Ghaffer, Alma Munoz ( 2015 )

PD-0589-15
PD-0589-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 5/15/2015 12:52:08 PM
Accepted 5/15/2015 2:16:22 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
No. PD-- - - - - - - CLERK
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellant
v.
ALMA MUNOZ GHAFFER
Appellee
From the Court of Appeals
For the Twelfth District at Tyler
Cause number 12-14-00190-CR
APPELLEE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appeal from the County Court at Law Number Five of Collin County,
the Honorable Dan K. Wilson, Judge Presiding
KYLE SHAW
shawlaw@sbcglobal.net
1333 W. McDermott, Suite 200
McKinney, Texas
Tel: 214-726-0088 May 15, 2015
Fax: 214-387-3353
State Bar No. 24004917
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTIFICATION OF
PARTIES ....................................................................................... 3
INDEX OF
AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... 4
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .................................... 5
STATEMENT OF THE
CASE ........................................................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................... 6
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW ........................................................................................ 7
A local police department's policy should not confer jurisdiction upon its
magistrate to issue a blood draw warrant for a crime over which the
magistrate and his county would, otherwise, have absolutely no jurisdiction.
Based on the facts presented in the record, did the court of appeals err in
finding that a Dallas magistrate had jurisdiction to issue a blood draw
warrant for an individual whose presence in Dallas County was solely as the
result of the decision of the arresting officer and for no stated purpose other
than policy, despite the crime and the arrest occurring in Collin County,
Texas?
REASONS FOR REVIEW .................................................................. 7
STATEMENT OF
FACTS .......................................................................................... 8
ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 10
The Twelfth Court of Appeals erred in finding that presence of a person
within a county, alone, is enough to confer jurisdiction on a Magistrate to
issue and effectuate a blood draw warrant. Based on the facts presented, the
Twelfth Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the Dallas magistrate had
jurisdiction to issue a blood draw warrant for Appellee where (1) Appellee
I
was arrested in Collin County, (2) the offense occurred in Collin County,
and (3) the only reason Appellee was present in Dallas County was because
of the arresting officer's decision and pursuant to alleged police department
policy. In doing so, the court of appeals created a per se rule wherein mere
presence, without consideration of other circumstances, is enough to confer
jurisdiction on a magistrate for search warrant purposes. Such a rule flies in
the face of the opposition to forum shopping, appears contrary to other case
law regarding blood draw warrants, and allows for the circumvention of
jurisdictional limits.
CONCLUSION.............................................................................. 15
PRAYER FOR
RELIEF ......................................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................ .17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................... 17
2
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
Parties: Counsel:
The State of Texas Greg Willis
Collin County Criminal District Attorney
John R. Rolater, Jr.
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Chief of Appellate Division
Calli D. Bailey
Assistant District Attorney
Trial Counsel
Appellate Counsel
Collin County District Attorney's Office
2100 Bloomdale Road, Suite 200
McKinney, Texas 75071
ALMA MUNOZ KYLE SHAW
GHAFFER 1333 W. McDermott, Suite 200
McKinney, Texas
Tel: 214-726-0088
Fax: 214-387-3353
State Bar No. 24004917
shawlaw@sbcglobal.net
HANNAH STROUD
Co-Counsel
Philips & Epperson Attorneys, LP
2301 Virginia Parkway
McKinney, Texas 75071
hstroud@philipsandepperson.com
Judge: Court:
The Hon. Dan K. Collin County Court at Law No. 5
Wilson Presiding Judge
Collin County, Texas
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITES
STATUTES
Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(a) ...................................................................... 7
Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(b )...................................................................... 7
Tex. Trans. Code §724.011 ................................................................ 13
CASES
Bitner v. State, 135 S.W.3d 906, 908-09
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd) ....................................... 11
Gilbert v. State, 439 S.W.2d 783
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ............................................................ 11
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013)
(citations removed) ................................................................. 14
Sanchez v. State, 365 S.W.3d 681, 686
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ........................................................ 11, 12
State v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2014, no pet. h.) ........................................ 14
State v. Ghaffer, No. 12-14-00190-CR, 2015 WL 1735560
(Tex. App.-Tyler March 15, 2015)
(not designated for publication) ................................................. 6, 12
Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, pet. granted) .................................. .13
4
No. PD-_ _ _ _ _ __
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.
