Arkadi Minassian v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-14-00966-CR
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
5/29/2015 10:21:46 AM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 01-14-00966-CR
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 5/29/2015 10:21:46 AM
FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
OF TEXAS AT
HOUSTON, TEXAS
ARKANDI MINNASSIAN
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appealed from the District Court
of Harris County, Texas
338th Judicial District
Cause No. 1300894
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appellant Requests
Oral Argument
DOUGLAS M. DURHAM
State Bar Number: 06278450
2800 Post Oak Boulevard Suite 4100
Houston, Texas 77056
(832) 390 2252 Telephone
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 38.1(a), the following is a list of all interested
parties in this cause:
1. ARKANDI MINNASSIAN- Appellant
2. Sam Adamo - Trial Counsel for Appellant during MTS
and Plea of Guilty
3200 Travis Street, Fourth Floor
Houston, Texas 77006
2a. Gary Polland- Trial Counsel for Appellant during Sentencing
2211 Norfolk, Suite 920
Houston, Texas 77098
3. Devon Anderson - District Attorney for Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
4. Ed McClees- Lead ADA for Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
5. Allan Curry, Chief Appellate Division, District
Attorney’s Office for Harris County, Texas 1201
Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77056
/s/ Douglas M. Durham
DOUGLAS M. DURHAM
State Bar Number: 06278450
2800 Post Oak Boulevard Suite 4100
Houston, Texas 77056
(832) 390 2252
Appellant’s Counsel on Appeal
ii
TABLE OF
CONTENTS Page
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………..iii
Index of Authorities (Cases)……………………………………………………..vi
Constitutions and Statues………………………………………………………..vii
Preliminary Statement…………………………………………………………….1
Statement Regarding Oral Argument……………………………………………..3
Appellant Waives Requests Oral Argument……………………………………...3
Questions Presented…………………………………………………………….3-4
WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT
AND SEARCH OF A LAPTOP FOUND IN VEHICLE, WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS
UNREASONABLE AND VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?
WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT
AND SEARCH OF A LAPTOP FOUND IN VEHICLE, WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES,
VIOLATED § 14.03(a) OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE?
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE SUPPRESSION
HEARING?
WHETHER APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS
INVOLUNTARY?
Statement of Facts…………………………………………………………………4
iii
First Point of Error………………………………………………………………...6
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT AND SEARCH
OF A LAPTOP FOUND IN VEHICLE, WITHOUT PROBABLE
CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS
UNREASONABLE AND VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Factual Summary…………………………………………………………………6
Argument and Authorities………………………………………………………..6
Second Point of Error ……………………………………………………………7
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT AND SEARCH
OF A LAPTOP FOUND IN VEHICLE, WITHOUT PROBABLE
CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, VIOLATED §
14.03(a) OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Factual Summary………………………………………………………………..13
Argument and Authorities……………………………………………………….14
Third Point of Error……………………………………………………………….
APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY
Factual Summary…………………………………………………………………13
Argument and Authority…………………………………………………………14
Fourth Point of Error…………………………………………………………..….16
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DURING
THE SUPPRESSION HEARING
Factual Summary…………………………………………………………………16
Argument and Authorities………………………………………………………16
iv
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….21
Certificate of Service……………………………………………………………22
v
AUTHORITY Page
Abercrombie v. State, 528 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)………….……. .10
Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d. 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)………….………….. 12
Bellah v. State, 641 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App-El Paso 1982), affirmed 653 S.W.2d
795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ………………………………...……………………10
Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)………………………… 8
Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) …………………13
Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990)………………………...18
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)………………………………………. 8
Dixon v. State, 206 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2006)………………………… 9
Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)………….………………11
Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)……………………...… 17
Ex Parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). ………………………17
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013)……………………………………..17
Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)………….….…………. 13
Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)…………………...….. 5
Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)…………..……. 17
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)…………………………..………………… 17
vi
Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431(Tex. Crim. App. 1998)…………………...……… 5
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)…………………………………………….. 8
Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)………………….. 4
Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)…...…………………. 7, 14
Keith v. State, 975S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1998, no pet.)…………… .4
Loesh v. State, 958 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)…………………..……. 12
Lowery v. State, 843 S.W.2 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd.) …………9, 10
Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
ref’d) …………………………………………………………………………..… 18
Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) …………………………12
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)…………………………………8, 11, 13
Smith v. State, 227 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)……………...………. ….3
Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d)....4
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)……………………….……..15, 17
Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)………………………...5
U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)……………………………………..…….7, 9, 14
Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)…………………....13
Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963)……………………………………..…....16
vii
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES Page
TEX. R. CRIM. PRO. § 14.03(a)…………………………..……………...…4, 11
TEX. R. CRIM. PRO. § 37.07……………………………………………...…….3
TEX. PENAL CODE §32.51 (b) (2013)……….…..……………..………………2
TEX. R. App. P. 33.1 (a) …………………………………………………..…. 13
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)………………………………………………..……… 4
TEX. R. APP. P. 9(i)(2)(B) …………………...…………..………………….....22
TEX. R. CRIM. PRO. § 14.03(a)(1)….…….…………………………… 8, 14, 15
TEX. R. APP. P. 9(l)(3)……………………………………….………….20
U. S. CONST. AMEND. IV……………………………………………4, 8
viii
NO. 14-13-01086-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
ARKANDI MINNASSIAN
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appealed from the District Court
of Harris County, Texas
338th Judicial District
Cause No. 1300894
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, ARKANDI MINNASSIAN, Appellant in the above
styled and numbered cause and would show the Court as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from an adverse ruling on a pre-trial Motion to Suppress,
1
subsequent guilty plea and sentence1 of thirty (30) years in prison for the offense of
“Fraudulent Possession of Identifying Information” as proscribed by the TEX.
PENAL CODE §32.51 (b) (2013). On the 26th day of May 2011, the 178th grand
jury of Harris County, Texas returned a one (1) paragraph indictment against the
Appellant, in Cause Number 1300894, alleging in paragraph one (1) [omitting the
formal parts] that:
…in Harris County, Texas, ARKANDI MINNASSIAN, hereafter styled
the Defendant, heretofore on or about March 29, 2011, did then and there
unlawfully, with the intent to defraud harm another, possess fifty or more pieces
of identifying information, to wit: an electronic identification number of HUAN
HO, CHRIS CELANO, WLIFREDO ARRENDONDO, WEIGUO YIN,
WAYNE STOKER, HI URANAND GANGWANI, JIAJIAN ZHONG,
GEORGE DILLARD, RONNY LIN, FORREST MORRJS, PRAKASH
SHAH, JAVED SYED, JOSEPH GAY, GARY KERR. MICHAEL
PERDUE, MOSHIN KASAMALI, ALVIN DOUGHTY, THOMAS
DEWITT, TIIOMAS WEHLAGE, TRANG MAI, CHAI-CHU HSU,
CHERYL HODGESON, TARIQ SIDDIQUE, EDWARD WONG, STEPHANIE
GRIFFIN, MANUEL GODINEZ, DANNY GOZA, ZAHR ALI, LARRY
LIN, SAMMY TILLISON, TIMOTHY HARRIS, RANDALL
GARDNER, JEFFREY CONDIT, SANDEEPREDDY EADULA,
EMILIA COLIN, LI RUIZ, EVA WADE, BILLY CASH , QUAN TON,
NANCY VALENTON, SATISH PASARTI, JUNNAHVEE BENSON,
BRIAN BOYD, SHEIH CHEN, SHAZAD RAJAN, LINDA HEATH,
CHRISTOPHER BRAVO, VOJISLAV LABOVJC, RIAZ DHARANT,
RONALD HOWARD, LUCIO VILLEGAS, ORANIT THUNYODOM,
SALEEM MOMINKHOJA, JOHN CHEYNEY, PAMELA NEWTON, ERNEST
RICHTER, living adult persons, without said persons' consent. (CR-I; p. 16).
On April 22, 2013 the Court granted over objection of trial counsel, the State’s
1
The Court sentenced Appellant without a plea agreement following a pre-sentence report.
