the Staley Family Partnership, LTD v. David Lee Stiles , 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 6630 ( 2014 )

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 18, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00735-CV
THE STALEY FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, LTD., Appellant
V.
DAVID LEE STILES, DELZIE STILES, GINGER WESTBROOK, ROBERT STILES,
AND DAVID STILES, Appellees
On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 429-03484-2010
OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Evans, and Lewis
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
Appellant, the Staley Family Partnership, Ltd. (Staley) brought an action seeking a
judicial declaration that it has an easement by necessity across land owned by appellees David
Lee Stiles, Delzie Stiles, Ginger Westbrook, Robert Stiles, and David Stiles to access County
Road 134 (CR 134). Appellees filed a counterclaim, seeking a judicial declaration that Staley
does not have an easement across appellees’ property and attorney’s fees. All issues were
submitted to the trial court in a bench trial. The trial court rendered judgment granting appellees’
counterclaim for declaratory judgment that Staley does not have an easement across appellees’
property and awarding appellees their attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Staley is the owner of a tract of land consisting of 10.129 acres (the Staley Tract) located
in Collin County, Texas. The Staley Tract was previously part of a much larger tract of land
owned by Thompson Helms by grant from the State of Texas in 1853 (the Thompson Helms
Tract). In 1855, after the deaths of Thompson Helms and his wife, Abigail, their estate conveyed
the portion of the Thompson Helms Tract west of Honey Creek to Robert Skaggs. In 1866, the
remaining portion of the Thompson Helms Tract was partitioned by the probate court between
the children of Thompson and Abigail Helms: Mary Helms, George Helms, Sarah T. Helms,
Frances M. Helms, James Helms, and Axia Ann Helms. At the time of the 1866 partition, Axia
Ann Helms was awarded a 152 acre tract that was the northernmost of the six partitioned tracts
of land (the Axia Ann Helms Tract), James Helms was awarded a 142 acre tract of land (the
James Helms Tract) south of the Axia Ann Helms Tract, and Frances M. Helms was awarded a
110 acre tract south of the James Helms Tract (the Frances M. Helms Tract), as shown on the
map below.
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In 1873, Frances M. Helms conveyed 60 acres comprising the eastern portion of his 110
acre tract to James Helms. In 1876, Frances M. Helms conveyed 40 acres in the middle of his
original 110 acre tract to James Helms, retaining the 10.129 acre tract now known as the Staley
Tract (depicted by gray shading on the map above). Honey Creek borders this remaining 10.129
acre tract to the west and south, and an unnamed tributary of Honey Creek borders the tract to
the east. In 1880, Frances M. Helms conveyed the remaining 10.129 acre tract, the westernmost
portion of his original 110-acre tract, to Moses Hubbard. Upon the death of Moses Hubbard and
his wife, the 10.129 acre tract was owned by The Moses and Mary Jane Hubbard Trust created
by a January 5, 1897 will. In June 2005, the 10.129 acre tract was conveyed from The Moses
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and Mary Jane Hubbard Trust to Berry Lynn Johnston. 1 In September 2005, the 10.129 acre
tract of land was conveyed by Berry Lynn Johnston to Charis Interests, Inc. In December 2009,
the 10.129 acre tract of land was conveyed by Charis Interests, Inc. to Staley.
Appellees own the portion of the Axia Ann Helms Tract and the portion of the James
Helms Tract that are bordered by Honey Creek on the west and an unnamed tributary of Honey
Creek on the east (the Stiles Tract). The Stiles Tract is north of the Staley Tract. CR 134 is now
located on the northern boundary of the Stiles Tract. Honey Creek and the unnamed tributary of
Honey Creek extend north of CR 134.
