J. Doe, Individually and as Next Friend of F. Doe and R. Doe, Children v. Tarrant County District Attorney's Office ( 2008 )


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  •                          COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 2-07-012-CV
    J. DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT                                    APPELLANTS
    FRIEND OF F. DOE AND R. DOE, CHILDREN
    V.
    TARRANT COUNTY DISTRICT                                                 APPELLEE
    ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
    ------------
    FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    ------------
    OPINION
    ------------
    Appellants J. Doe, individually, and as next friend of F. Doe and R. Doe
    (collectively, “Doe”) appeal from a trial court order denying their cross-claim for
    writ of mandamus seeking to compel appellee Tarrant County District
    Attorney’s Office (“DA”) to formally disclose documents inadvertently released
    pursuant to a public information request. We affirm.
    Background
    Jacob Muniz pled guilty to indecency with a child and was sentenced to
    four years’ confinement. The incident occurred while Muniz was employed by
    Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Fort Worth, Inc. and Boys and Girls Clubs of
    America (collectively, the “Clubs”). F. Doe was a victim of Muniz’s crime.
    In investigating potential civil claims, Doe sent public information requests
    to the DA and to the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office (the “sheriff’s office”)
    seeking documents relating to Muniz’s investigation, prosecution, and
    incarceration. The sheriff’s office forwarded the request it received to the DA
    for review and written response. 1    The DA drafted a letter to the Attorney
    General of Texas (the “AG”) asking for an opinion on whether 277 pages of the
    requested documents were exempt from public disclosure.2 The DA, however,
    inadvertently sent this letter, and the allegedly exempt documents, only to Doe.
    1
    … As legal counsel to the sheriff’s office, the DA provides legal advice
    concerning open records requests.
    2
    … Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.301 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (requiring
    governmental entity that wishes to withhold documents from disclosure
    pursuant to open records request to timely seek and obtain written ruling from
    AG).
    2
    Doe sued Muniz and the Clubs, alleging among other things that the Clubs
    negligently hired Muniz resulting in the sexual assault of F. Doe. Doe provided
    the DA documents to the Clubs in discovery and used some of them in
    depositions. The DA, upon learning that the AG had not received its letter
    requesting an opinion on Doe’s public information request, immediately sent
    Doe a formal written demand seeking return of the documents and submitted
    a new letter to the AG requesting an opinion regarding Doe’s requests.3 Doe
    refused to return the documents, asserting that the DA failed to (1) timely
    request a decision from the AG, (2) provide Doe with a written statement that
    the DA desired to withhold the requested information, and (3) provide Doe with
    a copy of the DA’s request to the AG as required by section 552.301 of the
    government code. 4
    The DA then intervened in the underlying lawsuit and requested a
    protective order. After a hearing, the trial court entered a protective order
    requiring Doe to return all inadvertently disclosed documents to the DA and to
    turn over for in camera inspection all originals and copies of depositions taken
    3
    … The AG provided a letter ruling in response to the DA’s request. Tex.
    Att’y Gen. OR2006-09590 (2006). In addition to addressing the DA’s claims
    of confidentiality, this letter noted, without discussing the error in sending the
    original request to Doe, that the DA’s request was untimely.
    4
    … Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.301.
    3
    in the litigation. The order further required Doe to submit an in camera letter
    identifying any party and person to whom Doe had disclosed or further
    disseminated the documents.      Finally, the order prohibited all parties from
    further copying or duplicating, in any way, any of the documents.
    Thereafter, Doe filed a cross-claim for writ of mandamus seeking an order
    requiring the DA to release all the documents that had been inadvertently
    produced to Doe. Doe asserted that the DA’s failure to timely request an AG
    opinion resulted in a presumption that the documents were public and that the
    DA did not meet its burden to overcome this presumption because the DA did
    not present any evidence of a “compelling reason” to withhold the documents.5
    After a hearing on Doe’s cross-claim, the trial court found that there was a
    compelling reason to withhold the documents and denied Doe’s writ of
    mandamus. The trial court severed the mandamus action from the underlying
    lawsuit, and Doe perfected this appeal. 6
    5
    … See id.§ 552.302 (providing that when governmental body fails to
    timely request AG opinion, documents are subject to public disclosure unless
    there is a compelling reason to withhold them), § 552.321 (Vernon 2004)
    (providing that if governmental body does not request AG opinion or refuses to
    supply public information, requestor may file suit for writ of mandamus
    compelling disclosure). The DA does not contest that its AG request was
    untimely.
