Bobby Lewis v. State ( 2013 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-12-00484-CR
BOBBY LEWIS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 364th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-433,785, Honorable Bradley S. Underwood, Presiding
September 6, 2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellant, Bobby Lewis, appeals his conviction for robbery. Through a single
issue, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of guilt. That
is, he believes the evidence failed to show he caused bodily injury "while trying to
maintain control of the tip jar" he had taken. Instead, the evidence simply illustrates that
the injury occurred while attempting to flee or escape. We affirm.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard discussed in
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) and Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Furthermore, a person commits
the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or
maintain control of property, that person “(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places
another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (West
2011). The phrase “in the course of committing theft” means “conduct that occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01. Finally, a person commits the offense of theft if that
person unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property.
Id. § 31.03(a).
Appellant does not dispute that he entered a local bar, found a tip jar, took it
without permission, exited the facility with the item, was chased by a bar employee,
engaged in a fight with that employee, struck the employee, and lost the tip jar, his
jacket and identification before escaping from the employee. To that we have testimony
from the complainant about at least one of the blows from appellant causing him (the
complainant) to suffer a black eye. Thus, we have undisputed evidence of a theft and
the infliction of bodily injury by appellant. But, it was not robbery, in his view, because
the State failed to prove the injury was inflicted with the intent to obtain or maintain the
property taken. Again, he suggests that the property had been abandoned when the
fight occurred and that he fought only to escape.
Yet, violence accompanying an attempted escape immediately after a completed
or attempted theft may constitute robbery. See White v. State, 671 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984); Ulloa v. State, 570 S.W.2d 954, 957-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);
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Morgan v. State, 703 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. App.Dallas 1985, no pet.). Furthermore,
abandonment of the property stolen does not necessarily prevent the proscribed
conduct from constituting robbery. See White v. State, 671 S.W.2d at 41; Ulloa, 570
S.W.2d at 957-58. And, while the complainant may have testified that he failed to
realize that the tip jar had been dropped by appellant until the altercation had ended, he
also testified that appellant had the jar when first encountering him and during the
altercation. The latter testimony, when coupled with appellant's concession about
taking the jar, fleeing, fighting and striking the employee, constitutes some evidence
upon which rational jurors could conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant, in
the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property,
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to another.
Because the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, we overrule the issue
and affirm the judgment.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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