William Smith A/K/A Bill Smith v. State ( 2013 )

NUMBER 13-11-00694-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
WILLIAM SMITH A/K/A
BILL SMITH, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion on Rehearing by Justice Perkes
On July 29, 2013, this Court issued a memorandum opinion affirming appellant’s
conviction for driving while intoxicated. See Smith v. Texas, No. 13-11-00694-CR, slip
op. (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 29, 2013, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication), http://www.13thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/pdfOpinion.asp?OpinionID=
21170. On August 28, 2013, after being granted an extension, appellant filed a motion
for rehearing. After due consideration, we deny the motion for rehearing but sua sponte
withdraw our previous opinion and judgment and substitute the following opinion and
accompanying judgment in their place. See TEX. R. APP. P. 19.1.
Appellant William Smith a/k/a Bill Smith appeals his conviction for driving while
intoxicated—third offense,1 a third-degree felony enhanced to a habitual felony offender.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2011). The trial court
found appellant guilty and, on finding two prior felony conviction enhancements to be
true,2 assessed punishment at twenty-five years imprisonment. See id. § 12.42(d). By
four issues, appellant complains the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to appoint a new
attorney on the day of trial; (2) admitting blood sample evidence; (3) allowing fingerprint
expert testimony and admitting prior judgments authenticated thereby; and (4) finding that
the evidence was sufficient to show two prior felony convictions. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND3
State trooper David Anguiano stopped appellant’s vehicle because appellant was
driving without wearing a seat belt. Upon approaching appellant’s vehicle, Officer
Anguiano “smelled the strong odor of some sort of alcoholic beverage coming from him”
1
Appellant was previously convicted of two offenses relating to the operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated: (1) On March 10, 2006, in Cause No. 63519, in the County Court at Law of San Patricio
County, Texas; and (2) On March 28, 2008 in Cause No. 2007-9764-3 in the County Court at Law No. 3 of
Nueces County, Texas.
2
Appellant was also previously convicted of two felony offenses for burglary of a habitation:
(1) On June 7, 1989, in Cause No. 88-CR-1586-A, in the 28th District Court of Nueces County, Texas; and
(2) On February 19, 1992, in Cause No. 2870-1, in the 156th District Court of Live Oak County, Texas.
3
Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for
it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. We have reordered appellant’s issues on appeal for clarity.
2
and saw “alcohol containers spread out throughout the vehicle.” Officer Anguiano
observed that appellant’s movements were slow and that he had glassy, blood-shot eyes.
Officer Anguiano administered five field sobriety tests; appellant failed three of them.
Officer Anguiano arrested appellant for driving while intoxicated.
Officer Anguiano testified that appellant made “a statement to the fact that it was a
felony D.W.I. for him.” Officer Anguiano “ran [appellant’s] information” with his in-car
computer and verified appellant’s criminal history with the communications operator.
Upon learning appellant had two previous D.W.I. convictions, Officer Anguiano believed
he was authorized by law to obtain a mandatory blood draw. Appellant did not give his
consent, and no warrant was obtained. The blood draw was taken about one hour after
appellant was stopped.
Anna Marie Quintanilla testified that she worked as a medical technologist at
Northwest Regional Hospital and that part of her duties include collecting blood and
testing specimens. She stated that she is a licensed medical technologist with twenty
years of experience, and that she is qualified to draw blood specimens. She explained
the standard procedures. She testified that she collected appellant’s blood sample and
that the blood sample was taken using reliable hospital procedures recognized by the
scientific community and as required by State regulations.
Emily Bonvino, a Department of Public Safety forensic scientist, testified regarding
the blood test results. Appellant’s blood sample contained .21 grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood.
