in Re Reliable Commercial Roofing Services, Inc. ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                 ACCEPTED
    01-15-00450-CV
    FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    6/29/2015 9:54:53 AM
    CHRISTOPHER PRINE
    CLERK
    No. 01-15-00450-CV
    IN THE                         FILED IN
    1st COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST COURT OF APPEALS                 HOUSTON, TEXAS
    6/29/2015 9:54:53 AM
    at Houston, Texas            CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
    Clerk
    IN RE RELIABLE COMMERCIAL ROOFING SERVICES, INC.,
    Relator
    From the 125th District Court of
    Harris County, Texas
    RELATOR’S REPLY TO REAL PARTY IN INTEREST’S RESPONSE TO
    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
    RAMSEY & MURRAY, P.C.
    Mark Ramsey
    Texas Bar No. 16521700
    Wayne Walters
    Texas Bar No. 24029333
    800 Gessner, Suite 250
    Houston, Texas 77024-4239
    Tel. 713/613-5400
    Fax 713/613-5414
    ATTORNEYS FOR RELATOR,
    RELIABLE COMMERCIAL
    ROOFING
    SERVICES, INC.
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................... 3
    ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 4
    PRAYER ....................................................................................................... 10
    CERTIFICATION ........................................................................................ 11
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................... 12
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................ 12
    2
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 204 .............................................................................................8,9,10
    CASES
    In re Ten Hagen Excavating, Inc., 
    435 S.W.3d 859
    , 866 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014,
    orig. proceeding) ......................................................................................... 5,8,9,10
    In re Transwestern Publishing Company, L.L.C., 96 S.W.3rd 501 (Tex.App.—Fort
    Worth 2002, orig. proceeding) .............................................................................8,9
    In the interest of N.R.C. and L.A.C., 
    94 S.W.3d 799
    (Tex.App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2002, pet.denied) .........................................................................................10
    Sherwood Lane Assoc. v. O'Neill, 
    782 S.W.2d 942
    (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.]
    1990, orig. proceeding) .....................................................................................4,5,6
    3
    No. ____________
    IN RE RELIABLE COMMERCIAL ROOFING SERVICES, INC.,
    Relator
    RELATOR’S REPLY TO REAL PARTY IN INTEREST’S RESPONSE TO
    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Relator, RELIABLE COMMERCIAL ROOFING SERVICES, INC.
    (“Reliable”), submits this reply to the response filed by Kenneth Presson, the Real
    Party in Interest (“Presson”), to Reliable’s petition for writ of mandamus pending
    before the Court.
    II. ARGUMENT
    A. Fundamental Fairness and the Right to Discovery
    Presson argues in his Response that, because the treating physicians he
    identified “might” be asked to testify at trial, but have not yet been retained as
    experts, the “fundamental fairness” doctrine proposed by this Court in the
    Sherwood Lane decision somehow does not apply to Reliable’s request for a
    medical exam. In Sherwood Lane, this Court stated as follows:
    The movant must demonstrate that the information sought [through
    the exam] is required to obtain a fair trial and therefore necessitates
    intrusion upon the privacy of the person he seeks to have
    examined…If, however, a plaintiff intends to use expert medical
    testimony to prove his or her alleged…condition, that condition is
    placed in controversy and the defendant would have good cause for an
    examination…
    4
    Sherwood Lane Assoc. v. O'Neill, 
    782 S.W.2d 942
    , 945 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Presson does not state in his response that he has no
    intention to use expert medical testimony to prove his condition. Without a doubt
    this is Presson’s intention. Because Presson clearly intends to use expert medical
    testimony to prove his alleged condition, Reliable has good cause for its requested
    medical exam under Sherwood Lane.
    The trial court’s action in denying the motion for medical examination
    severely restricts Reliable’s opportunity to discovery facts that may contradict
    those of the Plaintiff’s treating physicians. See 
    Id. Importantly, as
    this Court has
    previously held:
    The ultimate purpose of discovery is to seek the truth, so that disputes
    may be decided by what the facts reveal, not by what facts are
    concealed.…Fundamental fairness dictates that relators’ [physician]
    be allowed to examine the [plaintiff]; otherwise, relators will be at a
    severe disadvantage in the “battle of experts.”
