in Re Commitment of Raul Amado Quintero ( 2014 )


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  • In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-12-00371-CV
    ____________________
    IN RE COMMITMENT OF RAUL AMADO QUINTERO
    _______________________________________________________           ______________
    On Appeal from the 435th District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 11-12-13175-CV
    ________________________________________________________           _____________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Raul Amado Quintero challenges his civil commitment as a sexually violent
    predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2010 &
    Supp. 2013) (the SVP statute). In two issues, Quintero challenges the trial court’s
    pre-trial ruling on a motion to compel responses to requests for admission and its
    denial of a motion to strike the testimony of the State’s expert witness asserted
    1
    after the close of evidence.1 We conclude that Quintero’s issues do not present
    reversible error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Requests for Admissions
    Quintero presented eleven requests for admissions to the State in pre-trial
    discovery. The State asked for a protective order on the grounds that the requests
    invaded the work product privilege and that some of the requests were more
    appropriately addressed through witnesses with knowledge of the requested
    information. Quintero moved to compel the State to answer requests that did not
    involve privileged matters and were within its knowledge. The trial court did not
    require the State to admit or deny the following requests for admissions:
    (1) “The State has no evidence that [Quintero] has committed any sexual
    misconducts while incarcerated at the Texas Department of Criminal
    Justice[;]” and
    (2) “The State has no evidence that [Quintero] has committed any sexual
    offenses while incarcerated at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.”
    On appeal, Quintero contends the trial court abused its discretion and that the trial
    court’s ruling prevented Quintero from properly presenting his case on appeal.
    “The primary purpose of requests for admission is to simplify trials by
    eliminating matters about which there is no real controversy; to obviate in advance
    1
    While appellant asserted a third issue in his brief regarding the trial court’s
    refusal to submit certain requested jury questions, by correspondence to the court
    during the pendency of the appeal, appellant abandoned that issue.
    2
    of trial, proof of obviously undisputed facts.” In re Commitment of Jackson, No.
    09-12-00291-CV, 
    2013 WL 5874446
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 31, 2013,
    no pet.) (mem. op.). Because a judgment will be reversed only for an erroneous
    ruling that probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or prevented the
    appellant from properly presenting the case on appeal, a pre-trial ruling that
    prevents a party from having to respond to requests for admissions will generally
    be harmless if the appellant had access to other sources to obtain the information
    he sought in the requests for admissions. See In re Commitment of Young, 
    410 S.W.3d 542
    , 549-50 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.). The record reflects that
    the State produced to Quintero copies of business records obtained from the Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice, including copies of Quintero’s multidisciplinary
    records, sex offender treatment records, and penitentiary packets, approximately
    six weeks before trial. Further, Quintero deposed the State’s expert before trial.
    Therefore, Quintero had an opportunity to discover whether the State’s expert had
    identified or relied on any alleged sexual offenses or incidents of sexual
    misconduct committed by Quintero during his incarceration in forming her
    opinions. 
    Id. at 550.
    The trial court’s ruling, therefore, did not prevent Quintero
    from preparing for trial.
    Quintero contends that because the trial court did not require the State to
    admit or deny that it had no evidence that he had committed sexual offenses or
    3
    sexual misconduct during his incarceration, Quintero had to establish through his
    own testimony that he had no prison disciplinary history. This testimony about
    Quintero’s disciplinary history appears in the record, and Quintero’s counsel was
    able to argue to the jury that the last documented act of deviance by Quintero
    occurred in 1996 and that his lack of prison disciplinary history was important
    because it showed Quintero “can follow the rules.” The trial court’s ruling did not
    prevent Quintero from defending his case at trial or from presenting his case on
    appeal. See In re Commitment of Bunn, No. 09-12-00349-CV, 
    2013 WL 5874460
    ,
    at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    Based on a review of the entire record, we cannot conclude that any error by
    the trial court in granting the State’s motion for protective order caused the
    rendition of an improper judgment under the circumstances, or prevented Quintero
    from presenting his case on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). We overrule issue
    one.
    Motion to Strike Testimony
    Testifying for the State during Quintero’s trial, a psychiatrist, Dr. Sheri
    Gaines, offered her opinion about whether Quintero has a behavioral abnormality
    that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Quintero
    moved to strike all of Dr. Gaines’s testimony after both sides rested. No grounds
    4
    were stated on the record, but a written motion filed with the trial court stated that
    Dr. Gaines’s testimony should be excluded because
    Dr. Gaines’[s] opinion is based on her misunderstanding of Chapter
    841 of the Texas Health & Safety Code, unreliable reasoning that has
    not been accepted by the scientific community because the underlying
    scientific theory is not valid, the technique applying the theory is not
    valid, and because the technique used by Dr. Gaines has not been
    properly applied in the instant case.
    On appeal, Quintero argues the trial court erred in denying his motion.
    As evidentiary support for his argument that the trial court abused its
    discretion by denying Quintero’s non-contemporaneous motion to strike Dr.
    Gaines’s testimony after she testified, Quintero refers this Court to a single
    question and response from Dr. Gaines’s extensive testimony. During cross-
    examination, Quintero’s counsel asked, “And it’s a fact that no expert in these kind
    of cases are [sic] even knowledgeable what their rate of error is; is that right?” Dr.
    Gaines replied, “Yeah. I don’t really know what that means even to monitor rate of
    error.” Quintero does not refer the Court to any evidence in the record to support
    an argument that Dr. Gaines’s response to this question reveals that her testimony
    was not based upon accepted psychiatric techniques or that she failed to properly
    apply accepted psychiatric techniques in forming her opinion in this case.
    Dr. Gaines is licensed in the field of psychiatry and experienced in
    conducting psychiatric evaluations. She described her clinical practice and her
    5
    experience providing expert testimony in SVP commitment trials. She explained
    the methodology employed by experts in her field, she described how she applied
    that methodology in this case, and she explained in detail the facts and evidence
    relevant in forming her opinion and how those facts played a role in her evaluation.
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Quintero’s motion to strike
    Dr. Gaines’s testimony.2 See In re Commitment of Cox, No. 09-13-00316-CV,
    
    2014 WL 1400667
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 10, 2014, no pet. h.) (mem.
    op.); In re Commitment of Mitchell, No. 09-12-00607-CV, 
    2013 WL 5658425
    , at
    *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 17, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We overrule
    issue two and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    CHARLES KREGER
    Justice
    Submitted on December 2, 2013
    Opinion Delivered June 12, 2014
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
    2
    Because we determine the trial court could have reasonably found the
    expert’s testimony reliable, we do not decide whether the trial could have, as an
    alternate ground, denied the motion to strike for the reason it was not made at the
    earliest opportunity. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-12-00371-CV

Filed Date: 6/12/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015