3
II. FAILURE TO APPOINT NEW TRIAL COUNSEL
By his fourth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred “by forcing appellant to
trial with appointed counsel to whom appellant objected.” Appellant’s issue inquires
whether appointed counsel had a duty to timely relay appellant’s request for new counsel
to the court and whether appellant is entitled to rely on appointed counsel in discharging
his duties. Appellant, however, does not cite any authority that supports his argument for
reversal based upon defense counsel’s alleged duty to notify the trial court concerning
appellant’s desire for the appointment of other counsel.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for withdrawal and replacement of
appointed counsel under an abuse of discretion standard. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556,
566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). As expressed in King:
[T]he right to counsel may not be manipulated so as to obstruct the judicial
process or interfere with the administration of justice. Further, personality
conflicts and disagreements concerning trial strategy are typically not valid
grounds for withdrawal. A trial court has no duty to search for counsel
agreeable to the defendant.
Id. (citations omitted).
Once a trial court appoints an attorney to represent an indigent defendant, the
defendant has been accorded the protections provided under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 26.04 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the defendant then carries the burden of proving entitlement to a
change of counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
26.04 (West 2011); Barnett v. State, 344 S.W.3d 6, 24 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet.
ref’d) (citing Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)); see also Hill v.
4
State, 686 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Watkins v. State, 333 S.W.3d 771,
775 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref’d); Maes v. State, 275 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (noting that defendant is responsible for “making the
trial court aware of his dissatisfaction with counsel, stating his grounds for his
dissatisfaction, and offering evidence in support of his complaint”). A defendant may not
wait until the day of trial to demand different counsel or to request counsel be dismissed
so he may retain other counsel. Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784; Gilmore v. State, 323 S.W.3d
250, 264 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d).
During a break in the State’s first witness’s testimony, appellant informed the trial
court that “everything has happened so fast lately, and I really—I didn’t feel that I was
being represented in the way that I need to be.” Appellant stated he was present under
duress because he was not being represented in the manner he preferred and that his
attorney refused to “relieve himself” despite appellant’s persistent requests. The record
is otherwise silent in that regard. The trial court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss his
attorney and to appoint a new one, noting that the case was “seven months old” and that
appellant had never written the trial court or in any other manner communicated his
alleged duress prior to that moment.
We hold that appellant’s conclusory and untimely claim that his attorney was not
satisfactorily representing him did not show appellant was entitled to a change of counsel.
See Hill, 686 S.W.2d at 187; Watkins, 333 S.W.3d at 775; Maes, 275 S.W.3d at 71. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his day-of-trial request. See Webb, 533
S.W.2d at 784; Gilmore, 323 S.W.3d at 264. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.
5
III. BLOOD SAMPLE EVIDENCE
By his first issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by admitting a blood sample
that was allegedly taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and section 724 of the Texas Transportation Code. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (West 2011).
A. Constitutionality of Blood Draw
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Texas implied consent statute,
under which the officer seized a specimen of appellant’s blood. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (West 2011). Appellant argues that the United States
Supreme Court’s recent holding in Missouri v. McNeely, which was decided while this
appeal was pending,4 invalidates his blood draw because “the State did not meet its
burden of demonstrating an exigent circumstance existed . . . .” See 133 S. Ct. 1552,
1567–68 (2013) (McNeely addressed exigency, holding that the dissipation of alcohol,
without more, does not constitute exigent circumstances). See id. at 1563, 1568. We
disagree.
The withdrawal of a blood specimen is a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right to be free from
unreasonable searches. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A warrantless search or seizure is
per se unreasonable, unless it falls under a recognized exception to a warrant. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim.
4
After the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013),
we granted appellant’s requested leave to amend or supplement his brief to include the issue of whether the
blood seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, which appellant did not argue in his original brief.
6
Ohio App. 2000). It is well settled that one of the established exceptions to a warrant
requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has noted, “The implied consent law does
just that—it implies a suspect’s consent to a search in certain instances. This is
important when there is no search warrant, since it is another method of conducting a
constitutionally valid search.” Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (en banc).
The implied consent law expands on the State’s search capabilities by
providing a framework for drawing DWI suspects’ blood in the absence of a
search warrant. It gives officers an additional weapon in their investigative
arsenal, enabling them to draw blood in certain limited circumstances even
without a search warrant.
