Michael Brent Brown v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-15-00042-cr
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
6/22/2015 1:51:02 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
No. 01-15-00042-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
FOR THE FIRST SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1st COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
OF TEXAS, AT HOUSTON
6/22/2015 1:51:02 PM
***********************************
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
MICHAEL BRENT BROWN,
Appellant,
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee,
***********************************
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY
260 TH AND 163 RD JUDICIAL DISTRICTS, CAUSE NO. B-140,443-R
HONORABLE BUDDIE J. HAHN AND DENNIS POW ELL, JUDGES PRESIDING
***********************************
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
***********************************
Submitted by:
CHRISTINE R. BROWN-ZETO
Attorney at Law
1107 Green Avenue
Orange, Texas 77630
Telephone: (409) 886-8558
Telecopier: (409) 883-6523
State Bar # 03102200
Attorney for Appellant
crbrownzeto@sbcglobal.net
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
No. 01-15-00042-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TEXAS, AT HOUSTON
***********************************
MICHAEL BRENT BROWN,
Appellant,
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee,
***********************************
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY
260 TH AND 163 RD JUDICIAL DISTRICTS, CAUSE NO. B-140,443-R
HONORABLE BUDDIE J. HAHN AND DENNIS POW ELL, JUDGES PRESIDING
***********************************
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
***********************************
Submitted by:
CHRISTINE R. BROWN-ZETO
Attorney at Law
1107 Green Avenue
Orange, Texas 77630
Telephone: (409) 886-8558
Telecopier: (409) 883-6523
State Bar # 03102200
Attorney for Appellant
crbrownzeto@sbcglobal.net
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES
In order that members of the Court may determine disqualification or recusal
pursuant to TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 131(a), Appellee
certifies that the following is a complete list of the parties and persons interested in
the outcome:
(a) MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, Appellant;
(b) Christine R. Brown-Zeto, counsel for Appellant on appeal;
(c) W ILLIAM MARCUS W ILKERSON, counsel for Appellant at trial;
(d) Krispin W alker, counsel for Appellee at trial; and
(d) The State of Texas, Appellee.
SIGNED this 22 ND day of June, 2015.
/S/ Christine R. Brown-Zeto
CHRISTINE R. BROWN-ZETO
Attorney for Appellant
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
LIST OF AUTHORITIES iii
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2-5
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 5-9
POINTS OF ARGUMENT 9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 9-10
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
POINT 1: THE APPELLANT W AS NOT GRANTED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 6 TH
AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
10-15
PRAYER 16
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 18
ii
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Celestine v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 353, 356 (5 th Cir. 1984) 13
Mooney v. State, 817 S.W .2d 693, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) 10, 11
Smith v. State, 894 S.W .2d 876 (Tex. Ct. App. - Amarillo [1995]). 13, 14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 10,11,
12,13,
15
Wilkerson v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1065 (5 th Cir. 1992) 13
Will. v. State, 798 S.W .2d 368, 370 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1990) 13
Winn v. State, 871 S.W .2d 756 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi [1993]) 12
Rules and Statutes
iii
No. 01-15-00042-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TEXAS, AT HOUSTON
***********************************
MICHAEL BRENT BROWN,
Appellant,
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee,
***********************************
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY
260 TH AND 163 RD JUDICIAL DISTRICTS, CAUSE NO. B-140,443-R
HONORABLE BUDDIE J. HAHN AND DENNIS POW ELL, JUDGES PRESIDING
***********************************
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
***********************************
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant, MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, Defendant in Cause Number B-
140,443-R in the 260 TH District Court and 163 RD District Court of Orange County,
Texas does respectfully submit this brief to appeal the conviction and sentence
entered against him in this matter by the Appellee, THE STATE OF TEXAS. For the
1
purpose of judicial economy Appellant presents this combined brief for both causes
of action.
For the Convenience of the Court, reference to the Parties is by "Appellant"
and "Appellee."