2
motion to amend the indictment, specifically: adding after the date of April 29,
2011, the words “pursuant to one scheme and continuing course of conduct” and
deleting the words “an electronic identification number” and replacing with the words “a
telecommunication access device.” (CR-I; p. 17 and RR-II; p. 4-13). On May 5, 2014,
Appellant, following a hearing and adverse ruling on his Motion to Suppress,
Appellant executed a waiver of certain constitutional rights (among them his right
to a jury trial, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses) and entered a plea
of guilty without an agreed recommendation regarding punishment. (CR-I; p. 479,
493 and RR-III; p. 5-33). Thereafter the matter was reset for preparation of a Pre-
sentence report and sentencing hearing. (CR-I; p. 479, 493 and RR-III; p. 5-33).
On October 28, 2015, the Court heard and granted Appellant’s Motion to
Substitute Attorney Gary Polland for Attorney Sam Adamo. (RR-IV; p. 1-7). On
November 7, 2013, the Court conducted a hearing regarding Appellant’s
Objections to the Pre-sentence Report 2. (RR-V; p. 2-5). On November 18, 2013,
after a punishment hearing the Court sentenced Appellant to thirty (30) years in
2
Appellant’s counsel (Gary Polland) objected to the PSI report containing “extraneous
offense” evidence. (RR-V; p. 2-5). Specifically, to a “Nevada case that was never filed.” (RR-
VI; p. 7). Where a PSI report contains information regarding extraneous offenses, Section 3(a)(1)
of Article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits a trial court, as a sentencing
entity, to consider extraneous misconduct evidence in assessing punishment, even though the
extraneous offense has not been shown to have been committed by the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt. Smith v. State, 227 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
3
prison3. (CR-I; p. 557 and RR-VI; p. 1-22). On May 5, 2014, the Court signed a
written certification of Appellant’s Right to Appeal, stating “that this criminal case
is not a plea bargain case and the Defendant has a right to appeal.” (CR-I; p. 588).
On November 18, 2013, Appellant filed in writing timely notice of appeal. (CR-I;
p. 560).
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT
AND SEARCH OF A LAPTOP FOUND IN VEHICLE, WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS
UNREASONABLE AND VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?
WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT
AND SEARCH OF A LAPTOP FOUND IN VEHICLE, WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES,
VIOLATED § 14.03(a) OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE?
3
Appellant was eligible for probation and his co-defendant, Arin Mehrabian was sentenced
to 15 years in prison. (RR-VII; p. 40). Texas courts have traditionally held that if the punishment
assessed is within the range of punishment established by the legislature under its constitutional
authority, there is no violation of the state or federal prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment. Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Further, no
objection was made by trial counsel at time of sentencing as to an Eighth Amendment violation
and to the extent that the issue had merit it was waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Keith v.
State, 975S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1998, no pet.); Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d 300
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d).
4
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE DURING THE SUPPRESSION HEARING?
WHETHER APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS
INVOLUNTARY?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 5, 2014, a hearing on Appellant’s Motion to Suppress 4 filed
by attorney of record Sam Adamo on December 15, 2011, was held by the
Court. (CR-I; p. 72 and RR-III; p. 1-43). No witnesses were called during
the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. (RR-III; p. 6). State’s Exhibit 200
(Federal Search Warrant and Affidavit under Seal) and State’s Exhibit
201 (Order Unsealing Federal Search Warrant) were both admitted
without objection. (RR-III; p. 7 and State’s Exhibits 200 and 201). The
relevant parts of probable cause affidavit attached to the Federal Search
4
An earlier Motion to Suppress was filed on June 9, 2011 and signed by Appellant’s
counsel Bruce Kaye. (CR-I; p. 35).The Motion had no order attached and appears no ruling was
entered on this Motion by the Court. (CR-I; p. 46). Without obtaining an adverse ruling, all
argument asserted in this Motion to Suppress are not preserved. See Thomas v. State, 408
S.W.3d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Appellant’s Motion to Suppress filed by Sam Adamo,
dated December 15, 2011 stated “The United States Constitution amendment IV and Texas
Constitution Article 1, section 9, prohibit unreasonable searches, seizures, and arrests.” The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held “that similarities of the search and seizure provisions
in the State and Federal Constitutions, the United States Supreme Court may be permissive
authority in interpreting the Texas Constitution.” Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431(Tex. Crim. App.
