Kenneth Wayne Perry v. State ( 2008 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-06-378-CR
KENNETH WAYNE PERRY APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Kenneth Wayne Perry appeals his convictions for possession of
child pornography. In four points, Perry argues that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by
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… See T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.4.
admitting extraneous offense evidence, and that the trial court erred by failing
to grant his motion to suppress the evidence. We will affirm.
II. B ACKGROUND F ACTS
On September 7, 2004, Troy Lawrence, a detective with the Fort Worth
Police Department, received a packet from Detective Lori Rangel of the Dallas
Police Department containing evidence that Perry posted child pornography to
the Yahoo! web group, “Life is Like a Math Problem.”
On September 9, 2004, after reviewing the contents of the packet,
Detective Lawrence obtained a search warrant for Perry’s house.
Approximately two hours after obtaining the search warrant, Detective
Lawrence, along with Axel Schardt, his partner, and uniformed police officers,
went to Perry’s house to execute the warrant.
After Perry opened the front door of the house, Detective Lawrence and
the officers entered Perry’s house and located a computer in the back living
room. Detective Lawrence asked Perry if anyone else lived in the house, and
Perry told him that his wife, son, and daughter lived in the house with him.
Detective Lawrence seized a Gateway computer tower, digital camera, CDs,
floppies, and some paperwork. He took the items back to his office at the
police department.
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Later that day, Detective Lawrence began a forensic analysis of the
computer tower. Detective Lawrence found numerous images of child
pornography located in various areas on the computer. He stated that the
images appeared to have been downloaded off the internet and were not
homemade. Detective Lawrence stated that there were no viruses, trojans, or
backdoors on the computer that would place the images on the computer
without the owner’s knowledge.
Perry was indicted on four counts of possession of child pornography.
However, the State only tried counts one, two, and four at trial. On October
20, 2006, after entering a plea of not guilty, a jury found Perry guilty of all
three counts and assessed his punishment at two years’ confinement for counts
one, and four and ten years’ confinement, probated for ten years for count two.
III. L EGAL AND F ACTUAL S UFFICIENCY
In his first and second points, Perry contends that the evidence is legally
and factually insufficient to support his possession of child pornography
convictions. Specifically, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish
that he knowingly possessed the images, that the images were of “real”
children, and that he knew the images were of “real” children.
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A. Standards of Review
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d
772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.
Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v.
State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We then ask whether
the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is
nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder’s determination is clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the
evidence supporting the conviction that the fact-finder’s determination is
manifestly unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414–15, 417; Johnson v. State, 23
S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To reverse under the second ground,
we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great
weight and preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient,
contradicts the verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.
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In determining whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a
conviction that is nevertheless supported by legally sufficient evidence, it is not
enough that this court “harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to
overturn [the] conviction.” Id. We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly
wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have decided differently
than the jury or because we disagree with the jury’s resolution of a conflict in
the evidence. Id. W e may not simply substitute our judgment for the fact-
finder’s. Johnson, 23 S.W .3d at 12; Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Unless the record clearly reveals that a different result
is appropriate, we must defer to the jury’s determination of the weight to be
given contradictory testimonial evidence because resolution of the conflict
“often turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were
in attendance when the testimony was delivered.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8.
Thus, we must give due deference to the fact-finder’s determinations,
“particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the
evidence.” Id. at 9.
An opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a discussion of the
most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant’s complaint
on appeal. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Moreover, an opinion reversing and remanding on factual insufficiency grounds
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must detail all the evidence and clearly state why the finding in question is
factually insufficient and under which ground. Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d
283, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7.
B. Applicable Law
A person commits the offense of possession of child pornography if he
“knowingly or intentionally possesses visual material that visually depicts a child
younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was made who
is engaging in sexual conduct and the person knows that the material depicts
the child [engaging in sexual conduct].” T EX. P ENAL C ODE A NN. § 43.26(a)
(Vernon 2003). Visual material includes any “physical medium that allows an
image to be displayed on a computer or other video screen and any image
transmitted to a computer or other video screen by telephone line, cable,
satellite transmission, or other method.” Id. § 43.26(b)(3)(B). Sexual conduct
includes sexual contact, actual or simulated sexual intercourse, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals or anus. Id. § 43.25(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008). A
person possesses something when he exercises actual care, custody, control,
or management over it. Id. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon
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2003). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist or when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id.
