Raul Garcia Mirano v. State ( 2014 )


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  • Opinion filed June 19, 2014
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    ___________
    No. 11-12-00179-CR
    __________
    RAUL GARCIA MIRANO, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 70th District Court
    Ector County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. A-36,379
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The jury found Raul Garcia Mirano guilty of eight offenses from a fifteen-
    count indictment1: Count Three for aggravated sexual assault of a child, N.L.;
    Counts Four, Six, Ten, and Eleven for indecency with a child, N.L.;
    Counts Twelve and Fourteen for indecency with a child, E.L.; and Count Fifteen
    1
    The State abandoned Counts One, Two, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Thirteen prior to trial and
    abandoned Count Five after it rested.
    for continuous sexual abuse of young children, for acts against both N.L. and E.L.
    The jury assessed punishment at five years’ confinement for Count Three; two
    years’ probated sentences for Counts Four, Six, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and
    Fourteen; and twenty-five years’ confinement for Count Fifteen. The jury assessed
    no fines. The court sentenced Appellant accordingly. Appellant challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence on all convictions. We affirm.
    I. The Charged Offenses
    The grand jury returned a multi-count indictment against Appellant for
    aggravated sexual assault of a child, namely N.L.; indecency with a child, for acts
    committed against both N.L. and E.L.; and continuous sexual abuse of young
    children, for acts committed against both N.L. and E.L.
    A person commits the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child,
    younger than fourteen years of age, if he intentionally or knowingly causes the
    penetration of the anus or sexual organ of the child by any means or causes the
    anus or sexual organ of the child to contact the sexual organ of another person,
    including the actor. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West Supp. 2013).
    A person commits the offense of indecency with a child, younger than
    seventeen years of age, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, if the
    person engages in sexual contact with the child with the intent to gratify the sexual
    desire of any person. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (West 2011).
    A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if
    (1) during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, the person commits two
    or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are
    committed against one or more victims, and (2) at the time of the commission of
    each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the
    victim is a child younger than fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 21.02 (West Supp. 2013).
    2
    II. The Evidence at Trial
    The two victims are N.L. and E.L., granddaughters of Appellant. Their
    mother is C.M., who is the daughter of Appellant. C.M. is married to R.L. N.L.
    and E.L., who are fourteen years old and eleven years old, respectively, 2 have two
    sisters, B.L., seventeen years old, and O.L., nine years old, as well as three
    brothers, ages nineteen, twenty, and twenty-three. C.M. and R.L. lived with their
    four daughters in Odessa, Texas. Appellant also lived in Odessa, Texas, with his
    then-wife, R.B.
    N.L. testified she had just finished the eighth grade at the time of trial. N.L.
    testified that she first recounted the abuse of Appellant to her mother, C.M., after
    C.M. had found her and her sister, E.L., with another neighborhood girl, Nana,
    playing “mommy and daddy”; C.M. had inquired if anyone had touched them
    inappropriately. C.M. testified that N.L. said that Appellant had touched her, as
    did E.L. These outcries occurred in August 2008.
    N.L. said the first time she was touched inappropriately by Appellant was at
    Christmas, when she became upset that the Christmas card she had made for
    Appellant was not displayed at Appellant’s house and had been replaced by an
    aunt’s card. N.L. said she cried and went to Appellant’s room where she got
    underneath the blankets on the bed. N.L. said she was crying and her eyes were
    red when Appellant entered his bedroom and asked why she was crying. N.L. said
    that Appellant then put his hands under the blanket and pulled down her pants and
    underwear. N.L. testified that, after he pulled her pants and underwear down, he
    touched her anus and her vagina. N.L. said that she was touched inside her vagina
    lips and her butt during this incident while she was lying on her stomach. N.L.
    2
    These were their ages in June 2012 at the time of trial.
    3
    testified that Appellant touched the back part of her vagina and butt and slipped his
    finger in between her butt cheeks and the back part of her vagina. N.L. testified:
    I was laying on my stomach and he was touching my butt. And his
    hand went in a little bit to my anal part and he had slid his hand
    through there to my butt and his hand went by my vagina, but it didn’t
    go all the way in, but it was, it kind of went into my lips where -- I
    guess that you would say.
