Wade Manning Perry v. State ( 2009 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-128-CR
WADE MANNING PERRY APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Wade Manning Perry appeals his convictions for two counts of
online solicitation of a minor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(b)(2), (c),
(f) (Vernon Supp. 2009). In four points, he argues that his trial counsel gave
him ineffective assistance. We affirm.
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 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Background Facts
In June 2007, a Tarrant County grand jury indicted Perry with two counts
of online solicitation of a minor. 2 A year later, Perry entered into a written plea
agreement with the State, waived several statutory and constitutional rights,
signed a judicial confession, and pled guilty. Under the plea agreement, the trial
court deferred its adjudication of Perry’s guilt, placed Perry on community
supervision for six years, and delineated several written conditions of the
community supervision.
In November 2008, the State petitioned the trial court to proceed to its
adjudication of Perry’s guilt, alleging in five numbered paragraphs that he had
violated his community supervision terms because he (1) consumed alcohol
twice, (2) went to Baby Dolls (a sexually oriented business) three times and at
various times possessed or viewed pornography, (3) left Tarrant County without
his probation officer’s authorization, (4) failed to notify his probation officer
when his address changed, and (5) did not comply with electronic monitoring
because he left his home without approval and failed to dock his equipment.
Upon Perry’s request, the trial court appointed Robert Weathers to represent
2
 In some circumstances, online solicitation of a minor is a third-degree
felony, but the indictment alleged second-degree felonies. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 33.021(f).
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him regarding the allegations in the State’s petition. In January 2009, the State
amended its petition to the extent that it changed the allegation in the third
paragraph from leaving Tarrant County without authorization to traveling three
times within a thousand feet of a place where children commonly gather—a
“child safety zone”—including a school.
The trial court admonished Perry about his rights regarding the State’s
petition, and Perry waived those rights and pled true to all but the third
paragraph of the State’s amended petition (regarding traveling into a child
safety zone), to which he pled not true. Perry called his psychotherapist to
testify about Perry’s weekly sex offender treatment, 3 and then Perry testified
that he initially did not take community supervision seriously and explained
some of the circumstances of his violations (for instance, he said that he went
to Baby Doll’s only to deliver pizzas). The evidence showed that Perry complied
with many of his community supervision requirements, such as attending
therapy and not committing further crimes, and that he was “punctual,
courteous, and very respectful” to his community supervision officer. But
Perry’s community supervision officer said that Perry lied about his address
3
 Perry’s psychotherapist testified during the State’s cross-examination
that Perry “seemed to engage in treatment the minute that [the State’s petition
to adjudicate] was filed.”
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change and made admissions about his mistakes only after flunking a polygraph
examination.
The trial court found all five of the paragraphs in the State’s amended
petition true, convicted Perry, and postponed sentencing for the preparation of
a presentence investigation report (PSI). After hearing Perry testify again during
the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to sixteen years’
confinement. He filed notice of this appeal.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In four points, Perry argues that his trial counsel was ineffective, thus
violating his rights under the Texas and federal constitutions.
Standard of review
The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under the
Texas and federal constitutions. Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); Lemmons v. State, 75 S.W.3d 513, 526 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Perry
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that Weathers’s representation
fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for Weathers’s deficiency, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734,
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740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 62–63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999).
In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look
to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each
case. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. The issue is whether counsel’s assistance
was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms
at the time of the alleged error. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89, 104 S.
Ct. at 2065.
Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing
court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide
range of reasonable representation. Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 740; Mallett, 65
S.W.3d at 63. A reviewing court will rarely be in a position on direct appeal to
fairly evaluate the merits of an ineffective assistance claim. Thompson, 9
S.W.3d at 813–14. “In the majority of cases, the record on direct appeal is
undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the motives behind trial counsel’s
actions.” Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 740 (quoting Mallett, 65 S.W.3d at 63).
To overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, “any
allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the
record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Id. (quoting
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Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813). It is not appropriate for an appellate court to
simply infer ineffective assistance based upon unclear portions of the record.
Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The second prong of Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s errors
were so serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair and reliable
trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In other words, Perry
must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for Weathers’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
See id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The ultimate focus of
our inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding in which the
result is being challenged. Id. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2070.