§ 6.03(b).
Proof of a culpable mental state almost invariably depends upon
circumstantial evidence. Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95, 111 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, 504 U.S. (1992); see
also Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). A jury
can infer knowledge from all the circumstances, including the acts, conduct,
and remarks of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. Krause, 243
S.W.3d at 111; see also Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978).
C. “Knowingly” Possessed
Perry asserts that the evidence does not support the jury’s implied finding
based on its verdict that he “knowingly” possessed the images. Specifically,
he argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because the
images were found in the unallocated space of the hard drive, there is no longer
a directory for information that is stored in the unallocated space, and a typical
user would not know that the information is present on the computer.
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Detective Lawrence testified that the three images were found on Perry’s
computer in the unallocated portion of the hard drive. He explained that
unallocated space is the part of the hard drive in which files are not currently
being stored. He stated that if you look at a photograph on the computer, but
don’t save the photograph, it will be cached temporarily in the temporary
internet files, and then when you have finished looking at it, it will be stored in
the unallocated space. He further stated that when an item is deleted off a
computer, it is stored in the unallocated portion of the hard drive. Detective
Lawrence stated that information is stored in the unallocated space until it is
overwritten by other material.
Additionally, Detective Lawrence said that the images could not have
been placed on the computer by default, but rather they had to have been
intentionally placed on the computer. He also stated that there is not a
directory in the unallocated space; therefore, a person cannot access the
images once they are stored in the unallocated space.
Although Detective Lawrence testified that a user cannot access images
that are stored in the unallocated space on a computer, he also stated that the
images could not have gotten on the computer by default. In other words,
Perry must have either deleted a saved image on his computer or viewed an
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image online without saving it for the image to be stored in the unallocated
space.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude that any rational juror could have found that Perry knowingly
possessed the images. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789;
Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Additionally,
the evidence supporting the conviction is not so weak, nor the contrary
evidence so overwhelming, that the jury’s verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly
unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414–15, 417. Thus, we overrule Perry’s first
and third points.
D. The Images Were of “Real” Children
Perry argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove
that he knowingly possessed images of “real” children.
Section 43.26 of the Texas Penal Code only prohibits possession of
material that depicts an actual child, not material that merely “appears” to
depict a child. T EX. P ENAL C ODE A NN. § 43.26(a); Webb v. State, 109 S.W.3d
580, 583 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Accordingly, the State must
prove that (1) the appellant possessed visual material depicting a child under
the age of eighteen engaging in sexual conduct and (2) the appellant knew that
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the material depicted a child engaging in sexual conduct. Webb, 109 S.W.3d
at 583. Section 43.25 of the penal code provides in relevant part that
[w]hen it becomes necessary for the purposes of this section or
Section 43.26 to determine whether a child who participated in
sexual conduct was younger than 18 years of age, the court or jury
may make this determination by any of the following methods:
(1) personal inspection of the child;
(2) inspection of the photograph or motion picture that shows the
child engaging in the sexual performance;
(3) oral testimony by a witness to the sexual performance as to the
age of the child based on the child’s appearance at the time;
(4) expert medical testimony based on the appearance of the child
engaging in the sexual performance; or
(5) any other method authorized by law or by the rules of evidence
at common law.
T EX. P ENAL C ODE A NN. § 43.25(g).
Detective Lawrence testified that the three images showed children under
the age of eighteen engaged in sexual conduct. Additionally, the jury was
shown the images taken from Perry’s computer. The jury was allowed to
inspect the images under section 43.25 of the penal code to determine whether
the depicted children were younger than eighteen years old. See id. The jury
was allowed to use its common sense and apply its common knowledge,
observation, and experience from the ordinary affairs of life when giving effect
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to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Griffith v.