    N.L. said the second instance of abuse occurred just before N.L. and others
    were going to go to the movies, when Appellant asked her if she wanted candy or
    chocolates; she did and she went into his bedroom to get the candy, but Appellant
    instead lay down on the bed and put her on top of him facing him. N.L. testified
    that his privates touched hers and he moved it around but that both of them were
    wearing clothes at the time. N.L. testified that the third instance of abuse occurred
    when they were in the living room watching television when Appellant asked her
    to sit on his lap. She said that she sat on his lap, that she felt his private parts move
    against her private parts, and that it felt weird. N.L. also reported that, several
    times after people had left a room at Appellant’s house and he was alone with her,
    he would touch her butt on top of her clothes. N.L. said that she felt bad about
    herself because of these instances; that she suffers from depression, weight loss,
    sleep loss, and nightmares; and that she has cut herself.
    E.L. testified that she was eleven years old, had just finished the fifth grade,
    and was about to go into sixth grade at the time of trial. E.L. testified that
    Appellant had touched her on more than one occasion. E.L. said the first time was
    when he asked her if she wanted a massage and he took her and her sister, O.L., to
    his bedroom. E.L. said he touched her privates over her clothes in the bedroom
    while she was lying facedown on the bed. E.L. said that, during the first incident,
    Appellant asked her if she “liked it” when he touched her privates and that she said
    4
    “no.” E.L. said she was scared when Appellant asked her if she liked him touching
    her during this first incident.
    E.L. said the second instance of abuse occurred when Appellant took her to
    the guest room with her sister, O.L., and a cousin, Julie, and he flipped her over his
    shoulder and onto the bed. E.L. said Appellant touched her butt on the outside of
    her clothes when he flipped her over his shoulder. E.L. reported that Appellant
    told her not to tell anyone about the incidents of touching in the bedrooms.
    O.L. stated she was present when this second incident occurred and testified
    Appellant had touched E.L.’s butt in the guest room. O.L. testified that Appellant
    flipped her and played with her, that it was fine, that she had a good time, and that
    it was not scary. She testified that he played with the other grandchildren too.
    O.L. said she was not afraid, so she had not told her mother or grandmother about
    playing with Appellant.
    E.L. testified that the third incident occurred when Appellant was in the
    garage and he asked to fix her belt; he then put his hand underneath her clothes and
    underwear and touched her butt. Her father, R.L., saw part of the incident and
    confronted Appellant. R.L. testified about the incident that occurred in the garage 3
    when Appellant touched E.L. on the butt. According to R.L., he asked, “[W]hat
    are you doing?” and Appellant claimed he was fixing E.L.’s belt. Then R.L. said,
    “[N]o, you weren’t.” R.L. said Appellant looked scared. R.B., Appellant’s ex-
    wife, remembered that R.L. was upset about an incident in the garage and that R.L.
    and his wife took the children home, but R.B. did not see the incident. R.L.
    admitted he had a conviction for criminal mischief and two prior DWIs.
    C.M. testified her daughters were playing “mommy and daddy” with another
    girl from the neighborhood and were kissing each other, which C.M. thought was
    3
    R.L. also testified that, while he was at Appellant’s house on another occasion, Appellant had
    shown him pornographic magazines while they were in the garage and that it made R.L. uncomfortable.
    5
    inappropriate; C.M. then asked her daughters if anyone had touched them
    inappropriately. E.L. and N.L. told her that Appellant had touched them. E.L.
    recounted that the first time she spoke to anyone about the abuse by Appellant was
    after her mother had seen her and her sisters and a friend playing a “mommy and
    daddy” game.
    C.M. testified that the first incident N.L. described occurred at Christmas in
    2007 when Appellant pulled N.L.’s pants and underwear down while she was on
    the bed and under the blankets in Appellant’s bedroom. C.M. said the second
    incident described by N.L. occurred in the summer just before they went to a
    movie, Shrek, when Appellant offered N.L. candy that was in his bedroom. N.L.
    told C.M. that, once N.L. was in the bedroom, Appellant lay down on the bed; put
    N.L. on top of him; and, while they were both clothed, moved his privates on her
    privates. C.M. said the third incident N.L. recounted occurred when N.L. was in
    the living room and was asked to sit on Appellant’s lap; when she did, Appellant
    moved his private part against her private part through the clothes. C.M. also
    described what E.L. had told her about Appellant’s inappropriate actions when he
    touched her in his bedroom, the guest room, and the garage, all of which occurred
    before E.L.’s outcry to C.M. in August 2008.
