John Briggs v. Washington Federal F/K/A Washington Federal Savings ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
05-15-00834-cv
FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
12/16/2015 3:57:56 PM
LISA MATZ
CLERK
NO. 05-15-00834-CV
__________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
5th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS
FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 12/16/2015 3:57:56 PM
DALLAS, TEXAS LISA MATZ
Clerk
__________________________________________________________________
JOHN BRIGGS,
Appellant,
v.
WASHINGTON FEDERAL,
Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas
Cause No. DC-14-08367
Hon. Phyllis Lister Brown, Presiding
__________________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLEE WASHINGTON FEDERAL
__________________________________________________________________
BRITTANI WILMORE ROLLEN
State Bar No. 24036046
brollen@mcdonaldlaw.com
RUSSELL A. DEVENPORT
State Bar No. 24007109
rdevenport@mcdonaldlaw.com
KATHY M. KASSABIAN
State Bar No. 24077807
kkassabian@mcdonaldlaw.com
MCDONALD SANDERS, P.C.
777 Main Street, Suite 1300
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Telephone: 817-336-8651
Facsimile: 817-334-0271
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant is:
JOHN DAVID BRIGGS PRO SE
P.O. Box 360686
Dallas, Texas 75336
(214) 683-4887
Appellee is represented in this matter by:
BRITTANI WILMORE ROLLEN APPELLATE COUNSEL
State Bar No. 24036046
RUSSELL A. DEVENPORT TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL
State Bar No. 24007109
KATHY M. KASSABIAN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL
State Bar No. 24077807
McDONALD SANDERS,
A Professional Corporation
777 Main Street, Suite 1300
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Telephone: (817) 336-8651
Facsimile: (817) 334-0271
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL I
TABLE OF CONTENTS II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES IV
RECORD REFERENCES V
STATEMENT OF THE CASE VI
ISSUES PRESENTED VII
INTRODUCTION 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
Note Default and Foreclosure 1
Forcible Detainer Action 4
Briggs’s Motion to Vacate 5
John Briggs’s First Bankruptcy 5
Frances Briggs’s Bankruptcy 6
John Briggs’s Second Bankruptcy 6
Lawsuit Against Bankruptcy Court 6
John Briggs’s Bill of Review 7
Renewed Writ of Possession 7
Unserved Action in 162nd District Court 7
First Eviction Attempt and Samuel Gross’s Bankruptcy 8
Johnathon David’s Bankruptcy 9
Franesha’s Bankruptcy 9
Finding of Bad Faith and Abuse 10
Second Eviction Attempt and Subsequent Re-Entry 10
Washington Federal Files Instant Suit 11
Unserved Action in 14th District Court 11
All Three Open Cases are Consolidated 12
Final Judgment entered 12
ii
Defendants Held in Contempt 13
Defendants Apply for a TRO 14
Briggs Files a Second Appeal 14
Briggs Vacate Property 15
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 16
ARGUMENT 17
I. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Washington Federal. 19
A. Washington Federal conclusively established each element of
declaratory judgment. ............................................................................ 20
B. Washington Federal conclusively established each element of
trespass. .................................................................................................. 22
C. Washington Federal conclusively established each element of
injunctive relief. ..................................................................................... 24
D. Washington Federal conclusively negated an element of each
possible counterclaim alleged by John Briggs....................................... 27
II. Conclusion 29
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 31
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 32
APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE WASHINGTON FEDERAL 33
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson v. McCrae,
495 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1973, no writ) .....................21
Bates v. Kingspark & Whitehall Civic Imp. Ass'n,
01-11-00487-CV, 2012 WL 1564309, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
May 3, 2012, no pet.)(not designated for publication) .........................................25
Brownlee v. Brownlee,
665 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.1984) .................................................................................19
Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp.,
417 S.W.3d 909, 920 (Tex. 2013) .................................................................. 22-23
Dyegard Land P'ship v. Hoover,
39 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) ......................................19
Jim Rutherford Investments, Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n,
25 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
pet. denied) ........................................................................................ 19, 24, 25, 26
Letkeman v. Reyes,
299 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) ................................26
Nail v. Thompson,
806 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ) ....................................21
O'Keefe v. Phelan,
No.14-00-01194-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2591 at *7, 2001 WL 395307
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 19, 2001, no pet.) ..................................19
Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
430 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.) ............................25
Withem v. Deison,
09-08-00467-CV, 2009 WL 2045322, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 16,
2009, no pet.) ........................................................................................................25
Yalamanchili v. Mousa,
316 S.W.3d 33, 40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) .... 25-26
Statutes
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.002 ...................................................................21
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004 ...................................................................21
Rules
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. ................................................................................................19
TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.9(a) ...........................................................................................17
iv
RECORD REFERENCES
The Clerk’s Record will be cited by the abbreviation “C.R.” followed by the
page number (e.g., C.R.1). The Supplemental Clerk’s Record will be cited by the
abbreviation “Supp.C.R.” followed by the page number (e.g., Supp.C.R.1).
Appellant’s Brief will be cited as “Appellant’s Br.” followed by the page number
(e.g., “Appellant’s Br. 1”).
v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2009, Washington Federal provided a mortgage to John Briggs and his
then-wife Frances Briggs. In 2013, the Briggs defaulted on the note, and
Washington Federal instituted forcible detainer proceedings. Washington Federal
attempted to evict the Briggs from the Property in two separate eviction
proceedings. When that proved unsuccessful, Washington Federal filed the instant
lawsuit against John Briggs and the other residents of the Property seeking (i) a
declaratory judgment regarding the ownership of the Property; (ii) monetary
damages for Defendants’ continuing trespass; and (iii) an injunction ordering
Defendants to cease trespassing on the Property and from interfering with its use
and quiet enjoyment of the Property. [C.R.4-19.]
Because Washington Federal could conclusively establish its right to a
declaratory judgment, permanent injunction, and damages for trespass, Washington
Federal filed a traditional motion for summary judgment. [Supp.C.R.30-235.]