State, 976 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d).
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude that any rational juror could have found that the images were of “real”
children and that Perry knowingly possessed the images. See Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Hampton, 165 S.W.3d at 693. Additionally,
the evidence supporting the conviction is not so weak, nor the contrary
evidence so overwhelming, that the jury’s verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly
unjust. See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414–15, 417. Accordingly, we overrule
Perry’s second and fourth points.
IV. E XTRANEOUS O FFENSE E VIDENCE
In his third point, Perry complains that the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of an extraneous offense during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.
Specifically, Perry alleges that evidence that he posted child pornography to a
Yahoo! group was inadmissible under Rule 104(b), 403, and 404(b) of the
Texas Rules of Evidence.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling under the Rules of
Evidence is abuse of discretion. Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004); Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. Crim. App.
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1998). If the ruling was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case,
in light of what was before the trial court at the time the ruling was made, then
we must uphold the judgment. Sauceda, 129 S.W.3d at 120; State v. Ross,
32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d
540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543–44
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
B. Analysis
Perry argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of the Yahoo! website because it violates rules 104(b), 403, and
404(b).
Rule 404(b) provides that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .
T EX. R. E VID. 404(b).
Here, the Yahoo! evidence was admissible to show Perry’s intent or
motive to view and possess the three images on his computer. Additionally,
the evidence is admissible to show Perry’s knowledge that the images were on
his computer and that they were not on his computer as a result of mistake or
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accident. Accordingly, we hold that the Yahoo! evidence was admissible under
Rule 404(b).
We now turn to the balancing factors under Rule 403(b). The relevant
criteria in determining whether the prejudice of an extraneous offense
outweighs its probative value include (1) the inherent probative force of the
proffered item of evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that
evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an
improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury
from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue
weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of
the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already
admitted. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
The Yahoo! evidence is probative of Perry’s intent to view and store child
pornography on his computer and to explain why his house was searched for
child pornography. Furthermore, the State’s need for the evidence was
moderate because it established the reason why Perry’s house was searched.
Additionally, we believe that presenting the jury with this evidence would not
lead to a decision on an improper basis. Next, the presentation of the Yahoo!
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evidence did not have a tendency to confuse or distract the jury from the main
issues. Further, the evidence did not have a tendency to be given undue weight
by the jury because the Yahoo! images were similar to the images made on the
basis of the indictment. Finally, although the Yahoo! evidence was presented
throughout the State’s case-in-chief, the presentation did not consume an
inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Thus,
we hold that the Yahoo! evidence was admissible under Rule 403.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the Yahoo! evidence over Perry’s objections. Therefore, we overrule
Perry’s third point.
V. M OTION TO S UPPRESS
In his fourth point, Perry argues that the trial court erred by failing to
grant his motion to suppress the search of his residence. Specifically, Perry
argues that the search warrant affidavit was not supported by probable cause
and that evidence was purposefully omitted from the search warrant affidavit
that would have altered the probable cause determination. The State argues
that the trial court did not err by denying Perry’s motion to suppress.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under
a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own
factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no
pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. W iede v. State, 214
S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853,
855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195
S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Therefore, we give almost total
deference to the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if
the trial court’s determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn
on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673;
Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But when
application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor
of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de
novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.
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Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19.
We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact
findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling.
Id. at 819.
When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or
when there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested
findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact
findings that would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. Id.; see
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the
trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by
the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.
We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and
correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court
gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).
B. Probable Cause to Search the Residence
Perry asserts that the trial court should have granted his motion to
suppress the evidence because the search warrant affidavit fails to state
probable cause that he committed an offense and that evidence would be found
at his residence.
When reviewing a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant, we apply the
deferential standard of review articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983).
Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 810–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Under
that standard, we uphold the probable cause determination “so long as the
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that a search would
uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at
2331; see Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 810.
In assessing the sufficiency of an affidavit for an arrest or a search
warrant, the reviewing court is limited to the four corners of the affidavit.
Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 944 (2004); Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993). The reviewing court should interpret
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the affidavit in a common sense and realistic manner, recognizing that the
magistrate was permitted to draw reasonable inferences. Hankins, 132 S.W.3d
at 388; Jones, 833 S.W.2d at 124.
Probable cause will be found to exist if the affidavit shows facts and
circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which the affiant has
reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution to believe that the criteria set forth in article 18.01(c) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, have been met. Tolentino v. State, 638 S.W.2d
499, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); see T EX. C ODE C RIM. P ROC. A NN. art. 18.01(c)
(Vernon Supp. 2008). Therefore, the affidavit must set forth facts which
establish that (1) a specific offense has been committed, (2) the property to be
searched or items to be seized constitute evidence of the offense or evidence
that a particular person committed the offense, and (3) the property or items
are located at or on the person, place, or thing to be searched. Tolentino, 638
S.W.2d at 501. A mere affirmation of belief or suspicion is not enough to
sustain the issuance of a search warrant. Id. The task of the issuing
magistrate is to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied,
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501 U.S. 1259 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Heitman v. State, 815
S.W.2d 681, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
The affidavit provided in relevant part:
3. On September 7, 2004, Affiant received a complaint from
Detective LM Rangel #7361 from the Dallas Police Department’s
Child Exploitation Unit. This case is in reference to National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) CyberTipline Report
#’s 251997 and #251999. These complaints were received from
Yahoo! Inc. and dealt with the Yahoo! User “HURLIBO3" with the
mail address HURLIBO3@YAHOO.COM and the group
(http:groups.yahoo.com/group/lifeislikeamathproblem). The
suspect posted numerous child pornography images to the listed
Yahoo! group. Yahoo does not provide the date and time that the
actual images were uploaded. They only provide the date the
Yahoo! account was created and the most recent log-in dates and
times, if available.
4. A Dallas County grand jury subpoena was obtained from Yahoo
for the email address HURLIBO3@YAHOO.COM. Yahoo responded
back with a creation date, time and IP address. Yahoo provided the
IP address used by this customer, IP 4.226.189.32 with the
creation time and date of Thursday, June 17, 2004 @ 15:16:47
Pacific Time.
5. Detective Rangel used visual route to see what company owned
that IP address. Level 3 Communications is associated with this IP
address.
6. On August 2, 2004, Detective Rangel obtained a Dallas County
grand jury subpoena to request subscriber information from Level
3 Communications, regarding the IP address 4.226.189.32 for
June 17, 2004 @ 15:16:47 Pacific Time.
7. Level 3 responded back with the user name
uj0701545242@jweb-level3.juno.com. Level 3 also provided the
ANI (817) 927-8671.
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8. Det. Rangel did a search of this phone number. This phone
number comes back to Kenneth W. Perry at 3512 Medina Avenue,
Fort Worth, Texas 76133.
9. Det. Rangel obtained a Dallas County grand jury subpoena for
United Online for the user name uj0701545242@jweb-
level3.juno.com.
10. United Online responded back on August 24, 2004 with the
customer name Kenneth W. Perry, 3512 Medina Avenue, Fort
Worth, Texas 76133, phone number (817) 927-8671. The primary
account name for this subscriber is KKPERRY55. This profile is
billed on Visa Credit Card #[ ] under the name of Kenneth W. Perry
at 3512 Medina Avenue, Fort Worth, Texas 76133. This
subscriber has been an account holder since January 15, 2000.
11. Det. Rangel did a DL search of Kenneth W. Perry and located
TX DL # 08830972. This DL registers to Kenneth Wayne Perry
and lists his address as 3512 Medina, Fort Worth, Texas 76133.
It further describes him as a white male, 6'0'’, 200 pounds, Brown
Hair, Hazel Eyes, with a birthday of 9/14/1952.
12. A search of the Tarrant Appraisal District shows the registered
owner of the property located at 3512 Medina Avenue, Fort Worth,
Texas to be Kenneth W. Etux Karen L. Perry since the deed date of
10/17/1997.