    Shawndee Kennedy, Program Director for Harmony Home, testified about
    the services that her organization provides to the community.         Kennedy also
    testified about “grooming” and how sexual predators groom young children by
    befriending them, flattering them, spending time with them, and buying gifts for
    them. Kennedy said that the predator then engages in accidental touches to the
    child to desensitize the child before moving to inappropriate touching of the child’s
    sexual organs. Kennedy also talked about “delayed outcry” by children and the
    five phases that children go through. Kennedy admitted that she had not met or
    interviewed the children in this case.
    6
    Nicole McLean, a former forensic interviewer for Harmony Home, testified
    that she interviewed E.L. McLean described what she heard from E.L. and what
    she observed about E.L.’s behavior and mannerisms during the interview. McLean
    remembered that E.L. cried during the interview and alternated between looking at
    her and looking away and that E.L. initially giggled when McLean mentioned body
    parts.       McLean also interviewed N.L. the same day, and N.L. described the
    incidents of abuse by Appellant.
    Shelly Stanford, an investigator with the Odessa Police Department, testified
    that the department had received a complaint from C.M. of sexual abuse of
    children by Appellant.           Investigator Stanford testified that the children were
    interviewed at Harmony Home and that she reviewed the information gathered in
    those interviews and interviewed Appellant, who, after being read his Miranda4
    rights, waived them and agreed to talk to Investigator Stanford and provide her
    with a statement. Investigator Stanford testified she also gathered information
    from C.M.
    Count Three alleged that Appellant, in December 2007, committed
    aggravated sexual assault against N.L. when he penetrated N.L.’s sexual organ
    with his finger. Counts Four, Six, and Ten alleged that, in June 2007 (Count Four)
    and August 2007 (Counts Six and Ten), Appellant, with the intent to arouse or
    gratify his sexual desire, committed indecency with a child, N.L., when he touched
    her anus with his hand. Count Eleven alleged that Appellant, in August 2007, with
    the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire, committed indecency with a child,
    N.L., when he touched his sexual organ to her sexual organ over clothes.
    Count Twelve alleged that Appellant, in June 2007, with the intent to arouse
    or gratify his sexual desire, committed indecency with a child, E.L., when he
    touched her sexual organ with his hand over her clothes. Count Fourteen alleged
    4
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
    7
    that Appellant, in August 2007, with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual
    desire, committed indecency with a child, E.L., when he touched her anus with his
    hand over her clothes. Count Fifteen alleged that Appellant committed two or
    more acts of sexual abuse—indecency with a child, namely N.L. and E.L.—when
    he touched their anus or sexual organ with his hand, during a period of thirty days
    or more, and did so with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire.
    III. Issues Presented
    Appellant has asserted two sufficiency points of error. First, Appellant
    complains that there was insufficient evidence to convict him as to E.L. and,
    second, that there was insufficient evidence to convict him as to N.L.
    IV. Standard of Review
    We apply the sufficiency standard outlined in Jackson and its progeny for
    both of Appellant’s sufficiency points. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318
    (1979); Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Hooper v.
    State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We review all of the evidence
    introduced by both the State and Appellant in the light most favorable to the jury’s
    verdict and decide whether any rational jury could have found each element of the
    offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    .
    V. Discussion and Analysis
    The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for
    sexual assault. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a) (West Supp. 2013);
    Villalon v. State, 
    791 S.W.2d 130
    , 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (concluding child
    victim’s unsophisticated terminology alone established element of penetration
    beyond a reasonable doubt). The trier of fact may believe all, some, or none of a
    witness’s testimony because the factfinder is the sole judge of the weight and
    credibility of the witnesses. Sharp v. State, 
    707 S.W.2d 611
    , 614 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1986); Isham v. State, 
    258 S.W.3d 244
    , 248 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet.
    8
    ref’d). We defer to the trier of fact’s resolution of any conflicting inferences raised
    in the evidence and presume that the trier of fact resolved such conflicts in favor of
    the prosecution. 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318
    ; 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894
    ; Fuentes v.