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument in the event that this Court of Appeals feels
that oral argument would further aid them in their determination.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, was charged in Cause number B-
140,443-R with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance in that, on or
about March 18, 2014, and before the presentment of this indictment, in the County
and State aforesaid, did then and there intentionally and knowingly possess a
controlled substance, to wit: Amphetamine, in an amount by aggregate weight
including adulterants and dilutants, of one gram or more but less than four grams
And the Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present
that prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense by the MICHAEL BRENT
BROW N, to wit: on March 13, 1986, in the 163 RD District Court of Orange County,
Texas, in cause number B-850245 on the docket of said Court, the said MICHAEL
BRENT BROW N, under the name of Michael Brent Brown, was duly and legally
convicted in said last named court of a felony, to wit: Delivery of a Controlled
2
Substance, upon an indictment then legally pending in said last named court and of
which said court had jurisdiction; and said conviction was a final conviction and was
a conviction for an offense committed by the said MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, prior
to the commission of the offense hereinbefore charged against him as set forth in the
first paragraph hereof;
And the Grand Jurors aforesaid do further present that prior to the commission
of the aforesaid offense by the said MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, to wit: September
1, 1977, in the 128TH District Court of Orange County, Texas, in cause number A-
9095 on the docket of said court, the said MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, under the
name of Michael B. Brown, was duly and legally convicted in the same named court
of a felony, to wit: Aggravated Rape, upon an indictment then legally pending in the
last named court and of which said court had jurisdiction; and said conviction was
a final conviction and was a conviction for an offense by the said MICHAEL BRENT
BROW N prior to the commission and conviction of the offense hereinbefore charged
against him in the second paragraph hereof, and said conviction set for the in this
paragraph was prior to the commission of the offense set forth in the first paragraph
hereof
against the peace and dignity of the State.
On September 26, 2014, there was an announcement for the Appellant to
announce what he wanted to do in the presentence. (Supp. R.R. I) The case was
reset in order for some investigation to be done on an affidavit from a third party who
3
was claiming possession of the drugs involved in the case. (Supp. R.R. I, pp. 4-5)
The parties were reconvened on October 10, 2014 where it was discussed that the
charge without enhancements carried a punishment of 2-10 years in prison. (Supp.
II, pp. 4-6) W ith enhancements, the Appellant faced a punishment range of 25-99
years or life in prison for the offense charged. (Supp. II, pp 6-8). There was a plea
bargain offer of 5 years imprisonment in TDC offered to the Appellant which he
rejected. (Supp. R.R. II, pp. 8-9).
On October 31, 2014, the 260 TH District Court heard the Appellant's plea of
guilty to the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance. (R.R. II, pp. 4). The
Court additionally took the Appellants pleas of true to the enhancement paragraphs.
(R.R. II, pp. 4-5). The Court then admonished the Appellant of the range of
punishment being a term of 25 to 99 or life imprisonment. (R.R. II, pp. 6, 8). It was
an open plea and reset for a contested sentencing. (R.R. II, pp. 6-7) The court found
the Appellant guilty on October 31, 2014 and recessed the matter to get a
Presentence Investigation Report from the probation department. (R.R III, pp.8-9).
The punishment phase of the trial then went forward on December 11, 2014.
(R.R. III). The Court assessed punishment at life imprisonment in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division. (R.R. III, pp. 63-64). On
December 16, 2014, the Court signed the judgment sentencing the Appellant to life
Imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice- Institutional Division.
(C.R. I, pp. 26-28).
4
A Motion for New Trial was filed on December 16, 2014. (C.R. I, pp.29-31).
A hearing was held on the Motion for New Trial on February 10, 2015. (Supp. III).
The Court denied the Appellant’s Motion for New Trial on February 10, 2015. (C.R.
I, pp. 49).. On December 16, 2014 a Notice of Appeal was filed. (C.R. I, pp. 32-33).
It is from this disposition that Appellant Appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant, MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, was charged in Cause number B-
140,443-R with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance in that, on or
about March 18, 2014, and before the presentment of this indictment, in the County
and State aforesaid, did then and there intentionally and knowingly possess a
controlled substance, to wit: Amphetamine, in an amount by aggregate weight
including adulterants and dilutants, of one gram or more but less than four grams.
And the Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present
that prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense by the MICHAEL BRENT
BROW N, to wit: on March 13, 1986, in the 163 RD District Court of Orange County,
Texas, in cause number B-850245 on the docket of said Court, the said MICHAEL
BRENT BROW N, under the name of Michael Brent Brown, was duly and legally
convicted in said last named court of a felony, to wit: Delivery of a Controlled
Substance, upon an indictment then legally pending in said last named court and of
which said court had jurisdiction; and said conviction was a final conviction and was
a conviction for an offense committed by the said MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, prior
5
to the commission of the offense hereinbefore charged against him as set forth in the
first paragraph hereof;
And the Grand Jurors aforesaid do further present that prior to the commission
of the aforesaid offense by the said MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, to wit: September
1, 1977, in the 128 TH District Court of Orange County, Texas, in cause number A-
9095 on the docket of said court, the said MICHAEL BRENT BROW N, under the
name of Michael B. Brown, was duly and legally convicted in the same named court
of a felony, to wit: Aggravated Rape, upon an indictment then legally pending in the
last named court and of which said court had jurisdiction; and said conviction was
a final conviction and was a conviction for an offense by the said MICHAEL BRENT
BROW N prior to the commission and conviction of the offense hereinbefore charged
against him in the second paragraph hereof, and said conviction set for the in this
paragraph was prior to the commission of the offense set forth in the first paragraph
hereof
against the peace and dignity of the State.
