Christopher Allen Gillette v. State ( 2014 )

NUMBER 13-12-00454-CR and NUMBER 13-12-00455-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN GILLETTE, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 362nd District Court
of Denton County, Texas.
OPINION1
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
A jury convicted appellant Christopher Allen Gillette of two third-degree felony
offenses of terroristic threat. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(5), (6) (West,
1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant
to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 3d C.S.).
Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). One conviction resulted from statements appellant
made in a letter to a congressman, 2 and the other conviction came from statements
appellant made in a college class.3 The jury assessed punishment for the count involving
the letter at four years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division. For the count resulting from appellant’s classroom statements, the
jury assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement, but the trial court suspended that
sentence, placed appellant on community supervision for ten years, and ordered the two
sentences to run concurrently. By eight issues, which we reorganize as three and re-
order, appellant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the two convictions;
(2) jury charge error either violated his right to a unanimous verdict or, alternatively,
misinformed the jury of the requisite culpable mental state; and (3) the trial court should
not have admitted extraneous-offense evidence. Because we hold appellant suffered
egregious harm by the jury charge’s allowance for a non-unanimous verdict, we reverse
and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Appellant’s Letter to United States Congressman Michael Burgess
Appellant sent a letter to United States Congressman Michael Burgess of the 26th
Congressional District of Texas. In it, appellant vented many grievances against the
United States government, including its alleged failure to provide him, a United States
Army veteran, with proper medical care for injuries he received during his military service.
2 Appellate cause number 13-12-00455-CR.
3 Appellate cause number 13-12-00454-CR.
2
At the conclusion of the letter, appellant listed demands and resultant penalties should
his demands not be met. The relevant excerpt from the letter is as follows:4
I demand the following:
1. An official apology, personally written or typed from a representative of
the United States government in the U.S. House or Senate,
acknowledging that the United States government has negligently failed
to render proper medical care to my person. This official apology does
not have to be laborious in length. Simple sincerity will suffice.
2. The utilization of the full economic and political might of the United
States government congruent to its responsibility to provide proper
medical care to it’s [sic] veterans, specifically; the funding of a private
option at my discretion until I am properly healed; subject to oversight of
the office of my Congressional representative or another authority
delegated by said office.
3. Compensation in some form or fashion for the severe pain I have
encountered over the past decade of my life, subject to the wisdom and
discretion of Congressman Burgess, or an authority delegated at his
discretion.
If these demands are not met in a timely, efficient, and responsible
manner then the following penalties will be applied.
1. I will inform the American people of the criminal negligence of the United
States government. The great masses of the people universally
support me in this aspiration. I will shout so loud, and gather such a
great assembly of voices to my person, that the outcry will figuratively
shatter the eardrums of the entire United States Congress.
2. If I am able to find healing in the private sector, without just
compensation or service from my government, I will begin preparations
to begin offensive combat preparations against the federal government.
These preparations will include great care not to target civilian non-
combatant personnel, specifically women and children, and will not
include the use of explosives or political assassination as a means of
political change.
4 We have reformatted the tab stops in part of the excerpt for continuity. All emphases are as they
appear in the original.
3
3. I will assume the United States government has refused to render proper
medical aid to my person, an act tantamount to treason, and I will gather
armed men of good character to my cause in order to place the entire
United States Congress under arrest.
I am trying to warn you in the strongest terms humanly possible that on the
median average I consider the central government largely illegitimate. I
swore an oath to protect the U.S. Constitution, therefore protecting the
American people, and I feel that the actions of the federal government are
leading both myself and them down a path of involuntary servitude. These
outrages will not be tolerated!
The police department at Texas Women’s University (“TWU”), where appellant
was a student, was made aware of the letter.
B. Appellant’s Classroom Comments
About one week after appellant sent the letter to Congressman Burgess, appellant
interrupted his upper-division American history class—a small, 5 discussion-oriented
class—by raising his hand and voicing a complaint against the United States federal
government. Appellant began,6 “I am so angry that I cannot humanly explain it in words.”
The professor, Paul Travis, asked whether appellant’s comment related to class, and
appellant responded, “I would say I’m an American, uh, veteran, and I deserve medical
benefits, and yes. I need to—I am in a lot of pain. Okay. I don’t know where I need to
go or who I need to talk to, but I’m about to tear Washington, D.C. apart brick-by-brick.”
Appellant continued,
I have the specified, specialized military training; I know how to do it. I am
angry. I would never do anything to hurt any of the girls at this college, I
want y’all to understand that. But I am mad. I am fighting-hopping-out-of-
5 The professor testified that the class had about 20 or 21 students.
6 The following quotations are the Court’s transcription of an audio recording of appellant’s
classroom statement, which was admitted into evidence and is included in the appellate record. Certain
punctuation may be subject to interpretation.
