Centerpoint Apartments v. Jeffrey L. Webb ( 2008 )


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  •                           COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 2-07-278-CV
    CENTERPOINT APARTMENTS                                                 APPELLANT
    V.
    JEFFREY L. WEBB                                                          APPELLEE
    ------------
    FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF DENTON COUNTY
    ------------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ------------
    I. Introduction
    To paraphrase the Bard, “To be [a lease renewal], or not to be [a lease
    renewal].     That is the question.” 2          In one issue, Appellant Centerpoint
    Apartments (Centerpoint) appeals the trial court’s take nothing judgment in
    1
    … See T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.4.
    2
    … W ILLIAM S HAKESPEARE, H AMLET act 3, sc. 1.
    favor of Appellee Jeffrey L. Webb. At risk are damages of $1,186.67, plus
    attorney’s fees of several times that amount. We affirm.
    II. Factual and Procedural History
    On April 29, 2004, Dale Arms executed a Texas Apartment Association
    (TAA) Member form agreement with Centerpoint entitled “Apartment Lease
    Contract” (Lease 1). Lease 1’s term began on May 1, 2004, ended November
    30, 2004, required thirty days’ written notice of termination or intent to move
    out to prevent automatic month-to-month renewal, and provided for $545
    monthly rent and prorated rent of $425 for the first month, among other
    provisions. On May 1, 2004, Dale Arms’s older brother, Webb, entered a lease
    guaranty contract (Guaranty Contract) with Centerpoint, the terms of which are
    at issue here.
    On September 29, 2004, Centerpoint entered into a second TAA form
    agreement with Arms, also entitled “Apartment Lease Contract” (Lease 2),
    which was set to begin on December 1, 2004, the day after the expiration of
    Lease 1, and to end on June 30, 2005. Paragraph 3 of Lease 2 provided that
    it would automatically renew month-to-month unless either party gave at least
    sixty days’ written notice. It also provided that there was no prorated rent
    2
    amount, but it included an “Addendum for Rental Concessions,” (Addendum)
    dated September 29, 2004.3
    Arms fulfilled his contractual obligations under Lease 1; however, he
    breached Lease 2. Centerpoint filed suit in the justice court against Webb for
    breach of the Guaranty Contract and prevailed. Webb appealed to the county
    court.
    During the bench trial, the county court heard testimony and argument
    and reviewed evidence regarding whether Lease 2 was a new lease contract or
    a renewal of Lease 1. The trial court admitted Centerpoint’s exhibits, including
    the Guaranty Contract, Lease 2, and the Addendum. It also admitted Webb’s
    exhibits, including the TAA form Lease Contract Guaranty and Lease 1.
    Kendra Heintzelman, Centerpoint’s assistant property supervisor, testified
    that the Guaranty Contract “will guarantee renewals, original contract renewals,
    3
    … The Addendum provided as follows:
    Addendum to lease contract dated 9-24-04 between Dale Arms
    and Centerpoint Apartments[.] Rent from 12/1/04 to 6-30-05 will
    be $399.00 per month until 6-30-05. The total concession that
    you will be receiving is $1,022.00. . . . When this lease term ends,
    rent will automatically go to the current street rate. At that time,
    please contact the office to find out what the street rate is or if we
    are offering any discounts at that time.
    The underlined portions here and throughout this opinion represent the lines
    that were completed by hand.
    3
    roommate additions, deletions, modifications, apartment number changes.” She
    also testified that Centerpoint had modified TAA’s Lease Contract Guaranty
    form, which was admitted into evidence to compare to the Guaranty Contract,
    particularly the “[v]erbiage regarding renewals, amendments, modifications, unit
    number changes.” She testified that Centerpoint did not use a TAA renewal
    lease form, that the guarantor’s obligation terminates when the apartment is
    vacated, and that the guarantor’s rights were in the lease contract.        She
    testified that she believed that Lease 2 was a renewal. Webb testified that he
    understood the Guaranty Contract to be only for a six month period.
