Theodora Lee McAlister v. State ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-14-00068-CR
THEODORA LEE MCALISTER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 276th District Court
Marion County, Texas
Trial Court No. F14447
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Background
A jury found that Theodora Lee McAlister and her husband robbed James Odell Mitchell
at his home by hitting him in the head with an object and then taking his wallet, which contained
$306.00, and his pistol. After a jury trial, McAlister was found guilty of aggravated robbery,
sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment, and fined $7,500.00.
McAlister contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. First,
McAlister alleges that a fatal variance exists between the indictment and the evidence because
the indictment alleged that McAlister struck Mitchell on the head with an “unknown object,”
while the evidence showed that she struck Mitchell with a pistol. Further, McAlister claims that
the evidence is insufficient to show (1) that the grand jury was unaware of the object that struck
Mitchell and (2) that the grand jury used due diligence to ascertain the identity of the specific
object.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Variance
In her first point of error, McAlister argues that there is a fatal variance between the
indictment and the evidence at trial because the indictment alleges that she struck Mitchell with
an “unknown object” while the evidence established that she struck him with his own pistol.
A variance between the wording of the indictment and the evidence presented is fatal
only if it is material and also prejudices the defendant’s substantial rights. Gollihar v. State, 46
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S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Arguing that a fatal variance exists between the
allegation and proof is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 247. “The widely-
accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem
or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant’s
‘substantial rights’ is immaterial.” Id. at 247–48. In determining if the defendant’s substantial
rights have been prejudiced, we must consider whether the indictment, as written, informed the
defendant of the charge against her sufficiently to allow her to prepare an adequate defense at
trial and whether prosecution under the deficiently drafted indictment would subject the
defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime. Id.; see In re S.C., 229
S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied); Brown v. State, 159 S.W.3d 703,
709 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d).
Here, the indictment alleged that McAlister
did then and there, while in the course of committing theft of property and with
intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly cause bodily injury to JAMES ODELL MITCHELL a person 65 years
of age or older, by striking James Odell Mitchell on the head with an unknown
object . . . .
Even though Mitchell was hit from behind, he believed the assailants used his own pistol in the
attack.
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured solely by the elements of the offense as defined
by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 772 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). There is no
contention that the indictment failed to provide McAlister with proper notice of the criminal
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charge or that prosecution under the indictment would subject McAlister to later prosecution for
the same incident. Consequently, the alleged variance does not affect McAlister’s substantial
rights and, therefore, is immaterial; it may be properly excluded from the hypothetically correct
jury charge. Therefore, a failure to prove that the object was unknown does not render the
evidence insufficient. See Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 256; Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999); Carson v. State, 422 S.W.3d 733, 744 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet.
ref’d). We overrule this point of error.
B. Knowledge and Diligence of Grand Jury
McAlister also argues the evidence is insufficient to show that (a) the grand jury did not
know what object McAlister used to strike Mitchell, and (b) the grand jury used due diligence to
ascertain the object actually used to strike Mitchell.
These points of error are based on the Hicks Rule from Hicks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 419
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In Hicks, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated,
When an indictment alleges that the manner or means of inflicting the injury is
unknown and the evidence at trial does not establish the type of weapon used, a
prima facie showing is made that the weapon was unknown to the grand jury. . . .
However, if the evidence at trial shows what object was used to inflict the injury,
then the State must prove that the grand jury used due diligence in attempting to
ascertain the weapon used.
Id. at 424 (citation omitted).
The holding in Hicks was based on the principle that sufficiency of the evidence is
measured by the specific wording of the indictment—the State has to prove all the allegations
contained in the indictment. That principle is no longer sound. In Malik, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured solely by the elements
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of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240;
see Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The court in Sanchez held
that Malik rendered the Hicks Rule defunct and expressly overruled Hicks. Sanchez, 376 S.W.3d
at 772; see Fagan v. State, 89 S.W.3d 245, 249 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002 pet. ref’d) (“The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly disavowed the ‘due diligence’ rule set out in
Hicks.”) Since sufficiency of the evidence is now tested against the essential elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, the rationale for requiring evidence to
correspond precisely to the indictment is obsolete. Accordingly, we overrule this point of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: July 24, 2014
Date Decided: July 30, 2014
Do Not Publish
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