4
the-back-of-a-truck-with-an-AK-47 mad. I have a medical injury, and I
cannot get help from my government. I’m in a lot of pain. I’m a 3.5 GPA;
I’m a dean’s list student. I’m failing school. Now I need you to talk to the
president, the vice president or somebody. I don’t know if I need to drive
to a hospital or what, but I’m in a lot of pain.
Professor Travis asked appellant whether appellant felt like being in class, and
appellant answered, “No. I need medical attention.” Appellant gathered his belongings
and said, “I need to go. There is a congressional inquiry[7] into the matter right now. I
just need to go. I need to grab my stuff and go.” Before leaving, appellant again asked
Professor Travis to contact the vice president. It is unclear whether appellant was
alluding to the president and vice president of the United States or of TWU, and there
was no testimony clarifying the references.
Contrary to the alarming content of the statement, appellant’s tone was calm,
although anger can be detected. Appellant remained seated during the diatribe,
standing only at the conclusion when he gathered his belongings to leave. Classmate
Shannon Cloutier and Professor Travis testified they were concerned for appellant but
unafraid. Classmate Colleen Hester, on the other hand, testified she was afraid, the
teaching assistant was afraid, and appellant’s body language manifested anger.
Classmate Amanda Saye said appellant’s monologue sounded about how one would
expect a school shooting would begin and that she felt threatened. Saye and another
classmate, Troy French, both testified that appellant’s words made the students uneasy.
Class continued after appellant left. Hester testified that the teaching assistant
was trying to calm the students, some of whom Hester described as “a wreck.” French,
7 The evidence showed that in his dealings with Congressman Burgess, appellant filled out a form
entitled, “Congressional Inquiry.”
5
a disabled veteran who served in the Army and suffered from Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (“PTSD”), was concerned for appellant. French knew appellant had past
military service, and appellant’s words struck French as PTSD “warning signs.” French
testified that appellant’s words “ate at me. I felt like this was somebody who was needing
help and was either going to hurt themselves or hurt someone else.” French left class
and called the campus police. Officer Jennifer Niederhaus of the TWU Department of
Public Safety (TWUDPS) met French outside the classroom and asked Professor Travis
to exit the classroom to discuss the incident.
When Officer Niederhaus learned appellant had made the statement, she
recognized his name and contacted Sergeant Randy Leavell. Sergeant Leavell and
Lieutenant Kenneth Adams testified that the TWUDPS had been “briefed” on appellant
prior to that day. Lieutenant Adams explained that the briefing resulted from a letter
appellant wrote to the chief of police in response to a parking ticket, “and also a letter that
he had written to Congressman Burgess.”
TWUDPS placed the campus on lockdown. Upon learning that appellant was at
a VA hospital in Dallas, the TWUDPS secured a warrant to arrest appellant for committing
a terroristic threat. Officers Leavell and Adams arrested him at the VA hospital.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By his fifth and sixth issues, as enumerated in his brief, appellant argues the
evidence is insufficient to support his two convictions. Regarding his letter to
Congressman Burgess, appellant contends his statements were not threats, were
conditional, and were “vague and uncertain.” Appellant also emphasizes that there was
6
no evidence he owned ammunition or a gun. Regarding his classroom comments,
appellant contends he did not threaten an offense involving violence to persons or
property, and appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient to show he possessed the
requisite intent to be guilty of a terroristic threat.
A. Standard of Review
“The standard for determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support
a conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in original);
see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
“The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be
given testimony, and it is also the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in
the evidence.” Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc)
(citing Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Juries are
permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial, and
circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an
actor. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997)). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
7
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried. Id.
B. Appellant’s Letter to Congressman Burgess
1. Applicable Law
To convict appellant of terroristic threat for the statements he made in his letter to
Congressman Burgess, the jury needed to find beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
threatened to commit an offense involving violence to a person or property with the intent
to influence the conduct or activities of a branch or agency of the federal government.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(6). The jury charge narrowed “offense involving
violence to a person or property” to murder, aggravated assault, or criminal mischief.
Those terms were not defined.
A person acts with intent with respect to the nature of his conduct when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03
(West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).8 A jury can infer intent from the accused’s acts,
words, and conduct. See Phillips v. State, 401 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d) (citing Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1997, pet. ref’d)); Williams v. State, 194 S.W.3d 568, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006), aff’d, 252 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
A terroristic threat is complete when a person makes a threat with the intent to
influence the governmental body. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(6); Dues v.
8 We agree with appellant that terroristic threat is a conduct-oriented offense. See infra section
III.
8
State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at
291. It is not necessary that the threat actually influence the governmental body. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(6); Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 291. “[C]apability to carry
out the threat is not an essential element of the offense . . . .” Jarrell v. State, 537 S.W.2d
255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 291 (explaining that the
statutory language only requires making a threat).
