Carol Johnene Morris v. State of Texas ( 2013 )


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  • Opinéon filed January 319 2613
    QEIebentb Qtuurt of gppealz
    N0. 11-11~00037-CR
    CAROL JOHNENE MORRIS, Appellant
    V.
    STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 4415f District Court
    Midland County, Texas
    Triai Court Cause No. CR37161
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The jury convicteci Carol Johnene Ivhinriss appellant of the offense of theft in the amount
    of SLSOQ or more but less than $203000, Upon finding enhancement aliegafions to be true, the
    jury assessed her punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice for a term of twenty years and a fine of $103000. We reverse and
    render jud gment vacating appeiiant’s conviction on double jeopardy grounds based upon a
    previous conviction for the same offense.
    Background Facts
    The indictment alleged that, on or about October S, 2009, appellant unlawfully acquired
    and exercised control over us. currency of the value of $1,500 or more but less than $20,000
    from Manuel Valdez by deception Without his effective consent with the intent to deprive him of
    the property. Trial commenced on the offense alleged in the indictment on November 3, 2010.
    The evidence offered at trial showed that appellant offered to sell the real property located at 501
    South Tyler in Midland to Valdez for a total purchase price of $l2,000. Valdez paid her $6,000
    down on October 5, 2009, pursuant to a contract they executed for the sale of 501 South T yler.
    The State also offered evidence that appellant had previously conveyed two vacant lots to Valdez
    on September 28, 2009, for a total purchase price of $3,000 that Valdez paid her on that date.
    An attorney at a title company subsequently informed Valdez that appellant was unable
    to convey the properties to him because she only owned a partial interest of approximately
    16.67% in the properties. Valdez sent a demand letter to appellant dated October 15, 2009,
    demanding the return, within ten days, of the $9,000 that he had paid her for the three properties.
    Valdez testified that appellant never returned that money.
    Prior to trial, appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that
    her prosecution for the charged offense was barred for double jeopardy purposes as a result of
    her previous conviction in trial court cause no. CR36894 for the same offense. Appellant
    presented her application to the trial court for consideration at a pretrial hearing conducted on
    October 26, 20l0. The trial court subsequently denied appellant’s application, and the case
    proceeded to trial.
    Double Jeopardy
    Appearing pro so both at trial and on appeal, appellant raises the issue of double jeopardy
    in her point of error. We disagree with appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in denying
    her pretrial application because her previous conviction was not final for double jeopardy
    purposes at the time she presented the application. However, we conclude that appellant’s
    subsequent conviction in the underlying trial in this case can no longer stand alter the previous
    conviction became final.
    T he Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, enforceable against the states through
    the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be
    twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST, amends. V, XIV; see Ex parte Chaddock,
    
    369 S.W.3d 880
    , 882w83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Wotan v. State, 
    326 S.W.3d 189
    , 192 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2010). It protects an accused against the following: (1} a second prosecution for the
    same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
    (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown: v. Ohio, 432 US. 161, 165 (1977);
    Char/Mock, 369 SW3d at SSE-83; 
    Weinn, 326 S.W.3d at 192
    .
    This case now involves an allegation of a second prosecution for the same offense after
    conviction. We are knowledgeable of the facts and circumstances occurring in appellant’s
    previous conviction in trial court cause no. CR36894 because we issued an opinion in the case on
    February 9, 2012, in Morris v. State, No. ll—lO*00249~CR, 
    2012 WL 424923
    (Tex. Appm
    Eastiand February 9, 2012, pet. rei’d) (mem. op, not designated for publication).
    We previously reviewed the trial court’s order denying appellant’s application for writ of
    habeas corpus on double jeopardy grounds in Morris 12. State, No. ll~lO—00332~CR, 
    2011 WL 1818059
    (Tex. App.——~Eastland May 12, 2011, pet. ret’d) (mem. op, not designated for
    publication). Appellant appealed the trial court’s order referenced in our Cause No. 11-10»
    00332-CR prior to her conviction on the underlying offense in trial court cause no. CR37161 (the
    present case). Based upon the limited record before us in our Cause No. 11-10-00332—CR, we
    concluded that the conviction in trial court cause no. CR36894 was not for the same offense as
    the one charged in trial court cause no. CR37l6l because the indictments in each of the two trial
    court proceedings charged appellant with different offenses. Morris, 20ll WL 1818059, at * l.
