Fuh, Ayunwi Meme ( 2015 )


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    IN THE                                                                                              ORIGINAL
    TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    Ayunwi Meme Fuh,
    Petitioner,
    Vs.                                                                                                                                                                     No. 01-13-C
    . COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                                                                                                                                         NAY 2 2 2C15
    Respondent.                                                                                                                                                                                          Abel Acosta, Clefa
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    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
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    MAY 18 2015
    PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    Abet Acosta,Clerk
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    Ayunwi Meme Fuh                                                                                                                                                           Donald R. Cantrell
    14918 Havenridge dr                                                                                                                                                        800 Bering #208
    Houston Tx77083                                                                                                                                                            Houston, Tx 77057
    Memefuh400@yahoo.com
    Petitioner                                                                                                                                       Appointed appellate counsel
    PETITIONER REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
    TABLE OF CONTENTS                            Pages
    Index of Authorities                          5-6
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument             7
    Statement of the Case                         8-9
    Statement of Procedural History               9
    Grounds for Review                            10-13
    Argument                                      14-26
    Appeals court Opinion and Judgement attached (3 pages)
    1. The illegal acquisition of evidence (Tainted) requires suppression.
    The law of Texas requires the illegal acquisition of evidence to not be
    adduced in court. CCP Art 38.23 this was not the situation with
    petitioner's case leading to a conviction. Suppression of evidence is
    required under Texas law.
    2. The court of Appeal's ruling that the petitioner's appeal is frivolous
    and that there are no arguable grounds for review with no reversible
    error is incorrect and therefore not grounds to ignore the requirements of
    CCP art. 38.23 12, and 37.02 and proof beyond reasonable doubt.
    3. The incorrect and untrue jury charge resulted in a wrongful
    conviction. The Jury charged and convicted petitioner with sexual
    assault by penetration which was untrue and unfounded contrary to Ch.
    14-27.10 of the CCP which requires proof of penetration and be proven
    beyond reasonable doubt.
    4. Inconsistent statements and lies under oath (perjury) made by the
    complainant contrary to sections 37.06 and 37.02 of the CCP leading to
    a conviction.
    5. Tampering with and fabricating evidence (tainted) by complainant's
    mother contrary to sec. 37.09 of the CCP leading to a conviction.
    6. The failure to raise a valid legal claim that necessarily would have
    resulted in a reversal apparently also constitutes ineffective assistance by
    trial and appellate Counsels see Ex parte Daigle, 
    848 S.W.2d 691
    , 692
    (Crim.App. 1993)
    Petitioner's attorney's brief to the appeals court that petitioner's appeal
    is frivolous should be moot and the court should consider petitioner's
    own written pro se response to Anders brief as the attorney on record
    never consulted with petitioner on the reasons and grounds of his appeal
    despite the numerous times that petitioner tried to meet with appellate
    attorney about his case. Instead, appointed counsel requested for money
    from petitioner before any possible representation. Please see
    petitioner's letter with Appeals court from his attorney, requesting
    $7500 before any representation.