    At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court held that Webb was not subject
    to liability under the Guaranty Contract, stating,
    The document that the apartment commission has chosen to use
    is a document entitled Apartment Lease Contract. It does not, in
    any way, indicate that it is a renewal. That the apartment complex
    chooses to use that as its vehicle for continuation of occupancy by
    tenants in this action does not change it into a renewal contract.
    It is not labeled as such. . . . And the Court is going to strictly
    construe the language of the documents that these parties have
    signed. Therefore, I do not find that the Lease Contract Guaranty,
    . . . extends to the subsequent document, . . . says date of Lease
    Contract, 9/24/04, with the starting date being December 1, 2004.
    So the judgment is for the Defendant in this action.
    This appeal followed.
    4
    III. Analysis
    In its sole issue, Centerpoint argues that the trial court erred by rendering
    judgment in favor of Webb, claiming that it established as a matter of law that
    Webb breached the Guaranty Contract. Specifically, Centerpoint claims that
    the Guaranty Contract’s express terms extended Webb’s liability to include a
    breach of a lease renewal or any leases signed by Webb’s brother, that the
    lease contract title was not dispositive of an intent to renew or to discontinue
    Webb’s guarantor liability, and that Centerpoint established at trial all of the
    elements of a breach of guaranty claim.
    A. Standard of Review
    We review de novo a trial court’s conclusions of law with regard to
    contract interpretation. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 
    995 S.W.2d 647
    , 650–51(Tex. 1999); Huntley v. Enon Ltd. P’ship, 
    197 S.W.3d 844
    , 849 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). We accord no deference to
    the lower court’s decision. Quick v. City of Austin, 
    7 S.W.3d 109
    , 116 (Tex.
    1998).
    B. Contract Interpretation
    When interpreting a contract, no single provision taken alone will be given
    controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference
    to the whole instrument. Citizens Nat’l Bank in Abilene v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
    5
    
    136 Tex. 333
    , 
    150 S.W.2d 1003
    , 1006, cert. denied, 
    314 U.S. 656
    (1941).
    If an instrument is written so that it can be given a definite legal meaning or
    interpretation, the court should construe it as a matter of law. Coker v. Coker,
    
    650 S.W.2d 391
    , 393 (Tex. 1983); Pham v. Mongiello, 
    58 S.W.3d 284
    , 288
    (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied). To achieve this objective, the court
    should examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and
    give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered
    meaningless.      Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 
    150 Tex. 513
    , 
    243 S.W.2d 154
    , 158 (1951).
    The fact that the parties to a contract disagree over the interpretation of
    the contract does not necessarily render it ambiguous. 
    Pham, 58 S.W.3d at 288
    . Likewise, uncertainty or a lack of clarity in the language used in the
    contract does not automatically render it ambiguous. 
    Id. And an
    ambiguity
    does not arise simply because the parties advance conflicting interpretations;
    rather, for an ambiguity to exist, both interpretations must be reasonable.
    Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 
    22 S.W.3d 857
    , 861 (Tex. 2000);
    Sefzik v. Mady Dev., L.P., 
    231 S.W.3d 456
    , 460 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no
    pet.).
    1. Guaranty Contract Terms
    The Guaranty Contract provides in pertinent part as follows:
    6
    Lease Contract Information . . .
    ABOUT LEASE: Date of Lease Contract . . . 4/29/04 . . .
    Monthly rent for dwelling unit $545 . . .
    Beginning date of Lease Contract: 5/1/04 . . .
    Ending date of Lease Contract: 11/30/04[.]
    ...
    You, as guarantor signing this Lease Contract Guaranty, guarantee
    all obligations of resident(s) under the above Lease Contract,
    including but not limited to rent, late fees, property damage, repair
    costs, animal violation charges, reletting charges, utility payments
    and all other sums which may become due under the Lease
    Contract. You agree that your obligations as guarantor will
    continue and will not be affected by amendments, modifications,
    roommate changes or deletions, unit # changes, renewals or any
    lease agreements which may be agreed to from time to time
    between any of the residents and us (including month to month
    renewal in P.#3 of lease.) Guarantor is responsible for any
    holdovers, (paragraph #32 of lease.) If guarantor gives notice to
    move out, (P.#3 and #37 of lease) and resident renews lease or
    signs a new lease, guarantor’s notice will be considered void.
