AFCO Technologies, Inc. v. Corgill Construction, Inc. ( 2013 )


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  • Opinion filed June 6, 2013
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    __________
    No. 11-11-00297-CV
    _________
    AFCO TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellant
    V.
    CORGILL CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
    Taylor County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 47,770-A
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This appeal arises out of a breach of contract claim made by Corgill
    Construction, Inc. against AFCO Technologies, Inc. Corgill moved for, and the
    trial court granted, summary judgment. AFCO perfected this appeal. AFCO
    argues in four issues that the trial court erred when it granted Corgill’s motion for
    summary judgment. Because genuine issues of material fact exist, we reverse and
    remand.
    In Corgill’s original petition, it alleged that the City of Merkel contracted
    with AFCO for the completion of a water sewer project. As the general contractor
    for the project, AFCO sought bids from subcontractors. Corgill submitted a quote
    and claimed that an agreement was reached with AFCO to complete the necessary
    work. Corgill asserted that, after completing the work, AFCO refused Corgill’s
    requests for payment.
    We note at the outset that, in lieu of filing a response brief, Corgill has filed
    a letter with this court in which it stated that it agreed with AFCO that the case
    should be reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. Nevertheless, the
    comments to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1 provide that “[t]he rule does
    not permit an appellate court to order a new trial merely on the agreement of the
    parties absent reversible error.” See In re Z.A.S., No. 07-09-0136-CV, 
    2009 WL 2567948
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    Accordingly, our analysis of the issues raised on appeal follows.
    In its second issue, AFCO asserts that the trial court erred when it granted
    Corgill’s motion for summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of
    material fact concerning whether AFCO accepted the quote from Corgill based on,
    among other things, the capacity of the signatory to Corgill’s quote.
    A trial court must grant a traditional motion for summary judgment if the
    moving party establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); SAS
    Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 
    167 S.W.3d 840
    , 841 (Tex. 2005); Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
    Perez, 
    819 S.W.2d 470
    , 471 (Tex. 1991). The nonmovant is not required to file a
    response to defeat the movant’s summary judgment motion; however, once the
    movant establishes a right to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must
    come forward with evidence or law that precludes summary judgment. City of
    Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 
    589 S.W.2d 671
    , 678–79 (Tex. 1979). We
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    review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating
    Co. v. Dorsett, 
    164 S.W.3d 656
    , 661 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing a summary
    judgment, the appellate court takes as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant.
    
    Id. The appellate
    court “must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors
    could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the evidence presented” and may
    not ignore “undisputed evidence in the record that cannot be disregarded.”
    Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 
    236 S.W.3d 754
    , 755, 757 (Tex. 2007).
    The relevant evidence that we have before us consists of an affidavit of the
    president of Corgill, which was attached to Corgill’s motion for summary
    judgment, and an affidavit of the president of AFCO and a quote from Corgill,
    which were both attached to AFCO’s response. At the bottom of the quote, written
    by hand, is the following: “Accepted – Dean Locklear 7/8/2009.” The affidavit of
    the president of AFCO provided that “AFCO has no record on file that shows that
    AFCO accepted the quote provided by Corgill” and that the signed quote “shows
    acceptance of the quote by Dean Locklear in an individual capacity and not in the
    capacity to bind AFCO.” The only other evidence present in the record concerning
    whether AFCO accepted the quote is the following statement from the affidavit of
    the president of Corgill: “In July 2009, Corgill Construction entered into an
    agreement with AFCO Technologies, Inc. concerning a project ongoing in Merkel,
    Taylor County, Texas.”
    Based on our review of the summary judgment evidence before us and
    taking as true evidence favorable to AFCO, we hold that AFCO has raised a
    genuine issue of material fact concerning whether AFCO accepted the quote from
    Corgill. Issue Two is sustained. Because we have held that a genuine issue of
    material fact exists that precludes summary judgment, we do not reach AFCO’s
    other issues.
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    We reverse the summary judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to
    that court for further proceedings.
    JIM R. WRIGHT
    CHIEF JUSTICE
    June 6, 2013
    Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
    McCall, J., and Willson, J.
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