Universal Well Service, L.L.C. v. Applied Survey Systems, Inc. ( 2013 )


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  • Opinion filed June 20, 2013
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    __________
    No. 11-11-00335-CV
    __________
    UNIVERSAL WELL SERVICE, INC., Appellant
    V.
    APPLIED SURVEY SYSTEMS, INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the 132nd District Court
    Scurry County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 23756
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Universal Well Service, Inc. appeals the trial court’s judgment on a breach
    of contract and an open account suit filed against it by Applied Survey Systems,
    Inc. Universal did not appear or answer, and the trial court entered a default
    judgment for $119,122.30 in damages and $5,000 in attorney’s fees in favor of
    Applied Survey. Universal complains in a single issue that the trial court lacked
    personal jurisdiction over it because it was apparent on the face of the record that
    service of citation was defective. We agree, reverse the judgment of the trial court,
    and remand the case to it for further proceedings.
    I. Procedural History
    In October 2010, Applied Survey sued Universal and sought to recover
    $119,122.30 for survey and oil-field services it provided in Scurry County to
    Universal. Universal made partial payments on two invoices, and Applied Survey
    sued for the balance. Applied Survey hired a private process server, Christopher G.
    Sampa, to serve Universal with the lawsuit. On two separate occasions, Sampa
    attempted to serve Universal at 1717 James Place, Suite 200, in Houston. Sampa
    returned the citation unserved along with an affidavit in which he averred that he
    had attempted service on October 29, 2010, and November 1, 2010, but that he
    could not complete service because the office at that address was vacant. Applied
    Survey’s counsel filed Sampa’s affidavit with the district clerk.
    After Sampa returned the citation unserved, Applied Survey amended its
    petition and asked the district clerk to issue a new citation for service on the Texas
    Secretary of State, as the registered agent for Universal. Because Applied Survey
    thought that Universal did not have a Texas registered agent for service, it
    attempted to obtain service under former Article 2.11(B) of the Texas Business
    Corporation Act (now codified as TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.251 (West
    2012). 1 See BLS Dev., LLC v. Lopez, 
    359 S.W.3d 824
    , 827 (Tex. App.—Eastland
    2012, no pet.). The secretary of state forwarded the amended petition to the same
    address, 1717 James Street, Suite 200, in Houston, Texas, at which Sampa had
    attempted service. The secretary of state returned an affidavit stating that the
    1
    Applied Survey cited former Article 2.11(B) in its first amended original petition filed on December 13,
    2010, as its basis for obtaining service by serving the secretary of state. However, this article expired on January 1,
    2010, pursuant to TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 11.02. The provisions of former Article 2.11(B) relevant to this appeal
    were codified without substantive revision as Section 5.251.
    2
    documents were returned to it and noted that the petition and citation were “Not
    Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward.”
    Applied Survey’s counsel filed the secretary of state’s affidavit and his own
    affidavit regarding service with the district clerk. There is no mention in counsel’s
    affidavit, or in any other part of the record, that he or anyone else took any
    additional action to locate Universal’s registered agent or principal place of
    business after receiving Sampa’s affidavit.
    Applied Survey filed a motion for default judgment, certificate of last known
    address, and affidavits in support of liquidated damages and attorney’s fees. In
    June 2011, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Applied Survey for
    $119,122.30 in damages and $5,000 in attorney’s fees. Universal timely filed its
    notice of a restricted appeal.
    II. Issue Presented
    In a single issue, Universal complains that the trial court lacked personal
    jurisdiction over it because the service of citation was defective. It also argued
    that, because the defect was apparent on the face of the record, it is entitled to a
    reversal of the judgment and a remand to the trial court.
    III. Analysis
    On a restricted appeal, we review the entry of a no-answer, default judgment
    for strict compliance with the law on service of citation. Primate Constr., Inc. v.
    Silver, 
    884 S.W.2d 151
    , 152 (Tex. 1994); Nat’l Multiple Sclerosis Soc’y–N. Tex.
    Chapter v. Rice, 
    29 S.W.3d 174
    , 176 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, no pet.) The face
    of the record must affirmatively show strict compliance with the rules for service
    of citation for a default judgment to withstand direct attack. Ins. Co. of State of
    Pa. v. Lejeune, 
    297 S.W.3d 254
    , 256 (Tex. 2009); Primate 
    Constr., 884 S.W.2d at 152
    ; Wilson v. Dunn, 
    800 S.W.2d 833
    , 836 (Tex. 1990); Uvalde Country Club v.
    Martin Linen Supply Co., 
    690 S.W.2d 884
    , 885 (Tex. 1985); McKanna v. Edgar,
    3
    