On September 26, 2014, there was an announcement for the Appellant to
announce what he wanted to do in the presentence. (Supp. R.R. I) The case was
reset in order for some investigation to be done on an affidavit from a third party who
was claiming possession of the drugs involved in the case. (Supp. R.R. I, pp. 4-5)
The parties were reconvened on October 10, 2014 where it was discussed that the
charge without enhancements carried a punishment of 2-10 years in prison. (Supp.
6
II, pp. 4-6) W ith enhancements, the Appellant faced a punishment range of 25-99
years or life in prison for the offense charged. (Supp. II, pp 6-8). There was a plea
bargain offer of 5 years imprisonment in TDC offered to the Appellant which he
rejected. (Supp. R.R. II, pp. 8-9).
On October 31, 2014, the 260 TH District Court heard the Appellant's plea of
guilty to the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance. (R.R. II, pp. 4). The
Court additionally took the Appellants pleas of true to the enhancement paragraphs.
(R.R. II, pp. 4-5). The Court then admonished the Appellant of the range of
punishment being a term of 25 to 99 or life imprisonment. (R.R. II, pp. 6, 8). It was
an open plea and reset for a contested sentencing. (R.R. II, pp. 6-7) The court found
the Appellant guilty on October 31, 2014l and recessed the matter to get a
Presentence Investigation Report from the probation department. (R.R III, pp.8-9).
The punishment phase of the trial then went forward on December 11, 2014.
(R.R. III). After much discussion, the Appellant turned down a cap of 60 years in
order to be able to have the right to appeal his sentence. (R.R. III, pp. 4-7). There
were simply three witnesses to testify at the sentencing phase of the trial. The state
introduced different recordings from the jail of phone calls and visits with the
Appellant discussing the drugs he was charged with and getting people to take the
charges. (R.R. IV, Exhibit 3).
Michael Brent Brown had been on parole for 19 years before this charge had
arisen. (R.R. III, pp.16). During his time on parole, Mr. Brown had not failed any
7
urinalysis tests and worked mainly in the plants doing construction. (R.R. III, pp. 16).
The Appellant admitted he was selling synthetic marijuana. (R.R. III, pp. 24-25). He
supported his girlfriend’s drug habit by selling drugs. (R.R. III, pp. 32-33). Mr. Brown
was trying to get someone else to admit whose drugs the drugs were because they
were not his drugs and the whole thing backfired on him. (R.R. III, pp. 43-44). He just
knew he needed statements that the drugs were someone else’s drugs. (R.R. III, pp.
47).
Essie Bellfield had known Mr. Brown since he was a little boy. (R.R. III, pp.
49). He was helping her around the house picking up things and with her
decorations. (R.R. III, pp. 49-50). There were things for Michael Brown to do at the
church. (R.R. III, pp. 50). Mr. Brown could have been an asset to the community if
he was given an opportunity to be placed on probation. (R.R. III, pp. 51-52).
The state argued for a harsh sentence on the upper range of the scale. (R.R.
III, pp. 56). The Appellant’s counsel incorrectly argued that the adulterants and
dilutants in the drugs should bring the offense down to a state jail offense. (R.R. III,
pp. 56-57). The Court let counsel know that this argument made no sense. (R.R. III,
pp. 58).
The Court assessed punishment at life imprisonment in the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice- Institutional Division. (R.R. III, pp. 63-64). On December 16,
2014, the Court signed the judgment sentencing the Appellant to life Imprisonment
8
in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice- Institutional Division. (C.R. I, pp. 26-
28).
A Motion for New Trial was filed on December 16, 2014. (C.R. I, pp.29-31).
A hearing was held on the Motion for New Trial on February 10, 2015. (Supp. III).
The Appellant had been given the advice by counsel prior to his plea that he could
argue adulterants and dilutants at sentencing to bring the range of punishment down
to a state jail. (Supp. R.R. III, pp. 6-8). If he had not believed he could make this
argument, he would not have pled guilty. (Supp. R.R. III, pp. 8).
The Court denied the Appellant’s Motion for New Trial on February 10, 2015.