    Prayer for Relief                        27-29
    Certificate of Service                   30
    Certificate of Compliance                30
    Appendix post                            31
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W 2d 25, 27(Tex.Crim.App.l997)
    Ex parte Bradley, 781 SW2d 886,894 (Crim. App. 1989) pg. 20
    Alvarado v. State, 775S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. Crim. App.—San Antonio
    1989, pet. ref.) pg. 21
    Ex parte Daigle, 
    848 S.W.2d 691
    , 692 (Crim. App. 1993) pg. 21
    Sanchez v. State,\%2 S.W.3d 34(Tex.App.-SanAntonio 2005) affirmed
    
    209 S.W.3d 34
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(same) Pg. 22
    Dinkins v. State, 
    894 S.W.2d 330
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) pg. 25
    Evans v. State, 
    606 S.W.2d 880
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) pg. 26
    Woods v. State, 
    653 S.W.2d 1
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) pg. 26
    Warner v. State, 
    245 S.W.3d 458
    , 462 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) pg. 23
    Waldon v. State, 
    579 S.W.2d 499
    , 502 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) pg. 24-25
    Taylor v. state 332 s.w.3d 483,489(Tex.Crim.App.2011) pg. 23
    Hudson v. Michigan, 
    547 U.S. 586
    (2006) pg. 16
    Pham v. State, 
    175 S.W.3d 767
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)
    Weeks v. U.S., 
    232 U.S. 383
    (1914).   Pg. 16
    Almanazv. State, 
    686 S.W.2d 157
    , 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985)pg. 24
    Statutes
    Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.23 7, 12-13, 37.02, 37.06, 37.09,
    14-27.10
    Rules
    TRAP 9.4(i)(2)(D)
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Petitioner believes oral argument would be helpful to the Court because
    the issues raised are issues of first impression and the public policy
    behind resolution of these issues could be better discussed in the context
    of oral argument, where the Court can ask questions and consider
    alternatives and critical issues that petitioner is prepared to discuss and
    portray as this case presents novel issues that the court has not
    previously addressed.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    This case concerns a conviction of sexual assault of a child under the age
    of 17 based on a jury charge that does not conform to Ch. 14-27.10 of
    the CCP which requires proof of penetration and prove beyond
    reasonable doubt. It also concerns the defective indictment about the
    use of force and penetration which needs to be proven, the issue of
    whether tainted evidence should be adduced in trial where there is
    reasonable doubt questioning the legality and reliability of the evidence
    adduced at trial and its sufficiency, when and from whom the evidence
    was acquired; which was clearly contrary to the date on court files
    purporting the date of the alleged offence and the person it was collected
    from (complainant's mother), contrary to CCP Art. 38.23, and whether
    evidence acquired illegally should be suppressed as per the Texas code
    of criminal procedure. Also whether false .testimony under oath by the
    complainant should have been admissible. Complainant was coerced by
    her mother to falsely testify against petitioner, leading to a conviction
    contrary to sec. 37.02 CCP. This conviction should be overturned as the
    charge was unfair, improper and no crime was ever committed in the
    first place.
    STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    (1) Date of opinion from Court of Appeals: April 9, 2015
    (2) Date of Motion for Rehearing: None was filed.
    (3) Date Motion for Rehearing Disposed: N/A
    ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES
    The required documents and several other key documents that petitioner
    is presenting to the court are attached to this Petition in the Appendix.
    GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
    1. Insufficient evidence that was tainted exits to contradict the
    findings of the Jury as the only piece of evidence adduced at trial was
    not suppressed even after a motion was filed for the evidence to be
    suppressed due to its illegal acquisition directly from complainant's
    mother to the police. Semen was put on several items by complainant's
    mother on a shirt, pant, panties and shoes which were not traced to any
    particular female by DNA, on a date different from the date alleging the
    offence, by complainant's mother whom petitioner was dating. Yet only
    the panties' was brought to trial. All elements, if brought to trial would
    have raised doubts as to how did semen possibly get to all
    aforementioned items if it was not put there intentionally in a bid to set
    up and frame petitioner. Complainant's mother told petitioner she was
    doing this to destroy his future and that the courts would believe her
    daughter's story.
    10
    2. The jury charge and finding of sexual assault of a child under the age
    of 17 and verdict did not contain the requirement of guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt nor proof of penetration as required under Ch. 14-
    27.10 CCP. The jury subsequently asked a question that would have
    allowed the trial judge to fix the mistake in the original charge for it to
    be dismissed, so that the jury would have been informed of the correct
    law. However, the trial court answered the jury's question about the
    definition of penetration and sexual assault by referring them to the
    testimony only and failing to define and explain per statute of law
    thereby swaying the jurors' minds toward convicting petitioner
    wrongfully. Those errors undoubtedly lead to a conviction.
    3. Illegal acquisition of evidence (tainted) exists to support petitioner's
    review request and wrongful conviction outcry contrary to the Texas
    code of criminal procedure. On a date not mentioned as the date of the
    alleged offence which is alleged to have occurred in petitioner's
    apartment, complainant's mother in her own house where she had just
    been intimate with petitioner personally handed some clothing to the
    li
    police she had called, away from the alleged crime scene about 20 miles
    from petitioner's apartment, almost a week after the alleged assault.