After a hearing, the district court granted Washington Federal’s motion and entered
a Final Judgment in its favor on July 6, 2015. [C.R.39-44.] John Briggs filed this
appeal on July 9, 2015. [C.R.66.] None of the other Defendants appealed the Final
Judgment.
vi
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Washington Federal.
A. Washington Federal conclusively established the elements of its
claim for declaratory judgment.
B. Washington Federal conclusively established the elements of its
claim for trespass.
C. Washington Federal conclusively established the elements of its
claim for injunctive relief.
D. Washington Federal conclusively negated an element of all
possible counterclaims alleged by John Briggs.
vii
INTRODUCTION
The facts and procedural history of this case are tortuous and exasperating.
Washington Federal has tried to recover possession of the Property at issue from
John and Frances Briggs, together with their various friends and family, since
2013. The Briggs have raised every conceivable defense – and even created a few
of their own imagination. After years in the legal system, Washington Federal
finally gained possession of the Property and a Final Judgment from the district
court declaring its right to possession, holding that John and Frances Briggs owe
monetary damages for their continued trespass on the Property, and ordering John
Briggs and his friends and family to vacate the Property and prohibiting any further
trespass by them. Now John Briggs appeals the Final Judgment of the district
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Every alleged fact in Appellant’s Brief is disputed. The pertinent facts are
described below.
Note Default and Foreclosure
Washington Federal is a national banking association that, among other
things, extends credit to borrowers which is secured by real property in the State of
Texas. On or about September 3, 2009, John Briggs executed, as maker, a
promissory note in the original principal amount of $188,000.00 in favor of
1
Washington Federal, as payee (the “Note”). [Supp.C.R.62-65.] The Note was
secured by a Deed of Trust executed by John Briggs and his then-wife Frances
Briggs, as grantors, and delivered to Ronda Tomlinson, as Trustee, covering and
affecting certain real property located at 12311 Ravenview Road, Dallas, Texas
75253, together with all improvements and fixtures thereon and all rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereto (collectively, the “Property”). [Supp.C.R.67-
81.] The Deed of Trust is recorded as Document Number 200900265180 of the
Official Public Records of Dallas County, Texas. [Supp.C.R.67.] Washington
Federal is the owner and holder of the Note and has been the owner and holder of
the Note at all times relevant to this litigation. [Supp.C.R.57-60.]
Under the terms of the Note, John Briggs was required to pay Washington
Federal monthly installment payments of $1,067.45, each commencing on
November 1, 2009, and continuing with an identical monthly installment payment
being due and payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter until October 1,
2039, when any remaining outstanding amounts under the Note would be due.
[Supp.C.R.57-60, 62-65.]
John Briggs defaulted on the Note. By letter dated October 31, 2013 (the
“Notice of Intent to Accelerate Letter”), Washington Federal made written demand
upon John Briggs and Frances Briggs (via certified mail and first class mail) to
pay the past due amounts then due and owing under the terms of the Note and gave
2
notice that the maturity of the indebtedness due and owing under the Note would
be accelerated unless all past due amounts, then totaling $10,336.48, and other
charges set forth and described in the Notice of Intent to Accelerate Letter were
paid to Washington Federal on or before December 2, 2013. [Supp.C.R.82-86.]
John Briggs and Frances Briggs failed and refused to make the demanded
payments, or any portion thereof, by the required deadline. [Supp.C.R.57-60.]
On December 16, 2013, Washington Federal served written notice on John
Briggs and Frances Briggs that the maturity of the indebtedness due and owing
under the Note had been accelerated and was then fully due and payable (the
“Notice of Acceleration Letter”). [Supp.C.R.88-89.] The Notice of Acceleration
Letter was served on John Briggs and Frances Briggs by both certified mail and
first class mail, postage prepaid. [Supp.C.R.57-60.]
On December 16, 2013, a Notice of Substitute Trustee’s Sale instrument (the
“Notice of Sale”), which complied with all the requirements of the Deed of Trust
and §51.002 et. seq. of the Texas Property Code, was filed with the Dallas County
Clerk and was posted at the Dallas County Courthouse at the place designated for
such postings in accordance with the Deed of Trust and §51.002 of the Texas
Property Code. [Supp.C.R.91-93.] The Notice of Sale provided, among other
things, that the Property would be sold at a public auction to be held on Tuesday,
January 7, 2014 (the “Sale Date”), at the place designated by the Dallas County
3
Commissioner’s Court for such sales in Dallas County, Texas, and that the sale
would begin no earlier than 10:00 AM on the Sale Date and no later than three (3)
hours thereafter. On December 16, 2013, the Substitute Trustee served John
Briggs and Frances Briggs with a true and correct copy of the Notice of Sale, along
with the Notice of Acceleration Letter, by both certified mail and first class mail,
postage prepaid. (“Substitute Trustee’s Deed”). [Supp.C.R.95-104.]
On January 7, 2014, the Property was sold at public auction by the Substitute
Trustee to Washington Federal on a credit bid of One Hundred Eighty Eight
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Seven and 17/100 Dollars ($188,367.17) as stated
in the Notice of Sale. [Supp.C.R.95-104.] After the conclusion of the sale, the
Substitute Trustee’s Deed was executed and delivered by the Substitute Trustee to
Washington Federal. On January 9, 2014, the Substitute Trustee’s Deed was filed
of record as Document Number 201400005694 of the Official Public Records of
Dallas County, Texas. [Supp.C.R.95-104.]
Forcible Detainer Action
On or about January 14, 2014, Washington Federal delivered to John Briggs
and Frances Briggs notice to vacate the Property. On or about March 4, 2014,
Washington Federal filed a forcible detainer action against John Briggs and
Frances Briggs and all occupants of the premises located at the Property as Case
No. JE1401378H in Justice Court, Precinct 1, Place 1, Dallas County, Texas (the
4
“Justice Court”) (such proceeding being referred to herein as the “Forcible
Detainer Action”). [Supp.C.R.106-09.]