    6
    … Doe also fled a petition for writ of mandamus seeking the same relief
    sought by way of this appeal. This court denied Doe’s mandamus petition. In
    4
    Applicable Law
    A.    Texas Public Information Act
    The Texas Public Information Act (the “Act”) requires disclosure of public
    documents       and information   upon   request to   a    governmental entity.7
    Information is considered public if it is “collected, assembled, or maintained
    under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official
    business: (1) by a governmental body; or (2) for a governmental body and the
    governmental body owns the information or has a right of access to it.” 8
    Section 552.021 of the Act requires that public information be made available
    to the public during normal business hours of the governmental body.9
    However, some categories of information that would otherwise be public
    under the Act are made confidential by law other than the Act, and the Act
    excepts such information from the disclosure requirement in section 552.021.10
    Section 552.101 of the Act provides that “[i]nformation is excepted from the
    re Doe, No. 02-07-00010-CV, 
    2007 WL 530008
    (Tex. App.–Fort Worth, Feb.
    22, 2007, orig. proceeding).
    7
    … See generally 
    id. §§ 552.001–.353
    (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2008).
    8
    … 
    Id. § 552.002(a).
          9
    … 
    Id. § 552.021.
          10
    … See, e.g., 
    id. §§ 552.101,
    552.022(a), (b).
    5
    requirements of section 552.021 if it is information considered to be
    confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” 11
    “[G]overnmental compliance with confidentiality laws is mandatory, and their
    protections may not be waived by governmental entities.” 12
    If a governmental agency receives a written request for public information
    that it believes to be within an exception to disclosure, the agency must ask the
    AG, in writing and within ten days of receiving the request, for an opinion about
    the applicability of the exception.13    Also within ten days of receiving the
    request, the agency must notify the requestor of its decision to seek an AG
    opinion and provide the requestor with a copy of the written communications
    to the AG.14 If the agency fails to timely request an open records decision from
    the AG, the information requested is presumed to be subject to required public
    11
    … 
    Id. § 552.101.
    Section 552.022 of the Act also creates exceptions
    to disclosure for information that is “expressly” confidential “under other law.”
    
    Id. § 552.022(a),
    (b). These provisions are not at issue in this appeal.
    12
    … In re City of Georgetown, 
    53 S.W.3d 328
    , 340 (Tex. 2001) (Abbott,
    J., dissenting).
    13
    … Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.301(a), (b).
    14
    … 
    Id. § 552.301
    (d).
    6
    disclosure and must be released unless the governmental agency provides a
    “compelling reason” to withhold the information.15
    B.    Standard of Review
    Once the requested information is presumed to be public information
    because of an agency’s failure to make a timely request for an AG opinion, the
    party requesting the information may seek a writ of mandamus to compel
    release of the information.16 An action for a writ of mandamus initiated in the
    trial court is a civil action subject to appeal like any other civil suit.17
    Accordingly, although pled as a mandamus action, we do not employ the abuse
    of discretion standard applicable to original proceedings in the appellate
    courts.18 Rather, we review the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions
    of law, whether express or implied, in accordance with the standards generally
    15
    … 
    Id. § 552.302.
          16
    … 
    Id. § 552.321;
    see Simmons v. Kuzmich, 
    166 S.W.3d 342
    , 348
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
    17
    … Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 
    806 S.W.2d 791
    , 792 n.1 (Tex.
    1991); City of Fort Worth v. Abbott, 
    258 S.W.3d 320
    , 323 (Tex. App.—Austin
    2008, no pet.).
