Robert Earl Raymond v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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ROBERT EARL RAYMOND, No. 08-13-00106-CR
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Appellant, Appeal from the
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v. Criminal District Court No. 3
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THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Tarrant County, Texas
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Appellee. (TC# 1096584D)
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OPINION
Robert Earl Raymond appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his deferred adjudication
community supervision and sentencing him to 6 years’ imprisonment. In a single issue, Raymond
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After pleading guilty to the charged offense of burglary of a habitation, Raymond was
placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for 10 years. As part of his community
supervision, Raymond was required to “[r]emain within Tarrant County, Texas, unless the court or
supervision officer authorize[d] [him] to leave.” Alleging Raymond traveled “to the State of
Illinois[,] . . . to the State of Colorado[,] . . . [and] to the County of Wise in the State of Texas,
without authorization from Tarrant County CSCD[,]” the State moved to adjudicate. Raymond
entered a plea of not true.
At the hearing on the motion to adjudicate, the State presented the testimony of several
witnesses, including William Aaron Wallace, a DPS trooper, and Cleveland Benson, Raymond’s
supervision officer. Trooper Wallace testified he arrested Raymond in Wise County for
outstanding traffic warrants following a traffic stop. Benson testified Raymond failed to obtain
permits to travel to Illinois, Colorado, and Wise County and admitted to traveling to Illinois.
After considering the evidence and the parties’ arguments, the trial court found true the allegation
that Raymond traveled to Illinois and Wise County without permission.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole issue, Raymond challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to revoke his
community supervision. Raymond does not dispute “there is record evidence” he left Tarrant
County without permission from the supervision office. He does, however, assert the State
adduced no evidence he did not have the trial court’s permission to leave Tarrant. Raymond is
mistaken. The State was not required to prove Raymond left Tarrant County without obtaining
permission from the trial court to revoke his community supervision.
In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant is the same individual who is named in the judgment and order of probation, and
then must prove that the defendant violated a term of probation as alleged in the motion to revoke.
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873-74 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)[Emphasis added]. Here, the State
alleged Raymond violated his community supervision by leaving Tarrant County on three
separation occasions “without authorization from Tarrant County CSCD.” The State never
alleged Raymond violated his community supervision by leaving Tarrant County without
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obtaining the trial court’s permission. Accordingly, the State was required to prove only that
Raymond left Tarrant County “without authorization from Tarrant County CSCD.”
The State met its burden. When given the appropriate deference and viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the testimony of Trooper Wallace and Benson establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence that Raymond traveled to Illinois and Wise County “without
authorization from Tarrant County CSCD.” See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493
(Tex.Crim.App. 1984)(evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order
revoking community supervision); Allbright v. State, 13 S.W.3d 817, 818-19 (Tex.App.--Fort
Worth 2000, pet. ref’d)(in a community supervision revocation hearing, the trial judge is the sole
trier of fact and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s
motion to revoke Raymond’s community supervision. See Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493 (trial
court’s order revoking community supervision is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
Raymond’s issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
June 25, 2014
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice
Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
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