(C.R. I, pp. 49).. On December 16, 2014 a Notice of Appeal was filed. (C.R. I, pp.
32-33). It is from this disposition that Appellant Appeals.
POINTS OF ARGUMENT
POINT 1: THE APPELLANT WAS NOT GRANTED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 6 TH
AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant complains of one thing upon appeal. The Appellant was granted
ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case trial counsel had his client to plea to
a case involving a range of punishment of 25 to 99 or life. But the Appellant was
given the idea if he did that his lawyer could get the range of punishment changed
by arguing the issue of adulterants and dilutants. It was obvious from the record that
9
Counsel thought he could do this and that the Appellant thought he could do this. He
would not have pled if he had not thought this was a possibility. He was given bad
advice plain and simple. He had a right to effective assistance of counsel and did not
get it in this matter.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT 1: THE APPELLANT WAS NOT GRANTED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 6 TH
AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
Appellant would show the Court that Appellant did not have effective
assistance of counsel at trial as is provided for in the 6 th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Appellant retained W illiam Marcus W ilkerson Campbell as his attorney
in September of 2014. (C.R. I, pp. 8). Mr. W illiam Marcus W ilkerson represented
Mr. Brown throughout the trial. (RR. II-III). It was on appeal that present counsel
took over. (C.R. p. 4; R.R. III, pp. 65; R.R. Supp. R.R. III).
The standard for reviewing a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel was set out
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). The Court stated the Appellant must prove: (1) that counsel's performance
was deficient; and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense. (466
U.S. at 687 [1984]).
To meet the first prong of the test in Strickland, the Appellant must show that
there was a deficiency in the counsel's performance. In Mooney v. State, the Court
of Criminal Appeals required the appellant's allegation to demonstrate how counsel
10
erred. 817 S.W .2d 693, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In Mooney, the Court found
the appellant had not demonstrated in what ways counsel had erred in preparation,
presentation, and investigation. id. at 697.
On October 31, 2014, the Court heard the Appellant's plea of guilty to the
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance and true to the two enhancement
allegations before recessing the matter for a contested sentencing. (R.R. II, pp. 4-6).
The sentencing phase of the trial commenced on December 11, 2014. (R.R. III).
To meet the first prong of the test in Strickland, the Appellant must show that
there was a deficiency in the counsel's performance. In Mooney v. State, the Court
of Criminal Appeals required the appellant's allegation to demonstrate how counsel
erred. 817 S.W .2d 693, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In Mooney, the Court found
the appellant's allegation hadn't demonstrated in what ways counsel had erred in
preparation, presentation, and investigation. id. at 697.
A reasonably prudent attorney would have learned the range of punishment
and the law on how to argue that range of punishment. Obviously, W illiam Marcus
W ilkerson thought he could argue for a state jail punishment on a 25 to 99 or life
imprisonment case. (R.R. III, pp. 56-58). Even the court told counsel if that was true
then he is not guilty of what he pled to. (R.R. III, pp.57). This is what the Appellant
expected that he could do if he pled guilty. (Supp. R.R. III, pp. 6-7). This was the
advice he obtained from counsel. It is undisputable. He was told they could argue
that the weight of the drugs was from fillers which could bring the offense down to
11
a state jail offense. (Supp. R.R. III, pp. 6-7). If he had not thought he had a chance
to try and reduce the sentence he would not have pled guilty. (Supp. R.R. III, pp. 8).
This is definitely harmful error and should be reversible. Mr. W illiam Marcus
W ilkerson should have properly prepared and known the law on the issue of
sentencing during this case. Mr. Brown would have been entitled to a new trial with
someone who is properly prepared to advise him on the law in this the matter so he
can make a knowing and voluntary entering of any decision he makes. In Winn v.
State, the Court of Appeals determined that counsel was ineffective for failing to
procure expert medical testimony that was consistent with the defense theory of
suicide. 871 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi [1993]).
The facts are simple here. All defendants are entitled to be given competent
advice by counsel who know the law on a subject they have investigated and
prepared their case for trial. This didn’t occur in this case. Counsel was not prepared
on the issue of sentencing and in fact gave the Appellant inaccurate advice on the
law to get him to plead guilty. The case was set for a jury trial and the Appellant had
wanted a jury trial up until this point. But thinking he could get a chance to reduce
his sentence by arguing adulterants and dilutants at sentencing, he pled guilty.
(Supp. R.R. III, pp. 6-8). He was informed that if this occurred, he would be looking
at a state jail felony. (Supp. R.R. III, pp. 8-9).