    Complainant was not wearing these clothing and was not even present
    when her mother was personally handing over those clothing to the police,
    saying they would find evidence there. This evidence was clearly tainted
    and illegally acquired contrary to CCP Art. 38.23 and should not have
    been adduced at trial. This lead to a conviction. Insufficient and tainted
    evidence exists to contest the finding of the jury, so the conviction
    cannot stand.
    4. Perjury and inconsistent statements made by complainant under
    oath contrary to sec. 37.02 and 37.06 CCP. Complainant during cross
    examination insisted that she had told her mother of the alleged assault
    on the same day and that they had gone to the hospital that same night.
    That was not true. Petitioner was present at the complainant's house on
    the 3rd ofApril 2012 until about midnight and we all said good night to
    each other and petitioner left for work after. No vaginal swabs were
    taken, which would have cleared petitioner. Medical assessments
    12
    showed no foul play. Even CPS in an interview with complainant said
    the girl was not credible and did not look like she had been assaulted
    from the evidence, and statement she gave CPS. This conviction cannot
    stand.
    5. Petitioner's pro se response to Ander which contained the issues at
    stake for his appeal was never considered by the court of appeal thereby
    violating his right to appeal his case and prove his innocence. The failure
    to raise a valid legal claim that necessarily would have resulted in a
    reversal apparently also constitutes ineffective assistance by appellate
    counsel see Ex parte Daigle, 
    848 S.W.2d 691
    , 692 (Crim. App. 1993)
    13
    ARGUMENT
    1. The illegal acquisition of evidence requires that the evidence be
    suppressed.
    Under Texas statutory law, if the Fourth or Fifth Amendment is violated
    where evidence is illegally acquired, it is automatically suppressed, the
    main issue here is:
    The police in this case violated petitioner's Constitutional rights by
    illegally collecting evidence from complainant's mother who was angry
    with him at the time, from her house and not from my apartment where
    the alleged crime is purported by the state to have occurred; almost a
    week after the alleged crime date. Such evidence should be suspected,
    inadmissible and suppressed. The complainant never liked me and
    would do everything her mother told her in order to get rid of me. The
    complainant has a deep record of lies telling and false pretense from her
    school records. Failure by the state to thoroughly investigate and
    suppress the evidence illegally acquired led to a wrongful conviction
    which should be overturned and dismissed as no crime was ever
    14
    committed. The entire case was a setup orchestrated by complainant's
    mother whom petitioner was dating and was at the point of breaking up
    with her to go out of state and attend nursing school, when she pressed
    false allegations against petitioner in retaliation to his breaking up with
    her and personally handed evidence to the police almost a week from the
    date of the alleged crime in her own house, a location about 20 miles
    from petitioner's apartment where the alleged crime is purported to have
    happened. Suppression ofevidence especially illegally acquired is
    required under Texas law. Under federal law, suppression of evidence
    is not always necessary just because police violate the knock-and-
    announce rules. Hudson v. Michigan, 
    547 U.S. 586
    (2006, Kennedy, J.,
    concurring in the judgment). However, there is no "federal
    exclusionary" statute. Under federal law, the exclusionary rule is
    exclusively common law and can be changed by the courts. Weeks v.
    U.S., 
    232 U.S. 383
    (1914). In Texas, the exclusionary rule is statutory
    and requires suppression of evidence where the legal or Constitutional
    rights of the suspect are violated by the illegal collection of evidence.