ALMA MUNOZ GHAFFER
APPELLEE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
COMES NOW, Appellee, by and through her counsel, KYLE SHAW and
co-counsel, HANNAH STROUD, and respectfully urges this Court to grant
discretionary review of the above-named cause.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is requested in this matter. The issue before the Court is a
matter of first impression and the Court would benefit from further oral argument
in addition to the petition presented.
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Alma Munoz Ghaffer (Appellee) was charged with driving while
intoxicated. CR 5. Appellee filed a motion to suppress challenging the validity of
the warrant that allowed for the blood draw. CR 9-12. The trial court granted
Appellee's motion to suppress. CR 13. The state appealed the decision and the
Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting the
suppression. State v. Ghaffer, No. 12-14-00190-CR, 2015 WL 1735560 (Tex.
App.-Tyler March 15, 2015) (not designated for publication). Appellee herein
files her Petition for Discretionary Review.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals issued its opinion on March 15, 2015,
reversing the trial court's decision. Ghaffer, 2015 WL 1735560. Appellee herein
timely files her Petition for Discretionary Review.
Pursuant to a docket equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of
Texas on June 23, 2014, this appeal was transferred to the Twelfth Court of
Appeals from the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas, Texas.
6
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A local police department's policy should not confer jurisdiction upon its
magistrate to issue a blood draw warrant for a crime over which the magistrate and
his county would, otherwise, have absolutely no jurisdiction. Based on the facts
presented in the record, did the court of appeals err in finding that a Dallas
magistrate had jurisdiction to issue a blood draw warrant for an individual whose
presence in Dallas County was solely as the result of the decision of the arresting
officer and for no stated purpose other than policy, despite the crime and the arrest
occurring in Collin County, Texas?
REASONS FOR REVIEW
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
state or federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Court of
Criminal Appeals. Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(b).
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
state law in a way that conflicts with decisions of other courts of appeals. Tex. R.
App. P. 66.3(a).
7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The court of appeal's opinion omitted some important facts that Appellee
fleshes out below.
While in Collin County, Texas, Appellee was arrested for the offense of
driving while intoxicated. RR 9. The offense occurred in Collin County but
within the city limits of Dallas. RR 11, 22. The arresting officer was aware that
the offense had occurred in Collin County and that charges would be filed in
Collin County. RR 22-23. Despite this, Appellee was transported to Lew Sterrett
Jail, in Dallas County. RR 12-13. The decision to take Appellee to Lew Sterrett
and, therefore, to Dallas County, was based on department policy. RR 11, 22. The
arresting officer also cited issues with obtaining a blood draw in a timely fashion
as a reason for taking all individuals arrested in the City of Dallas (regardless of
the county that the offense/arrest actually occurred in), to Lew Sterrett and,
therefore, to Dallas County. RR 15. The arresting officer, however, did not
provide specific issues with regards as to obtaining Appellee's blood in a timely
fashion. RR 15.
8
The testimony of the sole witnesss did not address whether Appellee was
read her rights, pursuant to Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
although this matter was argued by the State's attorney. RR 28. The testimony of
the sole witness did not address whether exigent circumstances existed such that
Appellee could not be taken to Collin County and booked in to the appropriate jail.
9
ARGUMENT
1. A local police department's policy should not confer jurisdiction upon
its magistrate to issue a blood draw warrant for a crime over which the
magistrate and his county would, otherwise, have absolutely no
jurisdiction. Based on the facts presented in the record, did the court of
appeals err in finding that a Dallas magistrate had jurisdiction to issue
a blood draw warrant for an individual whose presence in Dallas
County was solely as the result of the decision of the arresting officer
and for no stated purpose other than policy, despite the crime and the
arrest occurring in Collin County, Texas?
The Twelfth Court of Appeals erred in finding that presence of a person
within a county, alone, is enough to confer jurisdiction on a Magistrate to issue
and effectuate a blood draw warrant. Based on the facts presented, the Twelfth
Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the Dallas magistrate had jurisdiction to
issue a blood draw warrant for Appellee where (1) Appellee was arrested in Collin
County, (2) the alleged offense occurred in Collin County, and (3) the only reason
Appellee was present in Dallas County was because of the arresting officer's
decision and pursuant to alleged police department policy.
In doing so, the court of appeals created a per se rule wherein mere
presence, without consideration of other circumstances, is enough to confer
jurisdiction on a magistrate for search warrant purposes. Such a per se rule flies in
the face of the opposition to forum shopping, appears contrary to other case law
regarding blood draw warrants, and allows for the circumvention of jurisdictional
limits.