1998). Although Texas Appellate Courts are not bound by federal case law in their analysis of
the protections provided by the Texas Constitution Article 1, section 9, Appellant has found no
authority to support the argument that the Texas Constitution Article 1, section 9, provides
greater protection that the Fourth Amendment. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) and cases interpreting Heitman.
5
Warrant purporting to establish probable cause are as following:
“I believe there is probable cause that the above listed property
contains the items set forth on Attachment B, hereto, such items
constituting evidence, fruits, and property designed for or intended to
be used in violations of: Title 18, United States Code ( U SC) Section
1029 ( Access Device Fraud) and 18 USC § 1028 (Identification
Documents). I am a Special Agent of the United States Secret
Service assigned to the Houston Field Office, and employed since
November 2006.
This case originated on 03/25/11, when I was contacted by
Special Agent (SA) Troy Sarria, United States Secret Service
(USSS), Dallas Field Office, regarding an on-going case in their
district involving gas pump skimmers. Through his investigation, SA
Sarria determined Minassian is involved in an organized crime ring
responsible for distributing highly sophisticated gas pump skimmers
to several cities and downloading the credit card numbers, initially
thought to be through Bluetooth devices later determined to be via
Zigbee Radio technologies…
SA Sarria stated he received information that Minassian
would be traveling from Dallas, TX to Houston, TX, on 03/29/11,
and departing on 03/30/11. SA Sarria stated Minassian was traveling
under the alias Ashot Aslanyan. On 03/28/11, Sgt. Gorski, HPD and
Houston Area Fraud Task Force member, was notified 4 skimmers
were found in 4 different gas pumps at a Valero gas station located at
11499 Beamer Rd., Houston, TX 77089…
On 3/29/2011 HAFTF conducted surveillance of Minassian
upon his arrival into Bush Intercontinental Airport. Minassian
departed the airport riding in the passenger seat of a white Nissan
Armada, California License Plate (LP) 5GRC174, registered to Arin
Mehrabian. Minassian and the driver, later determined to be Arin
Mehrabian, drove to the Valero gas station, located at 2404 Bay Area
Blvd. Neither the driver nor the passenger attempted to get gas, and
approximately 2-3 minutes later, the Nissan Armada departed the
scene in an erratic behavior and at a high rate of speed. Mobile
surveillance was discontinued.
Continuing on this date, members of the HAFTF conducted
stationary surveillance at the Valero gas station, 11499Beamer Rd.
6
The Nissan Armada, LP 5GRC174, was observed driving up to the
gas station pump and again, neither the driver or the passenger
attempted to pump gas. Members of the HAFTF arrested Minassian
and Mehiabian without incident. Search incident to arrest revealed an
open, powered on, laptop in the passenger seat area, an additional
laptop, 2 GPS devices, 6 universal keys for gas pumps, several cell
phones, double sided tape, 2 thumb drives, and a USB radio
receiver/transmitter device...
Due to the risk of losing the data stored on the computers, the
laptops were immediately examined by SA Sparks. Approximately
10,000 credit card numbers and names associated with these
numbers were discovered. Efforts are on-going to examine the
eight (8) skimmers found at the aforementioned pumps… (RR-
VII; p. 25-30).
Further, the Appellant offered (Defendant’s Exhibit 1-Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Suppress) admitted without objection. (CR-I; p. 464 and
RR-III; p. 8). Appellant’s “Summary of Argument” (Defendant’s
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and Response to State’s Brief)
was as follows:
“Officers had neither authority to seize Defendant nor to search
his car without a warrant. The State argues that the warrantless search
and seizure were authorized pursuant to the following: (1) a Federal
Search Warrant issued six days after officers unlawfully arrested
Defendant and unlawfully seized his property; (2) the automobile
exception 5 to the warrant requirement; or (3) as a search incident to
5
Under the automobile exception, law enforcement officials may conduct a warrantless
search of a vehicle if it is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe that it contains
contraband. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The mobility of vehicles
generally creates an exigency. U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). But see Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473 (2014) which suggests police must have warrant to search a cell phone or computer
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest.