    
    Id. Stated another
    way by another court in considering an exam request: “A denial
    of discovery goes to the heart of a party’s case when the party is prevented from
    developing essential elements of its claim or defense.” In re Ten Hagen
    Excavating, Inc., 
    435 S.W.3d 859
    , 863-64 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014).
    B. Trial Court’s Ruling
    Presson further argues in his Response that the trial court made a factual
    finding that Reliable did not meet its burden of showing good cause, thus denying
    5
    Reliable’s request for a medical exam. However, the basis for the trial court’s
    erroneous ruling is nowhere in the record and there is no indication of any factual
    finding by the trial court with regard to Reliable’s request for medical exam. [See
    Tabs E and H to Reliable’s Petition.] It must be presumed that the trial court based
    its decision on Presson’s “less intrusive means” argument, because this is the only
    argument asserted in Presson’s responses at the trial court level. [See Tabs D and G
    to Reliable’s Petition.] The trial court abused its discretion because, despite
    Reliable’s showing of good cause under controlling case law, the trial court
    arbitrarily and erroneously denied its request for a medical exam.
    C. Relevant Examination, Nexus Between Exam and Condition
    Presson further argues in his Response that Reliable’s argument in this
    mandamus proceeding is somehow deficient because its briefing does not show
    that the requested examination will lead to relevant information or that there is a
    nexus between a condition Presson asserts and the examination Reliable seeks.
    This argument is disingenuous at best, given the timing of the argument at this
    stage of the proceeding when it was not made by Presson at the trial court level.
    Reliable’s Motion for Medical Examination at the trial court level clearly
    addresses the “relevance” and “nexus” elements. [See Tab C to Reliable’s
    Petition.] However, Presson did not argue (in responding to either Reliable’s
    motion for medical exam or Reliable’s motion for reconsideration) that either the
    6
    relevancy of the exam or the nexus between the exam and Presson’s condition(s)
    was in issue. [See Tabs D and G to Reliable’s Petition.] As stated previously,
    Presson’s argument in opposition to the requested exam was limited to the “less
    intrusive means” argument.
    D. Potentially “Favorable” Information Available from
    Treating Providers Does not Preclude Exam
    Presson further argues in his Response that Reliable’s request for a medical
    exam is somehow weakened by the fact that there may be some information in
    Presson’s medical records which “Reliable could well find favorable and use at
    trial.” No authority was cited and no authority exists to support this argument.
    Along the same lines, Presson also argues that, because “favorable” information
    may be found in the medical records, “[t]here is no reason to compel Mr. Presson
    to undergo additional exams so as to obtain what could be the exact same
    testimony.” This argument presumes that Presson knows the results of the
    examination before it is performed. However, if the requested medical exam were
    to be conducted, such an exam may result in information that Presson could also
    “well find favorable and use at trial.” Again, this argument is presented by Presson
    without any legal authority to support it.
    To the extent that the opinions of the treating medical providers identified as
    “potential” testifying experts may be found to undermine Presson’s claims, this
    would have no bearing on whether Reliable is entitled to the requested medical
    7
    exam. As suggested in Presson’s response, one such treating provider, psychologist
    Dr. Francisco Perez, has opinions which may tend to “undermine” Presson’s
    claims. This suggestion might be more meaningful if Reliable had requested an
    examination by a psychologist. In that scenario, it might be valid for Presson to
    argue that Reliable has access to the “favorable” results of a psychological exam
    and, therefore, should not be entitled to another psychological exam. However,
    Reliable has requested a neurological examination to be performed by neurologist
    Raymond Martin, M.D. Dr. Martin can opine as to the physical injury to Mr.
    Presson’s head and the effects of that injury, whereas Dr. Perez, a Ph.D.
    psychologist is unqualified to give an opinion as to the physical injury or the
    physical impairment alleged by Presson in this lawsuit.