2. Discussion
In his letter to Congressman Burgess, appellant directed “demand[s]” to the United
States federal government. Appellant demanded the government give him an official
apology, “the funding of a private option” for his medical care, and compensation for past
pain. Appellant leveraged these demands with the threat to “begin preparations to begin
offensive combat preparations against the federal government” and the “gather[ing of]
armed men of good character to my cause in order to place the entire United States
Congress under arrest.” Contrary to appellant’s assertion that these words were too
vague or uncertain to constitute a threat, a rational jury could find the words
communicated a threat of murder, aggravated assault, or criminal mischief. That
appellant conditioned the threats on the government’s failure to satisfy his demands does
not undermine their potency; in fact, it supports the jury’s conclusion that appellant made
the threats with the intent to influence the conduct or activities of Congress. See Phillips,
401 S.W.3d at 291–92 (disregarding defendant’s contention that a conditional threat was
insufficient under section 22.07(a)(6)).9
9 Some cases hold a conditional threat may be insufficient to cause fear of imminent serious bodily
injury under Texas Penal Code section 22.07(a)(2). See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 905 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Tex.
9
At the conclusion of the letter, appellant said he would attend the Congressman’s
upcoming town hall meeting. As a result, the local police department increased its
security detail, but Congressman Burgess decided against canceling the meeting.
Appellant attended the meeting, re-urged his complaint, and filled out a congressional
inquiry form. There was no incident. On appeal, appellant argues these events show
that no one was afraid and that he did not intend to threaten violence.
We are unpersuaded. The increase in the security detail is some evidence of fear.
Regardless, although sometimes the victim’s reaction to a threat can shed light on the
actor’s intent, see In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 904 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet.
denied); Hadnot v. State, 884 S.W.2d 922, 925–26 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, no pet.)
(citing Jarrell, 537 S.W.2d at 256–57),10 evoking fear or succeeding in influencing the
governmental body are not elements of a terroristic threat. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.07(a)(6); Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 291. Congressman Burgess’s reaction after
reading appellant’s letter outside appellant’s presence, considering the letter with his staff,
and adopting a response to it provides no guidance to appellant’s intent in sending it. A
terroristic threat is complete when the accused, by threatening, seeks the desired reaction
described in statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(6); Dues, 634 S.W.2d at
306; Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 292; In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d at 904.
App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref’d). Those cases focus on the imminence requirement of subsection (a)(2).
Imminence is not required in subsection (a)(6). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(6) (West, Westlaw
through 2013 3d C.S.); Phillips v. State, 401 S.W.3d 282, 291–92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d).
10Again, these cases involve threats made under subsection (a)(2), and evidence of a victim’s
reaction may be more relevant to the element of imminence at issue in those cases.
10
Likewise, although appellant stresses that there was no evidence he owned
ammunition or a gun, the capability to carry out a threat is not an element of terroristic
threat. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(6); Jarrell, 537 S.W.2d at 257; Phillips,
401 S.W.3d at 291; see also Williams, 194 S.W.3d at 574–75. Moreover, at the time
Congressman Burgess received this letter, he did not know that appellant did not own
ammunition or a gun.
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, by
sending the letter, committed the charged offense of terroristic threat. See Johnson, 364
S.W.3d at 293–94; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99. We overrule appellant’s sixth issue.
C. Appellant’s Classroom Comments
1. Applicable Law
The offense of terroristic threat has two components: (1) the act of threatening
an offense involving violence to persons or property; and (2) intent. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.07(a). The statute lists six forms of intent. See id. With respect to
appellant’s classroom comments, the jury could convict appellant if it found beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant threatened to commit murder, aggravated assault, or
criminal mischief with the intent to place the public or a substantial group of the public in
fear of serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(5). Alternatively, the
jury could convict appellant for the same conduct upon finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intended to influence the conduct or activities of a branch or agency of the federal
11
government, the state, or a political subdivision of the state, see id. § 22.07(a)(6), to wit:
the United States Congress or the TWUDPS.11
As noted in the previous subsection, a jury can infer intent from the accused’s acts,
words, or conduct. Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 291; Williams, 194 S.W.3d at 575. Neither
capability to carry out the threat nor success in causing the intended effect are elements
of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(5)–(6); Jarrell, 537 S.W.2d at 257;
Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 291; see also Williams, 194 S.W.3d at 574–75. The term
“threatens” is not defined in the terroristic-threat statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.07(a)–(g). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “threat” as “[a] communicated intent to
inflict harm or loss on another or another’s property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1618 (9th
ed. 2009); see Cook, 940 S.W.2d at 347 (relying on sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary
to define “threat” for the purposes of section 22.07(a)(2)). Nothing in the statute or in
Black’s definition of “threat” limits a threat to verbal communication. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.07(a); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1618. Where relevant, we address
nonverbal communication, such as body language and tone.
