in the Interest of B.F.G., B.K.G. and B.M.G., Minor Children ( 2009 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-136-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF B.F.G., B.K.G.
AND B.M.G., MINOR CHILDREN
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FROM THE 235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Michelle G. attempts to appeal the trial court’s April 28, 2009
“Interlocutory Order of Termination of Respondent Michelle [G.]’s Parental
Rights.” We will dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
The order Michelle appeals from terminates her parental rights to three of
her children, B.F.G., B.K.G., and B.M.G.2 The order does not terminate
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… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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… The order specifically identifies only B.F.G., B.K.G., and B.M.G. as the
children that are the subject of the interlocutory order.
Michelle’s parental rights to a fourth child, M.A.B., who is identified in the
order’s style and in other documents in the record. The order also does not
terminate the parental rights to the children of the two presumed fathers
identified in the order, Charles G. and Michael B.
On May 18, 2009, we sent Michelle’s counsel a letter stating our concern
that we may not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the order she
appeals from is not a final, appealable order and, thus, not a final judgment.
We indicated that this court would dismiss the appeal if we did not receive a
response showing grounds for continuing the appeal. Michelle’s counsel
responded that the order is a final order as to B.F.G., B.K.G., and B.M.G.
because it terminates Michelle’s parental rights to those three children; that
Michelle’s parental rights were not terminated as to M.A.B., for whom she
“remains a Respondent in the proceedings in the trial court”; and that the
parental rights of the presumed fathers, who also “remain Respondents in the
proceedings in the trial court,” were not terminated as to any of the children.
On June 4, 2009, we sent a second letter to Michelle’s counsel stating
that the response did not show grounds for continuing the appeal and that this
court would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction if, within fourteen days
from the date of this letter, neither party furnished the court with a signed copy
of a final order disposing of all the parties and claims in the case or an order
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severing the appealed order from the remainder of the case. We have not
received a response.
Appellate courts have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and
from specific types of interlocutory orders designated by the legislature as
appealable. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001)
(providing general rule that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment);
see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon 2008) (listing
appealable interlocutory orders). A judgment is final and appealable if it
disposes of all parties and all issues. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. An order
that does not dispose of all parties and all issues in the case must be classified,
for purposes of an appeal, as an unappealable interlocutory order. Ruiz v. Ruiz,
946 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.).
The order that Michelle complains of is an unappealable interlocutory
order because it does not dispose of Michelle’s parental rights to M.A.B. nor
does it dispose of the presumed fathers’ parental rights to all four of the
children. See D.R. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, 281 S.W.3d
598, 600–02 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (holding that an order
terminating a father’s parental rights was not final until the order addressing
additional parties and children involved in the case was entered); Ruiz, 946
S.W.2d at 124. Accordingly, because there is no final judgment or appealable
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interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex.
R. App. P. 42.3(a); 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MEIER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and LIVINGSTON, J.
DELIVERED: July 9, 2009
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