7
arrest. Contrary to the State's arguments, the Defendant will
demonstrate the illegality of the State's actions on the following grounds:
(i) no probable cause existed at the time of the search to authorize a
warrantless search under the automobile exception; (ii) no probable
cause exists within the four comers of the Federal Search Warrant
Affidavit; (iii) Officers were not authorized to execute a warrantless
arrest because they did not have probable cause to execute the arrest, and
the arrest did not take place in a suspicious place as required by Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 14.03(a)(l); and (iv) because
officers were not authorized to execute a warrantless arrest, they could
not execute a valid search incident to the arrest.” (RR-VII; p. 56-57).
FIRST POINT OF ERROR
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT AND SEARCH
OF A LAPTOP FOUND IN VEHICLE, WITHOUT PROBABLE
CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS
UNREASONABLE AND VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Appellant adopts the same facts as alleged in the Statement of Facts.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
The state must show the existence of probable cause (at the time of the
warrantless arrest or search) and circumstances which made the procuring of a
warrant impracticable. Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
citing [Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 1969]. Probable cause to search exists
when the totality of the circumstances provides an officer or magistrate with a
substantial basis for concluding that there is a fair probability of finding
8
contraband or evidence at a particular location. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983). Probable cause "must be grounded on facts within the knowledge of the
officer, which in the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable."
U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Probable cause does not exist when a person
"whose identity, reliability, credibility, or basis of knowledge is unestablished,
[and he gives] information concerning criminal activity. Lowery v. State, 843
S.W.2 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd.). Gates requires a court to look at
the totality of the circumstances when addressing whether a hearsay tip from a
confidential informant provides an officer or magistrate with probable cause.
Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals applies the following factors to determi ne
whether a confidential informant's tip provides probable cause: whether the
evidence established that (1) the confidential informant was credible and
reliable; (2) the confidential informant was relaying freshly obtained, personally
observed information; and (3) the confidential informant provided a wealth of
verifiable details. Dixon v. State, 206 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2006). When
dealing with hearsay from an unnamed confidential informant, the proven
reliability and credibility of the informant are "highly relevant" considerations.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 231. A conclusory, barebones statement about the
reliability and credibility of an informant is inadequate. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
9
Where the officer has no prior experience with the confidential informant,
the court may look to other facts to determine the reliability and credibility,
such as criminal record, employment history, and reputation in the community.
Abercrombie v. State , 528 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Bellah v. State
, 641 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App-El Paso 1982), affirmed 653 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983).
In Dixon, supra., the informant had been 1) reliable in the past (informant had
given information on at least five previous occasions that had led to arrests); 2) the
information about the suspect was sufficiently detailed (informant told police the
suspect’s name, location, physical appearance, description of “suspect vehicle”
with license plate number, and that he had personally observed the suspect in
possession of rock cocaine); 3) the information was verifiable (police went to
location and observed suspect siting in car matching the physical description of
suspect and make and license plate of car).
By contrast, in Lowery v. State, 843 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1992), the
Court found there was no basis to conclude that the informant was credible or his
information reliable. The information provided was conclusory (informant said he
had seen people in suspect’s house that were high and he believed that a female in
house was exchanging sex for drugs). The Court concluded that these facts were
10
not of sufficient detail to be verified.
Here, the informant’s tip that Appellant was involved in “an organized
crime ring responsible for distributing highly sophisticated gas pump skimmers”
was nothing more than a conclusory statement. The fact that gas pump skimmers were
previously found at the same gas stations where Appellant was later observed, does
not establish “a substantial basis for concluding” that Appellant was engaged in
unlawful activity. The reference that Agent Sarria “received information” regarding
Appellant’s “traveling from Dallas, TX to Houston, TX, on 03/29/11, and
departing on 03/30/11” fails to establish: (1) the confidential informant was
credible and reliable; (2) the confidential informant was relaying freshly
obtained, personally observed information; and (3) the confidential informant
provided a wealth of verifiable details.”
