Mary Iacono v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., and Stanley Access Technologies, LLC ( 2015 )

Opinion issued May 19, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00084-CV
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MARY IACONO, Appellant
V.
STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC. AND STANLEY
ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 215th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2013-29901
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Mary Iacono, attempts to appeal from the trial court’s January 16,
2015 order granting appellees Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. and Stanley Access
Technologies, LLC’s (collectively “Stanley”) motion for partial summary
judgment. Stanley has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
We dismiss the appeal.
Iacono sued Omni Hotels Management Corporation and Stanley, asserting
claims against Stanley for products liability, breach of warranty, negligence, and
gross negligence. Omni Hotels asserted cross-claims against Stanley. On
November 3, 2014, Stanley filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On
January 16, 2015, the trial court granted Stanley’s motion, releasing and
discharging Stanley from all liability for Iacono’s products liability claims
“pertaining to the products manufactured by Stanley that have been pleaded or
could have been pleaded against [Stanley], including [Iacono’s] claims of
negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty and gross negligence.”
Iacono filed her notice of appeal of this order.
Stanley has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the January
16, 2015 summary judgment order is not a final and appealable judgment because
it does not resolve Iacono’s claims against Omni or Omni’s cross-claims against
Stanley. Iacono has not responded to Stanley’s motion to dismiss.
Generally, appellate courts only have jurisdiction over appeals from final
judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); N.E.
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). To be final, a
judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in a case. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at
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895. A summary judgment order is final for purposes of appeal only if it either
“actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court . . . or it states
with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.”
Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93; see N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799
S.W.2d 677, 678–79 (Tex. 1990) (“In the absence of a special statute making an
interlocutory order appealable, a judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in
the case, including those presented by counterclaim or cross action, to be final and
appealable.”).
Here, the trial court’s summary judgment order does not mention Iacono’s
claims against Omni Hotel or its cross-claims against Stanley. Cf. Sanchez, 799
S.W.2d at 679 (concluding summary judgment that did not dispose of counterclaim
was not final and appealable); Penson v. Auto Care Am., No. 01-08-00889-CV,
2010 WL 1492338, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010, no pet.)
(dismissing appeal when summary judgment order did not dispose of every
pending claim). The order also does not state that it is final or appealable or
include any other “clear indication that the trial court intended it to dispose of the
entire case.” Am. Heritage Capital, L.P. v. Gonzalez¸ 436 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court has no jurisdiction over this
attempted appeal. We grant Stanley’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal.
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See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss as moots any other pending
motions.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Huddle, and Lloyd.
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