State v. Tyran Dionne Spencer ( 2014 )

REVERSE and REMAND; and Opinion Filed June 23, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-01210-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V.
TYRAN DIONNE SPENCER, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MB12-55346
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Brown
Opinion by Justice Brown
In the course of this prosecution for operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the
trial court granted appellee Tyran Dionne Spencer’s motion to suppress all evidence resulting
from what she contends was an illegal blood draw by hospital personnel. The State appeals. We
reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Background
Around 11:00 in the evening on April 8, 2012, Spencer struck a utility pole with her car.
She was still sitting in her car when police officers arrived at the scene. The officers spoke with
Spencer and observed that she had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, alcohol on her breath, and
unsteady balance. Spencer told the paramedics that she did not need any medical treatment, and
the paramedics did not find any physical injuries. But based on Spencer’s elevated blood
pressure, the paramedics took Spencer to the emergency room at Baylor University Medical
Center in Dallas. At Baylor, Spencer denied being in any pain.
Two of the officers at the scene went to the emergency room with Spencer. There, one of
the officers asked Spencer whether she had been drinking. She admitted to drinking earlier that
day. The officer also gave Spencer the HGN test to which Spencer showed signs of intoxication.
The officer then read Spencer the statutory warning and asked her to provide a blood sample.
Spencer refused. Hospital personnel, however, drew Spencer’s blood within twenty minutes of
her arrival at Baylor. The results of the blood draw revealed that Spencer had an elevated blood
alcohol level and was intoxicated. Spencer did not consent to the blood draw at the time it was
taken, but she signed a consent form for treatment by the hospital before her discharge several
hours later. The medical records show Spencer sought follow-up treatment from Baylor for back
and neck pain.
Spencer moved to suppress the evidence that resulted from the blood draw because the
blood draw was without her consent and the officers did not obtain a warrant to draw her blood.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. Spencer was the only witness that
testified, and her consent form, results of the blood test, and other medical records from Baylor
were admitted as exhibits. Spencer testified that both before and after she told officers they
could not take her blood, a nurse tried to take her blood. She said “they kept asking [her] over
and over again if they could take [her] blood.” She remembered being frustrated because she
was asked to provide a blood sample and she kept telling “them” no. When someone tried to
stick a needle in her arm, she tried to take it out. Spencer testified that “they continued anyway”
and forcefully held her down to take her blood. Spencer clarified that it was not “officers” who
asked her over and over for a blood sample. She said “people” were “in and out of the room”
and the officers were among those people that asked to take her blood. She does not know how
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long the officers stayed at the hospital. Spencer said she signed the consent for medical
treatment “very, very late” after her blood was drawn.
After hearing Spencer’s testimony and reviewing additional briefing submitted by the
parties at the court’s request, the trial court granted Spencer’s motion to suppress and announced
its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. The court stated that this was a DWI
investigation from the time the officers first arrived at the scene, and it was reasonable for the
paramedics to deduce the fact of the investigation based on their interaction with and
observations of the officers. The court added that the paramedics and hospital personnel
followed their required protocol in treating Spencer “despite no obvious reason to treat” her and
the hospital personnel “no doubt” witnessed the officer interrogating Spencer and administering
the HGN test. The court found that while the paramedics and hospital personnel acted
appropriately, they acted in concert with and were “agents of the police.” The court concluded
that under these facts, the police officers should have procured a warrant to draw Spencer’s
blood, and because they did not do so, and no exception to the required warrant applied, the
evidence from the blood draw was suppressed.
Discussion
The State attacks the merits of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress in its
second issue. Specifically, the State argues that the record does not support a conclusion that an
agency relationship existed between the police officers and hospital personnel and therefore, the
trial court erred in granting Spencer’s motion to suppress. We agree with the State.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated
standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). That is,
we review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion but review the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. We give almost complete deference to the trial
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court’s determination of historical facts, particularly when the trial court’s fact findings are based
on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997). We also afford the same deference to mixed questions of law and fact if
resolving those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955
S.W.2d at 89. We review mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend on credibility and
demeanor as well as purely legal questions de novo. Id.; State v. Woodward, 341 S.W.3d 404,
410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
“The term ‘agency’ denotes a consensual relationship which exists between two persons
or parties where one of them is acting for or on behalf of the other.” Wilkerson v. State, 173
S.W.3d 521, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). But the law does not presume an agency relationship,
and the person alleging the existence of an agency relationship has the burden of proving it.
Elizondo v. State, 382 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Wilkerson, 173 S.W.3d at
529). To determine whether the hospital personnel were agents of and were, in fact, working for
or on behalf of the police officers, we examine the entire record and consider (1) the relationship
between the police and the hospital personnel as the potential police agent, (2) the hospital
personnel’s actions and perceptions, and (3) Spencer’s perceptions of the encounter. Wilkerson,
173 S.W.3d at 530–31. Stated another way, we look to see if the hospital personnel were “in
cahoots” with the police officers for purposes of obtaining evidence from Spencer’s blood draw.
Id. at 531.
When we consider the relationship between the police officers and the hospital personnel,
we look for “information about the relationship between” the police and the hospital personnel.