    The CCP states in relevant part: Art. 38.23. EVIDENCE NOT TO BE
    15
    USED, (a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in
    violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of
    Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America,
    shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any
    criminal case. Evidence in this case was tainted by complainant's mother
    ' who had promised to destroy petitioner's life in a printed out text
    message; which the court of appeal has. Evidence was not collected on
    the purported date included in the indictment. Complainant was also not
    wearing the clothes which her mother personally handed to the police
    officer informing him that he would find evidence in them. The
    complainant was not even present at the scene when evidence was being
    handed to the police by complainant's mother whom I was dating. All of
    these happened right after the complainant's mother had been intimate
    with petitioner, which she admitted in court under oath and even had
    access to the condom they shared in her house; not at the petitioner's
    apartment where the alleged assault is purported to have occurred. The
    indictment states that the alleged crime occurred on or around April 3
    2012 at petitioner's apartment but evidence was personally handed to the
    16
    police by petitioner's girlfriend almost a week later in her house where
    she always got intimate with petitioner. The evidence in this case should
    have been suppressed based on these findings, unfortunately, that never
    happened. Failure to suppress the evidence led to a wrongful and unfair
    conviction and should be overturned. I implore the honorable court to
    grant this for I am innocent of any wrong doing or violation of the law.
    2. The Court of Appeals' ruling that petitioner's appeal has no
    arguable grounds for review and that the appeal is frivolous is
    incorrect and therefore not grounds to ignore the requirements of
    CCP art. 38.23. and Ch. 14-27.10
    Petitioner was unfairly charged and the case was not proven beyond
    reasonable doubt as stipulated by our law. The appeals court misapplied
    precedent and misconstrued statute. Proof of sexual assault and
    penetration requirements must be met as per Ch. 14-27.10 of the CCP
    and that tainted evidence should not be adduced in trial as per CCP art.
    38.23. These are pertinent legal elements that apply to my case and are
    arguable grounds especially on a case of this nature. The medical exam
    17
    showed no physical evidence of sexual assault, no epithelial tissue cells
    from petitioner on evidence tendered, no hair, no bruises, no redness or
    tearing. The dates stipulated on the indictment are completely different
    from the dates that evidence was collected. False testimony that is easily
    proven and inconsistent statements by complainant are all grounds for an
    appeal, including the failure to suppress illegally obtained evidence that
    was tainted are serious grounds for an appeal as per our laws.
    3. The improper jury charge resulted in a wrongful conviction. The
    improper and untrue jury charge resulted in a wrongful conviction. The
    Jury charged and convicted petitioner with sexual assault by penetration
    which was untrue and unfounded contrary to Ch. 14-27.10 of the CCP
    which requires proof of penetration and be proven beyond reasonable
    doubt. Even when there was a hung jury twice, and there was no
    evidence what-so-ever physically and no epithelial cells from
    petitioner's skin cells was found on evidence tendered; which would
    normally have triggered an actual innocence probe on the part of the
    jury, and cleared petitioner of any wrong doing. Nothing was ever
    18
    proven because no crime was ever committed. The prosecution wanted a
    conviction by all means possible, not caring about the innocence of the
    petitioner or even a proof beyond reasonable doubt as stipulated by
    statute. The illegal acquisition of evidence was not questioned by any
    authority and was used to convince the jury into an unfair conviction.
    This conviction cannot stand.
    4. Inconsistent statements and lies under oath (perjury) made by the
    complainant contrary to sections 37.06 and 37.02 of the CCP leading to
    a conviction. When the complainant was asked by the medical examiner
    if petitioner had touched her in any part of her body, she said no but
    during trial she answered, yes and went ahead to say that petitioner had
    assaulted her on the 3rd of April 2012 and that she had told her mother
    the same day and they had proceeded to the police that same day, when
    asked during cross examination; is clearly not true as court records show
    that all of that was tendered almost a week later after complainant's
    mother had acquired her illegal and tainted evidence, and coached
    complainant on what to tell the police. The State's pretrial investigative
    19
    procedure was so impermissibly suggestive that it created false
    testimony while suppressing exculpatory evidence [Ex parte Bradley,
    781 SW2d 886,894 (Crim. App. 1989)]
    5. Tampering with and fabricating evidence (tainted) by
    complainant's mother contrary to sec. 37.09 of the CCP leading to a
    conviction. Evidence in this case was improperly and illegally collected.
    Complainant's mother who was dating petitioner personally called the
    police on a day not mentioned in the indictment and handed them some
    clothing supposed to belong to her daughter, who was not wearing them
    and was not even present when the clothing was being collected by the
    police in her house and not petitioner's apartment. Petitioner's apartment
    is supposed to be the alleged crime scene, yet evidence was collected
    miles away from a third party without complainant wearing them.
