Joseph Dwain Mason v. State ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                            NUMBER 13-13-00388-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    JOSEPH DWAIN MASON,                                                    Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                      Appellee.
    On appeal from the Criminal District Court 2
    of Dallas County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
    Appellant, Joseph Dwain Mason, pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain
    agreement with the State to the second-degree felony offense of aggravated assault
    with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (West 2011). The trial court
    placed appellant on deferred adjudication probation. Subsequently, the State filed a
    motion to proceed to adjudication of guilt. Appellant entered a plea of “true” to the
    State’s allegations that he had violated the terms of probation. The trial court granted
    the State’s motion, found appellant guilty of the charged offense, and set punishment at
    ten years’ confinement. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant’s appellate
    counsel, concluding that the appeal in this cause is frivolous, filed an Anders brief, in
    which he reviewed the merits, or lack thereof, of the appeal. We affirm. 1
    I.      ANDERS BRIEF
    Pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967), appellant’s appellate
    counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief stating that after carefully reviewing
    the appellate record, he was unable to find any “point of error that can be supported by
    the record” and “has reached the conclusion that there are no arguable grounds to be
    raised to support an appeal of this cause and the appeal is frivolous.” Counsel’s brief
    meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation
    demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re
    Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (AIn Texas, an Anders brief
    need not specifically advance >arguable= points of error if counsel finds none, but it must
    provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal
    authorities.@) (citing Hawkins v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 340
    , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus
    Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1991).
    In compliance with High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
    Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority,
    1
    This case is before the Court on transfer from the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas pursuant to a
    docket equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001
    (West 2005).
    2
    there are no errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has demonstrated that he has
    complied with the requirements of Anders by (1) examining the record and finding no
    arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) serving a copy of the brief and motion to
    withdraw as counsel on appellant, and (3) informing appellant of his right to review the
    record and to file a pro se response. 2 See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510
    n.3; see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.23. More than an
    adequate period of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response. 3
    See In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    .
    II.     INDEPENDENT REVIEW
    Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
    proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief; however,
    we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State,
    
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (ADue to the nature of Anders briefs,
    by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and
    reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the
    requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.@); 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    2
    The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with
    the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the
    court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the
    case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 693
    , 696-97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
    3
    Appellant filed a motion for extension of time to file his pro se response. The Court granted that
    motion, and his brief was due on October 31, 2013. Appellant has not filed his pro se response.
    3
    III.     MOTION TO WITHDRAW
    In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for
    permission to withdraw as counsel.                See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; see also In re
    
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408
    n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 
    903 S.W.2d 776
    , 779–80
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (AIf an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he
    must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the
    appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
    appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.@) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw that was carried with the case on September 13, 2013. Within five
    days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion
    and judgment to appellant and advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary
    review. 4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412
    n.35;
    Ex parte Owens, 
    206 S.W.3d 670
    , 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
    __________________
    ROGELIO VALDEZ
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the
    5th day of December, 2013.
    4
    No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this
    case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for
    discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review
    must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or
    timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any
    petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
    id. R. 68.3,
    and should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    See 
    id. R. 68.4.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-13-00388-CR

Filed Date: 12/5/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015