Id. at 530. We ask whether the police were present during the blood draw or gave the hospital
personnel instructions to draw Spencer’s blood. Id. We also determine whether the record
shows that the police were using the hospital personnel as its “anointed agent.” Id. Here, there
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is nothing in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing showing that the officers
attempted to use the hospital personnel as their agents. See id. at 530–31. While Spencer
testified that the officers were among the “people” that asked to take her blood, there is nothing
in the record linking the officers’ request and presence at the hospital to the hospital personnel’s
decision to draw Spencer’s blood. Spencer’s testimony reveals that the officers’ request to take
her blood was not the first request; she said that a nurse had tried to draw her blood both “before
and after” the officers’ request. And the medical records do not indicate that the officers
provided the nurse with instructions to take Spencer’s blood or that the nurse or lab technician
drew Spencer’s blood at the request of the officers. Spencer did not know how long the officers
stayed at the hospital, and she was unclear about who was in and out of the room during her time
there. In particular, nothing in her testimony or the medical records suggests that the officers
were in the room at the time she was restrained and her blood was drawn.
There also is nothing in the record to show that the reason the hospital personnel took
Spencer’s blood was for the purpose of gaining evidence to support a criminal prosecution. Id. at
530. When we examine the record and consider the hospital personnel’s actions and perceptions,
we look for the “primary reason” behind the decision to draw Spencer’s blood. Id. The trial
court noted that both the paramedics and hospital personnel followed their own “required
protocol[s]” in treating Spencer. And once Spencer arrived at the hospital, the actions and
perceptions of the hospital personnel appear to be aimed at providing treatment to her.
According to the medical records admitted as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, Spencer
arrived at the hospital at 11:17 in the evening. Those records reflect that the hospital was
presented with a patient that had been in a car accident in which she hit a pole and broke it in
half. The hospital personnel noted on the nursing record that while Spencer denied being in pain,
was in no apparent distress, and cooperative, she also had had an “[u]nsteady gait” and displayed
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“Impulsive” cognition. The notes further reflect that it had been reported that Spencer had been
drinking. Her blood was drawn at or around 11:35 in the evening. But a blood alcohol test was
not the only test ordered for her; rather, the record is clear that the hospital personnel ordered a
number of tests to be performed on Spencer’s blood specimen. The personnel also ordered,
among other things, a CT scan to assess Spencer for a head injury and a scan of her abdomen and
pelvis, citing abdomen pain status post trauma as the reason for the exam. The hospital
personnel indicated that the results from the blood tests and CT scans were needed immediately
as indicated by the listed priority level of “STAT.” Around the time Spencer’s blood was drawn,
the nurse applied a cervical collar. And shortly thereafter, she was admitted to monitor her
condition with the goal of “[i]mprov[ing] [her] comfort level.” Upon her discharge, Spencer
signed the form consenting to being treated by the hospital. The care provided by the hospital
personnel continued after Spencer’s discharge. The nursing records show that after radiology
recommended a follow-up evaluation, the personnel tried to contact her. Spencer was informed
during a phone conversation about the “severity of [her] injury.”
Finally, when we examine the record for evidence of Spencer’s perceptions of the
encounter with the hospital personnel, there is nothing to support a conclusion that Spencer
believed the hospital personnel that treated her were “cloaked with the actual or apparent
authority of the police.” Id. at 530–31. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that a
reasonable person in Spencer’s position would believe that the hospital personnel were acting as
agents of the police officers. Id. Spencer testified that she did not tell the paramedics that she
wanted to go to the hospital and she tried to pull the needle out of her arm. She explained,
however, that she tried to take the needle out of her arm because she is “scared of needles,” not
because she had already refused the officers’ request for a blood sample or thought the actions of
the hospital personnel were tied to the officers’ request.
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Spencer argues that the standard of review applied in this case is highly deferential to the
trial court’s determination of witness credibility and historical facts and based on her testimony
and medical records, a reasonable inference can be drawn that her blood was taken at the
direction of the police. She points out that she denied needing medical treatment and that both
nurses and police officers kept asking her over and over again if they could take her blood. She
adds that the record is unclear whether she was “actually suffering from any malady,” and the
“immediacy of the blood draw just as likely supports the trial court’s conclusion that it was done
at the behest of insisting police officers.”
But while our review is deferential to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and
view of the evidence, there has to more than unclear, vague references to “they” to support the
finding that the hospital personnel acted in concert with the police officers when the personnel
took Spencer’s blood. See id. at 530–32; Elizondo, 382 S.W.3d at 395–96. The trial court stated
that the paramedics and hospital personnel could deduce from the police interactions with
Spencer that this was a DWI investigation. But the court does not specify which facts support
this statement. Spencer’s testimony about who asked for the blood draw, when the request was
made, and whether the officers were even around when the blood was taken is sparse, and at
best, ambiguous as to the reasons for the blood draw. In addition, the medical records are silent
on any police interaction with the hospital personnel, and Spencer only testified that the officers
were among the hospital personnel; she did not state that the officers were interacting with
hospital personnel or whether the officers appeared to be involved with the hospital personnel’s
actions. Without any other evidence in the record to show that Spencer’s blood was drawn at the
request of the police, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded the
hospital personnel acted in concert with and were agents of the police officers. We sustain the
State’s second issue.
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We reverse the trial court’s order granting Spencer’s motion to suppress and remand this
cause for further proceedings. Based on our resolution of the State’s second issue, we need not
address the State’s first issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
/Ada Brown/
ADA BROWN
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
131210F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant On Appeal from the County Criminal Court
No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-13-01210-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. MB12-55346.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown.
TYRAN DIONNE SPENCER, Appellee Justices Lang and Myers participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order granting appellee Tyran
Dionne Spencer’s motion to suppress is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further
proceedings.
Judgment entered this 23rd day of June, 2014.
/Ada Brown/
ADA BROWN
JUSTICE
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