    388 S.W.2d 927
    , 929 (Tex. 1965). When the adequacy of service of citation is
    challenged in a restricted appeal, there are no presumptions in favor of valid
    issuance, service, or return of citation. BLS Dev., 
    LLC, 359 S.W.3d at 826
    (citing
    Primate 
    Constr., 884 S.W.2d at 152
    ). Any deviation from the rules regarding
    proper service of process will result in the setting aside of a default judgment.
    Mansell v. Ins. Co. of the W., 
    203 S.W.3d 499
    , 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
    In cases decided under former Article 2.11(B) (now Section 5.251) the
    courts require that the record affirmatively show that the plaintiff used “reasonable
    diligence” to serve the registered agent at the registered office before undertaking
    substituted service on the secretary of state. Nat’l Multiple Sclerosis 
    Soc’y–N., 29 S.W.3d at 176
    (citing Maddison Dual Fuels, Inc. v. S. Union Co., 
    944 S.W.2d 735
    (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); RWL Constr., Inc. v. Erickson, 
    877 S.W.2d 449
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Gen. Office Outfitters,
    Inc. v. Holt, 
    670 S.W.2d 748
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)).
    We held in National Multiple Sclerosis Society–North that reasonable
    diligence was not shown where the plaintiff provided no evidence of what it did to
    locate the registered agent of the defendant before serving the secretary of state.
    Nat’l Multiple Sclerosis 
    Soc’y–N., 29 S.W.3d at 177
    . Likewise, the First Court
    held in RWL Construction that, because the record was devoid of evidence of the
    attempts to locate and serve the registered agent, reasonable diligence was not
    shown. RWL 
    Constr., 877 S.W.2d at 451
    –52. The Fifth Court held in General
    Office Outfitters, that the officer’s return and a company officer’s affidavit showed
    only that the officer could not locate the registered agent at the address listed. The
    Fifth Court held that the record had to show “the actual diligence used, such as a
    description of each attempt made at serving the registered agent.” Gen. Office
    
    Outfitters, 670 S.W.2d at 750
    .
    4
    In Maddison Dual Fuels, the court reached the same conclusion as the First,
    Fifth, and this court did in the cases that we have outlined.          The record in
    Maddison Dual Fuels shows that the process server wrote “Bad Address” on the
    “Diligence of Service” form, but there was nothing in the record, including that
    form, that described the attempts at locating or serving the agent. The plaintiff did
    not show that it had exercised reasonable diligence to obtain service. Maddison
    Dual 
    Fuels, 944 S.W.2d at 738
    . Finally, in Wright Brothers, the First Court held
    that the record reflected that no action had been taken by the plaintiff to locate
    Wright’s registered agent. The court held that there was, therefore, error on the
    face of the record and that service on the secretary of state could not support the
    default judgment. Wright Bros. Energy, Inc. v. Krough, 
    67 S.W.3d 271
    , 274 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
    There is nothing in the record to show what action Applied Survey took to
    find out Universal’s address or the address of its registered agent after receiving
    Sampa’s affidavit, but before attempting service on the secretary of state. Like the
    plaintiffs in National Multiple Sclerosis Society–North, RWL Construction,
    General Office Outfitters, Maddison Dual Fuels, and Wright Brothers Energy,
    Applied Survey failed to present any evidence of reasonable diligence in its
    affidavits. Although Applied Survey mentions “diligence” in its petition, it does
    not set out any verified facts to support reasonable diligence. Because there is
    nothing in the record to show that Applied Survey exercised reasonable diligence
    to obtain service, error exists on the face of the record, and service on the secretary
    of state cannot support the default judgment.
    5
    IV. This Court’s Ruling
    We agree with Universal that there is no evidence to show that Applied
    Survey exercised reasonable diligence to obtain service before it attempted service
    on the secretary of state. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for
    further proceedings.
    MIKE WILLSON
    JUSTICE
    June 20, 2013
    Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
    McCall, J., and Willson, J.
    6