    18
    … 
    Simmons, 166 S.W.3d at 348
    . Although Doe’s issues on appeal are
    framed in terms of the abuse of discretion standard, we review Doe’s issues
    under the appropriate standards of review. 
    Id. at 348
    n.2.
    7
    applicable to a trial court's findings and conclusions in any civil matter. 19 That
    is, we review findings of fact for legal and factual evidentiary support, and we
    review conclusions of law de novo.20
    In a trial to the court where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are
    filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support
    it.21 Where a reporter’s record is filed, however, these implied findings are not
    conclusive, and an appellant may challenge them, as Doe tacitly does here, by
    contesting the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support such implied
    findings. 22 The judgment must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal
    theory that finds support in the evidence. 23
    We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only when (1) the record
    discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred
    by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered
    to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more
    19
    … 
    Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 794
    n.2; 
    Simmons, 166 S.W.3d at 346
    .
    20
    … 
    Simmons, 166 S.W.3d at 346
    ; Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. City of
    Dallas, 
    4 S.W.3d 469
    , 473 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.).
    21
    … Pharo v. Chambers County, 
    922 S.W.2d 945
    , 948 (Tex. 1996).
    22
    … Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(c)(4); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand,
    
    83 S.W.3d 789
    , 795 (Tex. 2002).
    23
    … Worford v. Stamper, 
    801 S.W.2d 108
    , 109 (Tex. 1990).
    8
    than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite
    of a vital fact.24 In determining whether there is legally sufficient evidence to
    support the finding under review, we must consider evidence favorable to the
    finding if a reasonable fact-finder could and disregard evidence contrary to the
    finding unless a reasonable fact-finder could not.25
    Whether information is subject to the Act and whether an exception to
    disclosure applies to the information are questions of law involving statutory
    construction.26 We review a trial court’s construction of a statute de novo.27
    The overriding goal of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's
    intent.28 When possible, the court must find legislative intent in the plain and
    common meaning of the words used in the statute.29 Moreover, in construing
    24
    … Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 
    977 S.W.2d 328
    , 334 (Tex.
    1998), cert. denied, 
    526 U.S. 1040
    (1999); Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence"
    and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 
    38 Tex. L. Rev. 361
    , 362–63
    (1960).
    25
    … City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 807, 827 (Tex. 2005).
    26
    … City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 
    22 S.W.3d 351
    , 357 (Tex.
    2000) (plurality opinion); 
    Simmons, 166 S.W.3d at 345
    –46.
    27
    … City of 
    Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 357
    ; 
    Simmons, 166 S.W.3d at 346
    .
    28
    … Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Downs, 
    81 S.W.3d 803
    , 805 (Tex. 2002).
    29
    … Thomas v. Cornyn, 
    71 S.W.3d 473
    , 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,
    no pet.).
    9
    statutes, we give due consideration to AG decisions even though they are not
    binding.30 This is especially so in cases involving public information requests,
    as the legislature has imposed on the AG the duty to provide written opinions
    to governmental entities that seek to withhold information requested under the
    Act.31
    Analysis
    A.       Section 552.101 Exemptions from Disclosure
    Doe requested documents from the DA that fall into three categories: (1)
    documents used or developed in the investigation of abuse or neglect of a child;
    (2) Muniz’s Tarrant County Jail visitation cards; and (3) National Crime
    Information Center (“NCIC”) and Texas Crime Information Center (“TCIC”)
    reports.32       Doe’s first issue on appeal is whether the DA, after not timely
    30
    … Jackson v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 
    243 S.W.3d 754
    , 758 (Tex.
    App.—Corpus Christi 2007, pet. denied) (citing Pack v. Crossroads, Inc., 
    53 S.W.3d 492
    , 504 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)).