John Briggs and Frances Briggs were served with notice of the Forcible
Detainer Action on March 7, 2014, but failed to appear at the hearing on March 14,
2014. Judgment was entered against John Briggs and Frances Briggs and all
occupants on March 14, 2014. [Supp.C.R.111.] John Briggs and Frances Briggs
did not file a timely appeal, and a Writ of Possession (the “Writ”) was issued in
favor of Washington Federal against John Briggs and Frances Briggs on March 21,
2014. [Supp.C.R.111.]
Briggs’s Motion to Vacate
On March 21, 2014, John Briggs and Frances Briggs filed a “Motion to
Vacate Forcible Entry and Detainer” as Case No. DC-14-02879 in the 192nd
District Court of Dallas County, Texas, attempting to prevent the enforcement of
the forcible detainer order and the Writ from the Justice Court. [Supp.C.R.119-
24.] John Briggs and Frances Briggs then failed to appear for the March 28, 2014
hearing set by that court. The 192nd Judicial Court dismissed that case on March
28, 2014. [Supp.C.R.126.]
John Briggs’s First Bankruptcy
On March 24, 2014, John Briggs filed his first bankruptcy proceeding in an
attempt to obstruct and delay eviction and Washington Federal’s possession of the
5
Property, Case No. 14-31372-BJH-13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”). [Supp.C.R.128-35.] The
Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case without discharge on April 30, 2014.
[Supp.C.R.137-38.]
Frances Briggs’s Bankruptcy
On May 2, 2014, Frances Briggs filed a bankruptcy proceeding in an attempt
to obstruct the eviction, Case No. 14-32101-SGJ-13 in the Bankruptcy Court.
[Supp.C.R.140-47.] On June 9, 2014, a Motion for Relief from Stay was granted
allowing Washington Federal to continue with the eviction of John Briggs, Frances
Briggs, and all other occupants from the Property. Frances’ bankruptcy was
dismissed without discharge on June 11, 2014. [Supp.C.R.149-50.]
John Briggs’s Second Bankruptcy
On June 11, 2014, John Briggs filed a second bankruptcy proceeding, Case
No. 14-32844-BJH-13 in the Bankruptcy Court. [Supp.C.R.152-59.] Once again,
on July 22, 2014, a Motion for Relief from Stay was granted to Washington
Federal allowing the eviction of John Briggs, Frances Briggs, and all other
occupants from the Property. John Briggs’s second bankruptcy case was dismissed
on July 29, 2014. [Supp.C.R.161.]
Lawsuit Against Bankruptcy Court
6
On June 17, 2014, John Briggs filed an action against the Bankruptcy Court
and against Dallas County, Case No. DC 14-06476 in the 99th Judicial District
Court of Dallas County, Texas. [Supp.C.R.163-68.] Briggs alleged violations of
his civil rights by the Bankruptcy Court in connection with the Forcible Detainer
Action. That case was dismissed for want of prosecution on November 17, 2014.
[Supp.C.R.170.]
John Briggs’s Bill of Review
On June 19, 2014, John Briggs filed an “Application for Bill of Review for
signed Summary Judgment Order and for Damages" against the Justice Court and
prior legal counsel for Washington Federal, seeking relief from the proceedings
before the Justice Court, as Case No. DC-14-06571 in the 192nd Judicial District
Court of Dallas County, Texas. [Supp.C.R.172-78.] The 192nd District Court
dismissed the case on July 25, 2014 after John Briggs failed to appear at a hearing.
[Supp.C.R.180.]
Renewed Writ of Possession
On July 31, 2014, Washington Federal renewed its Writ in the Justice Court.
The Writ was re-issued and posted, giving John Briggs and Frances Briggs and any
other occupants of the Property twenty-four (24) hours to vacate the premises.
[Supp.C.R.182.]
Unserved Action in 162nd District Court
7
On August 4, 2014, John Briggs filed an “Original Verified Petition and
Application for Temporary Restraint, Temporary and Permanent Injunction” as
Case No. DC-14-08367 in the 162nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County,
Texas. [C.R.5-8; Supp.C.R.184-87.] The petition is facially deficient because it
does not allege specific facts or relief requested. John Briggs never properly
served Washington Federal with process.
Briggs filed an Affidavit for Inability to Pay Cost Bond, and the district
clerk contested the affidavit. [C.R.9-11.] On December 4, 2014, the district court
granted the district clerk’s contest of the affidavit and ordered that John Briggs
could not proceed further without paying the court costs to the district clerk.
[C.R.14.] Briggs never paid the court costs.
First Eviction Attempt and Samuel Gross’s Bankruptcy
On August 6, 2014, the Dallas County Constable’s office served the Writ
and began moving John Briggs, Frances Briggs, and all other occupants out of the
Property at approximately 9:30 AM. At approximately 12:22 PM that same day,
Samuel Raithel Gross 1 filed a bankruptcy proceeding, Case No. 14-33855-SGJ in
the Bankruptcy Court, and listed the Property as his residence in his bankruptcy
petition, which halted the eviction. [Supp.C.R.191-98.] On September 10, 2014,
1
Mr. Gross is not believed to be related to John or Frances Briggs; he is merely a friend or
advisor.
8
another Motion for Relief from Stay was granted to Washington Federal, allowing
eviction of John Briggs, Frances Briggs, and all other occupants from the Property.
The bankruptcy court enjoined Samuel Gross from assisting any individual in the
filing of bankruptcy and enjoined him from going within thirty feet of the
Bankruptcy Clerk’s office in Dallas. [Supp.C.R.200-01.] The bankruptcy court
then dismissed his bankruptcy proceeding, without discharge, and with prejudice to
re-filing for five years on November 12, 2014. [Supp.C.R.201.]
Johnathon David’s Bankruptcy
On September 18, 2014, John and Frances Briggs’ son Johnathon David
Briggs filed a bankruptcy proceeding, again attempting to delay eviction, in Case
No. 14-34492-SGJ-13 in the Bankruptcy Court. [Supp.C.R.203-07.] On
November 10, 2014, Johnathon David Briggs’ bankruptcy proceeding was
dismissed without discharge. [Supp.C.R.209-10.]