10
Initially, Appellee notes that the issue presented herein is one of first
impression. While various cases address jurisdictional issues pertaining to
issuance of search warrants, no case addresses the exact fact pattern presented
here:
• Sanchez v. State, 365 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012): whereby
this Court held that a "statutory county court judge lacks jurisdiction to issue
a search warrant [for a blood draw] to be executed outside of his own
county," or "for an individual 'to be found in'" another county. Sanchez,
365 S.W.3d at 686. The facts of Sanchez differ in that the person was
located outside of the judge's county. However, alike this case, the offense
and arrest occurred outside of the judge's county.
• Gilbert v. State, 439 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973): whereby this
Court held that a justice of the peace, when acting as a magistrate, has
jurisdiction to issue a search warrant within his county but outside of his
city limits. Gilbert, 493 S.W.2d at 784. The Gilbert facts differ from this
case in that the offense took place within the magistrate's county and,
further, that the item to be searched was within the same county. Id.
• Bitner v. State, 135 S.W.3d 906, 908-09 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet.
refd): holding that a County Justice of the Peace "was authorized to sign the
search warrant for property located in [her] County even though she [the
magistrate] personally was outside her geographical jurisdiction when she
signed the search warrant." Again, the facts presented here differ from this
case, in that the offense occurred within the magistrate's county and the
property to be searched was also within the magistrate's county: the only
issue was the absence of the magistrate from the county.
No case has been located to address the facts of this case: the search of a person
located within a magistrate's county but where the offense and arrest occurred
outside of the county and, further, where the only reason for the person's presence
in the magistrate's county is because of police policy.
11
The opinion of the court of appeals was limited in its analysis, ultimately
founding its decision on a misreading of Sanchez. In Sanchez, this Court held that
a county court judge cannot issue a blood draw warrant for someone outside of
their county. Sanchez, 365 S.W.3d at 686. Based upon this, the court of appeals
held that the opposite must always be true. State v. Ghaffer, No. 12-14-00190-CR,
2015 WL 1735560, at *2 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Apr. 15, 2015) (finding that a
"statutory county court judge's jurisdiction, therefore, is determined by where the
search warrant is to be executed, not by where the offense occurred.") In making
this decision the court of appeals failed to acknowledge the different fact pattern
presented in Appellee's case, the public policy issues presented, and the ongoing
changes to blood-draw case law.
Appellee was in Dallas County at the time the warrant was issued, for one
reason - because she was transported there by the arresting officer, based upon
police department policy. While the arresting officer cited general concerns as to
obtaining a blood draw in a timely fashion, the record did not support a finding
that this was a specific concern in Appellee's case. In other words, based on the
record before the trial court and the court of appeals, the only reason for
Appellee's presence in Dallas County was a per se "rule" that all parties arrested
in the City of Dallas must be taken to Lew Sterrett's jail, regardless of any other
circumstances.
12
Analogizing this case to the facts presented in Weems, and sister courts
facing similar facts, helps to amplify the argument that a police department policy
cannot allow for a per se rule that permits arresting officers to confer jurisdiction
on their local magistrates for cases that they would not, otherwise, have
jurisdiction over. Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2014, pet. granted).
The Court will be familiar with the facts of Weems, a petition for
discretionary review having been granted in August, 2014. To summarize,
however, the Weems defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. at
657. After the defendant refused to provide a breath or blood specimen, he was
"transported to the hospital, and a mandatory blood draw was taken." The
arresting officer did not attempt to obtain a warrant. Id. at 658. As with several
other decisions from its sister courts, the San Antonio court of appeals, held that
"the implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutory scheme found in the
Transportation Code [Tex. Trans. Code §724.011] are not exceptions to the
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 665. In other words, a
statute cannot provide a per se rule that permits circumvention of the Fourth
Amendment. Similarly, a police department policy should not provide a per se
rule that allows circumvention of jurisdictional powers.
13
To further the analogy, Appellee points to State v. Anderson, wherein the
Beaumont court of appeals addressed the similar issue of warrantless blood draws.
State v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2014, no pet. h.). Of
import to this case, the court of appeals found that "advances in technology and
procedure now allow officers-often coordinating directly with prosecutors and
the court-to obtain warrants in an expedited fashion. Moreover, circumstances
may indicate that an officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is
being transported." Id. at 903 (citing to Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552,
1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (citations removed). In other words, given the
advances in technology, and changes to the manner in which a blood draw warrant
can be obtained, time considerations alone do not permit a warrantless blood draw.