Id. at 616; see Aviles v. State, 385 S.W.3d 110, 115 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, pet. ref’d)
(holding warrantless blood draw pursuant to section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas
Transportation Code does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
McNeely clarified exigency; it did not invalidate Texas’ implied consent statute. It
is noteworthy that in Section III of McNeely, Justice Sotomayor, although writing for a
four-person minority in that section of the opinion, implicitly characterized implied consent
statutes, including a specific reference to section 724.012(b) of the Texas Transportation
Code, see 133 S. Ct. 1566 n.9, as collateral to the exigency concerns underlying the issue
before the Supreme Court. See id. at 1566–67.
We overrule appellant’s first subissue to the extent he contends that McNeely
rendered 724.012(b) of the Texas Transportation Code unconstitutional.
7
B. Compliance With Blood Draw Statute
Appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting the blood sample evidence
because the sample was allegedly not taken by a qualified technician as required by the
Texas Transportation Code. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.017 (West 2011).5
This issue was not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Quintanilla, the
medical technologist who collected appellant’s blood sample, testified, without objection,
regarding her qualifications and the collection of appellant’s blood.6 Appellant thus failed
to preserve his issue by failing to object to Quintanilla’s qualifications at trial.7 See TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1. Even if we were to consider this issue, however, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals recently affirmed that a medical technologist such as a phlebotomist is a
technician who draws blood. See Krause v. State, No. PD-0819-12, 2013 WL 1890731,
at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. May 8, 2013); see also State v. Bingham, 921 S.W.2d 494, 496
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Torres v. State, 109 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2003, no pet.); Cavazos v. State, 969 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998,
pet. ref'd). We overrule appellant’s second subissue.
5
“Only a physician, qualified technician, chemist, registered professional nurse, or licensed
vocational nurse may take a blood specimen . . . .” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.017(a) (West 2011).
“‘[Q]ualified technician’ does not include emergency services personnel.” Id. § 724.017(c).
6
The day before Quintanilla testified, appellant objected to the admission of the sample because,
in part, “There’s no evidence that a qualified technician drew this blood.” The State responded that
Quintanilla was going to testify the next day, and the court carried the objection. The court later admitted
the specimen, and overruled appellant’s repeated objection to the extent that appellant argued “the
phlebotomist or whoever drew this blood is not at this time here to testify . . . .” These objections focused
on the absence of testimony and not Quintanilla’s personal qualifications, which appellant now challenges.
7
Appellant did later challenge Quintanilla’s qualifications in his directed verdict and closing
argument but only on the grounds that Quintanilla did not satisfy the standards for an expert witness
established by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In addition to being
untimely, this contention does not comport with the issue on appeal—that Quintanilla did not qualify under
the Texas Transportation Code. See Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(“The legal basis of a complaint raised on appeal cannot vary from that raised at trial.”).
8
Having overruled appellant’s two subissues, we overrule appellant’s first issue.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION
By his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by allowing the
fingerprint expert’s testimony and admitting prior judgments into evidence based thereon.
Specifically, appellant asserts that an expert in fingerprint identification must testify (1)
regarding his particular techniques and their acceptance in the community to establish
reliability; and (2) regarding specific matching markings he finds to identify fingerprints
rather than summarily state he found matching characteristics. Appellant specifically
complains the trial court erred by: (1) overruling appellant’s objection to and allowing the
fingerprint expert’s testimony during the guilt-innocence phase of trial; and (2) admitting
two prior judgments, which the fingerprint expert linked to appellant by comparing the
prints on the two prior judgments to appellant’s fingerprints, during the sentencing phase.
The admission of expert testimony is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Lagrone
v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The proponent of scientific
evidence must persuade the trial court through clear and convincing evidence that the
proposed evidence is reliable by establishing: (1) the underlying scientific theory is valid;
(2) the technique applying the theory is valid; and (3) the technique was properly applied
on the occasion in question. Somers v. State, 368 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Kelley v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also Russeau v.
State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (stating that fingerprint comparison
theory is reliable and admissible). On appeal, appellant does not challenge the first
9
element, but asserts “there is no evidence from which the trial court could determine the
technique or methodology applying the theory was valid or the technique was properly
applied in this case.” Appellant, however, did not raise these concerns in the trial court.