Analysis
In his four respective points, Perry asserts that Weathers was ineffective
because he (1) allegedly failed to review the State’s correct (amended) petition
before the adjudication proceeding, (2) failed to read Perry’s written statement
prior to the adjudication proceeding, (3) failed to obtain a “mitigation specialist”
to assist in the case, and (4) failed to obtain an expert witness on electronic
monitoring devices. Perry first contends that his trial counsel did not discuss
the State’s correct (amended) petition with him prior to his adjudication hearing.
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Perry relies on a portion of the record that indicates that when Weathers tried
to cross-examine a community supervision officer about paragraph three of the
amended petition, he became confused because he was looking at paragraph
three of the original petition:
Q. It says in particular that in violation of that condition,
that the defendant left Tarrant County, Texas, on or about October
17th of 2008 without authorization from the court or the probation
officer.
That’s the actual allegation; is that not true?
....
A. Sir, that’s not on my petition. I don’t know where
you’re reading --
Q. That was the original petition. You’ve amended that
petition; is that correct?
However, while this excerpt shows that Weathers was referring to the
wrong petition during part of his questioning, it does not, as Perry asserts,
make “clear” that Weathers did not discuss the correct petition with Perry.
Instead, Perry unequivocally represented to the trial court at the beginning of
the adjudication proceeding that he had discussed the amended petition with
Weathers. And Weathers was present when the trial court read the allegation
of the third paragraph of the amended petition before Perry pled not true to the
paragraph. Thus, at the very most, Weathers’s confusion during questioning
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creates ambiguity as to whether he knew of or had reviewed the State’s
amended petition, but we cannot infer ineffective assistance from unclear
portions of the record. See Mata, 226 S.W.3d at 432; Ex parte Karlson, 282
S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); Edwards v. State,
280 S.W.3d 441, 443 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d).
Also, even if Weathers had never seen the third paragraph of the
amended petition and was wholly unprepared to defend against it, Perry pled
true to the other four paragraphs of the amended petition, which were the same
as the corresponding paragraphs in the original petition. Perry’s pleas of true
were sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to revoke his community
supervision and adjudicate him guilty, and Perry has not shown how Weathers’s
greater preparation as to paragraph three would have changed that decision or
reduced his punishment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068;
Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979);
Battles v. State, 626 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no pet.).
Finally, Perry also briefly contends in his first point that Weathers’s
alleged lack of preparation signals that Perry’s pleas were
involuntary. However, Perry pled not true to the only paragraph of the State’s
petition that Weathers was allegedly unprepared to litigate, and Perry has not
explained how Weathers’s alleged lack of preparation as to paragraph three
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affected the voluntariness of Perry’s choice to enter true pleas to the other four
paragraphs. Perry represented to the trial court that he was pleading true to
those paragraphs freely and voluntarily. For all of these reasons, we overrule
Perry’s first point.
In his second point, Perry argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he did not read Perry’s written statement prior to the adjudication
hearing. Because Perry pled not true to paragraph three of the State’s amended
petition, the State called a community supervision officer who testified that
Perry told him verbally and through a written statement that he violated that
paragraph on three occasions by going to his home—which was within a
thousand feet of a school—to collect his belongings, watch pornographic
movies with his wife, and have sex with her. When the State offered the
statement as evidence, Weathers objected because he had not seen it, but
Weathers later withdrew the objection.
As the State argues, Perry has not demonstrated that before the
adjudication proceeding, Weathers had knowledge of the statement, access to
it, or a right to view it. Assuming that Weathers did know of the statement and
had a right to view it but chose not to, Perry has also not shown how Weathers
could have affected the proceedings in any way by studying the statement;
Perry has not argued that the statement was inadmissible or that Weathers
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should have made any particular tactical decision concerning the statement.
Finally, when Weathers was informed of the statement, the record indicates
that he acted reasonably by objecting on the ground that he had not seen it and
taking advantage of a recess that the trial court granted by reviewing it with
Perry.
Thus, we hold that Perry has not sustained his burden of proving either
Strickland element of ineffective assistance of counsel on Weathers’s conduct
regarding Perry’s written statement. We overrule Perry’s second point.