    Tampering with such evidence and personally handing them to the
    police was a clear violation of the law and led to an illegal conviction. I
    pray that the higher court see these facts and reverse this unfair
    conviction. Complainant's mother knowing full well that she had
    20
    tampered with the clothes she was handing over to the police, made sure
    she personally handed a shirt, pant, and panties, saying that the police
    would find evidence in them. This malicious act of complainant's
    mother is totally illicit and that evidence was not ordered suppressed by
    the trial court, leading to a conviction. This evidence was never collected
    at the alleged crime scene, not even on the alleged day of the purported
    assault. This conviction cannot stand.
    6. Jury probes and the failure to raise a valid legal claim that
    necessarily would have resulted in a reversal apparently also constitutes
    ineffective assistance by trial and appellate Counsels see Ex parte
    Daigle, 
    848 S.W.2d 691
    , 692 (Crim. App. 1993) Although there is no
    limit to the acts and omissions of defense counsel that may give rise to a
    colorable claim of ineffective assistance, the following is a compilation
    of some of the most common areas in which relief has been granted: 1.
    Failure to object to inadmissible evidence:
    Inadmissible hearsay [Alvarado v. State, 775S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex.
    Crim. App.—SanAntonio 1989, pet. ref.)]." Petitioner's trial attorney
    21
    failed to object to evidence tendered at trial, and fundamental error when
    during cross examination of the complainant she insisted that she had
    reported the alleged sexual assault to her mother and they had proceeded
    to the police and then to the hospital that same day. There was no sign of
    sexual assault or proof of penetration in this case. The omission and
    failure to object to fundamental error, led to a wrongful conviction.
    Appellate counsel after receiving a letter from petitioner about this error
    still failed to mention it in his Anders' brief including petitioner's
    grounds for his appeal. Appellate counsel failed to look at the crucial
    aspects pointed out to him by petitioner about the tainted evidence and
    false testimony, but went ahead to ask for $7500 before any
    representation what-so-ever. Please see his letter to petitioner about this
    issue with court of appeal. Leaving an offense element out of a jury
    charge, verdict, such as penetration is a "fundamental error" and
    always results in reversal of a conviction), Sanchez v. State, 
    182 S.W.3d 34
    (Tex.App. - SanAntonio 2005), affirmed
    209 S.W.3d 34
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)(same). In this case, the jury charge was unfair
    and improper because it was only charged with requiring the State to
    22
    prove elements [1A] and [IB] of the offense. The indictment contains
    the relevant portion of the Jury Charge in this case complainant. These
    errors are sometimes called "egregious errors." Courts assess harm from
    such errors carefully, and decide whether they: (1) affect the very basis
    of the case, (2) deprive the defense of a valuable right [such as having
    the jury charged using correct law?], or vitally affect a defensive theory.
    Warner v. State, 
    245 S.W.3d 458
    , 462 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). See also
    Taylor v. State, 
    332 S.W.3d 483
    , 489 (Tex.Crim.App. 201 l)(same) and
    Almanazv. State, 
    686 S.W.2d 157
    , 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985)(case
    discussing the process for addressing jury charge errors). This analysis
    was not performed by the Court of Appeals and trial court. See
    Appellant's Brief. These errors cannot be under looked.
    A defendant does not have to overcome the possibility that the jury may
    have ruled as it did because of the evidence; that is another fool's errand
    and contrary to actual law: It is also well established that a conviction
    based on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the
    circumstances do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except
    that ofthe guilt ofthe accused, and proof amounting only to a strong
    23
    suspicion or mere probability is insufficient. Waldon v. State, 
    579 S.W.2d 499
    , 502 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)(emphasis added). Here, there is
    a far more reasonable hypothesis about what is purported to have
    happened other than guilt - especially in light of the jury's question -
    which proves reasonable doubt due to insufficient evidence.
    The jury asked the question about scienter regarding the definition of
    sexual assault and penetration even though the trial court made no
    difference to their direction toward which the case was already moving.