W hen he realized he advised the Appellant incorrectly, there is nothing in the
record that shows that he attempted to stop the proceedings and make the court
12
aware of the situation. (Supp. R.R. III). If the Appellant had been allowed the
opportunity to withdraw his plea at this time due to the incorrect advice, this could
have been avoided. But that didn’t occur. It is clear that the Court thought Counsel
was making an absurd argument. (R.R. III, pp. 56-58). Counsel should have
attempted to fix his error. Instead it just got worse and the Appellant ended up with
a life sentence. It couldn’t get much worse. Counsel's failure to properly advise the
Appellant on this matter greatly hindered the Appellant taking away the real
voluntary nature of his plea in this matter and this led to harmful error and was such
deficient performance as to meet the first prong set forth in Strickland.
In the years since the Strickland decision, Texas courts have defined the
scope of the definition in Strickland. This Court in Williams v. State stated that the
Appellant is required to show that but for counsel's performance, the result would
have been different. 798 S.W .2d 368, 370 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1990) citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (1984). In addition the Fifth Circuit stated an appellant
cannot "simply allege but must 'affirmatively prove' prejudice." Wilkerson v.
Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1065 (5th Cir. 1992) citing Celestine v. Blackburn, 750
F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1984).
Any defendant is entitled to a defense put on that is adequately investigated
and presented. This notion is basic to the notion that defendant is entitled to a fair
trial. More and more courts are finding ineffective assistance of counsel where
there is a clear lack of preparation or investigation. The Court in Smith v. State,
13
found ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to interview or present
witnesses to the events resulting in the charges. 894 S.W .2d 876 (Tex. Ct. App. -
Amarillo [1995]). The Appellant's case was not properly presented. Mr. W illiam
Marcus W ilkerson did not properly advise the Appellant of the law on sentencing so
that he could make his decision on which way to proceed knowingly. This made his
plea involuntary. The State should not benefit from the ineffective counsel the
Appellant was given.
The sentencing facing the Appellant in this matter was 25 -99 or life
imprisonment. There was no way around that. For counsel to lead the Appellant into
thinking he could get the punishment range down from this range is just ineffective.
It rises to the level of making the Appellant’s plea involuntary. He went into the plea
thinking that even though the Court told him the range of punishment, his counsel,
who is supposed to be able to rely on, is telling him, we can argue for lesser time so
plea. And that is wrong advice. It is obvious by the tongue lashing given to the
defense counsel by the Court during sentencing. This is what Counsel was
attempting to do. He couldn’t have been more wrong and advised the Appellant
more incorrectly. Because of this, the Appellant did not understand the
consequences of his plea. And there is no doubt that the Appellant had ineffective
representation. The Appellant has made his prima facie showing that he did not
understand the consequences of his plea.
14
There is a reasonable probability that, but for this omission, the result would
have been different as provided for in Strickland. 446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This
omission prejudiced the Appellant. This matter should be sent back for a complete
new trial.
15
PRAYER
W HEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully prays that
the Honorable First Court of Appeals reverse the decision of the 260 TH and 163 RD
Judicial District Courts of Orange County and order that the sentence be vacated
and a new trial be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Christine R. Brown-Zeto
CHRISTINE R. BROWN-ZETO
Attorney at Law
1107 Green Avenue
Orange, Texas 77630
Telephone: (409) 886-8558
Telecopier: (409) 883-6523
State Bar # 03102200
Attorney for Appellant
crbrownzeto@sbcglobal.net
16
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
"Appellant's Brief" was this day hand delivered, mailed postage pre-paid or
transmitted via telecopier (fax) to Krispin W alker, Orange District Attorney's Office,
Orange County Courthouse, 801 Division St., Orange, Texas 77630, Attorney of
record for Appellee.
SIGNED this 22 ND day of June, 2015.
/s/ Christine R. Brown-Zeto
CHRISTINE R. BROWN-ZETO
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
"Appellant's Brief" was this day hand delivered, mailed postage pre-paid or
transmitted via telecopier (fax) to MICHAEL BRENT BROW N., # 1978080, Hospital
Galveston, P.O. Box 48, Substation #1, Galveston, TX 77555, Appellant in the above
referenced cause.
SIGNED this 22 ND day of June, 2015.
/s/ Christine R. Brown-Zeto
CHRISTINE R. BROWN-ZETO
17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this Brief is in compliance with Appellate Rule 9.4 in that
it is does not exceed the maximum allowance of words allowed. The number of
words in this document are 4333.
SIGNED this 22 ND day of June, 2015.
/s/ Christine R. Brown-Zeto
CHRISTINE R. BROWN-ZETO
18