Barnard, Ronnie MacK ( 2015 )

PD-0524-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
PD-0524-15 AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 6/8/2015 8:21:43 AM
Accepted 6/8/2015 4:23:47 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
NO.
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
RONNIE MACK BARNARD
Appellant
v.
STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee
APPELLANT’S PETITION
FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Petition from the 54th Judicial District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Number 2013-631-C2 and
Cause Number 07-13-00355-CR in the Seventh Court of Appeals of Texas
LAW OFFICE OF STAN SCHWIEGER
600 Austin Avenue, Suite 12
P.O. Box 975
Waco, Texas 76703-0975
(254) 752-5678
(254) 752-7792—Facsimile
E-mail: wacocrimatty@yahoo.com
State Bar No. 17880500
June 8, 2015
NAMES OF THE PARTIES TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT
STATE OF TEXAS
Ms. Michelle L. Voirin
Ms. Gabrielle A. Massey
Assistant McLennan County District Attorneys
McLennan County District Attorney’s Office
219 North Sixth Street, Suite 200
Waco, Texas 76701
APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL
Mr. Samuel L. “Sam” Martinez
Martinez & Martinez
1105 Wooded Acres Dr., Ste 200
Waco, Texas 76710-4449
TRIAL COURT JUDGE
The Honorable Matt Johnson
54th District Court Judge
McLennan County Courthouse
Waco, Texas 76701
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
NAMES OF ALL PARTIES TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
GROUND FOR REVIEW.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
The Amarillo court of appeals erred holding an objection was necessary
for a trial court to force an election of offenses during the State’s case in
chief.
GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE RESTATED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Reason for Granting Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Factual background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
C. To request or to have entry of a sua sponte order of an in-trial election .
. . that is the question. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
APPENDIX: Barnard v. State, No. 07-13-00355-CR, 2015 WL 1566734 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Apr. 8, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
STATE CASES
Amador v. State,
275 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Barnard v. State,
No. 07-13-00355-CR, 2015 WL 1566734 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 8, 2015,
no pet. h.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4
Bates v. State,
305 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Bradley v. State,
235 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
Cosio v. State,
353 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Crawford v. State,
696 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Crosslin v. State,
235 S.W. 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5
Gigliobianco v. State,
210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Jiminez v. State,
No. 07- 07-00389-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7555 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Sept. 29, 2009, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page iii
Molina v. State,
No. 05-05-01599-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9670 (Tex. App.–Dallas Nov. 8,
2006, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
O'Neal v. State,
746 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4
Phillips v. State,
130 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004), aff'd, 193 S.W.3d
904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5
Wilson v. State,
3 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref'd). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
STATE RULES
Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 6
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page iv
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant Ronnie Mack Barnard requests that this appeal not be presented on
oral argument. The law is sufficiently settled, and as such, briefing could adequately
suffice to aid this Court in its determination of this issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State of Texas indicted Mr. Barnard in cause number 2013-631-C2 as set
forth in the chart below:1
1 Aggravated Sexual Assault of “did then and there intentionally or
a Child knowingly cause the sexual organ of E.P., a
child who was at the time younger than
fourteen (14) years of age and not the spouse
of Defendant, to contact Defendant’s sexual
organ . . .”
2 Aggravated Sexual Assault of “did then and there intentionally or
a Child knowingly cause the mouth of E.P., a child
who was at the time younger than fourteen
(14) years of age and not the spouse of
Defendant, to contact Defendant’s sexual
organ . . .”
1
The original indictment contained thirteen counts. On the date of trial, the State
abandoned counts I, VIII, and XIII. (2 R.R. at 7). The counts in the table reflect the renumbered
remaining counts.
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page v
3 Aggravated Sexual Assault of “did then and there intentionally or
a Child knowingly cause the sexual organ of E.P., a
child who was at the time younger than
fourteen (14) years of age and not the spouse
of Defendant, to contact Defendant’s sexual
organ . . .”
4 Aggravated Sexual Assault of “did then and there intentionally or
a Child knowingly cause penetration of the sexual
organ of E.P., a child who was at the time
younger than fourteen (14) years of age and
not the spouse of Defendant, by means of a
vibrator . . .”
