Steven Michael Brown v. State ( 2009 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-07-395-CR
STEVEN MICHAEL BROWN APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Steven Michael Brown shot Brandon Webb at close range
with a shotgun. A jury found him guilty of aggravated assault and assessed
punishment at ten years and seventeen days’ confinement. The trial court
sentenced him accordingly.
1
… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that he is entitled to a
new trial, or in the alternative, a new punishment hearing because the
prosecutor commented on appellant’s failure to testify at the punishment
phase three times during the State’s closing argument at punishment.
Appellant did testify at the guilt-innocence phase of trial. We affirm.
Article 38.08 of the code of criminal procedure provides that a
defendant’s failure to testify on his own behalf may not be held against him
and that counsel may not allude to the defendant’s failure to testify.2 To
determine if the prosecutor’s comments violated article 38.08 by
impermissibly referring to appellant’s failure to testify, we must decide
whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a
character that the jury naturally and necessarily would have considered it to
be a comment on appellant’s failure to testify.3 If the prosecutor’s remark
calls to the jury’s attention the absence of evidence that only the defendant’s
testimony could supply, the comment is improper. But if the remark
reasonably can be construed to refer to the defendant’s failure to present
2
… Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.08 (Vernon 2005).
3
… Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);
Bustamante v. State, 48 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Fuentes v.
State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 275 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1026
(1999).
2
evidence other than his own testimony, the comment is not improper.4 The
offending language must be viewed from the jury’s standpoint, and the
implication that the comment referred to appellant’s failure to testify must be
clear.5 A mere indirect or implied allusion to his failure to testify does not
violate his right to remain silent.6
During the guilt-innocence phase of this case, appellant testified in his
own defense, denying that he had any involvement in the shooting. He
chose, however, not to testify during the punishment phase of the trial.
During this phase, however, he called his girlfriend’s father, Robert Flores,
who testified that appellant would be a good candidate for probation, and
Queinton Waldon, a community supervision officer, who testified about the
terms and conditions of community supervision and factors affecting
successful probation.
4
… Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 275; Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 279
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 700 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 954 (1991).
5
… Bustamante, 48 S.W.3d at 765; Swallow v. State, 829 S.W.2d 223,
225 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
6
… Wead, 129 S.W.3d at 130; Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481,
490–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1106 (1996).
3
Appellant first contends that the following statement about Mr. Flores
made during the State’s closing argument directly commented on his failure
to testify:
I submit to you that one of the most telling points in this trial
was when I was talking to Mr. Flores on the stand, Yesenia’s
father, and I’d asked him about why he had been so concerned
about the Defendant’s deception to him about not telling him
about what he had done, about what he was accused of.
The State responds that this remark was based on Mr. Flores’s testimony
about appellant’s living with his daughter in his home and not telling him that
he had pending charges and an upcoming trial. During the State’s cross-
examination, Mr. Flores testified as follows:
Q. Does he [appellant] spend a large amount of time at your
house at Blue Mound?
A. Yes, sir, he does.
Q. In fact, when we spoke last week you were concerned
about this guy living under your roof. Is that fair to say?
A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. Is it fair to say, Mr. Flores, that you didn’t even know
about this case being in progress until last week?
A. I did not know until last week, yes.
Q. Is it fair to say that the Defendant never once told you
about this while staying with your daughter in your house?
A. No, he did not.
4
Q. Was that concerning to you?
A. Yes, it was.
....
Q. Why were you concerned about that, Mr. Flores, when we
talked last week?
A. Are you a parent?
Q. Yes, sir, I am.
A. Well, you know my concern. That’s my daughter.
Q. And I know that. But what I want you to do is explain it
to the jury, sir. That’s why I’m asking.
A. Well, yes, I was concerned.
Q. Concerned about whose – – I mean, is there a safety
concern?
A. No, there’s not.
Q. Then what is – – I mean – –
A. My concern was I didn’t know what happened.
Q. Would you like to have known?
A. Yes, I would have.
Q. You feel like you should have known as the head of that
household?
A. Yes, I should have.
5
Q. And if you were going to dole out responsibility for that,
would it have been on Steven or on Yesenia?
A. Both.
Q. And how long has Yesenia dated the Defendant?
A. Probably around two years, that I know of.
Q. Is it fair to say that as parents we don’t always know what
our kids are up to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is this a good example of that?
A. I guess, yeah.
Q. Is that a tough spot for you to be in as a father today
testifying?
A. Yes.
Viewed from the jury’s standpoint, the prosecutor’s comment about
Mr. Flores’s testimony was merely a summation of Mr. Flores’s testimony
that appellant withheld information from him; it was not alluding to testimony
that could only be supplied by appellant.7 Accordingly, we hold that the
7
… See Bustamante, 48 S.W.3d at 765; Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 275;
see also Howard v. State, 153 S.W.3d 382, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1214 (2006); Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211, 222–23 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 940 (1990)(citing Fearance v. State,
771 S.W.2d 486, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927
(1989)); Harris v. State, 122 S.W.3d 871, 884 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003,
pet. ref’d).
6
comment was not manifestly intended or was of such a character that the
jury naturally and necessarily would have considered it to be a comment on
appellant’s failure to testify.8 Therefore, we overrule, appellant’s issue as to
the first comment.
Appellant next complains of the following comment:
And I submit to you this, that you’re supposed to look at this
case through the eyes of a citizen of this county, but it’s also
appropriate for you to do it as a parent, to think about the
actions, the decisions you have to make today about putting this
guy back out on the street with our families and our kids,
because that requires a level of trust between you and the
Defendant, that you have to trust him, to believe that he’s going
to be safe out there on the streets, that he’s going to do what
he’s supposed to do, that he’s going to be honest, that he’s
going to admit his responsibility here.
Immediately after the trial court overruled appellant’s objection, the
prosecutor said:
Look at the evidence in this case and the Defendant’s testimony
yesterday, his testimony to the cops when he gave that
statement, to the defense witnesses today, where is the truth?
In context, the prosecutor’s argument was a plea for law enforcement
and an exhortation for the jury to properly determine credibility based on the
8
… See Wead, 129 S.W.3d at 130 (holding that a prosecutorial argument
is an improper comment on a defendant’s failure to testify only if it manifestly
intends to be, or is of such character that a typical jury would naturally and
necessarily take it to be, a comment on the defendant's failure to testify);
Bustamante, 48 S.W.3d at 765 (same).
7
evidence presented at trial. Therefore, we hold that the comment was not
manifestly intended nor was of such a character that the jury naturally and
necessarily would have considered it to be a comment on appellant’s failure
to testify.9 Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s issue as to the second
complained-of comment.
Finally, appellant complains of the following comment from the
prosecutor’s closing argument:
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Waldon, the probation officer, came
in here and told you that those two most important things about
being on probation, being honest and being able to accept
responsibility.
Waldon testified that a person’s attitude and acceptance of responsibility
could affect their ability to successfully complete probation. Specifically, he
testified that one’s ability to admit responsibility or guilt would undermine a
person’s ability to successfully complete probation. We hold that the
prosecutor’s comment was a summation of Waldon’s testimony and not a
comment on appellant’s failure to testify. 10 Accordingly, we overrule
appellant’s complaint as to the third comment.
9
… See Wead,129 S.W.3d at 130; Bustamante, 48 S.W.3d at 765;
Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 275.
10
… See Harris, 122 S.W.3d at 884 (holding that mere summation of
evidence that did not require defendant to personally rebut the State’s
argument was not a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify).
8
Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and WALKER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 2, 2009
9