Joshua Rolston Majors A/K/A Joshua Roston Majors v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00600-CR
JOSHUA ROLSTON MAJORS A/K/A APPELLANT
JOSHUA ROSTON MAJORS
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR12459
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Appellant Joshua
Rolston Majors pled guilty to possession of more than four grams but less than
two hundred grams of a controlled substance—methamphetamine—with intent to
deliver, preserving the denial of his motion to suppress for appeal. He pled true
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
to both enhancement paragraphs. A jury convicted him and assessed his
punishment at sixty years’ confinement, and the trial court sentenced him
accordingly. In a single point, Appellant complains, “The admission of numerous
points of evidence at punishment resulted in harmful, reversible error that
affected Appellant’s substantial rights.” Because his point on appeal does not
comport with his arguments raised in the trial court, we overrule his sole point
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
During the night shift, Hood County Sheriff’s Deputy Gary Clark was at the
Tiger Mart gas station in Cresson, Texas, watching a vehicle belonging to
Michael Reddell. Three weeks earlier, Deputy Clark had received information
from someone he had arrested for possession of methamphetamine that Reddell
was transporting methamphetamine from Fort Worth to Hood County and selling
it out of the Tiger Mart.
As Deputy Clark watched the gas station, he saw a pickup truck pull into
the parking lot. Deputy Clark observed Reddell’s vehicle back out of its parking
space and pull alongside the pickup at the other end of the parking lot, away from
the gas pumps. The vehicles stopped next to each other for approximately two
to three minutes with the driver’s-side windows aligned. Deputy Clark believed
that the two drivers were speaking to each other. Reddell’s vehicle then left the
gas station and traveled westbound on Highway 377 toward Granbury.
Approximately one minute later, the pickup left the gas station and also headed
westbound on Highway 377 toward Granbury.
2
Deputy Joshua Lane, a certified drug dog handler, was working with his
drug dog that day, and he had parked his marked patrol car approximately one
block away from the gas station. Deputy Lane followed Reddell’s vehicle after it
left the gas station, the pickup traveled behind Deputy Lane, and Deputy Clark
followed the pickup.
Deputy Clark testified during the suppression hearing that he had followed
the pickup to get probable cause to make a traffic stop. Deputy Clark also
testified that he had seen the pickup weave within its lane and drive onto the
improved shoulder two to three times and that, in his opinion, the pickup had
been following Deputy Lane’s unit too closely. Deputy Clark suspected that the
driver might be impaired and also that the driver might have been involved in a
drug transaction at the gas station.
Based on all of his observations, Deputy Clark stopped the pickup at 1:59
a.m. Deputy Clark approached the truck from the passenger side and observed
Appellant sitting in the driver’s seat. He was the sole occupant. While speaking
with Appellant, Deputy Clark noticed a black bag sticking out from under the
driver’s seat by Appellant’s right leg.
Appellant told Deputy Clark that he had been arrested on a weapons
charge in another county. Deputy Clark asked Appellant to step out of the
pickup. Before getting out, Appellant reached down and shoved the black bag
under the seat. Deputy Clark patted Appellant down for weapons but did not
locate anything.
3
Deputy Clark then went to his patrol car to check Appellant’s driver’s
license and criminal history and also called Deputy Lane, who was not far away,
and asked him to come to his location with his drug dog. Deputy Clark then
walked back to Appellant and asked him about the black bag under the driver’s
seat. Appellant denied any knowledge of the bag and refused consent to search
his pickup in response to Deputy Clark’s request.
By this time, according to Deputy Clark, it was approximately 2:06 a.m.,
and Deputy Lane had arrived with his drug dog. Deputy Clark testified that
approximately six to seven minutes had elapsed between his initiation of the
traffic stop and Deputy Lane’s arrival.
Deputy Lane used his drug dog to conduct an open-air sniff around
Appellant’s pickup. The drug dog signaled an alert at the driver’s-side door.
Deputy Clark testified that he had explained to Appellant that the drug dog had
alerted and that the alert gave the deputy probable cause to search the pickup.