Franesha’s Bankruptcy
On October 29, 2014, John and Frances Briggs’ daughter Franesha Briggs
filed a bankruptcy proceeding, again attempting to delay eviction, in Case No. 14-
35147-SGJ-13 in the Bankruptcy Court. [Supp.C.R.212-21.] Franesha’s
bankruptcy case was dismissed on November 10, 2014 without discharge.
[Supp.C.R.223-24.]
9
Finding of Bad Faith and Abuse
In dismissing bankruptcy proceedings, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Stacy G. Jernigan made a specific finding that “John Briggs, Case No. 14-31372
and 14-32844, Frances Briggs, Case No. 14-32101, Samuel Gross, Case No. 14-
33855, Johnathon David Briggs, Case No. 14-34492 and Franesha Briggs, Case
No. 14-35147, have acted in concert to defraud, hinder and delay Washington
Federal in its eviction proceedings and have acted in bad faith to abuse the
bankruptcy system.” [Supp.C.R.223-24.]
Second Eviction Attempt and Subsequent Re-Entry
Patricia Stampley, a realtor, was hired by Washington Federal to oversee the
eviction of John Briggs, Frances Briggs, and any other occupant of the Property.
[Supp.C.R.234-35.] On November 7, 2014, Deputy Constable Carolina Garcia,
along with Ms. Stampley’s eviction crew, arrived to the Property to evict the
occupants. John Briggs came out of the home brandishing a gun, and he shot two
of his own dogs. At that point, Deputy Garcia called the police. Several police
officers arrived and spoke with John Briggs. [Supp.C.R.226-29, 234-35.]
After the police arrived, John Briggs, Frances Briggs, and all other
occupants were properly evicted from the Property. On November 11, 2014, Ms.
Stampley met an alarm company at the Property to install an alarm and was
greeted at the door by either John Briggs or a guest of John Briggs. Thus,
10
sometime between November 8, 2014 and November 11, 2014, John Briggs,
Frances Briggs, and other family members illegally broke back into the Property
and changed the locks. Ms. Stampley was told to leave and not return.
[Supp.C.R.234-35.]
Washington Federal Files Instant Suit
On January 6, 2015, Washington Federal filed this action against John
Briggs, Frances Briggs, Johnathon Briggs, Franesha Briggs, Damon Briggs, and
Samuel Gross in Cause No. DC-15-00147 in the 162nd Judicial District, Dallas,
Texas. [Supp.C.R.4-19.] Washington Federal brought claims for declaratory
judgment, trespass, and injunctive relief. [Supp.C.R.4-19.] Damon Briggs was
non-suited on February 19, 2015 after it was learned that he did not occupy the
Property. [Supp.C.R.23.] The remaining defendants are collectively referred to
herein as “Defendants.”
Unserved Action in 14th District Court
On January 20, 2015, John Briggs filed a “Verified Complaint with
prejudice and Temporary Restraining Order for permanent Injunction with
Prejudice Due To All Rights Reserved Supported by affidavit” as Case No. DC-15-
00607 in the 14th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. [Supp.C.R.20.]
Briggs named Washington Federal, Dallas County, and Justice of the Peace
Precinct 1, Place 1 as “Respondents.” John Briggs never properly served
11
Washington Federal, and he never sought a hearing on his application for
injunctive relief.
All Three Open Cases are Consolidated
On February 13, 2015, Washington Federal filed a Motion to Consolidate in
its own action, Cause No. DC-15-00147 in the 162nd District Court, requesting
consolidation of Briggs’s unserved action in the 14th Judicial District, Cause No.
DC-15-00607, into Washington Federal’s case. On March 10, 2015, Washington
Federal filed a second Motion to Consolidate requesting consolidation of Briggs’s
earlier unserved action in the 162nd District, Cause No. DC-14-08367, into
Washington Federal’s case. [Supp.C.R.24-28.]
On April 17, 2015, the 162nd District Court consolidated all three cases into
one under the earliest cause number, DC-14-08367. [C.R.18-19.]
Final Judgment entered
On March 24, 2015, Washington Federal filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment 2 as to its claims against Defendants and any pending claims of
Defendants against it. [Supp.C.R.30-235.] John Briggs filed a “Motion to Deny
Summary Judgment” on April 6, 2015 in Cause No. DC-15-00147, but he did not
2
This motion was filed in Cause No. DC-15-00147 prior to the consolidation of the actions.
12
attach any controverting evidence. 3 Washington Federal then filed a Reply.
[C.R.25-31.]
After a full hearing, the district court entered a Final Judgment Against John
Briggs, Frances Briggs, Franesha Jonnelle Briggs, Johnathon David Briggs and
Samuel Raithel Gross on July 6, 2015. [C.R.39-44.] In the Final Judgment, the
district court declared that Washington Federal owns all fee interests in the
Property and entered a permanent injunction against Defendants, ordering them to
vacate the Property and prohibiting any further trespass by them. The district court
also ordered John Briggs and Frances Briggs to pay monetary damages, attorney’s
fees, and court costs to Washington Federal, jointly and severally. The district
court ordered that John Briggs take nothing on any of his counterclaims.
On July 9, 2015, John Briggs filed a Notice of Appeal. [C.R.66.] None of
the other Defendants appealed the Final Judgment. The present briefing pertains to
this appeal, which was docketed as No. 05-15-00834-CV.
Defendants Held in Contempt
On July 30, 2015, Washington Federal filed a Motion for Contempt against
Defendants for failing to vacate the Property. The district court entered an Order
to Appear and Show Cause, ordering Defendants to appear for purposes of
3
This document does not appear to be in the clerk’s record.
13
determining whether they should be held in contempt of court for failure to comply
with the Final Judgment. [C.R.77-78.] On August 14, 2015, the district court
entered an Order Granting Washington Federal’s Motion for Contempt, which
ordered John Briggs and Frances Briggs to immediately vacate the Property and
instructed officers to take them into custody if they remained on the Property.
[C.R.79-80.]
Defendants Apply for a TRO
On August 24, 2015, John Briggs and Frances Briggs filed a “Verified
Application for Emergency Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary
Injunction with Prejudice Supported by Affiant’s Affidavit” and named
Washington Federal and its law firm, McDonald Sanders, P.C., as defendants.