Lastly, assuming arguendo that the “informant’s tip” was sufficiently verified
by police surveillance to provide probable cause for a “warrantless arrest.” The
United States Supreme Court has recently ruled that “police officers generally
cannot, search digital information on cell phones or computers seized from
defendants as an incident to a lawful arrest, without a search warrant. Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
11
SECOND POINT OF ERROR
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF APPELLANT VIOLATED
§14.03 (a) OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
Texas law imposes a general requirement, subject to exception, that arrests
be made pursuant to arrest warrants. Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003). Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits the warrantless arrest of an
individual when: 1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances
which reasonable show that such persons have been guilty of some felony,
violation of title 9, chapter 42, Penal Code, breach of the peace, or offense under
49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the
laws.” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted Article 14.03(a)(1), in
Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), as the functional
equivalent of probable cause. Where facts were as consistent with innocent activity
as with criminal activity, the arrest of a suspect based on those facts is unlawful
under Article 14.03 (a) (1). Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d. 407 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991). Judge Cochran in her concurring opinion in Dyar v. State, supra., reasoned
that analysis of Article 14.03 (a) (1), should be consistent with federal cases
12
applying the “exigent circumstances doctrine” and is the appropriate “analytical
framework for future fact scenarios under the statute.”
Here, Appellant’s conduct, as a mere passenger in a car observed driving to
and from gas pumps at two gas stations, is equally consistent with innocent
activity6 and fails to establish probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying
a warrantless arrest of Appellant and search of the lap top as an incident thereto.
Loesh v. State, 958 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). See also Riley v.
California 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
THIRD POINT OF ERROR
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL DURING THE SUPPRESSION HEARING
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Appellant adopts the same facts as alleged in the Statement of Facts.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
A motion to suppress is nothing more than a specialized objection to the
admissibility of evidence. Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the
6
Appellant and his driver could have been using the gas station as a stopping point in order
to look at a map or GPS device in order to orient themselves, while in route to some other
destination.
13
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the
ruling desired. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). A defendant’s appellate contention must
comport with the specific objection made at trial. Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346,
349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). An objection stating one legal theory may not be
used to support a different legal theory on appeal. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d
912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
Appellant’s the Motion to Suppress, filed by Sam Adamo on December 15,
2011 argued that: “The United States Constitution amendment IV and Texas
Constitution Article 1, section 9, prohibit unreasonable searches, seizures, and
arrests.” (CR-I; p. 72). “Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23 prohibits
introduction of evidence obtained in violation of these constitutional provisions.”
(CR-I; p. 72). “(A) The warrantless arrest was not authorized under Chapter 14 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and contravened the constitutional protections of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article One, Section Nine of the Texas Constitution.” (CR-I; p. 72). Specifically,
citing “Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 14.03(a)(1)” and arguing: (i)
“the present facts are insufficient to give officers probable cause to arrest
Appellant; (ii) “the suspicious places requirement is not met; (iii) Officer’s had
ample time to procure an arrest warrant; (B) The Search and Seizure of the
14
computer’s violated Appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and fails to fall
within an exception to the warrant requirement infringing on Appellant’s
Constitutional Rights.” (CR-I; p. 73-75). Appellant’s “Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Suppress…” filed by Sam Adamo on May 5, 2014, argued: “Officers
had neither authority to seize Defendant nor to search his car without a warrant.
The State argues that the warrantless search and seizure were authorized
pursuant to the following: (1) a Federal Search Warrant issued six days after
officers unlawfully arrested Defendant and unlawfully seized his property; (2)
the automobile exception 7 to the warrant requirement; or (3) as a search incident
to arrest. Contrary to the State's arguments, the Defendant will demonstrate the
illegality of the State's actions on the following grounds: (i) no probable cause
existed at the time of the search to authorize a warrantless search under the
automobile exception; (ii) no probable cause exists within the four corners of
the Federal Search Warrant Affidavit; (iii) Officers were not authorized to
execute a warrantless arrest because they did not have probable cause to execute
the arrest, and the arrest did not take place in a suspicious place as required by
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 14.03(a)(l); and (iv) because officers
7
Under the automobile exception, law enforcement officials may conduct a warrantless
search of a vehicle if it is readily mobile (exigent circumstance) and there is probable cause to
believe that it contains contraband. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). See
also U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
15
were not authorized to execute a warrantless arrest, they could not execute a
valid search incident to the arrest.” (CR-I; p. 464-465).