    31
    … 
    Id. 32 …
    Specifically, Doe requested the following: Muniz’s Tarrant County
    Jail telephone call log and telephone record verification and match results;
    Muniz’s Tarrant County Jail visitation log; Muniz’s Tarrant County Jail
    disciplinary records; all Texas Department of Criminal Justice documents
    providing information relating to Muniz’s 1980 and 1988 convictions;
    penitentiary packets; F. Doe’s school, medical, and psychological records; all
    witness statements and summaries of witness statements; names, addresses,
    and telephone numbers of all witnesses the DA interviewed or contacted; all
    documents pertaining to the criminal history of any witness or victim; and
    10
    seeking an open records ruling, failed to present any evidence of a compelling
    reason sufficient to rebut the presumption that the information Doe requested
    is public information.33 Relying on section 552.101,34 the DA argues that these
    documents are exempt from public disclosure because they are “confidential by
    law” and, therefore, the requirement in section 552.302 that the governmental
    body must timely request an AG opinion or else the information is presumed to
    be open does not apply.       Alternatively, the DA argues that it presented
    “compelling reasons” to withhold the documents. We agree with the DA that
    it demonstrated compelling reasons to withhold the information. 35
    diagrams, maps, or sketches of the Clubs’ buildings.
    33
    … The DA identified almost 1,000 documents that it was willing to
    provide to Doe upon payment of the appropriate fees. See Tex. Gov’t Code
    Ann. § 552.2615(a) (requiring governmental body, if request for information
    will result in costs over $40.00, to provide cost estimate to requestor
    identifying and explaining charges to be imposed). Those documents are not
    the subject of this appeal; the only documents at issue here are those the DA
    sought to withhold.
    34
    … 
    Id. § 552.101.
          35
    … Because we conclude that the DA provided evidence to support the
    trial court’s determination that there were compelling reasons to withhold the
    documents from disclosure, we do not reach the DA’s argument that it was not
    required to show a compelling reason.
    11
    1.       Compelling Reasons
    Relying heavily on this court’s opinion in Simmons v. Kuzmich,36 Doe
    asserts that the DA’s failure to timely request an AG opinion means that the
    documents are presumed to be public information and that the DA was
    obligated to provide evidence of a compelling reason to withhold the
    documents. In Simmons, this court held that a governmental entity attempting
    to overcome the presumption cannot simply assert an exception to disclosure;
    rather, the entity must present evidence of a compelling reason to prevent
    disclosure under that exception.37 In reaching this conclusion, however, we did
    not examine what would constitute a “compelling reason” for a governmental
    actor to withhold information. We held only that whether an exception applies
    is a different inquiry than whether there is a compelling reason to withhold
    information and that the governmental actor must do both in order to withhold
    information.38
    36
    … 
    166 S.W.3d 342
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
    37
    … 
    Id. at 350.
          38
    … 
    Id. (“[T]he governmental
    body must . . . show that its claimed
    exception to disclosure falls within one of the statutory exceptions to disclosure
    and how that exception creates a compelling reason to withhold the
    information.”); see 
    id. at 351–52
    (Cayce, C.J., dissenting) (stating that, by
    presenting evidence that releasing information could compromise criminal
    investigation, governmental actor demonstrated compelling reason to withhold
    information).
    12
    The AG has articulated a “general rule” about what constitutes a
    “compelling reason” to withhold information from the public in light of the
    section 552.302 presumption of openness. Specifically, the AG has identified
    two “compelling reasons” for a governmental actor to withhold information:
    [T]his presumption may be overcome where [1] the information at
    issue is deemed confidential by some source of law outside the
    [A]ct, and is therefore excepted from disclosure by section
    552.101 . . . , or [2] where the interest of a third party is at stake.
    For example, where information is confidential by statute or
    implicates the privacy interests of a third party, the information
    must be withheld from public disclosure even though the
    governmental body maintaining the information has failed to make
    a timely request for an open records decision.39
    Statutory and case law support the AG’s general rule. The Act itself
    provides a “compelling reason” for a governmental actor to withhold
    information by imposing criminal penalties on any person who “distributes
    information considered confidential under the terms of [the Act].” 40 Moreover,
    39
    … Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-630 (1994); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-150
    (1977) (“This presumption [of openness after a governmental actor fails to
    timely request an AG opinion] can only be overcome by a compelling
    demonstration that the information should not be released to the public, as
    might be the case if the information is deemed confidential by some other
    source of law, or if an exception designed to protect the interest of a third party
    is applicable.”).