At trial, Staley sought a declaratory judgment that by reason of necessity, it “has or owns
an access easement to, over, and across the Stiles Tract for purposes of access to and from [CR
134].” Following a bench trial, the trial court signed a judgment declaring that Staley does not
have an easement across appellees’ property—the Stiles Tract—to access CR 134 from Staley’s
10.129 acre tract—the Staley Tract—and awarding appellees attorney’s fees. The trial court
filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Staley requested additional findings, which were
not made. Specifically, the trial court concluded that Staley does not have an easement by
necessity, an implied easement, or an easement by estoppel across appellees’ property. 2 Staley
filed this appeal.
Easement by Necessity
Staley contends the trial court erred by failing to grant a declaratory judgment that Staley
established an easement by necessity over appellees’ property to access CR 134 and by rendering
1
When the 10.129 acre tract was sold to Berry Lynn Johnston in 2005, a specific exception in the special warranty deed provided, “Right of
access to a public street or road from subject property is not insured.”
2
“Easements may be created by express grant, by implication, by necessity, by estoppel, or by prescription.” Machala v. Weems, 56 S.W.3d
748, 755 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Tiller v. Lake Alexander Props., Ltd., 96 S.W.3d 617, 621 ((Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no
pet.); see also Hamrick v. Ward, 359 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pets. granted) (“Texas courts commonly refer to
easements implied by necessity as ‘easements by necessity’ and easements implied by prior use simply as ‘implied easements.’”). At trial, Staley
relied on theories of easement by implication, necessity, and estoppel. However, on appeal, Staley challenges only the trial court’s failure to find
it has an easement by necessity.
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a declaratory judgment in favor of appellees that Staley does not have an easement by necessity
over appellees’ property to access CR 134. Whether a party is entitled to an easement by
necessity is a question of law, and we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. See
Benedictine Sisters of the Good Shepherd v. Ellison, 956 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1997, pet. denied). A conclusion of law will be reversed if it is erroneous as a matter of
law. Id.
Elements of Easement by Necessity and Burden of Proof
An easement by necessity is established with proof of (1) unity of ownership of the
dominant and servient estates prior to severance, (2) necessity of a roadway, and (3) existence of
the necessity at the time of the severance of the two estates. Id.; see also Koonce v. Brite Estate,
663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. 1984). An easement by necessity is temporary and “ceases when the
necessity terminates.” Bains v. Parker, 182 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1944); see also Crone v.
Brumley, 219 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied). As the party seeking
the easement by necessity, Staley had the burden to establish all elements of that claim. See Duff
v. Matthews, 311 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. 1958); Crone, 219 S.W.3d at 68 (party seeking
easement has burden of proof). Whether these requirements have been met is determined at the
time of severance of the alleged dominant and servient estates. Miller v. Elliott, 94 S.W.3d 38,
43 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, pet. denied); 3 see also Ingham v. O’Block, 351 S.W.3d 96, 102 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (relevant time to determine unity of ownership is when
easement was allegedly created, that is, at time of severance).
3
The parcel of land owned by the grantor of the alleged easement is referred to as the servient estate and the parcel of land benefitted by the
alleged easement is referred to as the dominant estate. See Daniel v. Fox, 917 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
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Analysis
Prior to the 1866 partition of the Thompson Helms Tract, the property on which the
Staley Tract and the Stiles Tract are now located was united in common ownership by Thompson
Helms. In other words, the alleged dominant estate—the Staley Tract—and alleged servient
estate—the Stiles Tract—were a part of a single tract (the Thompson Helms Tract) until it was
partitioned in 1866. At that time, the 10.129 acres now known as the Staley Tract were part of
the Frances M. Helms Tract, and the Stiles Tract to the north of the Staley Tract was part of the
James Helms Tract and the Axia Ann Helms Tract. It is over what was the James Helms Tract
and the Axia Ann Helms Tract at the time of the 1866 partition that Staley sought an easement
by necessity to CR 134. The land contained in the Staley Tract was never part of the James
Helms Tract to its north. We therefore conclude the relevant severance occurred in 1866 when
the Thompson Helms Tract was partitioned and there was a severance of the alleged dominant
estate and the alleged servient estate. Accordingly, we necessarily reject the trial court’s Finding
of Fact No. 16 that the relevant severance occurred in 1876 when Frances M. Helms conveyed
40 acres of the remaining 50 acres in the Frances M. Helms Tract to James Helms. 4
Staley contends the Staley Tract has remained “landlocked” since 1866, and the necessity
for an easement across the Stiles Tract to the public road system has existed since that time and
presently exists. According to Staley, the partition in 1866 of the Thompson Helms Tract made
the westernmost 10.129 acres of the Frances M. Helms tract inaccessible from the east, south,
and west due to impassable ravines of Honey Creek on the west and south and the unnamed
tributary of Honey Creek on the east. Staley contends, therefore, that at the time of the 1866
partition, the only access to the 10.129 acres of the Frances M. Helms Tract was from the north,
through the James Helms Tract and the Axia Ann Helms Tract.