Subsection (a)(6) does not require that the threatened audience—the one subject
to a threat of violence—be the same as the audience which the person intends to
influence. See id. § 22.07(a)(6). 12 Neither does it require that the threat reach the
11 As part of his first two issues in his brief, addressed separately below, appellant argues the two
intents constitute separate offenses under section 22.07. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(5), (6).
We agree with appellant, but for the purposes of the sufficiency review, we, in using a hypothetically correct
jury charge, see Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), assume the two offenses
were charged separately, and we analyze the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether a rational
jury could have found either offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
12 In a classic hostage situation, for example, a person threatens one or more persons with the
intent to influence a third party to action.
12
threatened audience or even that the actor expect it to reach that audience. See id.
“The section is broad enough to cover threats to commit any crime of violence if the actor’s
intent is to cause fear, emergency action, or substantial inconvenience.” George v.
State, 841 S.W.2d 544, 546–47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), aff’d, 890 S.W.2d
73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc) (quoting SEARCY & PATTERSON, PRACTICE
COMMENTARY, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07 (Vernon 1989) and citing 2 BRANCH, TEXAS
ANNOTATED PENAL STATUTES, § 22.07 (3d ed. 1974)). A victim’s reaction, while
unnecessary to prove under the statute, may provide evidence of the actor’s intent. See
In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d at 904; Hadnot, 884 S.W.2d at 925–26.
2. Discussion
We must uphold the jury’s verdict unless, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that no rational jury could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
318–19; Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 293–94; see also Runningwolf v. State, 360 S.W.3d
490, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The reviewing court is not to assess the evidence as
the ‘thirteenth juror.’” (quoting Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988)); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding an
appellate court’s sufficiency review does not permit it to simply substitute its judgment for
that of the fact-finder).
First, a rational jury could find that appellant’s words conveyed a threat to commit
murder, aggravated assault, or criminal mischief. The trial court admitted, over defense
13
counsel’s objection, part of an email that appellant sent to a friend about six months before
the classroom incident.13 The email stated, in relevant part:
I’m sure you can classify me as dangerous. Because I am. Because
when I get my back fixed and I get maneuver [sic] capability back, I’m going
to do several things, like acquiring body armor, a fully automatic AK-47, an
M4 assault rifle, and about 3,000 rounds each of 7.62 millimeter and 5.56
millimeter ammo. After that, I’m going to take about six months off and I’m
going to get in the best cardiovascular shape of my life. I’m going to lift
weights frequently. And then I’m going to start running and gunning and
people are going to start dropping like flies. Paramilitary urban guerilla
warfare. I’m going to be completely drug free the entire time. But if I get
surrounded, I’ll take enough PCP or ketamine to the point where I couldn’t
feel it if napalm was dropped on me. And as I lay on the floor with my
lifeblood spilling through my teeth, I’m going to spit blood right in the fucking
cop’s face and I’m going to laugh. Because if we are willing to fight back
to the point of death, then we’ve already won. I’ve had about all the shit
I’m gonna take from this world, and I’m sick and tired of this place.
In light of this language, a rational jury could have interpreted appellant’s classroom
statement, which also referenced an AK-47, as more than mere invective; it could find
appellant used that diction to threaten others to elicit some desired response.
The trial court also admitted evidence of an incident between appellant and
another college professor that occurred at a different college about six months before this
incident.14 In that incident, appellant entered the wrong class (he was taking a class with
the professor but at a different time), and when the students began laughing because
appellant was looking around awkwardly, the professor, turning to the classroom from the
chalk board, told appellant to sit down and shut up. Appellant complied, but immediately
13 By his eighth issue, appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of this evidence. For the
sufficiency review, we consider all evidence, whether admissible or inadmissible. See Winfrey v. State,
393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998); Jaynes v. State, 216 S.W.3d 839, 845 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).
14Again, appellant, by his seventh issue, separately challenges the trial court’s admission of the
extraneous-act evidence, but we do not discount it in our sufficiency review. See supra note 11.
14
after class, he invited the professor to the hallway and, in an elevated voice, told the
professor that he would not be treated that way. Appellant later emailed the professor,
stating:
If a teacher uses their authority in a heavy-handed manner, I want them to
understand that they are dealing with an individual that has been specifically
professionally trained to take human life. I wouldn’t even let a police officer
speak to me in that manner unless a loaded gun was pointed at me.
In light of this language, a rational jury could have found appellant’s similar classroom
phrasing, “I have the specified, specialized military training”, to be a threat involving
violence.
In addition to appellant’s verbal communication, French testified that appellant
looked around the classroom as he spoke, and Hester testified that appellant’s body
language communicated anger. Trial testimony showed some people felt threatened.
