the motion was even filed.
Also lacking is compliance with other aspects of Rule 52. For instance, Martinez’
application contains no identity of the parties and counsel, table of contents, index of
authorities, statement of the case, or statement of the issues presented. Rule 52.3
requires one seeking extraordinary relief, such as a writ of mandamus, to include those
matters in his petition. And, that Martinez may be acting pro se does not relieve him of
complying with the rules of procedure. Holt v. F.F. Enters., 990 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
Additionally, nothing of record indicates that the motion purportedly filed below
was brought to the attention of the district court. Simply put, before mandamus relief
may issue, the petitioner must establish that the district court 1) had a legal duty to
perform a non-discretionary act, 2) was asked to perform the act, and 3) failed or
refused to do it. O’Connor v. First Court of Appeals, 837 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. 1992); In
re Chavez , 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). Given
this, it is encumbent upon Martinez to illustrate that the district court received and was
aware of his motion. This is so because a court cannot be faulted for doing nothing
when it is or was unaware of the need to act. Filing something with the district clerk
does not mean the trial court knows of it, nor is the clerk’s knowledge imputed to the
trial court. In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228. Thus, Martinez must prove that the trial
court received notice of the pleading. Id.
Here, the record simply indicates that Martinez’ motion was served on Brenda
Hudson at the courthouse in Tulia, Texas, by mail, and again, there is no indication it
was ever filed with the trial court or the district clerk. Whether the trial court was ever
made aware of it is unknown. Lacking that information, we cannot simply assume that
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the district court knew of its duty to act and neglected to perform it. Thus, Martinez has
not fulfilled his burden to illustrate that the trial court refused to act.
Next, and assuming arguendo that a pleading is brought to the attention of a
district court, the latter has a duty to consider and act upon it. In re Bates, 65 S.W.3d
133, 134-35 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d
682, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). This is so because the task
of considering it is ministerial. In re Bates, 65 S.W.3d at 134-35; Safety-Kleen Corp. v.
Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding), quoting
O’Donniley v. Golden, 860 S.W.2d at 269-70. However, the court has a reasonable
time within which to act. In re Bates, 65 S.W.3d at 135. And, whether that period
lapsed is dependent upon the circumstances of each case. Id. In other words, no
bright line demarcates the boundaries of a reasonable time period. Id. Many indicia are
influential, not the least of which are the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motion, its
overt refusal to act on same, the state of the court’s docket, and the existence of other
judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first. Id. So too must the
trial court’s inherent power to control its own docket be included in the mix. In re Bates,
65 S.W.3d at 135; see Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 694-695
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that a court has the inherent authority
to control its own docket). Since the latter power is discretionary, Hoggett v. Brown, 971
S.W.2d 472, 495 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied), we must be wary
of interfering with its exercise without legitimate basis. And, since the party requesting
mandamus relief has the burden to provide us with a record sufficient to establish his
right to same, Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992); In re Bates, 65
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S.W.3d at 135, Martinez had the obligation to provide us with a record establishing that
a properly filed motion has awaited disposition for an unreasonable length of time. He
has not done that. Instead, the record merely illustrates that Martinez mailed his motion
on June 27, 2014. And, because we do not hold that the district court’s failure to act
upon a motion about which it may have no knowledge constitutes unreasonable delay
per se, Martinez again has not satisfied his burden of proof.
Finally, because Martinez requests that we “grant” his writ of mandamus and
allow him relief “from confinement and [an] illegal sentence, and charge,” he is asking
that we order the trial court to rule a certain way. That we cannot do. A district court
may be compelled to consider and rule on a pending motion presented to the court.
See Simon v. Levario, 306 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Mandamus relief,
however, will not issue to compel the court to rule in a particular way on a pending
motion. Id.; White v. Reiter, 640 S.W.2d 586, 593-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
For the foregoing reasons, Martinez’ petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
Per Curiam
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