This case was initially docketed as DC-15-09535 in the 160th Judicial District, but
it was transferred to the 162nd District Court. The application for TRO was denied.
On November 3, John Briggs filed a motion to recuse Judge Phyllis Lister-
Brown of the 162nd District Court, which was denied. After John and Frances
Briggs filed an amended pleading dropping McDonald Sanders, P.C. as a
defendant, Washington Federal filed a Motion to Dismiss this latest lawsuit, which
was granted on November 3, 2015.
Briggs Files a Second Appeal
14
Also on August 24, 2015, John Briggs and Frances Briggs filed a second
Notice of Appeal, which was docketed as No. 05-15-01018-CV. This Notice
appealed the Order Granting Washington Federal’s Motion for Contempt dated
August 14. By letter dated September 11, 2015, this Honorable Court wrote John
and Frances Briggs and questioned its jurisdiction. Briggs failed to respond, and
this appeal was dismissed on October 7, 2015.
Briggs Vacate Property
On or about August 27, 2015, John Briggs and Frances Briggs finally
surrendered possession of the Property, roughly seventeen months after
Washington Federal began forcible detainer proceedings.
15
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
After John Briggs filed his appellant’s brief, this Court admonished him that
his brief failed to comply with Rule 38 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
and requested that he file an amended brief. Briggs has failed to do so. Because
Briggs’s brief presents no issues, authorities, or citations to the record, Briggs has
wholly failed to properly present any issue on appeal. This case should be
dismissed on this basis alone.
Moreover, Briggs appears to misunderstand the purpose of his appeal. In his
brief, he appears to complain about what he perceives to be a wrongful eviction
attempt by Washington Federal which occurred in November of 2014. This
eviction attempt is irrelevant, as Briggs broke back into the Property and regained
possession immediately thereafter. Notably, Briggs did not properly appeal the
writ of possession issued by the justice court following the Forcible Detainer
Action, and thus, he cannot contest that Washington Federal has a right to
possession of the Property.
The proper purpose of this appeal would be to determine whether the district
court properly granted summary judgment of Washington Federal’s claims against
John Briggs. Because Washington Federal conclusively established its causes of
action and negated any possible counterclaim by Briggs, the trial court did not err
in granting summary judgment in its favor.
16
ARGUMENT
As detailed at length in the Statement of Facts, John Briggs defaulted on a
Note payable to Washington Federal. [Supp.C.R.57-60, 82-86, 87-89.] Thereafter,
Washington Federal instituted a Forcible Detainer Action and obtained a writ of
possession for the Property. [Supp.C.R.111.] But John Briggs and his family and
friends refused to vacate the Property and utilized every possible legal maneuver to
avoid it. Ultimately, Washington Federal filed suit below against Defendants for
declaratory judgment, trespass, and injunctive relief. [Supp.C.R.4-19.]
Washington Federal sought a declaration that it owned all fee interests in the
Property and a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to vacate the Property
and prohibiting any further trespass by them. Washington Federal moved for
summary judgment of its claims against Defendants, and the motion was granted.
[Supp.C.R.30-235; C.R.39-44.]
In his brief, Briggs makes various complaints about the eviction attempts
which occurred in 2014. However, Rule 510.9 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure provides, “A party may appeal a judgment in an eviction case by filing a
bond, making a cash deposit, or filing a sworn statement of inability to pay with
the justice court within 5 days after the judgment is signed.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
510.9(a). Judgment was entered against John Briggs and Frances Briggs in the
Forcible Detainer Action on March 14, 2014. [Supp.C.R.111.] Briggs did not file
17
a bond, a cash deposit, or a statement of inability to pay within five days thereafter.
[Supp.C.R.111.] Accordingly, the Forcible Detainer Action was not appealed to
the county court, and it is a final judgment. Washington Federal’s right to
possession was finally established in the justice court, and it is not at issue in this
appeal.
Instead, the purpose of this appeal should be to determine whether the
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Washington Federal
in its lawsuit against Briggs for declaratory judgment, trespass, and injunctive
relief. [Supp.C.R.4-19.] Yet Briggs does not complain about the summary
judgment in his brief. Briggs only complains of various procedures utilized in the
November 7, 2014 eviction attempt, which became moot because he re-entered the
Property and changed the locks shortly after being evicted. [Supp.C.R.234-35.]
Briggs and his family did not finally surrender possession of the Property until
after the district court entered summary judgment against them below.
In fact, Briggs lists no issues presented at all in his brief, despite this Court’s
October 27, 2015 letter instructing him to amend his brief to comply with Rule 38
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 4 Briggs also fails to cite any authority
4
There is no doubt that Briggs received this letter because on November 6, he requested an
extension of time within which to file an amended brief. The Court granted his request and
extended the deadline to November 16. To date, Briggs has not filed an amended brief.
18
to support his contentions on appeal, and his brief contains no citations to the
record. An issue or point of error not supported by authority is waived. O'Keefe v.
Phelan, No.14-00-01194-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2591 at *7, 2001 WL
395307 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 19, 2001, no pet.). Litigants who
represent themselves must comply with the applicable law and procedural rules, as
must litigants represented by counsel. Id. Because Briggs presents no issues for
review which pertain to the summary judgment, the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
I. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Washington Federal.
In general, summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. If the movant's motion and summary
judgment proof facially establish its right to judgment as a matter of law, then the
burden shifts to the non-movant to raise fact issues precluding summary judgment.
Jim Rutherford Investments, Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d 845,
849 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). If the non-movant relies
on an affirmative defense to defeat summary judgment, he must present summary
judgment proof sufficient to raise a fact issue as to each element of that defense.
Id. (citing Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); Dyegard Land
P'ship v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 300, 306 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.)).
19
As previously discussed, Washington Federal filed a lawsuit against John
Briggs and other residents of the Property seeking (i) a declaratory judgment
regarding the ownership of the Property; (ii) monetary damages for Defendants’
continuing trespass; and (iii) an injunction ordering Defendants to cease
trespassing on the Property and from interfering with its use and quiet enjoyment
of the Property. [C.R.4-19.] Because Washington Federal could conclusively
establish its right to a declaratory judgment, permanent injunction, and damages
for trespass, Washington Federal filed a traditional motion for summary judgment.
