Dean Kawaja and Susan Kawaja v. Crawford's Auto Repair , 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11797 ( 2013 )


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  •                                      In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-13-00089-CV
    ____________________
    DEAN KAWAJA AND SUSAN KAWAJA, Appellants
    V.
    CRAWFORD’S AUTO REPAIR, Appellee
    _______________________________________________________          ______________
    On Appeal from the 172nd District Court
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. E-189,465
    ________________________________________________________          _____________
    OPINION
    Following a review of the record in this appeal, we conclude the trial court
    did not have jurisdiction over defendant Crawford’s Auto Repair. We therefore
    affirm the dismissal order.
    BACKGROUND
    Selma Duff drove her car to Georgia. In Georgia, Crawford’s Auto Repair
    put a new engine in the vehicle. Two and one-half months after the new engine
    was installed, Selma’s son was driving the vehicle in Texas when a wheel
    1
    assembly detached from the vehicle. The wheel rolled across the median of the
    freeway and struck an oncoming vehicle occupied by Dean Kawaja and Susan
    Kawaja.
    The Kawajas sued Crawford’s Auto Repair, among others, and pleaded both
    specific and general jurisdiction. Crawford’s Auto Repair filed a special
    appearance. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a. The trial court dismissed the claims against
    that defendant. The Kawajas filed this appeal.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question
    of law reviewed de novo. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 
    83 S.W.3d 789
    , 794-95 (Tex. 2002). The plaintiff has the initial burden of pleading sufficient
    allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the jurisdiction of a Texas
    court. 
    Id. at 793.
    The defendant must then negate all jurisdictional bases. 
    Id. JURISDICTION A
    trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the exercise
    of jurisdiction is authorized by statute and is consistent with due process. Spir Star
    AG v. Kimich, 
    310 S.W.3d 868
    , 872 (Tex. 2010); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
    Code Ann. § 17.042 (West 2008) (Texas long-arm statute). The defendant must
    have established minimum contacts with the forum state, and the assertion of
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    jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of substantial justice and fair
    play. Zinc Nacional, S.A. v. Bouché Trucking, Inc., 
    308 S.W.3d 395
    , 397 (Tex.
    2010). The minimum-contacts analysis requires “‘some act by which the defendant
    purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
    State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Michiana Easy
    Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 
    168 S.W.3d 777
    , 784 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Hanson
    v. Denckla, 
    357 U.S. 235
    , 253, 
    78 S. Ct. 1228
    , 
    2 L. Ed. 2d 1283
    (1958)). The focus is
    on the defendant’s activities and expectations. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v.
    Coleman, 
    83 S.W.3d 801
    , 806 (Tex. 2002).
    The defendant’s contacts may give rise to either general jurisdiction or
    specific jurisdiction. See Zinc 
    Nacional, 308 S.W.3d at 397
    . For a trial court to
    have general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant’s contacts
    with the forum must be systematic and continuous. Spir Star 
    AG, 310 S.W.3d at 872
    . Under general jurisdiction, there must be a showing that the defendant
    conducted substantial activities within the state. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 
    925 S.W.2d 591
    ,
    595 (Tex. 1996).
    Specific jurisdiction arises when the defendant purposefully avails itself of
    conducting activities in the forum state, and the cause of action arises from or is
    related to those contacts or activities. Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling
    3
    Co., 
    278 S.W.3d 333
    , 338 (Tex. 2009) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
    
    471 U.S. 462
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 2174
    , 
    85 L. Ed. 2d 528
    (1985)); Michiana Easy Livin’
    Country, 
    Inc., 168 S.W.3d at 784
    (Purposeful availment is the touchstone of
    jurisdictional due process.). Specific jurisdiction focuses on the relationship of the
    forum, the defendant, and the litigation. Retamco 
    Operating, 278 S.W.3d at 338
    .
    The contacts must be such that the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being
    haled into court” in Texas. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
    444 U.S. 286
    , 297, 
    100 S. Ct. 559
    , 
    62 L. Ed. 2d 490
    (1980).
    ANALYSIS
    As part of its jurisdiction claim, the Kawajas contend that Crawford’s Auto
    Repair operates a website for soliciting business. The Kawajas also rely on the
    car’s Texas registration and Texas license plates.
    The affidavit of John Crawford states that he is the owner and operator of
    Crawford’s Auto Repair in Marietta, Georgia, that he is not a resident of Texas,
    and that Crawford’s Auto Repair has never done business in Texas. Crawford
    states that neither he nor the business has ever purposefully put a product in the
    stream of commerce in Texas, designed a product for the Texas market, advertised
    in Texas, or established channels of regular communication with Texas customers.
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    Purposeful availment requires that a defendant seek some advantage, benefit,
    or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction. Spir Star 
    AG, 310 S.W.3d at 873
    . A
    seller who reaches beyond one state and creates continuing relationships with
    residents of another state may be subject to the jurisdiction of the latter in suits
    arising from those activities. 
    Id. (citing Moki
    Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 
    221 S.W.3d 569
    , 575 (Tex. 2007)).
    Although the accident occurred in Texas and the car likely had Texas
    registration and plates, there is no evidence that Crawford’s Auto Repair advertised
    specifically in Texas or had a business in Texas. All of the defendant’s activities
    occurred in Georgia. The Kawajas did not present any evidence that the website is
    anything other than a passive one. See Buckeye Aviation, L.L.C. v. Barrett
    Performance Aircraft, Inc., No. 09-10-00247-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4506, at
    **19-22 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 16, 2011, pet. denied).
    In World-Wide Volkswagen, a New York car dealership was sued in state
    court in Oklahoma by a New York resident. The car was bought from the
    defendant dealership in New York and driven by the plaintiff to Oklahoma, where
    the car was involved in a traffic accident. See World-Wide 
    Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288-89
    . The Supreme Court explained,
    [T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
    mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
    5
    Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the
    forum State are such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate
    being haled into court there.
    
    Id. at 297.
    Foreseeably, purchasers of automobiles may take them to another state,
    but the mere unilateral activity of the party claiming some relationship with a
    nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
    state. 
    Id. at 298;
    see also Cox v. Generac Power Sys., No. 2:08-cv-04278-NKL,
    
    2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54157
    (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2009); IRA Res., Inc. v. Griego,
    
    221 S.W.3d 592
    , 599 (Tex. 2007) (“The test is minimum contacts, not de minimus
    contacts[.]”).
    CONCLUSION
    Even if Crawford or his employees noticed the car’s Texas license plates, the
    fact that the car was driven to Texas by Selma’s son does not establish that
    Crawford’s Auto Repair purposely availed itself of Texas laws. In World-Wide
    Volkswagen, Justice White explained:
    If foreseeability were the criterion, a local California tire retailer could
    be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there; a
    Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled before
    a distant court for damage caused in New Jersey; or a Florida soft-
    drink concessionaire could be summoned to Alaska to account for
    injuries happening there. Every seller of chattels would in effect
    appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to
    suit would travel with the chattel.
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    Id. at 296
    (internal citations omitted). Crawford’s Auto Repair did not target Texas
    as a market. The company did not have systematic and continuous contacts with
    Texas. There are no facts to indicate that Crawford’s Auto Repair purposefully
    directed its vehicle repair service activities toward Texas residents, or that the
    Kawajas’ claims arose out of any activities by Crawford’s Auto Repair in Texas.
    We overrule the Kawajas’ issues. The trial court’s order is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    ______________________________
    DAVID GAULTNEY
    Justice
    Submitted on July 11, 2013
    Opinion Delivered September 19, 2013
    Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
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