Brian Douglas Black v. State ( 2008 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-07-023-CR
BRIAN DOUGLAS BLACK APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Brian Douglas Black appeals his conviction for hindering the
apprehension of a felon. In his sole point, appellant contends that the evidence
was legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
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… See T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.4.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
Sansom Park detectives asked the Fort Worth Police Department to aid
them in locating Stephan Mark Black (Mark), appellant’s brother, in connection
with illegal drug activities. The Fort Worth Police Department later discovered
that Mark also had an outstanding arrest warrant in Ohio.
On May 13, 2005, the police located Mark’s car outside of a Motel Six
in Tarrant County, after tracking his Georgia license plate. After speaking with
a security guard at the motel, the police, utilizing Mark’s license plate number,
discovered that a room had been rented by appellant. Because Mark was
known to use aliases, the police believed there was a possibility that the room
had actually been rented by Mark. When the police approached the room,
appellant answered the door and identified himself. Appellant told the police
that Mark was his brother, but he denied that Mark was with him and claimed
that he had not seen his brother in a while. The police, who did not have a
search warrant, asked appellant if they could search the room, and he
consented. While searching the room, the police found Mark hiding under a
bed; they also found appellant’s wife, Lois Black, hiding under the other bed.
Before appellant was arrested, he became combative and refused to comply
with the officers’ commands. The officers were forced to control appellant
with physical force and the use of a taser. After he was detained, appellant
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apologized for his behavior and admitted to the police that he was aware that
his brother was in the room.
On December 22, 2006, a jury convicted appellant for the offense of
hindering the apprehension of a felon. The trial court assessed punishment at
seven years’ confinement. Appellant timely filed this appeal.
S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d
772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The trier of fact is the
sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See T EX. C ODE C RIM.
P ROC. A NN. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Thus, when performing a legal sufficiency review, we
may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute
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our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735,
740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000). Instead, we
“determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the
combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). We must presume that the fact-finder resolved any
conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
The sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of
the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Bowden v.
State, 166 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). Such
a charge would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.
Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Malik, 953
S.W.2d at 240. The law as authorized by the indictment means the statutory
elements of the charged offense as modified by the charging instrument. See
Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
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A PPLICABLE L AW
A person is guilty of the offense of hindering the apprehension of a felon
if it is shown that he or she intentionally hindered the arrest, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of another for an offense by harboring or concealing
that person. T EX . P ENAL C ODE A NN. § 38.05(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
Whether the defendant possessed such an intent must ordinarily be established
by circumstantial evidence. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1106 (1996) (intent may be
discerned from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused); King v. State, 76
S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
A NALYSIS
Appellant contends that by allowing the police to search his motel room
when he had a constitutional right to deny them entry, he did not hinder the
apprehension of Mark but instead allowed the police to find him. Because he
was certain that the police would find Mark if they searched the motel room,
appellant argues that he did not have the intent to conceal or harbor Mark. The
record demonstrates, however, that the jury heard testimony from Officer John
Galloway and Corporal K.W. Stack, who both testified that appellant had told
police that Mark was not in the motel room when appellant knew otherwise.
Additionally, the evidence shows that appellant claimed that he had not seen
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his brother in a while. Furthermore, appellant testified that he knew his brother
was on parole, that the police had an arrest warrant for Mark, and that he lied
to the police to protect Mark. Appellant’s testimony to the police that Mark
was not there and that he had not seen him served to conceal or harbor Mark,
if only for a short time. See King, 76 S.W .3d at 661 (finding that
circumstantial evidence demonstrated the defendant’s intent to hinder
apprehension of parolee when defendant answered the door to parolee’s
residence and lied to police, denying that parolee was at residence); Sanford v.
State, No. 12-04-00330-CR, 2006 WL 1119257, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr.
28, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that
there was a reasonable inference of the intent to conceal when appellant lied
to police about a person being in the back seat of her car as police were clearly
searching for that person). If appellant had been successful in his deception
and if the police had not diligently proceeded with their search for Mark by
asking for appellant’s consent to search the room, appellant would have
prevented them from locating Mark at the motel.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State
established the essential elements of hindering the apprehension of a felon by
showing that appellant intended to hinder Mark’s apprehension by concealing
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him while knowing that he was wanted by the police for committing an offense.
See T EX. P ENAL C ODE A NN. § 38.05(a)(1); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319,
99 S. Ct. at 2789. Therefore, we overrule appellant’s sole point.
C ONCLUSION
Having overruled appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL F: LIVINGSTON, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.
DO NOT PUBLISH
T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 24, 2008
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