[Supp.C.R.30-235.] In response, Briggs filed a “Motion to Deny Summary
Judgment,” but he did not attach any controverting evidence. Washington Federal
then filed a Reply which nonetheless negated each argument raised by Briggs in
his “motion.” [C.R.25-31.] After a hearing, the district court granted Washington
Federal’s motion and entered a Final Judgment in its favor. [C.R.39-44.]
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment because
Washington Federal conclusively established the elements of its causes of action,
as discussed in detail below.
A. Washington Federal conclusively established each element of
declaratory judgment.
Pursuant to Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Washington Federal requested a judgment declaring that Washington Federal owns
20
all fee interests in the Property and all rights to possession, to the exclusion of all
others, including John Briggs.
The goal of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, codified at Chapter 37
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the “UDJA”), “is to settle and to
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other
legal relations.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.002(b). The UDJA is to be
liberally construed and administered. Id. Furthermore, courts should interpret and
construe the UDJA so as to effectuate its general purpose. Id. at § 37.002(c).
Declaratory relief is available whenever there is a justiciable controversy involving
uncertainty or insecurity as to the rights, legal relations or status of parties and
when declaratory relief will settle a dispute and put an end to the controversy.
Anderson v. McCrae, 495 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1973, no
writ). A court has the right to determine any question of construction or validity
arising out of a deed, contract or other instrument that affects the rights, status or
legal relations of party, and as such, a court has the right to declare the rights,
status or legal relations of the parties thereunder, as a matter of law. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004(a). Seeking summary judgment on a question of law
is a proper disposition of a declaratory judgment proceeding. See Nail v.
Thompson, 806 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
21
Below, Washington Federal asked the trial court to (1) construe the various
instruments before this Court, namely the Childers Affidavit [Supp.C.R.57-60], the
Deed of Trust [Supp.C.R.67-81], and the Substitute Trustee’s Deed [Supp.C.R.95-
104], and (2) requested a judgment declaring that Washington Federal owns all fee
interests in the Property, which is legally described as follows:
Being 2.07 acres net out of the Wm. Latham Survey, Abstract No.
838, Deed Records, Dallas County, Texas, being 2.07 acres net of the
entire East side of C.H. Spurgeon tract as recorded in Volume 2621,
Page 543, Deed Records, Dallas County, Texas.
Because Washington Federal conclusively established that it owns all fee
interests in the Property and all rights to possession, to the exclusion of all others,
including John Briggs, the trial court did not err in awarding Washington Federal a
declaratory judgment.
B. Washington Federal conclusively established each element of
trespass.
Trespass to real property requires an unauthorized physical entry on the
plaintiff’s land by some person or thing. Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood
Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 920 (Tex. 2013). A party that trespasses upon
the property rights of another, while acting in the good faith and honest belief that
he had the lawful and legal right to do so is regarded as an innocent trespasser and
liable only for the actual damages sustained. Id. at 921. However, a party who
22
knowingly and intentionally trespasses, or who does so maliciously, may be liable
for additional forms of damages. Id.
Through its Motion for Summary Judgment and the attached evidence,
Washington Federal established all of the elements of its claim. [Supp.C.R.30-
235.] First, Washington Federal established it became the lawful fee owner of the
Property upon foreclosure with all rights of possession. Washington Federal
included, as summary judgment evidence, the Petition for a forcible detainer action
against John Briggs and Frances Briggs and all occupants and Judgment entered
therein on March 14, 2014. [Supp.C.R.106-09, 111.] Washington Federal also
included evidence that Defendants have done everything in their power to delay
eviction, which includes a Motion to Vacate, John’s First Bankruptcy, Frances’
Bankruptcy, John’s Second Bankruptcy, Lawsuit Against Bankruptcy Court, Bill
of Review, Unserved Action in 162nd, Gross’s Bankruptcy, Johnathon’s
Bankruptcy, and Franesha’s Bankruptcy. [Supp.C.R.119-24, 128-35, 140-47, 152-
59, 163-68, 172-78, 184-87, 191-98, 203-07, 212-21.]
Second, Washington Federal established that it evicted and removed
Defendants from the Property on November 7, 2014. However, John Briggs
illegally re-entered the Property shortly thereafter. Washington Federal included,
as summary judgment evidence, the Sworn Affidavit of Patricia Stampley.
[Supp.C.R.234-35.] The re-entry into and retaking of possession by John Briggs
23
was physical, intentional, voluntary and without consent of any kind from
Washington Federal. Further, John Briggs acted with malice in breaking into the
Property and remaining thereon. John Briggs’ actions would constitute a criminal
trespass under Section 30.05 of the Texas Penal Code as well as trespass giving
rise to the civil cause of action. These actions caused injury to Washington
Federal.
Last, Washington Federal established it was entitled to judgment for all
actual damages in the amount of $16,500.00, which was the fair rental value of
$1,100.00 to compensate for the loss of use of the Property for fifteen (15) months.
Washington Federal provided evidence of its damages through the Sworn Affidavit
of Patricia Stampley. [Supp.C.R.234-35.]
Because Washington Federal conclusively established that John Briggs
trespassed on its Property by his unauthorized physical re-entry, the trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment on Washington Federal’s cause of action for
trespass.
C. Washington Federal conclusively established each element of
injunctive relief.
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Jim Rutherford Investments, Inc. v. Terramar Beach
Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
24
denied); Bates v. Kingspark & Whitehall Civic Imp. Ass'n, 01-11-00487-CV, 2012
WL 1564309, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 3, 2012, no pet.)(not
designated for publication). When the trial court issues a permanent injunction in
response to a party’s motion for summary judgment, the court also applies the
traditional summary judgment standards of review. Rutherford, 25 S.W.3d at 848-
849.