4
The trial court’s erroneous Finding of Fact No. 16, however, did not result in the rendering of an incorrect judgment.
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Necessity at the time of severance is an essential element of an easement by necessity.
Staley bore the burden of proving not only unity of ownership and present necessity, “but also
‘historical necessity,’ i.e., an easement was necessary at the time of the severance.” Ellison, 956
S.W.2d at 633; see also Ingham, 351 S.W.3d at 102 (referring to third element of easement by
necessity as “historical necessity”).
Staley sought declaration of an easement by necessity “to, over, and across the Stiles
Tract for purposes of access to and from [CR 134].” Staley bore the burden of establishing that
its claim for access across the Stiles Tract was a necessity and not merely a convenience. See
Harrington v. Dawson-Conway Ranch, Ltd., 372 S.W.3d 711, 724 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012,
pet. denied) (“In an easement by necessity case, whether by reservation or grant, we hold that the
degree of necessity required is that of ‘strict necessity.’”). Staley also bore the burden of
establishing that this necessity to cross the Stiles Tract for access to CR 134 arose at the time of
the partition of the alleged dominant and servient estates. See Ellison, 956 S.W.2d at 633. The
inquiry that governs resolution of this case is whether at the time of the severance, the dominant
estate—the Staley Tract—had the right to pass over the servient estate—the Stiles Tract—due to
necessity of access to CR 134. See Bains, 182 S.W.2d at 399; Crone, 219 S.W.3d at 70 (noting
no evidence established that at time of severance a public road abutted property across which
plaintiff sought easement by necessity; evidence was therefore legally insufficient to support
easement by necessity); Tiller v. Lake Alexander Props., Ltd, 96 S.W.3d 617, 623 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (easement by necessity may not be imposed where there is no evidence
of necessity to access public road at time of severance of dominant and servient estates); Heard
v. Roos, 885 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.) (proof of unity of
ownership and necessity of roadway not enough to establish an easement by necessity; proof the
necessity existed at time dominant and servient estates were severed must be shown, and
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evidence did not support a finding that public road existed at time of severance); Ellison, 956
S.W.2d at 632 (holding a requisite to proof of historical necessity is a showing that easement
would provide access to a public road existing prior to severance of dominant and servient
estates); see also Perez v. Benavides, No. 04-06-00751-CV, 2007 WL 1608927, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio June 6, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (at the time of severance, Share F was
landlocked, and Perez’s predecessors never gained access to a public road across Share F;
accordingly, evidence conclusively established no necessity existed for Perez’s predecessors to
use Share F to access a public road at time the estates were severed); Penney v. Mangum, No. 07-
08-0025-CV, 2009 WL 1677837, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, June 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (record clearly showed that at time of severance, FM 1187 was in existence and was only
access to servient estate; easement to access FM 1877 was necessity); Daniel v. Fox, 917 S.W.2d
106, 112 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (“We find overwhelming evidence that
the roadway in controversy was in existence and being used as a necessity prior to and
subsequent to [partition of the property].”).
