Charles Dandreaun Seaton A/K/A Charles D. Seaton v. State ( 2005 )


Menu:
  •   COURT OF APPEALS

    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH

    NO. 2-03-487-CR


    CHARLES DANDREAUN SEATON                                            APPELLANT

    A/K/A CHARLES D. SEATON

    V.

    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                                  STATE


    ------------

    FROM THE 372ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

    ------------

    MEMORANDUM OPINION1

    ------------

            Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pretrial unsworn oral motion for continuance.  We affirm.

            An unsworn oral motion for continuance preserves nothing for review.  Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000); Ricketts v. State, 89 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d); Woodall v. State, 77 S.W.3d 388, 401 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d).  Citing O’Rarden v. State, 777 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d), appellant argues that this rule applies only to statutory motions for continuance2 and not to motions for continuance based on equitable principles.3  But this court, relying on Dewberry, has already rejected that argument.  See Ricketts, 89 S.W.3d at 317; Woodall, 77 S.W.3d at 401.  But see Munoz v. State, 24 S.W.3d 427, 430-32 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (acknowledging general rule that oral motion for continuance preserves nothing for review but addressing point on equitable grounds).

            Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                      PER CURIAM

     

    PANEL F:   LIVINGSTON, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.

    DO NOT PUBLISH

    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

    DELIVERED: February 3, 2005


    NOTES

    1. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

    2. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 29.03, 29.08 (Vernon 1989).

    3. Appellant did not state in his motion that it was based on the trial court’s equitable powers.