William Emanuel Glen Hartfield v. State ( 2008 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-07-454-CR
WILLIAM EMANUEL GLEN APPELLANT
HARTFIELD
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
------------
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY
------------
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
------------
I. INTRODUCTION
In two issues, appellant William E.G. Hartfield appeals his conviction for
arson, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct
a competency hearing and committed reversible error by failing to include a jury
instruction on attempted arson as a lesser included offense. We will affirm.
1
… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. B ACKGROUND
Residents of the Shadow Creek Apartments noticed a strong chemical
odor in their apartments and called 911. Firefighters noticed liquid leaking from
the ceiling in an upstairs unit and found a gasoline-filled balloon in the attic.
Apartment 2009, which was leased to Hartfield, was the only apartment with
access to the attic. Firefighters obtained a search warrant to search that unit
and saw some insulation and ceiling material on the carpet by the entrance to
the attic. They also found more insulation and ceiling material and a package
for balloons in Hartfield’s trash can. Inside the attic, firefighters found another
gasoline-filled balloon, a charred, partially burned sock, and charred insulation
material. Ultimately, Hartfield was charged with arson.
III. C OMPETENCY TO S TAND T RIAL
In his first issue, Hartfield contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to conduct a formal competency hearing under article 46B
of the code of criminal procedure and as required to satisfy due process. The
parties agree that the trial court conducted an informal inquiry into Hartfield’s
competency.
Prior to trial, Hartfield’s first attorney filed a motion suggesting
incompetency and request for examination. The trial court granted the motion
and appointed Dr. Barry Norman to conduct an examination of Hartfield to
2
determine his competency. Dr. Norman reported that Hartfield had a
“diagnosable mental illness/emotional disturbance” and that his impression of
the illness was “[d]epression, mild, situational in nature” and “Mixed Personality
Disorder.” The doctor found that Hartfield was competent to stand trial. 2
Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is presumed
competent to stand trial and shall be found competent unless proved
incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 46B.003(b) (Vernon 2006). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he
lacks: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. art. 46B.003(a)(2); McDaniel
v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Because the parties agree that the trial court conducted an informal
competency inquiry, and because Hartfield’s appellate complaint concerns the
trial court’s failure to conduct a formal incompetency hearing, our analysis
2
… The report included findings that Hartfield “appears to have a rational
and factual understanding of the charges and the potential consequences and
penalties”; “provided a reasonably accurate rendition of the penalty range for
the alleged offense”; “appears to have a good understanding of basic legal
concepts”; and “possesses the capacity to testify in a relevant manner[,] . . .
was able to converse logically and remain on topic[, and] . . . conversed with
this examiner in a goal-directed manner without significant problems.”
3
begins with the statutory requirements of a formal competency hearing.3 If,
after an informal inquiry into a defendant’s competency to stand trial, the court
determines that evidence exists to support a finding of incompetency, the court
must order an examination to determine whether the defendant is incompetent
to stand trial in a criminal case.4 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005(a);
Lawrence v. State, 169 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet.
ref’d). And generally, if the court determines that evidence exists to support
a finding of incompetency, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether
the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, and, on the request of either party
or on the court’s motion, a jury shall make the determination as to whether the
defendant is incompetent. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 46B.005(b),
46B.051; Lawrence, 169 S.W.3d at 322. In determining whether evidence
requires a hearing on competency, the trial court is to consider only the
evidence tending to show incompetency, and not evidence showing
competency, in order to find whether there is some evidence, a quantity more
3
… Thus, we make no determination regarding the trial court’s informal
inquiry process and address only whether the trial court was required to hold
a formal competency hearing.
4
… A court also may appoint one or more disinterested experts to examine
the defendant upon a suggestion that the defendant may be incompetent to
stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.021.
4
than none or a scintilla, that rationally could lead to a determination of
incompetency. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1216 (2000) (citing Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) and applying former version of incompetency statute).
We review a trial court’s decision not to conduct a formal competency
hearing for an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995).