Thomas Staley testified at trial that 1866 maps do not show CR 134. He testified that the
records that would provide information regarding establishment of CR 134 “go back” to the
1930s. He testified the “mapping is very poor, so it’s not clear what roads were up there. We’re
pretty certain there were some roads. We don’t know if it’s 134 or not.” As to whether CR 134
was located at the northern boundary of what is now the Stiles Tract in 1866, Thomas Staley
testified that there may have been a county road, “But – it might not have been called a county
road. It may have just been a road, you know. We don’t know. That’s a long time ago.” 5 See
Crone, 219 S.W.3d at 69–70 (maps dated 1936 and 1944 did not establish existence of a public
road in 1920 or 1923, nor did they furnish a basis for inferring that a public road existed some
5
At submission, counsel for Staley acknowledged Staley did not show at trial the location of a public road in 1866.
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sixteen and twenty years before their publication). David Stiles testified at trial that he had no
knowledge of what was at the northern boundary of the Stiles Tract in 1866. There is no credible
evidence in the record that a public road was in existence and being used in 1866 at the northern
boundary of what is now the Stiles Tract. 6 Although Staley contends the Staley Tract was
landlocked at the time of severance, there is no credible evidence to show the necessity of access
across the Stiles Tract to a public road in the current location of CR 134 at the time of severance.
Applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude Staley failed to establish as a matter of
law the essential element of existence of the necessity at the time of the severance.
Attorney’s Fees
Staley contends that, because the trial court erred by failing to grant a declaratory
judgment that Staley established an easement by necessity, the trial court erred by awarding
attorney’s fees to appellees and by failing to award attorney’s fees to Staley. The trial court has
discretion to award reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as it deems equitable and just under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 37.009 (West 2008) (trial court may award reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees to
prevailing party in declaratory judgment action); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 37.002(b) & 37.004(a); Roberson v. City of Austin, 157 S.W.3d 130, 136–37 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2005, pet. denied) (noting a large number of easement cases have been decided under the
UDJA and that the UDJA, which is to be liberally applied, states it applies to determine the
validity of deeds). The grant or denial of attorney’s fees in a declaratory judgment action lies
within the discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not be reversed on appeal absent a
clear showing that it abused that discretion. Oake v. Collin Cnty., 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex.
6
There is also no credible evidence in the record that a public road was in existence and being used in 1876 (the date the trial court
determined the relevant severance occurred) at the northern boundary of what is now the Stiles Tract.
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1985); see also Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Lazy Nine Mun. Util. Dist., 198 S.W.3d 300,
319 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (entitlement to attorney’s fees “depends on what
is equitable and just, and the trial court’s power is, in that respect, discretionary”).
Staley did not file a post-trial motion complaining about the amount of attorney’s fees
awarded appellees or that the attorney’s fees awarded appellees were unreasonable or
unnecessary, and Staley does not argue on appeal that the attorney’s fees awarded appellees were
unreasonable or unnecessary. Staley only argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by
awarding attorney’s fees to appellees because appellees should not have been the prevailing
parties in the trial court. The trial court granted appellees’ request for a declaratory judgment
that Staley does not have an easement by necessity across appellees’ property. Having
concluded the trial court did not err by granting appellees’ request for a declaratory judgment or
by denying Staley’s request for a declaratory judgment, and as Staley does not contend the
appellees’ attorney’s fees are unreasonable or unnecessary, we cannot conclude the trial court
abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to appellees.
Conclusion
We resolve Staley’s sole issue against it. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
130735F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
THE STALEY FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District
LTD., Appellant Court, Collin County, Texas,
Trial Court Cause No. 429-03484-2010.
No. 05-13-00735-CV V. Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore,
Justices Evans and Lewis participating.
DAVID LEE STILES, DELZIE STILES,
GINGER WESTBROOK, ROBERT
STILES, AND DAVID STILES, Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees David Lee Stiles, Delzie Stiles, Ginger Westbrook,
Robert Stiles, and David Stiles recover their costs of this appeal from appellant The Staley
Family Partnership.
Judgment entered this 18th day of June, 2014.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
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