Deputy Clark testified that he had then asked Appellant if there was anything
illegal in the pickup and that Appellant had replied, “[Y]es.”
Deputy Clark read Appellant his Miranda warnings, 2 and Appellant agreed
to speak with him. Appellant told Deputy Clark that methamphetamine was in the
pickup. Deputy Clark then handcuffed Appellant.
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630
(1966).
4
Deputy Clark searched Appellant’s pickup and located the black bag that
he had seen earlier. Inside it, Deputy Clark found items that he testified were
related to the sale of methamphetamine: (1) several Ziploc baggies containing
methamphetamine; (2) digital scales; (3) empty Ziploc baggies; (4) a glass
smoking pipe with white powder residue; (5) a straw with white powder residue;
and (6) a spoon.
Appellant was placed under arrest for possession of methamphetamine at
2:12 a.m. The return on Appellant’s driver’s license came back at 2:11 a.m. and
showed that his driver’s license was invalid. The entire incident lasted
approximately thirteen minutes.
In a single point, Appellant complains that the admission of “[a]ll
statements by Investigator Clark and other employees of the Hood County Sheriff
that related to any occurrence after the initial traffic stop, and . . . [a]ll physical
evidence obtained by the Hood County Sher[]iff after the initial traffic stop” was
reversible error as the evidence “should have been suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree.” Appellant had argued in his motion to suppress that these items
were the fruits of his unlawful arrest, made pursuant to neither warrant, probable
cause, nor any other lawful authority in violation of state and federal
constitutions, as well as article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Appellant reiterated these
grounds, emphasizing the vague nature of the “following too closely” allegation
as a traffic offense committed in the officer’s presence. He also argued that the
5
dog sniff that is only 67 to 68 percent reliable would not provide sufficient
probable cause to support a warrant and, equally, is insufficient to support a
warrantless search. He did not argue at any time to the trial court that the dog
sniff unreasonably prolonged the detention or exceeded the scope of the
detention. He raises those complaints for the first time on appeal. Appellant
specifically limits his complaints in his brief, arguing that
the evidence obtained by the officer was the fruit of an unreasonable
search because the search exceeded the scope of the initial
detention. Appellant was stopped by Investigator Clark for following
too closely. Investigator Clark asked him to step out of the car, and
requested permission to search the vehicle. Appellant denied
consent. Investigator Clark then requested a K-9 unit to do a drug
sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. The scope of a routine traffic stop,
without more, does not include a K-9 unit doing a drug sniff of the
exterior of the vehicle. Investigator Clark violated Appellant’s
Constitutional rights by continued detention without articulable facts
to justify the continued detention. The search was unjustified, and
illegal.
The K-9 drug sniff of Appellant’s vehicle exceeded the scope
of the traffic stop. The K-9 drug sniff was an unlawful search. The
evidence discovered in course of the search should have been
suppressed as fruit of an unlawful search. (Citations omitted.)
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds
for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
objection, or motion. 3 Further, the trial court must have ruled on the request,
3
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Landers v. State, 402 S.W.3d 252, 254 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013); Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2013, pet. ref’d).
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objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must
have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. 4
The complaint made on appeal must also comport with the complaint
made in the trial court, or the error is forfeited. 5 To determine whether the
complaint on appeal comports with that made at trial, we consider the context in
which the complaint was made and the parties’ shared understanding at that
time. 6
Because Appellant’s complaints that the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged his
detention and exceeded the scope of the detention were first raised on appeal,
they are untimely and not preserved for appellate review. Further, because
these appear to be the only complaints Appellant raises on appeal, we overrule
his sole point and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
4
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011) (Pena II).
5
Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Lovill v.
State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A complaint will not be
preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the
complaint made at trial.”); Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009) (Pena I) (“Whether a party’s particular complaint is preserved depends on
whether the complaint on appeal comports with the complaint made at trial.”).
6
Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009); Pena I, 285 S.W.3d at 464.
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/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.
GABRIEL, J., concurs without opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 7, 2014
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