Perry argues in his third point that Weathers was ineffective because he
did not obtain a mitigation expert in “an effort to persuade the trial court to
assess a lenient sentence.” He relies on Wiggins v. Smith to contend that
Weathers should have relied on a mitigation expert rather than relying only on
the PSI and Perry’s testimony for mitigation. 539 U.S. 510, 523–27, 534–35,
123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536–38, 2542 (2003) (holding that counsel’s decision not
to adequately investigate or introduce evidence about the defendant’s abusive
childhood in a capital case was unreasonable). In Wiggins, while reviewing the
defendant’s proceedings for post-conviction relief in which he had presented
the testimony of a licensed social worker about his bleak life history to support
his ineffective assistance claim, the Supreme Court said that “strategic choices
made after less than complete investigation are reasonable” only to the extent
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that “reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 2535. Here, unlike in
Wiggins, Perry raises his ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, without
having filed a motion for new trial to develop his position, and without any
evidence concerning any particular basis for mitigation that Weathers should
have raised but did not. The facts here are analogous to our recent decision in
Chavarri v. State, in which we held,
[T]here is no evidence in the record demonstrating why trial
counsel did not hire a mitigation specialist, there is no evidence in
the record illuminating the extent of trial counsel’s investigation
into Chavarri’s background and life circumstances for possible
mitigating evidence, nor is there any evidence in the record that
mitigating evidence existed to be discovered by a mitigation
specialist. The silent record is thus not sufficiently developed to
allow us to do more than speculate as to why trial counsel did not
hire a mitigation specialist. . . .
Because Chavarri’s allegation of ineffectiveness is not firmly
founded in the record, he has not overcome the strong presumption
that trial counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
representation.
Nos. 02-08-00099-CR, 02-08-00100-CR, 2009 WL 885954, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Apr. 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (footnote and citations omitted); see Grijalva v. State, No.
02-08-00018-CR, 2008 WL 4602252, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 16,
2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding similarly and
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explaining that there was no “evidence in the record indicating that any such
mitigation evidence existed to be discovered by a mitigation specialist had
appellant obtained one”); Teixeira v. State, 89 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding that to sustain an ineffective
assistance challenge, “there must be some showing in the record that [a
mitigation] expert would have testified in a manner that would have benefitted”
the defendant). Because the record is undeveloped and Perry has not proved
or even contended that there is any particular mitigating evidence that was not
introduced at trial but would have been had Weathers retained a mitigation
expert, we hold under the cases cited above that Perry has not sustained his
burden to show that Weathers was ineffective on that ground, and we overrule
Perry’s third point.
Finally, in Perry’s fourth point, he argues that his trial counsel should have
retained an expert witness to testify about electronic monitoring devices (and
presumably, how insulin pumps may interfere with such devices, since Perry is
diabetic and attempted to testify about such interference at trial). The entire
argument for Perry’s fourth point is as follows:
Just as [Perry’s] Trial Counsel should have obtained a Mitigation
Expert, counsel also should have asked the trial court for an expert
on Electronic Monitoring Devices. Instead, [Perry’s] Trial Counsel
sought to in effect, use [Perry] himself as the expert, relying on the
“research” that [Perry] had “personally” done on the subject.
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Rather than offering the testimony of an expert or even an
authoritative article found by [Perry] during his ‘research,’ trial
counsel sought to use [Perry’s] own testimony; and when the State
objected, counsel had [nowhere] else to turn.
However, Perry cannot demonstrate that an expert that testified about
electronic monitoring devices could have helped his defense. First, Perry pled
true to the amended petition’s paragraph related to his monitoring device, and
that plea was sufficient to enable to the trial court to find the allegation true.
Second, the State’s allegations in its amended petition regarding the monitoring
device were that Perry left his home without authorization and failed to dock
the device on separate days. Perry’s testimony at trial indicated that he left his
home to do laundry after wetting his bed because he had a high blood sugar
level after his insulin pump became unhooked during the middle of the night
while he was “moving around.” The testimony did not indicate that the pump’s
malfunctioning had anything to do with his monitoring device. Perry also
testified that he failed to dock the monitoring device because he had just moved
into a new apartment, not because of anything related to his insulin pump.
Thus, Perry admitted the facts alleged by the State and cannot show that
retaining an expert on monitoring devices was reasonably required by Weathers
or would have changed the result of his case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
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104 S. Ct. at 2064; Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 740. Therefore, we also overrule
Perry’s fourth point.
Conclusion
Having overruled all of Perry’s points, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 3, 2009
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