    E. Application of Rule 167a versus Rule 204.1
    Presson further argues that there is a meaningful distinction between the
    language of former Rule 167a and the current Rule 204.1 in how courts should
    consider the “good cause” requirement in requests for medical exams. Presson
    seems to assert that Rule 204.1 has a more stringent requirement for courts to
    analyze and apply the “good cause” requirement.                 Presson references
    Transwestern and Ten Hagen (notably, Fort Worth and Dallas cases, respectively),
    both of which involved requests for exams under the current Rule 204.1, ostensibly
    to show that the Plaintiff’s use (or intended use) of medical experts is insufficient
    8
    under Rule 204.1 to show good cause, absent satisfaction of the three-part “good
    cause” test.
    Here, it is important to reiterate that the only “good cause” element
    challenged by Presson in the trial court pleadings is the “less intrusive means”
    element. Further, as set forth in Reliable’s Petition, Transwestern and Ten Hagen,
    both support Reliable’s position. In Transwestern, the Fort Worth Court of
    Appeals found that the information sought by way of the requested exam could not
    be obtained by less intrusive means because, absent the exam, the defendant’s
    experts would be limited to a review of the plaintiff’s records and the testimony of
    the plaintiff’s experts. In re Transwestern Publishing Company, L.L.C., 96
    S.W.3rd 501, 508 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2002, orig. proceeding).
    In Ten Hagen, the court considered all three elements of the “good cause”
    test and found that good cause existed to allow the requested exam. Notably, the
    court considered the “less intrusive means” element and found that, although there
    are “a number of avenues that could…potentially provide less intrusive means for
    obtaining medical information without an examination…[t]he adequacy of these
    measures must still be evaluated in light of the fair trial standard.” In re Ten
    Hagen Excavating, Inc., 
    435 S.W.3d 859
    , 869-70 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014). That
    court went on to state:
    In general, and particularly where the intended examination is not
    intrusive, invasive or unnecessarily physically uncomfortable, parties
    9
    are permitted to explore matters not covered by the opposing party's
    examinations, make their own observations, and attempt to discover
    facts that may contradict the opinions of the opposing party's expert
    witnesses.
    
    Id. at 870
    As is also set forth in Reliable’s Petition, the 14th Court of appeals in
    Houston (applying Rule 204.1) held that a trial court abused its discretion in
    denying a motion for an independent psychological examination, finding that
    “good cause for a psychological examination is established where the petitioner
    intends to use expert medical testimony to prove a fact in controversy.”      In the
    interest of N.R.C. and L.A.C., 
    94 S.W.3d 799
    , 815 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2002, pet. denied).   It does not appear that this Houston court decision was
    considered in Presson’s Response.
    PRAYER
    For these reasons and as set forth more fully in Relator’s Petition for Writ of
    Mandamus, Relator asks that the Court issue a writ of mandamus directing Judge
    Carter to vacate his orders of February 27 and May 5, 2015 and to enter an order
    granting Relator’s Motion for Medical Examination of the Plaintiff.
    10
    Respectfully submitted,
    RAMSEY & MURRAY, P.C.
    By:__________________________
    Mark Ramsey
    SBOT No. 16521700
    Wayne Walters
    SBOT No. 24029333
    800 Gessner, Suite 250
    Houston, Texas 77024
    Phone: (713) 613-5400
    Fax: (713) 613-5414
    Attorneys for Relator,
    RELIABLE COMMERCIAL
    ROOFING ERVICES, INC.
    CERTIFICATION
    I certify that I have reviewed the petition and have concluded that every
    factual statement made in the petition is supported by competent evidence included
    in the appendix to the Petition for Writ of Mandamus or in the record.
    ________________________
    Wayne Walters
    11
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft
    Word 2013 and contains 1556 words, as determined by the computer software’s
    word-count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in TRAP
    9.4(i)(1).
    ________________________
    Wayne Walters
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that, on the 29th day of June, 2015, I served electronically and/or by
    certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of this document on the following
    parties:
    a.    Kurt B. Arnold, Caj D. Boatright and Cesar Tavares, ARNOLD & UITKIN
    LLP, 6009 Memorial Drive, Houston, Texas 77007.
    b.    The Honorable Kyle Carter, Judge of the 125th District Court of Harris
    County, Texas, 201 Caroline, 10th Floor, Houston, Texas 77002
    ________________________
    Wayne Walters
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-15-00450-CV

Filed Date: 6/29/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016