    ...
    Guarantor unconditionally understands that the guarantor form
    allows the resident the right to renew his or her lease at any time
    he or she desires without approval from guarantor or notification by
    apartment management to guarantor of such renewal. Guarantor
    is responsible for any renewals signed by resident.
    2. Lease Title and Terms
    Centerpoint argues that, contrary to the trial court’s interpretation, Lease
    2’s title, “Apartment Lease Contract,” was not dispositive of the parties’ intent
    to renew Lease 1 or to continue Webb’s liability. However, while title alone
    7
    may not be dispositive, we may consider it in interpreting the parties’
    intentions. Cf. 
    Sefzik, 231 S.W.3d at 462
    (“Texas courts attach greater weight
    to the operative clauses of a contract than the captions or titles.”); see also
    Enter. Leasing Co. v. Barrios, 
    156 S.W.3d 547
    , 549 (Tex. 2004) (recognizing
    that in certain cases, courts may consider the title of a contract provision or
    section to interpret a contract, although greater weight should be given to the
    contract’s operative clauses).
    On its face, Lease 2 does not appear to be a renewal or extension of
    Lease 1. Lease 2 is not titled a “renewal” or “extension”; rather, it is titled,
    “Apartment Lease Contract,” and purports to set out a new agreement by
    stating, “[T]he initial term of the Lease Contract begins on the 1 day of
    December, 2004 . . . .”     If Centerpoint had intended for Lease 2 to be a
    renewal of Lease 1, it could have easily labeled it as such or otherwise
    indicated it somewhere on the contract itself. Heintzelman testified that the
    majority of Centerpoint’s forms were TAA and that Centerpoint had modified
    the TAA Lease Guaranty Contract “to make the Guaranty what they wanted it
    to be.” She provided no testimony with regard to why Centerpoint could not
    have labeled any subsequent apartment lease contract a “renewal contract” to
    fit the language that she testified Centerpoint had added to TAA’s Lease
    Guaranty Contract to create the Guaranty Contract.
    8
    Furthermore, the Guaranty Contract specifically references Paragraph 3,
    which provides for automatic renewal, in its list of continuing obligations,
    stating:
    You agree that your obligations as guarantor will continue and will
    not be affected by amendments, modifications, roommate changes
    or deletions, unit # changes, renewals or any lease agreements
    which may be agreed to from time to time between any of the
    residents and us (including month to month renewal in P. #3 of
    lease.) [Emphasis added.]
    Paragraph 3 in Lease 1 sets out the initial term of the lease and provides,
    “This Lease Contract will automatically renew month-to-month unless either
    party gives at least 30 days written notice of termination or intent to move-out
    as required by paragraph 37.”     [Emphasis added.] Paragraph 3 in Lease 2
    requires sixty days’ written notice to prevent automatic renewal.           Both
    contracts state under Paragraph 10(5), “Month to month renewal in paragraph
    #3 continues indefinitely for cosigners, residents and guarantors until written
    notice of intent to vacate is given as required by paragraph #37.” [Emphasis
    added.]
    Nothing in either lease provides for any sort of renewal other than the
    month-to-month renewal referred to in Paragraph 3. Under the plain terms of
    either lease, renewal is automatic; therefore, if Arms had not signed Lease 2,
    Lease 1 would have automatically renewed and Webb’s liability would have
    9
    continued. Instead, Centerpoint and Arms signed Lease 2, which included a
    different termination term to prevent automatic renewal and different monthly
    rent in the Addendum. To treat Lease 2 as a renewal would require us to
    ignore Paragraph 3, which we may not do. See Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
    
    876 S.W.2d 132
    , 133 (Tex. 1994) (“[E]ach part of the contract should be
    given effect.”). Therefore, we conclude that Lease 2 was a new lease, and not
    a renewal.