5 Aggravated Sexual Assault of “did then and there intentionally or
a Child knowingly cause the penetration of the sexual
organ of E.P., a child who was at the time
younger than fourteen (14) years of age and
not the spouse of Defendant, by means of
Defendant’s finger . . .”
6 Indecency with a Child by “did then and there, with the intent to arouse
Contact or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
engage in sexual contact with E.P. by
touching the genitals of E.P., a child who
was at the time younger than seventeen (17)
years of age and not the spouse of
Defendant, by means of Defendant’s hand .
. .”
7 Indecency with a Child by “did then and there, with the intent to arouse
Contact or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
engage in sexual contact with E.P. by
touching the breast of E.P., a child who was
at the time younger than seventeen (17) years
of age and not the spouse of Defendant, by
means of Defendant’s hand . . .”
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page vi
8 Indecency with a Child by “did then and there, with the intent to arouse
Contact or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
engage in sexual contact with E.P. by
touching the breast of E.P., a child who was
at the time younger than seventeen (17) years
of age and not the spouse of Defendant, by
means of Defendant’s genitals . . .”
9 Indecency with a Child by “did then and there, with the intent to arouse
Contact or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
cause E.P., a child who was at the time
younger than seventeen (17) years of age and
not the spouse of Defendant, to engage in
sexual contact by causing said E.P. to touch
the genitals of the Defendant, by means of
E.P.’s hand . . .”
10 Sexual Assault of a Child “d i d t h en and there in t en t i o n a lly o r
knowingly cause the sexual organ of E.P., a
child who was at the time younger than
seventeen (17) years of age and not the
spouse of Defendant, to contact Defendant’s
sexual organ . . .”
11 Sexual Assault of a Child “d i d t h en a nd there inten t i o n a lly o r
knowingly cause penetration of the sexual
organ of E.P., a child who was at the time
younger than seventeen (17) years of age and
not the spouse of Defendant, by means of
Defendant’s finger . . .”
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page vii
12 Indecency with a Child by “did then and there, with the intent to arouse
Contact or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
engage in sexual contact with E.P. by
touching the genitals of E.P., a child who
was at the time younger than seventeen (17)
years of age and not the spouse of
Defendant, by means of Defendant’s hand .
. .”
13 Sexual Assault of a Child “d id then a n d t h er e i n t en t i o n ally or
knowingly cause penetration of the anus of
E.P., a child who was at the time younger
than seventeen (17) years of age and not the
spouse of Defendant, by means of
Defendant’s finger . . .”
Trial began on September 11, 2013 in the 54th Judicial District Court with the
Honorable Judge Matt Johnson, presiding. After a trial to the jury, Mr. Barnard was
found guilty of the indicted offenses.2 Mr. Barnard elected the jury for punishment,
which imposed life sentences on each count, imposed consecutively.3 Notice of
Appeal was timely filed by Mr. Barnard on September 16, 2013.4 The trial court
2
(4 R.R. 189S91).
3
(I C.R. at 103S33).
4
(I C.R. at 135).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page viii
certified Mr. Barnard’s right to appeal on September 13, 2013.5 The Seventh Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on April 8, 2015.6
5
(I C.R. at 134).
6
Barnard v. State, No. 07-13-00355-CR, 2015 WL 1566734 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Apr. 8, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page ix
GROUND FOR REVIEW
The Amarillo court of appeals erred holding an objection was necessary
for a trial court to force an election of offenses during the State’s case in
chief.
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page x
GROUND FOR REVIEW RESTATED:
The Amarillo court of appeals erred holding an objection was necessary
for a trial court to force an election of offenses during the State’s case in
chief.
This case presents the question of when a trial court abuses its discretion by
failing to require the State to elect the offense(s) the State is relying upon for
conviction. During trial, several instances of alleged sexual abuse were set forth by the
complaining witness. Although State identified discrete instances of actions consistent
with the indictment, the trial court failed to force an election at anytime. This matter
should be reversed and remanded to the court of appeals to allow further review under
the correct standard.
