Mayra Soto Gines v. State ( 2013 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-12-00155-CR
________________________
MAYRA SOTO GINES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 320th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 62,477-D; Honorable Don Emerson, Presiding
August 15, 2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Mayra Soto Gines, pled guilty in open court to possession with the
intent to deliver a Penalty Group 1 controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an
amount of two hundred grams or more but less than four hundred grams, 1 in a drug-free
1
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(e) (W EST 2010). An offense under the section is punishable
by imprisonment for life or for a term of not more than 99 years or less than 10 years, and a fine not to
exceed $100,000.
zone, 2 while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, 3 and was sentenced to fifteen years
confinement. She asserts (1) her counsel was ineffective; (2) the trial court erred by
including a deadly weapon finding in its judgment; and (3) there was insufficient
evidence to require Appellant to pay court-appointed attorney’s fees. We modify the
trial court’s judgment to delete the order that Appellant pay $200 in court-appointed
attorney’s fees and affirm as modified.
Background
In June 2011, Appellant was indicted for knowingly possessing with the intent to
deliver methamphetamine in an amount of two hundred grams or more but less than
four hundred grams on or about October 7, 2010. The indictment also alleged the
offense was committed in a drug-free zone and Appellant used or exhibited a deadly
weapon—a firearm.
In March 2012, Appellant entered an open plea of guilty to the offense alleged in
the indictment. In her Written Plea Admonishments, she confessed her guilt to every
allegation in the indictment and the trial court found Appellant’s Judicial Confession was
true. After the parties indicated there was nothing further in the guilt/innocence
proceeding, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the offense alleged in the indictment.
During the punishment proceeding, two officers testified that, on October 7, 2010,
they executed a search warrant at Appellant’s residence. In a safe located in
2
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134(c) (W EST SUPP. 2012). If it is shown that an offense under
section 481.112(e) was committed in a drug-free zone, the minimum term of confinement is increased by
five years.
3
TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(17) (W EST SUPP. 2012).
2
Appellant’s bedroom, the officers found twelve ounces of methamphetamine and a
loaded handgun. Another officer testified he found more methamphetamine in the living
room. Appellant testified that, during the search, she confessed to selling drugs in a
drug-free zone and a deadly weapon was in her safe. She also testified she understood
the handgun next to the drugs in the safe was part of the offense. Thereafter, she
asked the trial judge to place her on deferred adjudication community supervision and
testified to mitigating circumstances. The trial court subsequently assessed the
minimum sentence possible, fifteen years confinement, and this appeal followed.
Discussion
Appellant asserts: (1) her counsel was ineffective because he did not assert, or
present evidence on, deferred adjudication community supervision (deferred
adjudication) during the guilt/innocence phase of the plea proceeding; (2) the trial court
erroneously included a deadly weapon finding in the judgment because it failed to make
an affirmative finding in open court; and (3) there was insufficient evidence of
Appellant’s ability to pay her court-appointed attorney’s fees.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We examine ineffective assistance of counsel claims by the standard enunciated
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
See Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Appellant has
the burden to show by a preponderance of evidence (1) trial counsel’s performance was
deficient in that it fell below the prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficiency
prejudiced the defendant; that is, but for the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability
3
that the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Thompson v. State, 9
S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Counsel’s conduct is viewed with great
deference; Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), and the
record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d
at 812.
Appellant asserts her counsel was ineffective because he did not request
deferred adjudication during the guilt/innocence phase of her plea hearing even though
an application for community supervision was on file and her counsel requested
deferred adjudication through her testimony during the sentencing phase of the
proceedings. 4 During the sentencing phase, the trial court had the authority to grant
deferred adjudication even though it had made an oral finding of guilt. See Anderson v.
State, 937 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.); Powers v.
State, 727 S.W.2d 313, 316-17 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d). See
also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5 (W EST 2012). Accordingly, assuming
without deciding Appellant’s counsel was ineffective, we find no harm because deferred
adjudication was requested during the sentencing phase—a time when the trial court
had authority to withdraw its oral pronouncement of guilt and grant Appellant’s request.
Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
4
During the sentencing phase of the plea hearing, the following exchange took place between Appellant
and her counsel:
Q. Are you asking Judge Emerson to place you on probation, deferred adjudication
probation?
A. Yes, I would—I would love one more chance, you know. I—mercy, have one
chance.
Q. Well, Mayra . . . Why do you believe that you should be allowed even one chance
and get deferred probation?
A. Because I will prove that I—you’ll never see me again. I—I did it—I did it
because my husband got taken away and we were already two or three months
behind on rent, and I didn’t know, you know, how to get quick cash.
4
Deadly Weapon
Appellant next contends the trial court erred by incorporating a deadly weapon
finding in its judgment because it did not make an affirmative deadly weapon finding at
sentencing. We disagree.
A trial court is not required to orally announce a deadly-weapon finding at
sentencing and may include such a finding in its written judgment “if the allegation of
use of a deadly weapon is clear from the face of the indictment.” Ex parte Huskins, 176
S.W.3d 818, 820-21 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Here, the indictment clearly stated
Appellant was alleged to have used or exhibited a deadly weapon in the commission of
the offense, two officers testified at the hearing to the presence of a deadly weapon in
the bedroom safe, photographs of the handgun were admitted at the hearing, and
Appellant testified to the presence of the deadly weapon in the bedroom safe containing
drugs. Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
Court-Appointed Attorney’s Fees
The written judgment in this case reflects an assessment of court-appointed
attorney’s fees totaling $200 as court costs. In order to assess court-appointed
attorney’s fees as court costs, a trial court must determine that the defendant has
financial resources sufficient to offset in part, or in whole, the costs of the legal services
provided. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (W EST 2009). In that regard, the
record must reflect some factual basis to support the determination that the defendant is
capable of paying court-appointed attorney’s fees. See Perez v. State, 323 S.W.3d
298, 307 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d). See also Barrera v. State, 291 S.W.3d
5
515, 518 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.); Perez v. State, 280 S.W.3d 886, 887
(Tex.App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.). We note the record does not contain a
pronouncement, determination, or finding that Appellant had financial resources
sufficient for her to pay all, or any part of, the fees paid her court-appointed counsel,
and we are unable to find any evidence to support such a determination. Therefore, we
conclude, and the State candidly confesses as much, that the order to pay court-
appointed attorney’s fees was improper. See Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 555-56
(Tex.Crim.App. 2010). When the evidence does not support an order to pay court-
appointed attorney’s fees, the proper remedy is to delete the order from the judgment.
Id. at 557. See Anderson v. State, No. 03-09-00630-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5033,
at *9 (Tex.App.—Austin July 1, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue is sustained and we modify the
judgment to delete the order to pay $200 in court-appointed attorney’s fees as court
costs.
Conclusion
We modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the order to pay $200 in court-
appointed attorney’s fees and affirm as modified.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
6