    Centerpoint also contends that the Guaranty Contract language, “any
    lease agreements which may be agreed to from time to time,” makes a specific
    reference to future transactions and should necessarily extend Webb’s liability
    to Lease 2. Webb counters that the “any lease agreements” language in the
    Guaranty Contract only refers to Lease 1 because the preceding terms in the
    sentence only reference changes to Lease 1, not new leases. The controversial
    provision reads as follows:
    You agree that your obligations as guarantor will continue and will
    not be affected by amendments, modifications, roommate changes
    or deletions, unit # changes, renewals or any lease agreements
    which may be agreed to from time to time between any of the
    residents and us (including month to month renewal in P. #3 of
    lease.) Guarantor is responsible for any holdovers, (paragraph #32
    of lease.) If guarantor gives notice to move out, (P.#3 and #37 of
    lease) and resident renews lease or signs a new lease, guarantor’s
    notice will be considered void. [Emphasis added.]
    10
    The Guaranty Contract’s language contemplates that Centerpoint and
    Arms might renew, modify, or make changes to Lease 1 during Lease 1’s term
    without voiding the Guaranty Contract, demonstrated by the section entitled
    “Lease Contract Information,” with its specific beginning and ending dates, as
    well as the language stating that the guarantor guarantees all obligations “under
    the above Lease Contract,” and the language providing for renewals and other
    changes under Lease 1.
    However, we have been unable to find language in the Guaranty Contract
    that, as a matter of law, would extend Webb’s liability as a guarantor beyond
    Lease 1 to new leases between Arms and Centerpoint without Webb giving
    “notice to move out.”      Under that one circumstance, if the resident then
    “renews lease or signs a new lease, guarantor’s notice will be considered void.”
    [Emphasis added.]4 Had Centerpoint wanted to expressly include new leases
    in the Guaranty Contract under any other circumstance, it could have added the
    word “new” to the clause listing every other type of change to Lease 1:
    4
    … Nothing was produced at trial to show that this exception would
    apply.
    11
    amendments, modifications, roommate changes, unit number changes,
    renewals, or holdovers.5
    Therefore, we disagree with Centerpoint’s contention that the “any lease
    agreements” language included or contemplated any future contracts between
    Arms and Centerpoint. If we were to follow this reasoning, then Lease 1‘s
    ending date, which was included in the Guaranty Contract, would be a term
    rendered meaningless. See 
    Forbau, 876 S.W.2d at 133
    . The words “new
    lease” are not used anywhere in the “any lease agreements” sentence and the
    preceding items in that sentence all refer to changes to Lease 1. Additionally,
    the Guaranty Contract makes multiple references to the “Lease Contract” that
    is being guaranteed, with a capital L and a capital C; Lease 1 is titled
    “Apartment Lease Contract,” as is Lease 2.      However, the sections in the
    Guaranty Contract that clarify obligations under Lease 1, including the “any
    lease agreements” section, refer to the lease with a lower case “l”—a clear
    distinction between the specific “Lease Contract” and any general agreements
    that might take place under that Lease Contract. See 
    id. at 133–34
    (reciting
    the general contract construction rule that the more specific provision will
    govern the general).
    5
    … Lease 1 and Lease 2 both provide for extension of the lease contract
    term for holdovers, under Paragraph 32.
    12
    We interpret the “any lease agreements” language to simply extend
    Webb’s liability to any lease changes along the lines of amendments or
    modifications that might occur “from time to time” under Lease 1. Cf. Blount
    v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 
    432 S.W.2d 549
    , 552–53 (Tex. Civ.
    App.—Dallas 1968, no writ) (stating that language regarding “agreements
    . . . in force or hereafter made” clearly comprehended guarantor’s intent to
    guarantee obligor’s present and future indebtedness in obligor’s usual course
    of business (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we hold that Webb was not liable,
    as a matter of law, as guarantor under Lease 2. We overrule Centerpoint’s sole
    issue.6
    IV. Conclusion
    Having overruled Centerpoint’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    PER CURIAM
    PANEL: MCCOY, HOLMAN, and GARDNER, JJ.
    DELIVERED: August 28, 2008
    6
    … Because this is dispositive of Centerpoint’s breach of guaranty claim,
    we need not address that portion of Centerpoint’s sole issue. See T EX. R. A PP.
    P. 47.1.
    13