This evidence, in combination with the other evidence, supports a finding that appellant
made a veiled threat to the persons in the classroom. In context, appellant expressed
anger with the federal government, but that does not mean he did not threaten to take his
anger out on others. Although appellant assured his audience he would not harm female
students, his assurance did not cover male students or Professor Travis. French “turned
to [French’s] classmate and was like, well what about us males?” The State emphasized
this point to the jury. Moreover, the jury had already heard evidence of appellant’s letter
to Congressman Burgess, which he sent about one week before the classroom comment,
in which appellant similarly assured that he would take “great care not to target civilian
non-combatant personnel, specifically women and children . . . .” (emphasis added). A
15
rational jury could infer appellant intentionally excluded men from his classroom
assurance because he viewed them differently than women.15
Alternatively, a rational jury could find appellant threatened, more directly, persons
or property in Washington, D.C. Appellant stated that he was “about to tear Washington,
D.C. apart brick-by-brick” using his “specified, specialized military training” because he
“cannot get help from [his] government” for his pain. Appellant then characterized his
anger with his AK-47 comment and asked Professor Travis to contact the president or
vice president. Cloutier’s takeaway was that appellant was going to ride “in the back of
a pickup truck through Washington, D.C. with an AK-47.” Saye also thought appellant
directed his threat at the federal government to take down “certain political figures,”
against whom appellant “needed to vindicate himself in some way.” It is noteworthy that
this was about one week after appellant made similar complaints and threats in his letter
to Congressman Burgess, which sheds additional light on appellant’s words and intent.
Second, we hold a rational jury could have found appellant made the threat with
both charged intents. To a certain extent, the analysis of appellant’s intent overlaps the
analysis of whether he made a threat, and evidence supporting that finding is also relevant
in assessing his intent. The evidence supporting either charged intent included
appellant’s: truculent diction, body language showing anger, and prior bad acts, which
shed light on appellant’s AK-47 and specialized training references. That appellant
looked around the room as he spoke and did not include men in his assurance of no harm
15 Defense counsel emphasized that the TWU student body is predominantly female and that
appellant’s general assurance reflected that rather than isolating male students. While we consider that a
valid point, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, see Johnson v. State, 364
S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), mandates a different characterization.
16
supports a finding that appellant intended to place those, or at least some, in the
classroom in fear of serious bodily injury. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict
appellant under section 22.07(a)(5).
On the other hand, appellant’s president and vice president references could lead
a rational jury to find that appellant intended to influence a branch or agency of the federal
government. Appellant said he was about to “tear Washington, D.C. apart brick-by-brick”
because he could not get help from the government for his pain. Of course, a demand
that his professor contact the federal executive seems irrational, but there is no
requirement in the statute that a person making a terroristic threat have reasonable
expectations or demands. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
see Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 293–94; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99, the evidence was
sufficient to convict appellant under section 22.07(a)(6). We overrule appellant’s fifth
issue.16
III. JURY CHARGE ERROR
By his first two issues, appellant argues that, with respect to each of his
convictions, the disjunctive submission of two offenses in the jury charge application
paragraphs permitted a non-unanimous jury verdict in violation of the Texas and United
16 Having found the evidence sufficient to convict appellant under section 22.07(a)(6) with the intent
to influence the United States Congress, we need not consider the alternative theory—that he intended to
influence the TWUDPS—which is based on the same subsection. See, e.g., Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d
9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“When the trial court’s charge authorizes the jury to convict on more than one
theory . . . the verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any of the theories.”) (citations
omitted). This is true even considering our jury-charge-error analysis infra. Unlike the issue raised by
charging two of the statute’s subsections in the disjunctive, see infra, both of these theories are based on
the same subsection. Our unit-of-prosecution analysis below does not preclude charging multiple theories
of violating a single subjection, see infra, and the broad language of this subjection allows alternative
theories, each of which constitute a manner of violating the subsection. See infra.
17
States Constitutions. 17 Specifically, appellant contends that the six listed intents in
Texas Penal Code section 22.07 constitute six separate and distinct offenses and that
the submission of two intents in a single charge application paragraph precluded jury
unanimity. The State insists that the six intents are just different methods of committing
one offense, which can be submitted together. We agree with appellant.
A. Standard of Review
Our first duty in analyzing a jury-charge issue is to decide whether error exists.
Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Middleton v. State, 125
S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc)). Preservation of charge error does
not become an issue until we assess harm. Id. (citing Middleton, 125 S.W.3d at 453).