13. Affiant also received an envelope from Det. Rangel containing
a compact disc. This disc contains the images uploaded by the
suspect to the Yahoo! group from both CyberTipline complaints.
14. The images, from complaint # 251997, of child pornography
posted to the Yahoo! group are attached to this affidavit as exhibit
#1.
15. The images, from complaint # 251999, of child pornography
posted to the Yahoo! group are attached to this affidavit as exhibit
#2.
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16. Through Affiant’s training and experience, Affiant knows that
computer files can be maintained for long periods of time in a
number of ways: on a computer’s built-in hard disk drive, on
portable storage disks, on CD-ROMs, or on other computer media.
Most often the user maintains the files purposefully. Even when
the files have been “deleted”, however, computer forensic
examiners are nonetheless often able to recover the files that had
been purposefully possessed previously.
Perry asserts that the only evidence in the affidavit that connects him to
the Yahoo! group is the telephone number that was used to access the internet
at the time that the Yahoo! group was created. We disagree.
The affidavit set forth sufficient facts to show that the affiant had
probable cause to believe that Perry posted the images on the Yahoo! website
and that child pornography could be found on Perry’s computer. The affidavit
details how the affiant traced the Yahoo! evidence to Perry’s computer and the
steps the affiant took to verify that Perry was the individual who posted the
images. Accordingly, the facts contained in the affidavit establish probable
cause that a crime had been committed and that there was fair probability that
images constituting evidence would be found at Perry’s house. See T EX. C ODE
C RIM. P ROC. A NN. art. 18.01(c). Thus, we hold that the affidavit clearly sets
forth facts to satisfy each element of article 18.01(c) of the code of criminal
procedure.
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C. Omission in Affidavit
Perry further argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress because the affiant purposefully omitted facts from the affidavit that
were relevant to the determination of probable cause. Specifically, Perry
asserts that Detective Lawrence purposefully omitted the name, Mr. Cory Ryker
of Dallas, Texas, which was registered to the Yahoo! group on June 7, 2004.
In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court recognized that if an
affirmative misrepresentation is knowingly included in a probable cause
affidavit, and the misrepresentation is material and necessary to establishing the
probable cause, the warrant is rendered invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978). In Darby v. State, we
held that although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has never directly
decided the issue, omissions in search warrant affidavits should be analyzed
under Franks. 145 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d)
(citations omitted). In order for an affiant’s omission to be a basis to suppress
a warrant, the appellant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the omission was made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
the truth in an attempt to mislead the magistrate. Id.
Here, the record does not reflect by a preponderance of the evidence that
Detective Lawrence intentionally or knowingly, with reckless disregard for the
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truth, made any misstatements or omissions in the affidavit that would affect
the finding of probable cause in support of the issuance of the warrant. See id.
Given the thoroughness of Detective Lawrence’s investigation and the evidence
gathered during the course of the investigation as discussed in the affidavit,
Perry has not shown that Detective Lawrence’s omissions were made
intentionally or in reckless disregard of the truth in an attempt to mislead the
magistrate judge. See Darby, 145 S.W.3d at 721–22 (holding omission that
tipster used victim’s credit card or that she was in jail for domestic violence
when interviewed was not sufficient to defeat probable cause).
Additionally, even if the omitted information had been included in the
affidavit, a magistrate judge could reasonably conclude that Perry, not Cory
Ryker, posted the images on Yahoo!. As such, even if the information had been
included, the magistrate judge could have determined that probable cause
existed to issue the warrant to search Perry’s residence. See Hackleman v.
State, 919 S.W.2d 440, 449 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d). Thus, we
hold that the warrant was not rendered invalid because of the omission. Having
determined that the search warrant stated probable cause to search Perry’s
house and the warrant was not invalid because of the omission, we overrule
Perry’s fourth point.
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VI. C ONCLUSION
Having overruled Perry’s four points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DIXON W. HOLMAN
JUSTICE
PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and HOLMAN, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 21, 2008
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