The same can be said of Appellee's case, wherein part of the reasoning behind the
Dallas police department's policy is the alleged difficulty in obtaining blood draw
warrants from out of county.
The court of appeal's decision allows for a rule whereby mere presence,
alone, grants a Magistrate jurisdiction to issue a search warrant. The court of
appeals erred in generating such a broad rule and, in doing so, generates long term
effects for all forms of other criminal cases.
14
CONCLUSION
To conclude, to permit an arresting officer to take an arrestee to a county jail
of the officer's choice, based upon alleged department policy, does nothing more
than create a per se rule allowing for forum shopping and the circumvention of
basic jurisdictional powers. The presence of Appellee in Dallas County was solely
based upon the decision of the arresting officer. The court of appeals erred in
failing to take note of this distinction and in presuming that Appellee's presence in
the county, alone, provided the Magistrate jurisdiction to issue a blood draw
warrant.
PRAYER
The court of appeals erred in overturning the trial court's decision to grant
Appellee's motion to suppress. Appellee respectfully requests that the Court grant
this petition, set the case for submission, reverse the decision of the Twelfth Court
of Appeals, and remand the cause for consideration of any remaining points of
error.
15
Respectfully submitted,
KYLE SHAW
1333 W. McDermott, Suite 200
McKinney, Texas
Tel: 214-726-0088 .
Fax: 214-387-3353
/s/ Kyle Shaw
Kyle Shaw
Attorney for Appellee
State Bar No. 24004917
shawlaw@sbcglobal.net
Hannah Stroud
Co-Counsel for Appellee
State Bar No. 24069426
hstroud@philipsandepperson.com
16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
True copies of Appellee's Petition for Discretionary Review has been
served on opposing counsel, Greg Willis, District Attorney's Office, Collin
County Courthouse, 2100 Bloomdale Road, Suite 200, McKinney, Texas 75071 on
May 15, 2015, by first-class mail and fax, and to the Honorable Lisa McMinn,
State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 13046, Capital Station, Austin, Texas
78711-3046, on May 15, 2015.
Isl Kyle Shaw
Kyle Shaw
Attorney for Appellee
Hannah Stroud
Co-Counsel for Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the work limitations in Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.4(i)(2). In reliance on the word county of the computer program used
to prepare this brief, the undersigned attorney certifies that this brief contains
l, 780 words, exclusive of the sections of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1 ).
Isl Kyle Shaw
Kyle Shaw
17
APPENDIX
Opinion of the Twelfth Court of Appeals
N0.12-14-00190-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPEAL FROM THE
APPELLANT
v. § COUNTY COURT
ALMA MUNOZ GHAFFER,
APPELLEE § COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
The State of Texas appeals the trial court's grant of Alma Munoz Ghaffer's motion to
suppress evidence. In two issues, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting
Appellee's motion to suppress. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
Appellee was involved in a collision in Collin County within the Dallas city limits.
Officer Tyler Prothro of the Dallas Police Department arrested her there for driving while
intoxicated. He then transported her to Lew Sterrett jail in Dallas County. Officer Prothro
testified that it is the department's policy to transport arrestees for any crime other than public
intoxication or warrants to that facility.
Appellee refused to provide a sample of her breath or blood. Officer Prothro prepared an
affidavit for a search warrant and presented it to the Honorable Hal Turley, a Dallas County
magistrate assigned to work in the Lew Sterrett jail. The magistrate signed the search warrant to
obtain a blood sample from Appellee in Dallas County. A sample was then obtained at the Lew
Sterrett jail.
1 Pursuant to a docket equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas on June 23, 2014, this
appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas, Texas.
Appellee was charged by information with driving while intoxicated. She filed a motion
to suppress certain evidence, including her blood. At the suppression hearing, the arguments
were limited to ones regarding the validity of the search warrant for Appellee's blood. After
hearing evidence, the trial court granted the motion and made express findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Among these were the conclusions that ( 1) the jurisdiction of a magistrate is
limited to the county or district of the court that appointed him, (2) the magistrate in this case had
the statutory authority to issue a blood search warrant for offenses occurring within Dallas
County, and (3) the magistrate in this case lacked jurisdiction to issue the search warrant for
Appellee's blood.