    40
    … Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.352; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-676
    (2002) (“Section [552.101] . . . refers to information that a governmental body
    may not choose to release, and the improper disclosure of which results in
    criminal penalties under the [Act]. Thus, when section 552.101 applies, the
    13
    the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals recently agreed with the AG that a
    governmental actor demonstrates a “compelling reason” to withhold information
    when that actor establishes that the information is confidential by statute. 41
    And the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that an “individual does not
    forfeit all right to control access to intimate facts concerning his personal life
    merely because the State has a legitimate interest in obtaining that
    information.” 42
    Accordingly, we conclude that a governmental actor demonstrates a
    “compelling reason” to withhold public information when the actor shows that
    [Act] prohibits the governmental body from disclosing the information.”)
    (footnotes omitted).
    41
    … 
    Jackson, 243 S.W.3d at 757
    –58 (holding that Transportation Code
    section 552.051 prohibits disclosure of information in basic driver’s license
    record file, and because TDPS demonstrated that statute required TDPS to
    maintain confidentiality of this information, TDPS satisfied burden to show
    compelling reason to withhold information).
    42
    … Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 
    540 S.W.2d 668
    , 679 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 
    430 U.S. 931
    (1977). The AG has also
    consistently opined that the Act does not compel disclosure of information
    where “release of that information would impair some constitutional right.”
    Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-430 (1985) (holding that lists of persons who visited with
    inmates are exempt from disclosure because information is confidential by
    constitutional law); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-185 (1978) (holding that logs
    of inmate correspondence are confidential by constitutional law); Tex. Att’y
    Gen. ORD-100 (1975) (holding that portions of library circulation records linking
    identities of individual patrons to materials accessed by those patrons are
    confidential by constitutional law).
    14
    (1) it is prohibited by statute from disclosing certain information and, therefore,
    that information is exempt from disclosure under section 552.101, or (2) the
    disclosure of the information implicates the constitutionally protected privacy
    interest of a party other than the governmental body. 43
    2.    Information that is confidential by statute
    Doe’s open records request sought information regarding investigations
    into allegations of child abuse, and it also sought NCIC and TCIC reports. The
    DA urged, and the trial court held, that the DA had a compelling reason to
    withhold this information because it is made confidential by statute.
    a.     Family Code Section 261.201
    Section 261.201 of the Family Code clearly removes information within
    its scope from disclosure under the Act. That section declares the following:
    (a)   The following information is confidential, is not subject to public
    release under [the Act], and may be disclosed only for purposes
    consistent with this code and applicable federal or state law or under
    rules adopted by an investigating agency:
    (1) a report of alleged or suspected abuse or neglect made under
    this chapter and the identity of the person making the report; and
    43
    … Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 552.101, 552.302; Indus. 
    Found., 540 S.W.2d at 678-79
    ; 
    Jackson, 243 S.W.3d at 757
    –58; see 
    also supra
    n.39. We
    emphasize that this opinion should not be construed as identifying the only
    “compelling reasons” to withhold information; there may be other such reasons
    that are not relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
    15
    (2) except as otherwise provided in this section, the files, reports,
    records, communications, audiotapes, videotapes, and working
    papers used or developed in an investigation under this chapter or
    in providing services as a result of an investigation. 44
    Confidentiality is central to the family code provisions governing the reporting
    of child abuse, 45 and the State has a compelling interest in protecting the
    confidentiality of information used or obtained in an investigation of alleged or
    suspected child abuse. 46
    The terms of section 261.201 alone provide a “compelling reason” for the
    DA to withhold some of the information Doe requested.              By expressly
    exempting information within the scope of section 261.201 from the scope of
    the Act, the legislature imposed on the governmental body a duty to maintain
    the confidentiality of that information.
    Accordingly, the only issue for the trial court to resolve was whether the
    documents contained information within the scope of section 261.201.
    44
    … Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.201(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008); see also
    Coachman v. State, 
    692 S.W.2d 940
    , 945 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    1985, writ ref’d).