    State, 
    991 S.W.2d 267
    , 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Turro v. State, 
    867 S.W.2d 43
    , 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
    A. Sufficiency of Evidence for Convictions as to E.L.
    Appellant asserted in his first point of error that the evidence was
    insufficient to convict him of the crimes alleged to have been committed by him
    against E.L. and that there was insufficient proof of the required culpable mental
    state.    E.L. testified that Appellant had inappropriately touched her on three
    separate occasions. E.L. testified that Appellant touched her private parts over her
    clothes in Appellant’s bedroom and asked if she “liked it,” that he touched her butt
    in the guest bedroom after he flipped her over his shoulder, and that Appellant
    touched her butt inside of her underwear while they were in the garage. The jury
    may convict on the testimony of the victim alone. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07(a);
    
    Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134
    . In E.L.’s case, O.L. corroborated E.L.’s testimony
    about the inappropriate touching of E.L. by Appellant in his guest bedroom, and
    E.L.’s father, R.L., testified about what he saw in the garage. In addition, E.L.’s
    mother testified about E.L.’s outcry, which can be sufficient for conviction. See
    Rodriguez v. State, 
    819 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    Appellant complains that his intent to sexually arouse or gratify himself was
    never proven, but intent can be inferred from words or deeds. “Mental culpability
    is of such a nature that it generally must be inferred from the circumstances under
    which a prohibited act or omission occurs.” Moore v. State, 
    969 S.W.2d 4
    , 10
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 
    819 S.W.2d 806
    , 810 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1991)). “A defendant’s mental state ‘was concealed within his own
    mind and can only be determined from his words, acts, and conduct.’” 
    Id. (quoting 9
    Norwood v. State, 
    120 S.W.2d 806
    , 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938)). Appellant’s acts
    of touching E.L. over and under her clothes and asking her if she “liked it” evinced
    his intent to sexually arouse or gratify himself. C.M. described the time periods
    when these instances of abuse occurred. We hold that a rational jury could have
    found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the crimes of
    indecency with E.L. and continuous sexual abuse of E.L. We overrule Appellant’s
    first point of error.
    B. Sufficiency of Evidence for Convictions as to N.L.
    Appellant asserts in his second point of error that there was insufficient
    evidence to convict him of crimes against N.L. The jury may convict on the
    testimony of the victim alone. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07(a); 
    Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134
    .    N.L. said that Appellant had inappropriately touched her on several
    occasions.
    N.L. said the first incident of abuse occurred at Christmas in Appellant’s
    bedroom when he pulled her pants and underwear down and touched her butt and
    vagina. N.L. testified:
    I was laying on my stomach and he was touching my butt. And his
    hand went in a little bit to my anal part and he had slid his hand
    through there to my butt and his hand went by my vagina, but it didn’t
    go all the way in, but it was, it kind of went into my lips where -- I
    guess that you would say.
    N.L. said the second incident occurred just before they were going to go to
    the movies when Appellant asked her if she wanted candy and she followed him
    into his bedroom; Appellant, who was clothed, then lay down on the bed and put
    N.L., who was also clothed, on top of him and facing him. N.L. testified that his
    privates touched hers and that he moved his privates around. N.L. testified about a
    third incident in the living room when they were watching television and Appellant
    asked her to sit on his lap; she said that she felt his private parts move against her
    10
    private parts and that it felt weird. N.L. also reported that, several times after
    people had left a room at Appellant’s house and she and Appellant were alone,
    Appellant touched her butt on top of her clothes. C.M. testified about when these
    acts of abuse occurred.
    Appellant again complains that his intent to sexually arouse or gratify
    himself was never proven, but “[m]ental culpability is of such a nature that it
    generally must be inferred from the circumstances under which a prohibited act or
    omission occurs.” 
    Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 10
    (quoting 
    Hernandez, 819 S.W.2d at 810
    ). “A defendant’s mental state ‘was concealed within his own mind and can
    only be determined from his words, acts, and conduct.’” 
    Id. (quoting Norwood,
    120 S.W.2d at 809). Appellant’s actions in the bedroom and living room incidents,
    when he moved his private parts against N.L.’s private parts, demonstrated his
    intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. We hold that a rational juror could
    have found the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Appellant committed the crimes of aggravated sexual assault of N.L., indecency
    with N.L., and continuous sexual abuse of N.L. We overrule Appellant’s second
    point of error.
    VI. Conclusion
    After reviewing the record, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to
    convict Appellant of indecency with a child and continuous sexual abuse of a
    child, namely E.L. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict
    Appellant of aggravated sexual assault of a child, indecency with a child, and
    continuous sexual abuse of a child, namely N.L. We overrule both of Appellant’s
    points of error on sufficiency of the evidence.
    11
    VII. This Court’s Ruling
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    MIKE WILLSON
    JUSTICE
    June 19, 2014
    Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
    Willson, J., and Bailey, J.
    12