Nicolas C. Flores v. State ( 2014 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-13-00548-CR
Nicolas C. FLORES,
Appellant
v.
The
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 8, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 355026
Honorable Liza Rodriguez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 23, 2014
AFFIRMED
After the trial court denied the motion to suppress filed by appellant Nicolas C. Flores, a
jury found him guilty of the offense of driving while intoxicated. On appeal, Flores contends the
trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress and (2) refusing to admit transcripts of the
arresting officer’s testimony from both the administrative license revocation hearing and the
motion to suppress hearing. Flores also contends that if this court reverses the trial court’s ruling
on the motion to suppress, we should render a judgment of acquittal because the evidence would
then be legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-13-00548-CR
BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2011, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Detective Michael Fletcher was on
routine patrol when he saw a vehicle parked in a McDonald’s parking lot, at an angle across several
parking spots. As the officer approached, he saw Flores slumped over the steering wheel.
Detective Fletcher described Flores as responding slowly to the spotlight Detective Fletcher used
to illuminate the interior of the vehicle. When Detective Flores approached the vehicle to verify
that Flores was not injured or in need of help, Flores rolled down the back window, and Detective
Flores detected the smell of intoxicants. When asked to exit the vehicle and provide his driver’s
license and proof of insurance, Flores refused. Flores was ultimately arrested, and a warrant was
obtained to draw a specimen of Flores’s blood. The toxicology report showed that Flores’s blood
alcohol content was 0.18, more than double the legal limit.
The trial court denied Flores’s motion to suppress; and, after multiple witnesses and several
days of testimony, the jury found Flores guilty of driving while intoxicated-second. The jury
assessed one year confinement in the county jail, suspended and probated for a term of eighteen
months, and a fine in the amount of $400.00. Flores appeals.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his first issue, Flores contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and
specifically challenges the trial court’s conclusion that Flores’s seizure was objectively reasonable
under the community caretaking function.
A. Standard of Review
We apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress.
Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion, we review the trial court’s ruling under a bifurcated standard. Valtierra
v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We first give almost total deference to the
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trial court’s determination of historical facts, especially when those findings turn on the witnesses’
credibility and demeanor. Id. The trial judge is “entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of the
witness’s testimony—even if that testimony is uncontroverted—because he has the opportunity to
observe the witness’s demeanor and appearance.” Id. “If the trial judge makes express findings
of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to his ruling and determine whether the
evidence supports [the] factual findings.” Id. Second, we review the trial court’s application of
the law to the facts de novo. Id. “We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if that ruling is reasonably
supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. at 447–48
(internal citations omitted).
B. Community Caretaking Function
Without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an offense has been committed, a
police officer may, in accordance with his community caretaking function, “stop and assist an
individual whom a reasonable person—given the totality of the circumstances—would believe is
in need of help.” Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). The community caretaking function is “‘totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.’” Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Cady, 413
U.S. at 441). The exception concerns police functions such as assisting individuals who cannot
care for themselves or who are in danger of physical harm, resolving conflicts, and reducing the
opportunities for the commission of crime. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003).
To properly invoke the community caretaking exception, a police officer must (1) be
primarily motivated by his community caretaking function, and (2) reasonably believe that the
individual is in need of help. Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
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In determining whether a police officer reasonably believed an individual was in need of help, the
following factors are considered: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual;
(2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone or had access to
assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual—if not
assisted—presented a danger to himself or others. Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151–52.
C. Testimony before the Trial Court
The only witness called to testify at the motion to suppress hearing was Detective Fletcher.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., on February 20, 2011, Detective Fletcher was on patrol when he
noticed a car parked in a McDonald’s parking lot. On cross-examination, Detective Fletcher
agreed the parking lot was a public parking lot, was well-lit, the drive-through lane of the
McDonald’s restaurant was open for business, and the parking lot was not an isolated area but was
near a busy intersection. Detective Fletcher explained Flores’s parked vehicle was unusual
because at 3:00 a.m., only the McDonald’s drive-through is operational.
As Detective Fletcher approached the vehicle, he saw the headlights were on, it was parked
across several parking lanes, and he could see the “driver was slumped forward with his head
down.” When Detective Fletcher initially parked his vehicle, he had a clear sight of both the
driver’s window and driver’s back door; he reiterated that his patrol car was not blocking the
parked vehicle. Detective Fletcher was adamant that he approached the driver “[t]o check on his
well-being to make sure that he was okay,” not in regard to any criminal offense. Before he exited
his vehicle, Detective Fletcher turned on his spotlight to illuminate the interior of Flores’s vehicle.
As Detective Fletcher approached the vehicle, Flores rolled down the “back vent window.”
While attempting to identify Flores, Detective Fletcher testified that he “smelled a light odor of
intoxicants coming from the vehicle” and described Flores as “slow, kind of like he had just woke
up, as he raised up from, I guess, reacting to the spotlight itself.” When Detective Fletcher asked
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Flores to exit the vehicle and to provide his driver’s license and proof of insurance, Flores refused
to exit the vehicle, was generally uncooperative, and then “started his car back up.” Based on
Flores’s response, Detective Fletcher was instructed by his sergeant to move his patrol vehicle to
prevent Flores from leaving the parking lot. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked
several questions regarding Detective Fletcher’s prior testimony at the administrative license
revocation hearing, particularly focusing on the location of Detective Fletcher’s patrol vehicle.