    That is, since the jury had already inferred that petitioner intentionally
    went to his apartment under a false claim although it was well
    established that petitioner had called complainant's mother telling her he
    would need to collect his laptop for work as he had been abruptly called
    to fill in at work that night; yet, the court was merely curious as to
    whether that was something of causal ingredient to the charge. This
    makes no sense. Inferring what a jury did must be based on logic, or else
    we can just accept whatever our imaginations can dream up as a
    "reason" why they did what they did.
    24
    In that world, sufflciency-of-the-evidence review becomes entirely
    meaningless. Juries have wide latitude, but they are not altogether
    unrestrained in coming to their decisions. It defies logic to conclude that
    the jury did what the Court of Appeals purports it might have done.
    Better is to consider the logic behind the jury's question and infer from
    that the basis for its question in the first place. When that is done, it is
    clear that the jury did not believe petitioner actually did and unlawfully
    penetrate the vagina of the complainant. Then, when the trial judge
    refused to confirm that scienter was an element of the offense, they
    convicted on the single element the charge provided: [1A]
    knowledgeable penetration [IB] and force. The charge did not tell the
    jury they had to find proof of both elements of the offense, and the trial
    court failed to so inform them in response to the jury question. These are
    both fundamental, egregious errors that resulted in a conviction for
    Sexual assault of a child against a man whom the jury almost-certainly
    found had no idea if petitioner actually committed any offence against
    our laws at all. Leaving out required elements from the charge is a
    fundamental error per Z>/wfa>Mv.State,894S.W.2d330339(Tex.Crim.App.
    25
    1995), and Evans v. State, 
    606 S.W.2d 880
    , 883 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980),
    overruled o.g., Woods v. State, 653 S.W.2d (Tex.Crim.App. 1980)("A
    jury charge which authorizes a conviction without requiring the jury to
    find all of the elements of the offense charged is fundamentally
    defective"). See also 
    Sanchez, supra
    (defendant's conviction for sexual
    assault reversed because the charge did not require the jury to find that
    the defendant knew.
    26
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF
    Your honors, I humbly pray that his petition be granted and that I get
    this wrongful conviction overturned, or that a new trial is granted, and
    this unfair conviction be cleared from my record. I have difficulties
    thriving and I am in total misery for something that never actually
    happened. I have been wronged by my accusers as they set me up and I
    humbly implore the court to use insight in this matter and see that there
    was no law broken by me neither was any crime committed. I humbly
    ask to be vindicated as a result of such findings. It would require the
    help of you all as the Honorable Judges of this respectable Court, to see
    through the lies perpetrated against me by these people accusing me of
    any wrong doing using fabricated evidence against me. I ask again, for
    your bravery in standing up, against the injustices that they have done to
    me, which have irrevocably changed my life for the worse, more than
    they will ever know. The evidence adduced during, trial following its
    illegal acquisition by the police on a date not inscribed on the indictment
    speculating an alleged assault, directly from a person whom petitioner
    27
    was dating, and had problems with at the time, in her own house, clothes
    which were not being worn by complainant at the time, and complainant
    not even present when evidence was being collected, should be ordered
    suppressed. The conviction was based on tainted evidence and false
    testimony and should be reversed and judgment of acquittal ordered per
    
    Waldon* 579 S.W.2d at 502
    . The State intentionally suppressed evidence
    favorable to petitioner [Ex parte Lewis, 
    587 S.W.2d 697
    , 701 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1979)] and knowingly used perjured testimony to secure the
    applicant's conviction [Ex parte Adams,768 S.W,2d 281,293 Crim. App.
    1989)] Also, the State's pretrial investigative procedure was so
    impermissibly suggestive that it created false testimony while
    suppressing exculpatory evidence. The error in the jury charge lacking
    proof of penetration and perjured testimony cases should be corrected
    for all future cases especially in cases where penetration was clearly
    doubtful and unfounded as per the CCP 14-27.10 where proof of
    penetration and actual sexual assault in such cases is required for any
    conviction to be passed. Also where false testimony, tainted evidence
    28
    and perjury exist, relief and vindication should thrive. Petitioner also
    requests such other and further relief as is just.
    RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
    Ayunwi Meme Fuh
    14918 Havenridge dr
    Houston Tx 77083
    Memefuh400@yahoo.com
    PETITIONER
    29
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OR DELIVERY
    I hereby certify that on April 29th, 2015, a copy of the foregoing Petition
    for Discretionary Review was served on the following by certified mail,
    return receipt requested:
    Ayunwi Meme Fuh
    14918 Havenridge dr
    Houston, Texas 77083
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I hereby certify that this Petition conforms to the requirements of TRAP
    9, and consists of 4,499 words per TRAP 9.4(i)(2)(D).
    Ayunwi Meme Fuh.
    30
    IN THE TEXAS
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AYUNWI MEME FUH,
    Petitioner,
    Vs.                                                                                                                                                                No. 01-13-00494-CR
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Respondent.
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    APPENDIX -
    PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
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    Index:
    Court of Appeals Opinion dated April 9, 2015 and Judgment attached
    Jury Question and trial court's response pg. 23-26
    31
    JUDGMENT
    Court of gppeate
    Jftot Hfetritt of Cexa*
    NO. 01-13-00494-CR
    AYUNWI MEME FUH, Appellant
    . '          V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    Appeal from the 230th District Court ofHarris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 1354773).
    This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on June 5,
    2013. After submitting the case on the appellate record and the arguments properly
    raised by the parties, the Court holds that the trial court's judgment contains no reversible
    error. Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial court's judgment.
    The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.
    Judgment rendered April 9, 2015.
    Per curiam opinion delivered by panel consisting of Chief Justice Radack and Justices
    Brown and Lloyd.
    Opinion issued April 9, 2015
    In The
    Court of Appeal*
    For The
    $ ft*t JBtetrttt of Gfexa*
    NO. 01-13-00494-CR
    AYUNWI MEME FUH, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 230th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1354773
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A jury convicted appellant Ayunwi Meme Fuh of the offense of sexual
    assault of a child under seventeen years of age and assessed punishment at two
    years' confinement in TDCJ. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.011(a)(2)(A), 12.33
    (West 2011). Appellant timely filed a notice ofappeal.
    Appellant's appointed counsel on appeal has filed a motion to withdraw,
    along with abrief stating that the record presents no reversible error and the appeal
    is without merit and is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 87 S. Ct.
    1396(1967).
    Counsel's brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional
    evaluation ofthe record and supplying us with references to the record and legal
    
    authority. 386 U.S. at 744
    , 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel indicates that he has thoroughly
    reviewed the record and he is unable to advance any grounds of error that warrant
    reversal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 
    744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400
    ; Mitchell v. State, 193 '
    S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [lstDist] 2006, no pet).
    We have independently reviewed the entire record in this appeal, and we
    conclude that no reversible error exists in the record, there are no arguable grounds
    for review, and the appeal is frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 
    744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400
    (emphasizing that reviewing court—and not counsel—determines, after full
    examination of proceedings, whether appeal is wholly frivolous); Garner v. State,
    
    300 S.W.3d 763
    , 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reviewing court must determine
    whether arguable grounds for review exist); Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    ,
    826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (same); 
    Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 155
    (reviewing
    court determines whether arguable grounds exist by reviewing entire record). We
    note that an appellant may challenge aholding that there are no arguable grounds
    for appeal by filing a petition for discretionary review in the Texas Court of
    Criminal Appeals. See 
    Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827
    & n.6.
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court and grant counsel's motion to
    withdraw.1 Attorney Don R. Cantrell must immediately send appellant the
    required notice and file acopy of the notice with the Clerk of this Court. See TEX.
    R. App. P. 6.5(c). All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of ChiefJustice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd.
    Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
    Appointed counsel still has aduty to inform appellant of the result of this appeal
    and that he may, on his own, pursue discretionary review in the Texas Court of
    Criminal Appeals. See Ex Parte Wilson, 
    956 S.W.2d 25
    , 27 (Tex. Crim App