A. Reason for Granting Review.
The Amarillo court of appeals’ decision has decided an important question of
state or federal law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of this Court.7
Mr. Barnard understands that the “principal role” of this Court is to be “the caretaker
of Texas law, not the arbiter of individual applications.”8 However, “the legal
7
TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3(c).
8
Bradley v. State, 235 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Cochran, J.
concurring in the denial of discretionary review).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page 1
ramifications and ripple effect of the lower court’s opinion” is such as to require
review.9
B. Factual background.
A 19SyearSold married woman at the time of trial, E.P.10 detailed alleged abuse
that continued from about the age of nine or 10 years of age.11 E.P. was the daughter
of Liese Lehrman, who married Mr. Barnard.12 E.P. testified, that despite his being a
stepfather, their relationship grew closer.13 E.P. testified sexual abuse began with the
touching her genitals, and eventually her breasts.14 The testimony showed that Mr.
Barnard then moved to digital penetration,15 and eventually sexual intercourse16 and
other sexual acts.17 Eventually, E.P.’s mother and Mr. Barnard divorced. E.P. met her
9
Id.
10
Now Emily Hudson. (3 R.R. at 79).
11
(3 R.R. at 95).
12
(4 R.R. at 9).
13
(3 R.R. at 88S90).
14
(3 R.R. at 92).
15
(3 R.R. at 95).
16
(3 R.R. at 96, 101, 115, 171).
17
Several instances are set forth below, but for instance see (3 R.R. at 113).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page 2
husband18 and had discussions of the allegations against Mr. Barnard with him.19
Family members notified the police and Mr. Barnard was arrested.
C. To request or to have entry of a sua sponte order of an in-trial election
. . . that is the question . . .
In his sole issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to sua sponte order the State to elect the specific acts it relied on
for conviction. This complaint was not raised in the trial court and is
therefore not preserved for our review.20
It is the Amarillo court of appeals tunnel vision on this issue that requires review.
While it may appear that the failure of Mr. Barnard to request an election waived any
error,21 it is not so here.
The general rule is “where one act of intercourse is alleged in the indictment and
more than one act of intercourse is shown by the evidence in a sexual assault trial, the
State must elect the act upon which it would rely for conviction.”22 Repeatedly
throughout its opinion, the Amarillo Court of Appeals found that the lack of objection
by Appellant terminated his right to review of the required election: (1) [t]his
complaint was not raised in the trial court and is therefore not preserved for our
18
(3 R.R. at 27).
19
(3 R.R. at 31S33).
20
Barnard, 2015 WL 1566734, at *1.
21
Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
22
O’Neal v. State, 746 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page 3
review23; (2) [b]ut the State is not obligated to make an election and error is not shown
absent the defendant’s timely motion for election.24
But the complained of error did not and does not require an objection.
Specifically, Mr. Barnard argued the trial court failed to force the State’s
election during the presentation of its case in chief.25 This issue aligns perfectly with
established state law. Before the State rests, the trial court has discretion in directing
the State to make an election.26 It is only at the time that the State rests its case in
chief, in the face of a timely request by the defendant, the trial court must order the
State to make its election.”27 So, under established law, no objection is necessary to
23
Barnard, 2015 WL 1566734, at *1.
24
Barnard, 2015 WL 1566734, at *2 (citing O’Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 771 n.3; Crawford
v. State, 696 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (citing Bates v. State, 305 S.W.2d 366, 368
(Tex. Crim. App. 1957)) (on showing of more than one act of intercourse, on the defendant’s
motion, the State must elect and failure to so order is error); Jiminez v. State, No. 07- 07-00389-CR,
2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7555, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 29, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (noting absent a motion by the defendant to require an election, the
State is not required to make an election); Molina v. State, No. 05–05–01599–CR, 2006 Tex. App.
LEXIS 9670, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 8, 2006, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication)
(appellant did not request an election and appellate court found no authority suggesting the trial
court should have ordered an election on its own motion)).
25
The issue before the Amarillo court of appeals was whether the “trial court’s failure
to sua sponte order an election as to each the allegations in the various indicted counts . . .” was
erroneous. Appellant’s Br. at 5.
26
Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004), aff’d,
193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (emphasis added).
