Ashton Harry Matthews v. State , 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6861 ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00428-CR
ASHTON HARRY MATTHEWS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 53745-B
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OPINION
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A jury convicted Appellant Ashton Harry Matthews of assault of a public
servant and assessed his punishment at five years’ confinement and a $2,500
fine. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. In his sole issue, Appellant
contends that the trial court reversibly erred by instructing the jury on a partial
definition of “reasonable doubt.” Because the trial court did not reversibly err, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
At trial, Appellant properly and timely objected to the partial Geesa
instruction. 1 The proper analysis of his complaint, then, is governed by Almanza
v. State: 2 If error exists in the jury charge and if proper objection was made to
the erroneous instruction, we must reverse if Appellant suffered any harm. 3
Appellant asks this court to reconsider our decision in Vosberg v. State, 4 in which
we held that the instruction—“It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt
beyond all possible doubt. It is required that the prosecution’s proof exclude[] all
‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the defendant’s guilt”—is not a definition of
reasonable doubt but “merely notes that reasonable doubt does not mean
possible doubt.” 5 In Vosberg, we held that the trial court did not commit error in
giving that instruction. 6 We did not hold, and we do not now hold that giving such
an instruction is a wise thing for trial courts to do. But, under existing law and on
this record, we must hold that it was not error to give the charge in this case.
1
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled
by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
2
686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g).
3
Id.
4
80 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d).
5
Id.
6
Id.
2
Indeed, in abrogating Geesa, 7 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
specifically stated, “We find that the better practice is to give no definition of
reasonable doubt at all to the jury.” 8 Nevertheless, this court has held that
instructing the jury what the term “reasonable doubt” does not mean is not
providing a definition of what the term does mean. 9 Applying this subtle logic to
the distinction between instructions, and following our precedent, we overrule
Appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and SUDDERTH, JJ.
LIVINGSTON, C.J., and SUDDERTH, J., concur without opinion.
PUBLISH
DELIVERED: July 2, 2015
7
820 S.W.2d at 161.
8
Paulson, 28 S.W.3d at 573.
9
Vosberg, 80 S.W.3d at 324.
3