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show that
his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
second that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant's case. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Trial counsel’s argument, in his
Memorandum in support of the Motion to suppress, that “no probable cause exists
within the four corners of the Federal Search Warrant Affidavit” further asserts
“the Federal Magistrate Judge did not have a substantial basis upon which to find
that the facts stated within the four corners of the affidavit gave officers probable
cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found in the Defendant’s
possession.” (CR-I; p. 474). However, he does not address the facts recited in the
affidavit that:
“…Due to the risk of losing the data stored on the computers, the laptops
were immediately examined by SA Sparks. Approximately10,000 credit
card numbers and names associated with these numbers were
discovered.”
The information regarding the credit cards names and numbers found in the lap
tops was a fact that appeared within the four corners of the search warrant
affidavit. Regardless, in Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963) the Supreme
16
Court has made clear that any evidence that is obtained by the “exploitation of an
illegality” may not be used as evidence. Here Appellant’s counsel, failed to argue
that the information recovered by the warrantless search of both laptops (names
and credit card numbers) was tainted and the fruit of the poisonous tree. 8 Without
the inclusion of those facts in the search warrant affidavit, the search warrant
affidavit fails to establish probable cause. 9 See also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409 (2013);[where warrantless entry by dog and canine officer into curtiliage of
home and reportedly positive dog sniff tainted probable cause recited in warrant].
To the extent trial counsel failed to specifically argue this legal theory (regarding
the specific manner and means that the federal search warrant was invalid), he has
waived this theory on appeal.
Accordingly, Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel during the
suppression hearing.
FOURTH POINT OF ERROR
APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Appellant adopts the same facts as alleged in the Statement of Facts.
8
See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
9
Appellant’s arrest was unlawful and entry and search of laptops was unlawful for reasons
asserted under points of error one and two in this Brief.
17
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
A defendant's election to plead guilty when based upon erroneous advice of
counsel is not done voluntarily and knowingly. Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The test for ineffective assistance of counsel during the
plea bargaining process is to show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and that this deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Ex Parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987). In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the
plea process, this court must apply the Strickland test. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The
test requires that the defendant demonstrate that (1) counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). “Reasonable probability” means a “probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Strickland’s second prong carries a lower
burden of proof than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard applicable to
the first prong. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990).
Appellant need not show that counsel’s deficient performance “more likely than
18
not altered the outcome of the case.” Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). Instead, Appellant satisfies the
prejudice requirement of Strickland by showing “a reasonable probability” that
absent counsel’s erroneous advice, Appellant would not have entered his plea.
Without it, the factual basis to support the Court’s finding of Appellant’s guilt is
legally insufficient.
Here, the evidence presented during the Motion for New Trial established, “to
a reasonable probability” that Appellant did not believe his trial counsel was
prepared for the suppression hearing or trial. After the adverse ruling on the
Motion to Suppress, he felt pressured by his trial counsel to enter a plea of guilty,
and erroneously believed, if convicted by a jury (after a trial), that the Judge was
the exclusive decision maker regarding his sentence. Appellant was led to believe
if he went to trial and was convicted he would receive a more severe sentence
than if he entered a plea of guilty. He was led to believe that if he entered a plea
of guilty he would get a sentence of less than twenty (20) years. (MNT-IV;
Exhibit D; p. 287-290 and MNT-IV; Exhibit F; p. 294-295).
19
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Appellant’s case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Douglas M. Durham
DOUGLAS M. DURHAM
State Bar Number: 06278450
2800 Post Oak Boulevard Suite 4100
Houston, Texas 77056
Telephone (832) 390 2252
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing Appellant's Brief was served on Assistant
Criminal District Attorney by hand delivery on this the 29th
day of May, 2015.
/s/ Douglas M. Durham
DOUGLAS M. DURHAM
21
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that pursuant to Tex. R. Of App. Procedure
9(l)(3), that the number of words in this Brief is less than 15,000
words to wit: 5507 words, in compliance with Tex. R. Of App.
Procedure, 9(i)(2)(B) on this the 29TH day of May, 2015.
/s/ Douglas M. Durham
DOUGLAS M. DURHAM
22