If we find jury-charge error, we apply one of the two following standards for reviewing
harm: “Where there has been a timely objection made at trial, an appellate court will
search for only ‘some harm.’ By contrast, where the error is urged for the first time on
appeal, a reviewing court will search for ‘egregious harm.’” Mann v. State, 964 S.W.2d
639, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726,
731–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
17 We review appellant’s two issues together, as appellant briefed them. Separately, we note that
the United States Supreme Court has ruled the United States Constitution does not require a unanimous
jury verdict in state criminal trials. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407–14 (1972); see also
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359–63 (2000); Sanchez v. State, 23 S.W.3d 30, 41 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) (en banc) (Keller, J., concurring); Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 351 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Appellant, however, quotes more recent
language from the Supreme Court that may suggest a softening of that position. See McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.14 (2010); see also Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2012).
Regardless, because appellant neither argued nor cited authority showing that the federal constitution
would provide rights or protections beyond those afforded by the state constitution, we address the
unanimity issue in the context of Texas law, which is how the court of criminal appeals has approached it.
See Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 419 n.2, 421–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
18
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo. Harris v. State,
359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Ramos v. State, 303 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). In construing a statute, we must “seek to effectuate the ‘collective’
intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation.” Harris, 359 S.W.3d at
629 (quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc)).
“We look first to the statute’s literal text, and ‘we read words and phrases in context and
construe them according to the rules of grammar and usage.’” Id. (quoting Lopez v.
State, 253 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); Jones v. State, 323 S.W.3d 885,
888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “We must ‘presume that every word in a statute has been
used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given
effect if reasonably possible.’” Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 629 (quoting State v. Hardy, 963
S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)). Only if the statutory language is
ambiguous or leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not have possibly
intended, may we consult extra-textual sources. Id.; Jones, 323 S.W.3d at 888; Boykin,
818 S.W.2d at 785.
In the process, we consider any prior judicial construction of the statute. Jones,
323 S.W.3d at 888. A judicial construction of the statute is the law until it is overruled.
Id. at 888–89. The interests of stare decisis are at their height for judicial constructions
of legislative enactments because parties rely on the constructions for guidance in
complying with the enactments. Id. at 889.
19
B. Applicable Law
Under our state constitution, jury unanimity is required in felony cases, and under
our state statutes, unanimity is required in all criminal cases. Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d
417, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007); see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 37.02–.04 (West,
Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). “Put simply, the jury must unanimously agree about the
occurrence of a single criminal offense, but they need not be unanimous about the specific
manner and means of how that offense was committed.” Young, 341 S.W.3d at 422;
Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 714. “To discern what a jury must be unanimous about, appellate
courts examine the statute defining the offense to determine whether the Legislature
‘created multiple, separate, offenses, or a single offense’ with different methods or means
of commission.” Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 714 (quoting Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305,
311 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In a case like this one, “the proper analysis is to determine
whether the Legislature intended for the separate statutory subsections in a single statute
to constitute distinct offenses. In other words, we must determine the allowable unit of
prosecution” for the offense. Loving v. State, 401 S.W.3d 642, 645–46 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013).
In assessing the allowable unit of prosecution, we begin by looking to the plain
language of the statute and any case law interpreting it. Id. at 646. “Absent an express
statement defining the allowable unit of prosecution, the gravamen of an offense best
describes the allowable unit of prosecution.” Id. at 647; see Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630;
Jones, 323 S.W.3d 889; Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 714; Huffman v. State, 267 S.W.3d 902,
20
907 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To clarify some of the difficulty surrounding unanimity
issues, the court of criminal appeals has identified three offense gravamina: (1) “result
of conduct” offenses, which focus on the product of certain conduct; (2) “nature of
conduct” offenses, which proscribe certain acts or conduct, “regardless of any result that
might occur;” and (3) “circumstances of conduct” offenses, which focus on surrounding
circumstances to criminalize otherwise innocent behavior. Loving, 401 S.W.3d at 647;
Young, 341 S.W.3d at 423; McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989) (en banc); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03.
In “result of conduct” offenses, the jury must be unanimous about the
specific result required by the statute. With “nature of conduct” crimes, the
jury must be unanimous about the specific criminal act, and with
“circumstances surrounding the conduct” offenses, unanimity is required
about the existence of the particular circumstances that makes the
otherwise innocent act criminal.
Young, 341 S.W.3d at 424.
If the focus of the offense is the result—that is, the offense is a “result of
conduct” crime—then different types of results are considered to be
separate offenses, but different types of conduct are not. On the other
hand, if the focus of the offense is the conduct—that is, the offense is a
“nature of conduct” crime—then different types of conduct are considered
to be separate offenses.
Huffman, 267 S.W.3d at 907.
The court of criminal appeals has identified various tools that may help determine
a statute’s gravamen, such as grammar, including focus on verb forms, identification of
what offense element completes the offense, and consideration of whether each statutory
provision concerns a different type of harm. See Loving, 401 S.W.3d at 647; Harris, 359
S.W.3d at 630; Jones, 323 S.W.3d at 890–92. The Legislature’s assignment of different
21
punishment ranges to different statute subsections can also indicate the subsections are
separate offenses rather than manners of committing a single offense. See Jones, 323
S.W.3d at 890; Dolkart v. State, 197 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d).