During the guilt-innocence phase, appellant objected to the expert’s testimony on
the grounds that “I don’t believe that the expert’s opinion is rationally based upon human
perception . . . .” During the sentencing phase, appellant objected to the admission of
the two prior judgments because “the [expert’s] testimony wasn’t specific enough
regarding the comparison points, plus there’s no written reports.” Neither objection
comports with appellant’s argument on appeal. Appellant’s issues therefore have not
been preserved for review on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Heidelberg v. State, 144
S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“The legal basis of a complaint raised on appeal
cannot vary from that raised at trial.”). Even if we were to consider such arguments,
however, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion. The record reflects that
Deputy Flores established the reliability of his techniques and comparisons and that he
sufficiently testified concerning the commonality of features and physical characteristics
he found in his fingerprint comparisons. We overrule appellant’s second issue.
V. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE PRIOR FELONIES
By his third issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show that he
committed the two prior felonies alleged in the indictment.
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
enhancement paragraphs to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. Jaynes v. State, 216
10
S.W.3d 839, 845 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.); see Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony. Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 845 (citing Westbrook
v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We give deference to the factfinder’s decisions about the
weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. Although appellant contests the admissibility
of some of the evidence, we must consider all the evidence in conducting our review. Id.
To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is
linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two elements. Id. A
certified copy of a final judgment and sentence is one method of proving them. See id.
The factfinder “fits the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together and weighs the credibility of
each piece,” looking to the totality of the evidence to determine whether both elements
are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 923.
The State alleged in the indictment that appellant had two prior convictions:
(1) “Burglary of a Habitation, on June 7, 1989, in Cause No. 88-CR-1586-A,” from the 28th
District Court of Nueces County; and (2) “Burglary of a Habitation, on February 19, 1992,
in Cause No. 2870-1” from the 156th District Court of Live Oak County, Texas. During
the sentencing phase, the trial court admitted State’s Exhibit Numbers 3, 5, and 6.
State’s Exhibit 3 was a fingerprint card with appellant’s prints that Fred Flores, a Nueces
11
County deputy sheriff and fingerprint identification expert, took from appellant. State’s
Exhibits 5 and 6 were the earlier judgments’ “pen packs.”
State’s Exhibit 5 contained a certified copy of a felony conviction and sentence for
burglary of a habitation in cause number 2870-1, rendered by the 156th District Court of
Live Oak County, Texas on February 19, 1992. The defendant’s name on the judgment
is “William Perry Smith,” and the exhibit included pictures of the defendant and
fingerprints. State’s Exhibit 6 contained certified copies of two judgments, including a
felony conviction and a sentence for burglary of a habitation in cause number
88-CR-1586-A, rendered by the 28th District Court of Nueces County, Texas on June 7,
1989. The defendant in the judgment is “William Smith,” and the exhibit included the
defendant’s picture and fingerprints. Flores testified that “[a]fter comparing the known
fingerprints of the Defendant William Bill Smith [appellant] to the pen packets in Exhibits 6
and 5, it was determined based on . . . that comparison, that they’re one in the same
individual, William Bill Smith.”
Texas law has long recognized that matching an accused’s fingerprints to a set of
fingerprints in a “pen packet” is sufficient to prove that the accused is the person
convicted in the prior conviction. See Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984) (en banc); Cole v. State, 484 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Allen v.
State, 451 S.W.2d 484, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Williams v. State, 356 S.W.3d 508,
517 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d); Cleveland v. State, 814 S.W.2d 140, 142
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); Lancaster v. State, 734 S.W.2d 161, 165
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, pet. ref’d). Additionally, allowing the factfinder to compare
12
photographs included in pen packets with the defendant can alone be sufficient to prove
the defendant is the same person as the one in the photograph. Forward v. State, No.
11-11-00060-CR, 2013 WL 1248287, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 28, 2013, no
pet.) (citing Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 31–32).
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold
that a rational factfinder could have found that two prior convictions existed and that
appellant was the person convicted. See Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 845. We overrule
appellant’s third issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GREGORY T. PERKES
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
31st day of October, 2013.
13