Michael Jessie Cowell v. State ( 2014 )

Affirm and Opinion Filed June 10, 2014
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00565-CR
MICHAEL JESSIE COWELL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 380-81327-2012
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang-Miers
Opinion by Justice Francis
Michael Jessie Cowell appeals his convictions for sexual assault of a child and two
counts of indecency with a child. After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed punishment at
six years in prison for the sexual assault conviction, ten years confinement, probated for ten
years, and a $1000 fine for indecency of a child by touching the genitals of the child, and five
years confinement, probated for ten years, and a $1000 fine for indecency of a child by touching
the child’s breast. In nine issues, appellant claims insufficient evidence supports his three
convictions and the trial court erred by excluding evidence and overruling certain objections.
We affirm.
Fifteen-year-old D.S. began chatting online with appellant; they became friends on
Facebook and exchanged phones numbers. Appellant told D.S. he was thirty-one years old, lived
in Missouri, was separated from his wife who lived in Kansas, and wanted a divorce because his
wife was crazy and cheated on him. D.S. told him she would not have sex with him because she
was waiting until she got married. They discussed getting married after appellant divorced his
wife.
The two eventually made plans to meet in November 2011. Appellant drove to Texas
and met D.S. outside her parents’ house around 2 a.m. They sat in his truck and talked for two
hours, then drove to a Motel 8 in McKinney where appellant rented a room. According to D.S.,
they initially just talked but then “it escalated to sexual things like kissing, touching.” D.S. took
her clothes off from the waist down but appellant remained clothed. As they kissed, appellant
touched her breast and genitals with his hand and penetrated her vagina with his fingers.
According to D.S., the encounter went on for about an hour, and she was a willing participant.
The following day, they arranged to meet again. Appellant picked D.S. up, and they
drove to a park. Later, he drove her to the alley behind her house. When D.S. got out of
appellant’s truck, her father drove up and confronted appellant who claimed he was twenty-one
years old. After she left with her father, D.S. told her parents everything. They then contacted
the McKinney police department. Appellant was later arrested and charged with sexual assault
and two counts of indecency with a child.
In his third, fourth, and fifth issues, appellant contends insufficient evidence supports his
convictions. Although we question whether appellant has adequately briefed these issues given
his failure to cite to any authority or to the record, we nevertheless have reviewed his complaints
and conclude they lack merit.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
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(1979). This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony,
weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, when analyzing the sufficiency
of the evidence, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the
combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict. Id. The testimony of a sexual assault victim is alone sufficient evidence to prove an
assault. Karnes v. State, 873 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.).
A person commits the offense of sexual assault if he causes the penetration of the anus or
sexual organ of a child by any means. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)(A) (West 2011).
A child means a person under 17 years of age. Id. § 22.011(c)(1). A person commits indecency
with a child if he engages in sexual contact with the child. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). Sexual contact
includes “any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or
any part of the genitals of a child.” Id. § 21.11(c)(1).
As detailed above, D.S. testified about her sexual contact with appellant, including that
he touched her breast and genitals and placed his fingers inside her vagina. She also admitted
describing herself, in a journal she kept before the encounter with appellant, as a sociopath,
delusional, and a little “bitch,” capable of lying and manipulating things. Although appellant
contends D.S.’s description of herself in the journal somehow renders her clear and direct
testimony about his actions insufficient, we cannot agree. The jury, as factfinder, was able to
assess the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses who testified at trial. Most importantly, the
jury was able to assess D.S.’s credibility and demeanor when she discussed meeting appellant,
going to the motel, and being touched and sexually assaulted. From the guilty verdict, it is clear
the jury found D.S. credible and rejected any claim that her “manipulative” or “delusional
behavior” tainted her testimony. We overrule appellant’s third, fourth, and fifth issues.
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In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by excluding evidence of D.S.’s
incidents of prior sexual abuse. In his second issue, he complains the trial court also erred by
excluding evidence of her prior psychiatric hospitalizations. Under both issues, appellant claims
this evidence was admissible to impeach D.S. as well as to challenge her credibility. Appellant
also claims the exclusion of this evidence violated his constitutional right to confrontation.