Detective Fletcher was resolute that Flores’s vehicle was not “blocked in” prior to Detective
Fletcher discussing the situation with his sergeant. After discussing the situation with his sergeant,
Detective Fletcher then moved his patrol vehicle and blocked any egress by Flores.
D. Analysis
As previously noted, in deciding whether the trial court properly concluded that Flores’s
seizure was objectively reasonable under the community caretaking function, the trial court was
required to find that Detective Fletcher was (1) primarily motivated by his community caretaking
function, and (2) reasonably believed that Flores was in need of help. See Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d
at 854–55.
1. Primarily Motivated by Community Caretaking Function
Detective Fletcher was unwavering in his testimony that he approached Flores “[t]o check
on his well-being to make sure that he was okay.” Detective Fletcher testified Flores was slumped
over the steering wheel of his vehicle which was parked across multiple parking spaces at a
McDonald’s whose dining area was closed for business at 3:00 a.m. Based on this evidence, the
trial court found that it was Detective Fletcher’s “intent to check on the well-being of [Flores] and
that’s the reason that he initially made contact with him.” Because the record supports the trial
court’s finding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Detective Fletcher
was primarily motivated by community caretaking concerns. See Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 855
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(“We see no reason to second-guess the trial judge’s determination of an issue that is supported by
the record and depends so much on credibility and demeanor.”); Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277 (“The
trial court, as the exclusive judge of credibility and finder of fact, could have concluded that [the
officer] was primarily motivated by community caretaking concerns.”).
Having determined that the trial court properly found that Detective Fletcher was primarily
motivated by his community caretaking concerns, we next consider whether Detective Fletcher
reasonably believed that Flores was in need of help.
2. Reasonable Belief that Flores Was in Need of Help
In applying this second prong of the test, we do not focus on the specific distress that Flores
was exhibiting, but instead we conduct an objective analysis “focusing on what the officer
observed and whether the inference that the individual was in need of help was reasonable.”
Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 856. Although the parking lot in which Flores was parked was not in an
isolated location, it was 3:00 a.m., and Flores’s vehicle was parked across several parking spaces
in a parking lot of a business that was only open for drive-through service. Gonzalez, 369 S.W.3d
at 856; Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 152.
Detective Fletcher testified that Flores was alone in the vehicle and that he was slumped
over the steering wheel. Although there were employees in the restaurant, only the drive-through
was open, and there were no signs that anyone from the restaurant was assisting Flores at the time.
The trial court found that “because of the hour of the night and the position in which the defendant
was in, the manner in which the car was parked. . . . I don’t think it would have been prudent for
[Detective Fletcher] not to investigate the situation and check to see what—if the defendant needed
assistance in some way.” Because the trial court’s finding is supported by the record, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Detective Fletcher reasonably believed Flores was
in need of help.
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3. Conclusion
Because the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Detective Fletcher was
primarily motivated by his community caretaking concerns and reasonably believed Flores was in
need of help, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Flores’s motion to suppress.
Flores’s first issue is overruled.
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
During the cross-examination of Detective Fletcher at trial, defense counsel attempted to
admit transcripts of Detective Fletcher’s testimony from the administrative hearing on Flores’s
license revocation and the hearing on Flores’s motion to suppress. The trial court sustained the
State’s objection. In his second issue, Flores contends the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding the transcripts.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard. Rodriguez v. State, 203 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Weatherred v. State,
15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily
or unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810
S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). When considering a trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence, we will not reverse the ruling unless it falls outside the “zone of reasonable
disagreement.” McGee v. State, 233 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
B. Arguments of the Parties
Flores contends that the transcripts of Detective Fletcher’s testimony from the
administrative hearing and the motion to suppress were prior inconsistent statements that were
admissible not just for impeachment, but for the truth of the matter asserted. The State counters
that because Detective Fletcher admitted to making all of the previous statements, and explained
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them to the jury, the transcripts were inadmissible under Rule 613(a) of the Texas Rules of
Evidence.
C. Prior Inconsistent Statements
A prior inconsistent statement is a statement “inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony,
and . . . given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding.”
TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(A). A prior inconsistent statement of a witness may not be admitted until
the witness is told the contents of the prior statement as well as the time and the place and the
person to whom it was made, and is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. TEX.
R. EVID. 613(a). “If the witness unequivocally admits having made such statement, extrinsic
evidence of same shall not be admitted.” Id.
D. Analysis
During cross-examination, defense counsel extensively questioned Detective Fletcher
regarding his prior testimony. In response to these questions, Detective Fletcher unequivocally
admitted making each of the statements in his prior testimony, but he disagreed with defense
counsel as to what the officer meant by his statements. Because Detective Fletcher admitted each
of the statements in question, extrinsic evidence of the statements was inadmissible. Id.; Parson
v. State, 193 S.W.3d 116, 120–22 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d) (holding trial court
abused its discretion in admitting extrinsic evidence of witness’s prior testimony where witness
admitted making prior statements). Therefore, the trial court did not act arbitrarily or without
reference to any guiding rules or principles in refusing to admit the transcripts. Accordingly, we
overrule Flores’s second issue.
SUFFICIENCY
Although Flores labels his final issue as “sufficiency of the evidence,” his only argument
is that “there is no evidence to support the conviction other than that which is the subject of the
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Motion to Suppress, therefore if this Honorable Court determines that it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial Court to deny the Motion to Suppress, then this case should be reversed and a verdict
of ‘Not Guilty’ rendered.” Because we have held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Flores’s motion to suppress, Flores’s third issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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