27
Id. (citing O’Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 772; Crosslin v. State, 235 S.W. 905 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1921).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page 4
force a sua sponte election before the close of the State’s case in chief. It is only after
the close of the State’s case that mandates an objection.28
Furthermore, the claim by the Amarillo Court of Appeals that they were unable
to find . . . “any authority even intimating the trial court was nevertheless obligated to
order an election sua sponte” is specious, and violates the Rule of Appellate
Procedure.29 Both the Tenth Court, the transferor court, and the Fourteenth Court of
Appeals have specifically held that a “trial court in its discretion may order the State
to make its election at any time prior to the resting of the State’s case in chief.”30
By such definition, no objection or request was necessary from the defendant.
Such lawful requirements “may not be disregarded . . .”31 at the court of appeals level.
28
Id.; accord Wilson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d).
29
TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. “In cases transferred by the Supreme Court from one court of
appeals to another, the court of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in
accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if the
transferee court’s decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the precedent of the
transferor court. The court’s opinion may state whether the outcome would have been different had
the transferee court not been required to decide the case in accordance with the transferor court’s
precedent.”
30
See Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 349; Wilson, 3 S.W.3d at 225.
31
Cf. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011) (holding that a claimed
undue burden on the prosecution resulting from the application of the Confrontation Clause was an
insufficient reason to not impose lawful requirements on that party).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page 5
Because the Amarillo court of appeals failed to follow this dictate here, this Court
should grant review.32
D. Conclusion.
Squarely before this Court is an opportunity to the issue of whether the trial
court maintains discretion to order an election prior to the State’s resting–with or
without a request by the defendant. This Court has stated that is the law. Lower courts
have followed this Court’s mandate. Review of this decision by the Amarillo court is
required to maintain consistency in this State’s law.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons alleged above, Petitioner was denied a fair trial. Mr. Barnard
prays that this Honorable Court will grant his Petition, and order a brief on the merits
of this case. Following briefing, Mr. Barnard further requests that this Court find in
his favor, and remand this matter to the Amarillo court of appeals for further review.
32
See Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (granting the
State’s petition under TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3(c) when the lower court failed to follow established case
law from this Court); Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (granting
the defendant’s petition under TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3(c)).
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page 6
Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICE OF STAN SCHWIEGER
/s/ Stan Schwieger
Stan Schwieger
600 Austin Avenue, Suite 12
P.O. Box 975
Waco, Texas 76703-0975
(254) 752-5678
(254) 756-7792—Facsimile
E-mail: wacocrimatty@yahoo.com
State Bar No. 17880500
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the Petition delivered to the McLennan County District Attorney’s
Office, Waco, Texas, attorney of record for the State of Texas, by this Court’s
electronic filing service and to the State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 13046, Capitol
Station, Austin, Texas 78711, by first class mail, on June 8, 2015.
/s/ Stan Schwieger
Stan Schwieger
Ronnie Mack Barnard v. State—Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review Page 7
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Stan Schwieger
Barnard v. State, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2015)
2015 WL 1566734
2015 WL 1566734
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FOR DESIGNATION AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.
DO NOT PUBLISH.
Court of Appeals of Texas,
Amarillo.
Ronnie Mack Barnard, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
No. 07–13–00355–CR | April 8, 2015
On Appeal from the 54th District Court, McLennan County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2013–631–C2, Honorable Matt
Johnson, Presiding
Attorneys and Law Firms
Stan Schwieger, for Ronnie Mack Barnard.
Abel Reyna, for the State of Texas.
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James T. Campbell Justice
*1 A thirteen-count indictment accused appellant, Ronnie Mack Barnard, of aggravated sexual assault of a child, indecency
with a child by contact, and sexual assault of a child. The State abandoned three of the counts and proceeded to trial on the
remaining ten. A jury found appellant guilty of each count. The range of punishment was enhanced by two prior convictions.
The jury assessed punishment at life in prison on each count. The trial court imposed the sentences and ordered they run
consecutively. We will affirm.
Analysis
In his sole issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte order the State to elect the specific
acts it relied on for conviction.