We first note that, to preserve error for appellate review, a defendant must lodge a timely,
specific objection. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). A defendant waives even his constitutional
right to confront witnesses if he does not object at trial to the denial of that right. Melendez–Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3 (2009). Appellant bore the burden of making a
confrontation clause objection at trial; because he did not do so, we conclude he has waived this
portion of his argument.
Under his first issue, appellant claims he offered the evidence of two prior sexual abuse
incidents under evidentiary rule 412 to attack D.S.’s credibility. The first incident occurred
when D.S. was four or six years old, the second when she was thirteen.
We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard. See Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery
v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).
Rule 412 provides that, in a “prosecution for sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault,
or attempt to commit sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault, evidence of specific instances
of an alleged victim’s past sexual behavior” is not admissible unless certain requirements are
met. TEX. R. EVID. 412(b). Specifically, the procedural requirements of paragraph (c) and (d)
concerning the in-camera hearing and the sealing of the record must be satisfied; the proponent
must establish that evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual behavior fall into one of
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the five categories set out in rule 412(b)(2); and finally, the probative value of the offered
evidence must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.
Although he claims the evidence was admissible, appellant made no attempt at trial or in
his brief on appeal to establish the evidence fell into one of the five categories listed in rule
412(b)(2). Specifically, appellant did not argue the evidence was (1) necessary to rebut or
explain scientific or medical evidence offered by the State; (2) of past sexual behavior with
appellant and was offered by appellant upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to
the sexual behavior which is the basis of the offense charged; (3) related to the motive or bias of
the alleged victim; (4) admissible under Rule 609; or (5) constitutionally required to be admitted.
See id. Nor did he make any argument that the probative value outweighed the danger or unfair
prejudice. See id. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding the evidence. We overrule his first issue.
With respect to his second issue in which he complains the trial court excluded evidence
of D.S.’s prior hospitalizations and her mental state, appellant claims this evidence was
necessary for the jury to determine D.S.’s credibility and was admissible under evidentiary rule
608(b).
While rule 608 provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence
referring only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, subsection (b) specifically provides
specific instances of conduct of the witness may not be inquired into on cross-examination. See
TEX. R. EVID. 608(a), (b). Whether evidence of a witness’s mental illness or disturbance
suffered in the recent past—before the event in question occurred—may be admissible must be
decided on an ad hoc basis, and deference is given to the trial court initially deciding the issue.
See Virts v. State, 739 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). An accused’s right to cross-
examine a testifying State’s witness includes the right to impeach the witness with relevant
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evidence that might reflect, among other things, an impairment or disability affecting the
witness’s credibility. Id. at 29. Cross-examination of a testifying State's witness to show the
witness suffered a recent mental illness or disturbance is proper, provided such mental illness or
disturbance reflects on the witness’s credibility. Id. at 30. However, the mere fact the witness
has suffered or received treatment for a mental illness or disturbance in the recent past does not
alone make this admissible impeachment evidence. Id.
The offer of proof showed D.S. had been hospitalized eight different times at Green Oaks
Psychiatric Hospital over a two-to-three-year period before this incident occurred. D.S. testified
the stays were “really close together and probably lasted for about a year.” She experienced
suicidal ideation or self-mutilation but received help, treatment, therapy, and counseling.
Appellant does not explain how D.S.’s emotional disturbances or mental health issues affected
her ability to recall events or were otherwise relevant to impeach her credibility as a witness. To
the extent he suggests he was denied the opportunity to question D.S. about her mental health or
behavior, we note that, during cross-examination, she admitted calling herself a sociopath,
somewhat delusional, a “little bitch,” manipulative, and capable of lying. Given the discretion
accorded the trial court and that fact that D.S. admitted to many of the behavioral issues raised in
the offer of proof, we cannot conclude the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence of her
hospitalizations was error or that appellant was harmed. We overrule the second issue.
In his sixth and seventh issues, appellant claims the trial court erred by overruling his
motion for mistrial and his objection that the prosecutor indirectly commented on his failure to
testify.