In its petition, Washington Federal sought a permanent injunction which
would (1) require Defendants to vacate the Property and remove all of their
personal property, and (2) prevent Defendants from further trespassing onto the
Property or otherwise interfering with Washington Federal’s use and quiet
enjoyment of the Property. Trespass to real property requires a showing of an
unauthorized physical entry onto the Washington Federal's property by some
person or thing. Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.). An injunction is appropriate to prevent trespass
to real property, especially in situations where the trespass is continuous in nature.
A party seeking a permanent injunction must prove a wrongful act, imminent
harm, irreparable injury, and the lack of an adequate remedy at law. Withem v.
Deison, 09-08-00467-CV, 2009 WL 2045322, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July
16, 2009, no pet.). A trespass cause of action accrues upon discovery of the first
physical invasion on plaintiff's property. Yalamanchili v. Mousa, 316 S.W.3d 33,
25
40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). The continuing tort
doctrine is an exception to the statute of limitations for torts that are ongoing and
continuous, creating a separate cause of action on each occasion. Id. Whether to
grant a permanent injunction lies within the trial court's discretion. Letkeman v.
Reyes, 299 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.).
Through its motion for summary judgment and the attached evidence,
Washington Federal established all of the elements of its claim. [Supp.C.R.30-
235.] First, Defendants wrongfully and illegally re-entered the Property, and
Washington Federal has been damaged. [Supp.C.R.234-35.] Second, Washington
Federal also showed that due to Defendants’ continuing trespass on the Property,
imminent harm and irreparable injury threatened Washington Federal’s use and
quiet enjoyment of the Property. [Supp.C.R.30-235.] Finally, Washington Federal
has no adequate remedy at law because Defendants’ displayed a complete lack of
regard for Washington Federal’s rights and may again attempt to break-in and take
possession of the Property.
Washington Federal conclusively established all elements of its action for
injunctive relief. Jim Rutherford Investments, Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n,
25 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)(“where
the facts conclusively show that a party is violating the substantive law, the trial
court should enjoin the violation, and in such case, there is no discretion to be
26
exercised.”). Because Washington Federal conclusively established that John
Briggs committed a wrongful act by the continuing trespass on Washington
Federal’s Property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring John
Briggs to vacate the Property, remove all of his personal property, and enjoining
John Briggs from further trespassing onto the Property or otherwise interfering
with Washington Federal’s use and quiet enjoyment of the Property.
D. Washington Federal conclusively negated an element of each possible
counterclaim alleged by John Briggs.
In response to Washington Federal’s petition, John Briggs filed a “Motion to
Dismiss with Prejudice Due to Fraud Supported by Affiant Affidavit and Due to
All Rights Reserved with Prejudice” on March 2, 2015, which presumptively
served as his answer. In it, he fails to articulate a cognizable cause of action and/or
affirmative defense. However, in an abundance of caution, Washington Federal
outlined each of Briggs’ allegations in its Motion for Summary Judgment and
argued that Briggs had no evidence to support any of them. In response to
Washington Federal’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Briggs filed a “Motion to
Deny Summary Judgment” on April 6, 2015 in Cause No. DC-15-00147, but he
did not attach any controverting evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not
err in granting summary judgment in favor of Washington Federal.
27
The only possible counterclaims alleged by Briggs were those in his two
lawsuits against Washington Federal which were consolidated into Washington
Federal’s lawsuit. Briggs’ earliest consolidated lawsuit was Case No. DC-14-
08367 in the 162nd Judicial District Court, in which he filed an application for TRO
but never served Washington Federal. The clerk ordered that he could not proceed
without paying the filing fees, and he never paid the fees. This claim was not
before the trial court. [C.R.14.] Briggs’ second consolidated lawsuit was Case No.
DC-15-00607 in the 14th Judicial District Court, filed January 20, 2015. In this
case, Briggs sought another TRO, but he never properly served Washington
Federal. Moreover, he never pursued a hearing on his TRO or presented any
evidence to support his claim in response to Washington Federal’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. By granting Washington Federal’s permanent injunction, the
district court impliedly denied Briggs’ request because they were at exact odds
with each other. Moreover, in its Final Judgment, the district court ordered “that
John Briggs take nothing on any of his counterclaims,” and the Judgment “finally
disposes of all parties and claims before the parties and is appealable. [C.R.39-44.]
Thus, the district court denied any counterclaims by Briggs and entered Final
Judgment in favor of Washington Federal.
28
II. Conclusion
In sum, Washington Federal conclusively established each element of its
causes of action for declaratory judgment, trespass damages, and injunctive relief,
and John Briggs failed to present any controverting evidence. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in declaring that Washington Federal owns all fee simple
interest in the Property, awarding trespass damages to Washington Federal, and
permanently enjoining Defendants from reentering the Property. This Honorable
Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellee Washington Federal
prays that this Honorable Court affirm the judgment of the trial court, award costs
to Appellee, and for such other and further relief to which Appellee may be justly
entitled.
29
Respectfully submitted,
McDONALD SANDERS, P.C.
By: /s/Brittani Wilmore Rollen
BRITTANI WILMORE ROLLEN
State Bar No. 24036046
brollen@mcdonaldlaw.com
RUSSELL A. DEVENPORT
State Bar No. 24007109
rdevenport@mcdonaldlaw.com
KATHY M. KASSABIAN
State Bar No. 24077807
kkassabian@mcdonaldlaw.com
777 Main Street, Suite 1300
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Telephone: (817) 336-8651
Facsimile: (817) 334-0271
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
WASHINGTON FEDERAL
30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a, I hereby certify that on the
16th day of December, 2015, I served the foregoing document upon all other
parties as follows:
John Briggs, pro se Via:
P.O. Box 360686 Efile.TXCourts.gov
Dallas, Texas 75336 Hand delivery
electricexpress@aol.com U.S. Mail
Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Commercial Delivery Service
Fax #_____________
Email
Other (as directed by the Court)
/s/Brittani Wilmore Rollen
Brittani Wilmore Rollen
Attorney for Appellee Washington Federal
31
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) because the brief contains 5,973 words, excluding
the parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1). I
am relying on the word count function of Microsoft Word for the word count.