    45
    … See Tex. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Benson, 
    893 S.W.2d 236
    , 242
    (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied).
    46
    … See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
    480 U.S. 39
    , 57, 
    107 S. Ct. 989
    , 1001
    (1987) (describing compelling interest in protecting child-abuse information);
    
    Benson, 893 S.W.2d at 242
    (noting purpose of confidentiality protections in
    family code to encourage reporting of suspected child abuse).
    16
    Because the trial court did not enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, we
    must affirm the trial court’s order if there is any evidence to support the
    conclusion that the information is within the scope of section 261.201.47 The
    trial court took judicial notice of the entire record in this proceeding. The record
    included the documents at issue, which had been submitted in camera to the
    trial court. The record also included the AG ruling provided in response to
    Doe’s open records request, in which the AG determined that those documents
    identified by the DA as within the scope of section 261.201 “must [be]
    withh[e]ld . . . under section 552.101.” 48 This was sufficient evidence for the
    trial court to have determined that some of the documents were within the
    scope of section 261.201 and, therefore, the DA had a compelling reason to
    withhold them from disclosure.
    b.    Government Code Section 411.083
    Doe also sought information contained in NCIC and TCIC reports relating
    to Muniz. Section 411.083 of the Government Code provides that “[c]riminal
    history record information maintained by the [Department of Public Safety] is
    confidential information for the use of the department and, except as provided
    47
    … 
    Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109
    .
    48
    … Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2006-09590 (2006).
    17
    by this subchapter, may not be disseminated by the department.” 49 As with the
    other categories of documents at issue here, the AG has consistently held that
    information within the scope of section 411.083 is exempt from disclosure by
    section 552.101.50
    As with the documents under section 261.201, the trial court was
    provided the NCIC and TCIC reports for in camera review. Section 411.083
    provides a compelling reason to withhold such reports. The trial court did not
    err in denying mandamus relief to Doe regarding these reports.
    3.      Information that is confidential by constitutional law
    Relying on the exemption in section 552.101 for information that is
    confidential based on constitutional law, the DA sought to withhold from
    disclosure to Doe visitation logs and other materials reflecting communications
    between Muniz and other persons. The AG has opined that such information
    is exempted from disclosure under the Act because it implicates the
    constitutionally protected privacy interests of third parties.51 In particular, it is
    established constitutional law that, subject to regulations reasonably related to
    49
    … Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.083 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
    50
    … See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2008-12058 (2008), OR2008-12002
    (2008).
    51
    … Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-430 (1985), ORD-428 (1985), ORD-185
    (1978).
    18
    the state’s interest in the order and security of penal institutions, inmates and
    private persons have a constitutional privacy interest in maintaining the
    confidentiality of correspondence and communications between them.52
    As with documents reflecting information made confidential by statute,
    the record included documents reflecting Muniz’s communications with private
    persons, as those documents were submitted in camera. This information is
    exempt from disclosure under the Act because it is confidential by
    constitutional law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the
    information in these documents was exempt from disclosure.
    Having concluded that the DA showed a compelling reason to withhold
    the documents at issue, we overrule Doe’s first issue.
    B.    Deposition Transcripts
    Doe’s second issue on appeal alleges that the trial court abused its
    discretion in removing entire witness deposition transcripts from the record,
    without conducting an in camera inspection. Doe, however, wholly failed to
    provide us with any argument or authorities in support of this issue as required
    by appellate rule 38.1(h).53 An issue on appeal unsupported by argument or
    52
    … See supra n.50.
    53
    … See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h) (“The [appellate] brief must contain a
    clear and concise argument for the contention made, with appropriate citations
    19
    citation to any legal authority presents nothing for the court to review. 54 Issue
    two is overruled.
    Conclusion
    Having overruled both of Doe’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    JOHN CAYCE
    CHIEF JUSTICE
    PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ.
    DELIVERED: October 9, 2008
    to authorities and to the record.”).
    54
    … Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
    126 S.W.3d 676
    , 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2004, pet. denied), cert. denied, 
    543 U.S. 1076
    (2005).
    20