A comment on a defendant’s failure to testify violates his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. See U.S. CONST. art. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 10. In determining whether the
prosecutor made an impermissible comment, we view the statement “from the jury’s standpoint
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and the implication that the comment referred to the defendant’s failure to testify must be clear.”
Bustamante v. State, 48 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The test is whether the
language used was “manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would
necessarily and naturally take it as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” Id. We take
into account the context in which the comment was made; it is not sufficient that the comment
might be construed as an implied or indirect allusion. Id.
During closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed specifics of D.S.’s testimony, then
stated “you have heard nothing to refute [D.S.] . . ..” Appellant objected on the grounds the
prosecutor was commenting on his failure to testify. The trial court sustained the objection and
instructed the jury to disregard but denied appellant’s motion for mistrial.
Appellant, in turn, argued D.S. was a liar and delusional. He argued she wrote poems
and letters to him but that there was no evidence he reciprocated. In response, the prosecutor
argued:
When you go back there, consider the full evidence. Consider all of it. And ask
yourself, the very question that he asked you, does he reciprocate? Did he
reciprocate? If you can find a reason back there based on the evidence in this case
why he was in town other than to see this 15-year-old girl, you go back there and
find some reasons –
Appellant again objected on the grounds it was a “direct and possibly indirect comment on him
not testifying and explaining the situation.” The trial court overruled the objection.
Appellant now assigns the denial of his motion for mistrial and the overruling of his
second objection as reversible error. These comments, however, are not a clear reference to
appellant’s failure to testify, nor did they draw the jury’s attention to an absence of evidence that
could have been supplied only by appellant. See Brown v. State, 92 S.W.3d 655, 667−68 (Tex.
App.―Dallas 2002), aff’d, 122 S.W.3d 794 (2003). A prosecutor does not improperly comment
on a defendant’s failure to testify where the language can reasonably be construed to refer to a
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defendant’s failure to produce evidence other than his own testimony. See Jackson v. State, 17
S.W.3d 664, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Here, the comment can reasonably be construed as a
reference to appellant’s failure to produce evidence from witnesses other than himself. Because
the prosecutor’s statements were not of such a character that the jury would necessarily and
naturally take them as a comment on appellant’s failure to testify, we conclude the trial court did
not err by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial or his subsequent objection. We overrule
appellant’s sixth and seventh issues.
In his eighth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing D.S. to testify
about online comments made to her by appellant’s wife. We need not determine whether the
admission of this evidence was error because, even if it were, appellant has failed to show how
he was harmed by its admission.
When reviewing the erroneous admission of evidence, we disregard any error that does
not affect substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is affected when the
error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.
Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In assessing the likelihood the
jury’s decision was adversely affected by the error, we consider everything in the record,
including any testimony or physical evidence, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict,
the character of the alleged error, and how it might be considered in connection with other
evidence in the case. Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Here, the message itself was not admitted, and the jury was not apprised of its content.
Although D.S. said it was not “a friendly conversation” and the person purporting to be
appellant’s wife was “always angry,” the complained of testimony is neither substantial nor
injurious when all the evidence is considered. After reviewing the entire record, we cannot
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conclude this portion of D.S.’s testimony was determinative in the jury’s decision to convict
appellant. We overrule his eighth issue.
In his final issue, appellant claims the jury charge instruction on parole eligibility mislead
the jury and allowed a verdict that violated his due process rights under the United States
Constitution.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered and rejected a similar argument in
Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In that case, the court acknowledged
that the instruction dictated by the code of criminal procedure may appear to be misleading and
inapplicable to some defendants. Id. at 363. Nevertheless, it construed article 37.07, section 4 to
be an absolute command that the good conduct time instruction be given to the jury. Id.
Although appellant requests we reconsider this ruling, we decline to do so. As an intermediate
court, we have no authority to overrule that case and are bound to follow the decisions of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Chatham v. State, 646 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1982, no pet.). We overrule appellant’s last issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 /Molly Francis/
130565F.U05 MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MICHAEL JESSIE COWELL, Appellant On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-13-00565-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 380-81327-2012.
Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Bridges and Lang-Miers
participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 10th day of June, 2014.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
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