But, the court of criminal appeals has cautioned against placing undue weight on a
statute’s punishment provisions, especially when “more weighty factors are available for
consideration.” See Jones, 323 S.W.3d at 890.
The terroristic threat statute reads:
(a) A person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any offense
involving violence to any person or property with intent to:
(1) cause a reaction of any type to his threat by an official or volunteer
agency organized to deal with emergencies;
(2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury;
(3) prevent or interrupt the occupation or use of a building, room,
place of assembly, place to which the public has access, place of
employment or occupation, aircraft, automobile, or other form of
conveyance, or other public place;
(4) cause impairment or interruption of public communications, public
transportation, public water, gas, or power supply or other public
service;
(5) place the public or a substantial group of the public in fear of
serious bodily injury; or
(6) influence the conduct or activities of a branch or agency of the
federal government, the state, or a political subdivision of the state.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a). An offense under subsection (a)(1) is a class B
misdemeanor. Id. § 22.07(b). A violation of subsection (a)(2) is also a class B
misdemeanor, but it is a class A misdemeanor if committed against a family or household
member or a public servant. Id. § 22.07(c). An offense under subsection (a)(3) is a
22
class A misdemeanor, but it is a state jail felony if the actor causes a pecuniary loss of
$1,500 or more. Id. § 22.07(d). A violation of subsections (a)(4) through (a)(6) is a third
degree felony. Id. § 22.07(e).
C. Discussion
In essence, our task is to determine whether the six intents illustrate how a
terroristic threat may be committed or, instead, independently establish what constitutes
the offense. See Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 722. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
explained, “It should be realized that it is the desired reaction of the listener, irregardless
[sic] of whether or not the threat is real, that constitutes the offense.” Jarrell, 537 S.W.2d
at 257 (quoting BRANCH’S ANNOTATED PENAL CODE § 22.07 (3d ed. 1973)). In context,
the court of criminal appeals was addressing the defendant’s evidentiary argument that
his inability to execute a threat undermined his conviction. See id. The clarification
nevertheless emphasized that the statute’s gravamen is the intended effect of a threat,
not the threat itself. See id. In other words, the gravamen of the statute, as implicated
by the statute’s name, is terrorizing by threat; a threat, without a terroristic intent, is not a
terroristic threat. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a); Jarrell, 537 S.W.2d at 257.18
The element that completes the offense, see Loving, 401 S.W.3d at 647; Harris, 359
S.W.3d at 630; Jones, 323 S.W.3d at 890, is the actor’s intent to cause a particular
reaction by threatening. See Dues, 634 S.W.2d at 306; Phillips, 401 S.W.3d at 292; In
re A.C., 48 S.W.3d at 904.
18 The State recognizes this, admitting in its brief that “the gravamen of the offense is the intent
itself . . . .”
23
The statute proscribes six separate terroristic objectives. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.07(a). Beginning with the first enumerated intent and progressing through the
list, the severity or audience associated with each terroristic aim increases
correspondingly. See id. Not coincidentally, so does the punishment. See id. §
22.07(b)–(e).19 The disparity in correlative punishment ranges shows the Legislature is
not merely outlining different manners of committing the same offense. See Jones, 323
S.W.3d at 890;20 Dolkart, 197 S.W.3d at 893. The Legislature views and treats some
terroristic objectives more seriously than others, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(b)–
(e), which shows the Legislature intended each subsection to be a separate, punishable
offense. See Loving, 401 S.W.3d at 647; Haight v. State, 137 S.W.3d 48, 50–51 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). The statute’s focus on separately-punishable intents rather than
circumstances or results shows the offense is conduct-oriented; “[I]f the focus of the
offense is on the conduct . . . the offense is a ‘nature of conduct’ crime . . . .” Huffman,
19 It is noteworthy that the jury charge also charged appellant with an offense under section
22.07(a)(3)—the prevention or interruption of the occupation or use of a public building—as a lesser-
included offense. An offense under subsection (a)(3) is a class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.07(d) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
20 The Jones Court’s caution against relying too heavily on a statute’s punishment provisions
addressed a different issue than the practical concerns posed by this statute. See Jones v. State, 323
S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The Jones Court was explaining that the Legislature’s
subsequent addition of punishment ranges to a statute did not change the Court’s prior assessment of the
statute’s gravamen. See id. The added punishment provisions to that statute, which outlawed making a
false statement to obtain property or credit, categorized offense degrees by threshold pecuniary amounts
of property or credit sought by the actor. See id.; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.32 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 3d C.S.). Unlike the statute in this case, the ranges outlined in section 32.32 dictated the
offense degree without regard to which subsection of the statute the actor violated; the ranges applied
equally to all subsections. Here, on the other hand, a case’s applicable offense range wholly depends on
which specific subsection of section 22.07 a person violates. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(b)–(e)
(West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
24
267 S.W.3d at 907. For conduct-oriented offenses, the jury must be unanimous about
the specific criminal act. See Young, 341 S.W.3d at 424.