This appeal followed.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In its first issue, the State argues that the magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the search
warrant for Appellee's blood draw because Appellee was located in the county of the
magistrate's office when he signed the warrant and when the search was conducted. In its
second issue, the State contends that even if the magistrate lacked authority to issue the warrant,
the blood evidence should not be suppressed because Officer Prothro acted in good faith reliance
on a warrant based on probable cause.
Standard of Review and Governing Law
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v. State, IO
S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Shepherd v. State, 273
S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We give almost total deference to a trial court's
determination of historical facts, especially if those determinations tum on witness credibility or
demeanor, and review de novo the trial court's application of the law to facts not based on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). When deciding a motion to suppress evidence, a trial court is the exclusive trier of fact
and judge of the witnesses' credibility. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). Accordingly, a trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of a
witness's testimony. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
2
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The nonconsensual extraction of blood implicates privacy rights and
falls within the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Sanchez v. State, 365 S.W.3d 681, 684
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966)). Although a blood draw constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment, the Constitution will not be offended if the draw occurs pursuant to a valid search
warrant. Sanchez, 365 S.W.3d at 684.
Under the code of criminal procedure, any magistrate who is an attorney licensed by this
state may issue a search warrant under Article 18.02(10) to collect a blood specimen from a
person who is arrested for driving while intoxicated and refuses to submit to a breath or blood
alcohol test. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.0lG) (West Supp. 2014). This provision does
not speak to the magistrate's jurisdiction, but confers only the specific power articulated.
Sanchez, 365 S.W.3d at 687 n.6 .
.Jurisdiction of Magistrate to Issue Search Warrant
We are asked to determine whether the search warrant, issued by a Dallas County
magistrate for execution in Dallas County, was valid for the blood draw in Dallas County. We
have not been directed to, nor have we found through our independent research, any authority to
support that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant. Although the trial court cited
Sanchez in its conclusions of law, that case does not support the trial court's conclusion that a
magistrate's jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for blood is determined by the county in which
the offense occurred.
In Sanchez, a Montgomery County statutory county court judge issued a search warrant
for blood to be executed in Harris County. Id. at 683. The appellant challenged the judge's
jurisdiction to do so. Id. at 684. In its analysis, the court of criminal appeals noted that statutory
county court judges are omitted from the listing of judicial positions having statewide authority
found in Article 1.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 686. It thus held that "[a]
statutory county court judge lacks jurisdiction to issue a search warrant to be executed outside of
his own county." Id. A statutory county court judge's jurisdiction, therefore, is determined by
where the search warrant is to be executed, not by where the offense occurred. See id.
Here, the Dallas County magistrate issued a search warrant to be executed in Dallas
County. Like statutory county court judges, magistrates have not been given statewide authority
3
by the legislature. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.23 (West 2005). But unlike the
search warrant in Sanchez, the search warrant here was executed in the.magistrate's own county.
We conclude that the magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the search warrant for blood to be
executed in the county of his office.
Appellee urges that the magistrate's jurisdiction was affected by the fact that she was in
Dallas County only because of Dallas Police Department policy. She claims that finding the
search warrant valid will allow the State to benefit by disregarding the law. Thus, she implicitly
avers that her transportation from one county to the next was illegal unless it was for the purpose
of providing her with her statutory warnings more expeditiously. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. arts. 14.06(a) (West Supp. 2014) (person arrested without order must be taken before any
magistrate of the county, or magistrate of another county to provide warnings more
expeditiously), 15.17(a) (West Supp. 2014) (same). She notes that there is no evidence in the
record that her transportation to Dallas County expedited her warnings. However, the issue of
where Appellee should have received her statutory warnings was not addressed at the
suppression hearing. Furthermore, Appellee cites no authority for the proposition that a violation
of Articles 14.06(a) and 15.17(a) renders a magistrate without jurisdiction to issue a search
warrant for blood to be executed in his own county. We conclude that Appellee's argument is
without merit.
Having given due deference to the trial court's ruling, we hold that the trial court erred by
granting Appellee's motion to suppress based upon the magistrate's lack of jurisdiction to issue
the search warrant for Appellee's blood. Accordingly, we sustain the State's first issue. Because
we conclude that the magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the warrant, we do not address the
State's second issue regarding the good faith exception.
DISPOSITION
Having sustained Appellant's first issue, we reverse the trial court's order granting the
motion to suppress.
BRIAN HOYLE
Justice
Opinion delivered April 15, 2015.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
4