Anson Dujuan Grissom v. State ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00164-CR
NO. 02-14-00165-CR
NO. 02-14-00166-CR
ANSON DUJUAN GRISSOM APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1300502D, 1300503D, 1300504D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Anson Dujuan Grissom entered an open plea of guilty to three
first-degree-felony offenses: (1) burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit
an aggravated sexual assault; (2) aggravated sexual assault using a knife; and
(3) aggravated robbery using a knife. The trial court assessed punishment at
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
forty-five years’ imprisonment for each offense and ordered that the sentences
run concurrently.
Grissom’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet
the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See
386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel
notified Grissom of his motion to withdraw, provided him a copy of the brief,
informed him of his right to file a pro se response, provided him a form motion for
pro se access to the appellate record that lacked only Grissom’s signature and
the date, provided instructions to file the pro se form within ten days and gave
him this court’s address, and informed him of his pro se right to seek
discretionary review should this court hold the appeal to be frivolous. See 436
S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only
then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with
counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in
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the record that arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Grissom has filed a pro se letter in
which he argues in one point that his sentence is excessive. We overrule this
argument because it is unpreserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Means v.
State, 347 S.W.3d 873, 874 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (“Because
Appellant did not object to his sentences when they were imposed or present his
motions for new trial to the trial court, he failed to preserve his sentencing
complaints for appellate review.”); Laboriel-Guity v. State, 336 S.W.3d 754, 756
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d).
We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, overrule appellant’s one pro se
issue, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 30, 2015
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