    The record before us in this appeal from trial court cause number CR37161 reveals that
    the trial court had an additional ground for denying appellant’s double jeopardy claim prior to
    trial. The record from the pretrial hearing shows that the previous conviction in trial court
    cauese no. CR36894 was on appeal at the time of the hearing. A conviction is not final for
    double jeopardy purposes while it is pending on appeal. Ex parte Gutierrez, 
    987 S.W.2d 227
    ,
    230~3l (Tex. App.~»~Austin 1999, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, we remain correct in our previous
    determination that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s double jeopardy claim prior to
    trial.
    In this appeal, the State asserts that appellant’s double jeopardy claim must continue to
    fail because appellant did not make a sufficient record of “the substance of the previous trial.”
    However, the State concludes its argument on appellant’s double jeopardy claim with the
    following statement: “Having argued that double jeopardy is not an issue because Appellant did
    not make a record, the State feels the need to advance to the court in candor that there may be an
    issue of double jeopardy in another proceeding where the record can be expanded.”
    Additionally, the State supported this statement by citing four cases.
    A cursory review of the citation information for our opinion affirming appellant’s
    previous conviction reveals that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has refused appellant’s
    petition for discretionary review2 and we have issued mandate in the case. Accordingly,
    appellant’s previous conviction is now final for double jeopardy purposes. The State‘s candid
    statement concerning a potential double jeopardy problem, coupled with our knowledge of the
    previous conviction’s finality, raises a significant concern to this court pertaining to appellant’s
    double jeopardy claim.
    Citing Garza v. State. 
    622 S.W.2d 85
    , 8990 (Tex Crim. App. 1981), the State contends
    that an appellate court cannot look to another appellate record to supply a deficiency in the proof
    of another case under consideration on appeal. See also 
    Gutierrez, 987 S.W.2d at 230
    . We agree
    with the State’s contention in principle. However, the holdings in Garza and Gutierrez are
    distinguishable because. in addition to reviewing an appellate record from the previous
    conviction, we have issued a detailed, written opinion affirming appellant’s previous conviction.
    Among other things, we evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence in our opinion and upheld
    appellant’s previous conviction after extensively addressing the evidence in our previous
    opinion. Under the unique facts of this appeal. we conclude that it is permissible for this court to
    consider the contents of our previous opinion in resolving appellant‘s double jeopardy claim.
    The cases cited by the State stand for the proposition that, when an indictment permits the
    State to obtain only one conviction. a defendant is not placed in jeopardy for more than one
    criminal not unless the State offers multiple instances of conduct in support of the indictment.
    Erparre Goodoreod, 
    967 S.W.2d 859
    . 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). “If evidence of more than
    one offense is admitted and a conviction for either could be had under the indictment. and neither
    the State nor the court elects. a plea of former conviction is good upon a prosecution based upon
    one of said offenses. it being uncertain for which one the conviction was had.” Walker v. State,
    473 SWin 499, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
    The State charged appellant in the previous conviction with one instance of theft
    occurring on or about September 28? 2009.E Our opinion affinning the previous conviction
    'A copy of the indictment from the previous conviction is included in the appellate record in this appeal.
    4
    shows that the State presented evidence of two instances of conduct constituting the charged
    offense of theft, one Occurring with the sale of the vacant lots on September 28. 2009, and the
    other occurring with, the real property located at Sill South Tyler on October S. 2009. Our
    previous opinion shows further that the State did not make an election of which instance upon
    which it reiied to obtain the previous conviction. The absence of an election is evidenced by the
    fact that we addressed both instances in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
    appellant’s previous conviction. Morris, 
    2012 WL 424923
    , at *2~4. Accordingly, appellant was
    placed in jeopardy for both criminal acts in the previous trial. Furthermore, her claim of double
    jeopardy for both offenses is now mature afier she exhausted the appeal of her previous
    conviction. Appellant’s first point of error is sustained. We need not address her other points
    because our resolution of her first point is dispositive of this appeal.
    This Court ’5 Ruling
    The judgment of the trial court is reversed. We render judgment vacating appellant’s
    conviction in trial court cause no. CR37l6l. See Ball 12. United States, 470 US. 856. 864 (1985)
    (The appropriate remedy for a double jeopardy Violation is to vacate one of the convictions).
    PER CURIAM
    January 31, 2013
    Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.203).
    Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
    McCall, l. and Willson, J.