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because the brief has been prepared in a proportionally
spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word 2010 in Times New Roman, with 14
point text and 12 point footnotes.
Dated: December 16, 2015
/s/ Brittani Wilmore Rollen
Brittani Wilmore Rollen
Attorney for Appellee Washington Federal
I:\09217\0005\10E3920.DOCX
32
NO. 05-15-00834-CV
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS, TEXAS
__________________________________________________________________
JOHN BRIGGS,
Appellant,
v.
WASHINGTON FEDERAL,
Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas
Cause No. DC-14-08367
Hon. Phyllis Lister Brown, Presiding
__________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE WASHINGTON FEDERAL
__________________________________________________________________
1. Final Judgment issued July 6, 2015 [C.R.39-44.]
33
1
34
CAUSE NO. DC-14-08367
JOHN BRIGGS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff and Counter Defendant, §
§
~ §
§
WASHINGTON FEDERAL, §
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
and Cross-Plaintiff, §
v. §
§
FRANCES BRIGGS, FRANESHA §
JONNELLE BRIGGS, JOHNATHON §
DAVID BRIGGS, and SAMUEL §
RAITHEL GROSS, §
§
Cross Claim Defendants. § 162ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST JOHN BRIGGS, FRANCES
BRIGGS, FRANESHA JONNELLE BRIGGS, JOHNATHON
DAVID BRIGGS AND SAMUEL RAITHEL GROSS
On the 6th day of July, 2015, came on to be heard Washington Federal's Motion for
Summary Judgment (the "Motion") against John Briggs, Frances Briggs, Franesha Jonnelle
Briggs, Johnathon David Briggs and Samuel Raithel Gross in the above-entitled and
numbered cause. Cause Numbers DC-15-00607 and DC-15-00147 have been
consolidated before this Court in the above-captioned cause. 4ROI!,Jaed will 1i1 1t1 1e Motior 1is-
a reqliest for default against Eranesha 'eaaelle B•iggs aR'il Sa.r'f!!,Jel Raili'lel Gress.
Washington Federal appeared by and through its attorney of record. John Briggs, Frances
r-(~Y1!?5~ j. ~rt~
Brigg~and Johnathon Davi riggs appeared pro so.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1
I:\09217\0005\1 037762.DOC
39
Gross. e submitted to the Court. It
and Samuel Raithel Gross are founded o
which are attached as exhibits to t urt finds the same to be sufficient to
sand Samuel Raithel
s that Judgment should be rendered in favor Washington Federal
gains! Franesha Jonnelle Briggs and Samuel Raithel Gros ·
era s
F11rther, with regard to Washington Federal's claims against .John Briggs, Frances
Briggs .aAQ-Johnathon David Briggs, after determining that the Mot1 was properly before 6rms
1\
the Court, and after reviewing the Court's file, the Court proceeded to consider the matters
required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to be considered upon motions for
summary judgment, including the pleadings, the Motion, the affidavits submitted by the
parties, the summary judgment evidence attached to the Motion and on file, the authorities
c1ted by the part1es, and the arguments of counsel and the pro se part1es. After rev1ew1ng
and considering all such matters, the Court is of the opinion that Washington Federal's
Motion is well taken and should be granted in all respects.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Washington
Federal's requests for declaratory relief are GRANTED. Accordingly, it is HEREBY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2
1:\09217\0005\1 037762.DOC 40
'
DECLARED that Washington Federal owns all fee interests in 12311 Ravenview Road,
Dallas, Texas 75253 (the "Property"), together with all improvements and fixtures thereon
and all rights, privileges and appurtenances the1 eto, and that such i11te1ests of 'vVasl 1i1 1gt01 1
Federal are to the exclusion of John Briggs, Frances Briggs, Franesha Jonnelle Briggs,
Johnathon David Briggs and Samuel Raithel Gross.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Washington Federal
be granted a permanent injunction as requested. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) John Bnggs, Frances Bnggs, Franesha Jonnelle Briggs, Johnathon David Briggs and
Samuel Raithel Gross shall each vacate the Property and remove all of their personal
property from the same withi``d``~ollowing this Judgment , and (ii) John Briggs,
Frances Briggs, Franesha Jormelle Briggs, Johnathon David Briggs and Samuel Raithel
Gross are further prohibited from thereafter trespassing onto the Property or otherwise
iotede[iog witb Wasbiogtoo Eedeml's use aod q11iel eojoyrneol of !be E>roperty
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that John Briggs take
nothing on any of his counterclaims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Washington Federal
have and recover judgment of and from John Briggs and Frances Briggs, jointly and
severally, for actual damages in the principal sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED and 007100 DOLLARS ($16,500.00).
S FURrER ORDERED,n``D and DECRE~\t ashingt`` era I
h~uo <>nn ;, r.f <>nn ·.lr.hn n · ~n-' - . . :\.
a a
'\I ' ·a
f\ 7'\ '" ' ' '1 \.
•••••al~, ``~ drun'9~ '" thlpri"lipru wm of THIRTYTitR.\o THOUsAND a}.,
00/100 DO~ LARS ( 3,000.00).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3
1:\092171000511 037762. DOC
41
'
'
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Washington Federal
""~
have and recover judgment of and from John Briggst\Frances Briggs, F-~aResl=la dOIIIIelle
Bri!j!JS, dflhf'lath~l'l Baviel B1iggs and Sa~uel Raitl1el Gfl:ess, joi11tly a11d seve1ally, 101 all
costs of court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Washington Federal
J
have and recover judgment of and from John Briggs"\Frances Briggs, FFaResl=la deRRelle-
-81ig!'js, Jel=lflatl'lo11 8a>. t'>rZlf>bS
~ 1'-t- <-Q`` -lSlQL(p
:~1(~,``~ ~i~fy'14£ .
Jcl=\i'-!l'fTHoN ~ ``G``
ll~
FIZANESt+ff j. t51t t£'5{9 5
ti@``
Rvs.5et\ D6\Je;w PoR::r;
Coot~JsCL ~ w~s.t-rr ~T6N. Feoe-Je.4L
44