This complaint was not raised in the trial court and is therefore not preserved for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see
Tennyson v. State, No. 05–00–01194–CR, 2001 Tex.App. LEXIS 3442, at *3, 2001 WL 569297 (Tex.App.–Dallas May 25,
2001, no pet.)(not designated for publication) (citing appellate rule 33.1(a) and stating “[b]ecause appellant did not request an
election after the State rested, we conclude appellant waived his right to require an election at that time”). While appellant
contends he may assert his complaint for the first time on appeal because it arises from unobjected-to jury charge error that
caused him egregious harm, based on the following analysis we find the trial court did not err. The egregious harm standard
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Barnard v. State, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2015)
2015 WL 1566734
for unobjected-to jury charge error applies only after the appellate court first finds error in the jury charge. Tolbert v. State, 306
S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (citing Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)).
Moreover, even if properly preserved for our review appellant's issue lacks any merit. As a general rule, when the State's
evidence shows multiple instances of conduct conforming to a single indictment allegation, the State must elect the instance on
which it will rely for conviction. Martinez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); O'Neal v. State, 746 S.W.2d
769, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Ordering an election by the State “forces it to formally differentiate the specific evidence upon
which it will rely as proof of the charged offense from evidence of other offenses or misconduct it offers only in an evidentiary
capacity.” Phillips v. State, 193 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). The election requirement also provides protection of
such fundamental rights of the defendant as notice and unanimity thus ensuring “both that the defendant is aware of precisely
which act he must defend himself against, and that the jurors know precisely which act they must all agree he is guilty of in
order to convict him.” Id.
Thus, after the State rests its case-in-chief, provided the defendant makes a timely request, the trial court must order the State to
elect the act it relies on for conviction. Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 909; O'Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 771. The trial court has no discretion
to respond otherwise. Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 909; O'Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 771. In such instances, the court's failure to order
an election is error. O'Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 772.
*2 But the State is not obligated to make an election and error is not shown absent the defendant's timely motion for election.
O'Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 771 n.3; Crawford v. State, 696 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (citing Bates v. State, 165
Tex. Crim. 140, 305 S.W.2d 366, 368 (1957)) (on showing of more than one act of intercourse, on the defendant's motion, the
State must elect and failure to so order is error); Jiminez v. State, No. 07–07–00389–CR, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 7555, at *3
n.3, 2009 WL 3102010 (Tex.App.–Amarillo Sept. 29, 2009, pet. refused) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting
absent a motion by the defendant to require an election, the State is not required to make an election); Molina v. State, No. 05–
05–01599–CR, 2006 Tex.App. LEXIS 9670, at *2–3, 2006 WL 3218555 (Tex.App.–Dallas Nov. 8, 2006, pet. refused) (not
designated for publication) (appellant did not request an election and appellate court found no authority suggesting the trial
court should have ordered an election on its own motion).
In the present case, appellant made no motion requesting an election by the State. We are not shown, nor do we find, any
authority even intimating the trial court was nevertheless obligated to order an election sua sponte. Such a requirement would
effectively make ordering an election a ministerial task. Importantly, it would deny the defendant a significant strategic option 1
and allow a disjointed error-preservation procedure. 2 Appellant's reliance on O'Neal is misplaced. The opinion does not support
the notion that a trial court has discretion to order an election sua sponte. Rather, the O'Neal court stated, “Once the State rests
its case in chief, in the face of a timely request by the defendant, the trial court must order the State to make its election. Failure
to do so constitutes error.” 746 S.W.2d at 772 (emphasis supplied); see id. at 771 n.3 (“[A]ppellant preserved error by his motion
to require election. Absent such a motion by the defendant, the State is not required to make an election”).
We find that even had appellant preserved his complaint, the trial court had no obligation to sua sponte order an election.
Conclusion
Appellant's issue is overruled and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Footnotes
1 See Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 775 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) ( “A defendant may choose not to elect so that the State is jeopardy-
barred from prosecuting on any of the offenses that were in evidence. Punishment would then also be limited to the charged offense
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
Barnard v. State, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2015)
2015 WL 1566734
only, and, given the jeopardy bar, there is no possibility that the defendant would receive an additional stacked sentence, based on
any of the offenses in evidence, down the line” (footnote omitted)).
2 A defendant would necessarily have to object on the record pointing out to the trial court, in a timely manner, its failure to sua sponte
order an election. SeeTEX.R.APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3