On appeal, Hartfield argues that Dr. Norman’s report, as well as motions
to withdraw filed by two of Hartfield’s defense counsel, were evidence of his
incompetency, requiring the trial court to conduct a formal hearing concerning
his competency to stand trial.5 Hartfield argues that Dr. Norman’s opinion that
Hartfield had “a diagnosable mental illness/emotional disturbance” was some
evidence of his incompetency, but we hold that this diagnosis did not compel
the trial court to hold a formal hearing when no evidence indicated that Hartfield
5
… Hartfield also contends that an inference can be made that the trial
court “determined that evidence existed to support a finding of incompetency
as a threshold matter” because it granted his first attorney’s Motion Suggesting
Incompetency and Request for Examination, but the fact that a court grants a
motion for a competency evaluation does not constitute evidence that the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial. See Johnson v. State, 564 S.W.2d
707, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (op. on reh’g), overruled on other grounds by
Williams v. State, 663 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
5
was incapable of consulting with counsel or understand the proceedings against
him. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395–96; see also McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at
710 (noting that evidence of severe mental illness or moderate retardation or
that defendant engaged in bizarre acts is usually sufficient to create a bona fide
doubt about defendant’s competency and necessitate a competency inquiry
under former version of competency statute).
Hartfield also points to Dr. Norman’s finding that medications were
“necessary to attain or maintain competency.” The State argues, and we
agree, that this statement must be viewed in the context of the entire report.
Cf. Ramos v. State, 865 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding
that in deciding whether there was any evidence entitling defendant to a lesser
included offense jury instruction, statement allegedly raising issue must be
viewed in context). The “Medication” section of Dr. Norman’s report contained
the following:
C. Are medications necessary to attain or maintain competency
1. Yes
D. Are medications likely to help restore the defendant to
competency in the foreseeable future
1. Not applicable
The report then stated Dr. Norman’s opinion that psychotropic medications
were “[p]rospective treatment options appropriate for defendant.” Reading
6
these sections of the report together, Dr. Norman’s determination that Hartfield
needed medication “to attain or maintain competency” was not some evidence
of his incompetency and did not mandate a formal competency hearing absent
evidence of a present inability to communicate with his attorney or to
understand the proceedings. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395–96. Dr. Norman
made clear that his ultimate professional opinion was that Hartfield was
competent to stand trial, and the report demonstrates that Dr. Norman did not
determine that medication was necessary to attain competency, but rather
would be a prospective treatment option appropriate to ensure Hartfield
maintained competency in the future. In the doctor’s professional opinion,
Hartfield’s lack of medication did not render him incompetent at that time.
The issue of Hartfield’s competency is not mentioned in the reporter’s
record. Hartfield did not request that a jury determine his competency to stand
trial, and he did not present the trial court with any evidence, such as the
opinion of another expert, of his incompetency. The record does not include
any discussions regarding Hartfield’s competency other than the motion
suggesting incompetency and Dr. Norman’s examination. We cannot conclude
that the trial court’s decision not to conduct a formal competency hearing was
arbitrary and unreasonable; to the contrary, there was no evidence of Hartfield’s
incompetency to warrant such a hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
7
46B.004(c); McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 711; Lewis, 911 S.W.2d at 7. Thus, we
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting a formal
hearing concerning Hartfield’s competency to stand trial. We overrule
Hartfield’s first issue.
IV. J URY INSTRUCTION ON L ESSER INCLUDED O FFENSE
In his second issue, Hartfield argues that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to include a jury instruction on attempted arson as a
lesser included offense. Hartfield concedes that he did not request the
instruction at trial but argues that we should review this matter for egregious
harm pursuant to Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984) (op. on reh’g).
But Almanza does not relate to the failure to give a lesser included
offense instruction, and the decision whether to request such an instruction is
a strategic decision for the parties and is separate from the trial court’s
obligation to instruct the jury on the law. See Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d
244, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Middleton v. State, No. 12-07-00066-CR,
2008 WL 787567, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 26, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). If neither side requests a lesser included
instruction, the trial court need not submit one sua sponte. Delgado, 235
S.W.3d at 249–50; Mashburn v. State, No. 02-07-00256-CR, 2008 WL
8
3186642, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2008, no pet. h.).
Consequently, we conclude that it was not error for the trial court not to give
an unrequested lesser included offense jury instruction. We overrule Hartfield’s
second issue.
V. C ONCLUSION
Having overruled Hartfield’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 23, 2008
9