Mark Allen Hollifield v. State ( 2014 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 5, 2014
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00940-CR
MARK ALLEN HOLLIFIELD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-82328-2012
OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, O’Neill, and FitzGerald
Opinion by Justice FitzGerald
Appellant was convicted of harassment of a public servant and sentenced to two years’
imprisonment. In a single issue on appeal, appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction. Concluding appellant’s argument is without merit, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
BACKGROUND
Police officer Sara Borchers observed that appellant was almost hit by a car as he crossed
Jupiter Road. The driver of the car had to slam on the brakes to avoid hitting appellant. Appellant
also had an unsteady walk. When the officer approached appellant, she noticed that his clothes
were soiled, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was incoherent. Appellant was completely
unaware that he had almost been hit by a car. After officer Borchers attempted to administer a
field sobriety test, she determined that appellant was intoxicated, and a danger to himself and
others. Appellant was placed under arrest.
When officer Borchers arrested appellant, he became belligerent. Officer Borchers
searched appellant, and found a bottle of Alcatraz Sour Apple Shot. Appellant told Borchers he
had HIV or AIDS, and spit on her face. But when appellant was booked into jail, he did not
mention HIV or AIDS as one of his medical conditions.
Following a trial to the court, appellant was found guilty of harassment of a public
servant and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
ANALYSIS
In a single issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction for harassment of a public servant. Specifically, appellant argues that he was too
intoxicated to form the requisite intent to harass, assault, or alarm officer Borchers.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We are
required to defer to the factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder
is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The factfinder may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of
any witness’s testimony. Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no
pet.). Reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence presented at trial, and
circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor.
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[I]t is not necessary that every fact
point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is
–2–
warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.”
Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
The elements of harassment of a public servant as to officer Borchers are that appellant,
with the intent to assault, harass, or alarm, and with the knowledge that Borchers was a public
servant, caused Borchers to contact appellant’s saliva while Borchers was lawfully discharging
an official duty. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.11(a)(2) (West 2011).
Officer Borchers testified that appellant became angry and belligerent when he was
arrested, and leveled a barrage of curses and insults at Borchers and the officer accompanying
her. When Borchers asked appellant if he had anything sharp, he replied that he did have
something that would stick or poke the officer. Appellant told officer Borchers that he would
“kick her ass” if she “messed with him again.” When officer Borchers attempted to buckle
appellant’s seatbelt in the patrol car, appellant told her that he had HIV or AIDS and spit on
Borchers’ face. Borchers testified that she was sure the spit did not result from appellant’s
yelling, and she believed he did it intentionally. Borchers further testified that she viewed
appellant’s behavior as harassing and assaultive.
The video of the incident taken from the patrol car was admitted into evidence, and a
portion of the video was played for the court.
Officer Jason Ruffing also testified about booking appellant into jail. During the booking
process, officer Ruffing questioned appellant about his medical conditions. Appellant did not
mention HIV or AIDS, and reported only that he had hepatitis C and epilepsy. Officer Ruffing
believed that appellant was under the influence, and appellant told Rushing that he had
consumed twelve beers before he was arrested.
Appellant insists that his case is “vastly different” from the typical harassment of a public
servant case because it involves an extremely intoxicated individual who was incapable of
–3–
exercising control over his normal faculties. We disagree. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense
to the commission of crime. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (West 2011). Evidence of
appellant’s intoxication does not negate the element of intent. See Hawkins v. State, 605 S.W.2d
586, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
Appellant also argues that “it is possible” that appellant did not intentionally spit on
Borchers and it is “highly likely” that his extreme agitation resulted in involuntary spitting. It is
well-established, however, that “one’s acts are generally reliable circumstantial evidence of
one’s intent.” Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Mere possibilities,
however, do not defeat the sufficiency of the evidence. In light of appellant’s hostile and
belligerent demeanor, the verbal abuse leveled at the officers, appellant’s claim that he had a
highly infectious and communicable disease, and Borchers’ testimony that appellant
intentionally spit on her, the trial court could reasonably conclude that appellant intended to spit
on Borchers. Appellant’s issue is overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
/Kerry P. FitzGerald/
KERRY P. FITZGERALD
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
130940F.U05
–4–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MARK ALLEN HOLLIFIELD, Appellant On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-13-00940-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 296-82328-2012.
Opinion delivered by Justice FitzGerald.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Moseley and O'Neill participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered June 5, 2014
/Kerry P. FitzGerald/
KERRY P. FITZGERALD
JUSTICE
–5–