Of more practical concern, because the six intents have different punishment
ranges, a general guilty verdict gives a trial court no direction on which punishment range
applies in a case. For example, if a defendant is charged under sections 22.07(a)(2)
(intending to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury) and 22.07(a)(5)
(intending to place a group of the public in fear of serious bodily injury), and a jury returns
one guilty verdict, the trial court is unable to determine whether the jury unanimously
found the defendant committed a class B misdemeanor, a third-degree felony, or neither.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2), (5), (c), (e). We cannot presume the
Legislature intended to undermine jury unanimity, confuse trial courts, or thwart the
prosecution of terroristic threats rather than effect such prosecution. See TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 311.021(1)–(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). We conclude the
trial court erred in submitting two offenses under one verdict form.
D. Harm
Appellant did not object to the jury charge at trial. Therefore, because the error is
being urged for the first time on appeal, we review the record for egregious harm. Mann,
964 S.W.2d at 641. Jury-charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis
of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.
Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Stuhler v. State, 218
S.W.3d 706, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007)). The error must have been so harmful as to effectively deny the
25
accused a fair and impartial trial. See Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008).
In determining whether appellant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial, we
review “the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues
and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant
information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d
483, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984) (en banc)). We will examine “any . . . part of the record as a whole
which may illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused.” Id. at 490
(quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174).
1. Jury Charge
Looking first to the jury charge, it outlined the terroristic threat elements under
Texas Penal Code section 22.07(a)(5) and (a)(6) together in one paragraph. The four
application paragraphs preceding the single verdict form allowed the jury to convict
appellant of one offense if it found beyond a reasonable doubt he violated 22.07(a)(5) or
(a)(6). This type of “mix and match” verdict deprives a defendant of the right to a
unanimous jury verdict. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750–52. Rather, the law requires that
“each and every juror agree[] that the defendant committed the same, single, specific
criminal act.” Id. at 745; see Stuhler, 218 S.W.3d at 719; Francis v. State, 36 S.W.3d
121, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (“An unanimous jury verdict ensures that the
jury agrees on the factual elements underlying an offense—it is more than mere
agreement on a violation of a statute.”).
26
The State argues the charge nevertheless “clearly spelled out the general
unanimity requirement.” We disagree. As in Ngo, “the word ‘unanimously’ appeared
only in the ‘boilerplate’ section of the jury charge dealing with selection of a jury
foreman[.]” Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 744–45. The paragraph read in full:
After you retire to your jury room you should select one of your members as
your Presiding Juror. It is the Presiding Juror’s duty to preside at your
deliberations, vote with you, and when you have unanimously agreed upon
a verdict, to certify to your verdict by using the appropriate form, and signing
the same as Presiding Juror.
This paragraph is almost identical to the one the Ngo Court held inadequate to correct
the unanimity issue in that case. As in that case, “the jury could well have believed that
they need only be unanimous about their ‘verdict’ of guilty or not guilty of the general
offense . . . .” Id. at 745. This factor weighs in favor of finding egregious harm. See id.
at 752.
2. Evidence and Argument of Counsel
A rational juror could have found appellant made threats involving violence with
the intent to place persons in the classroom in fear of serious bodily injury. The same
juror could have found the evidence insufficient to convict appellant of intending to
influence the United States Congress. Defense counsel argued that the evidence was
insufficient to convict appellant on either ground, and the juror could have found the
argument compelling as it related to the charge that appellant intended to influence the
United States Congress.
Unconstrained by a review that views the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, we recognize that the juror would be reasonable in construing appellant’s
27
president and vice president references to be references to those positions at the
university rather than the federal government; it is arguably more likely that appellant
wanted Professor Travis to contact the university administration rather than the federal
government. The same juror would also be reasonable in finding that the classroom
context of the statements, while supporting a finding that appellant threatened the
classroom audience, made it unlikely appellant was attempting to influence the United
States Congress. The juror could construe appellant’s invective against the federal
government as an explanation for his anger rather than his intended target. Regarding
the TWUDPS, the juror could have concluded there was no evidence appellant intended
to influence the campus police or even anticipated its involvement. The testimony of
other witnesses shows they were surprised appellant’s comments prompted the campus
police’s response.
A different rational juror on the same jury could have found that appellant’s threat
was made with the intent to influence the United States Congress. This juror could have
agreed with defense counsel that the evidence did not support an intent to place the public
in fear of serious bodily injury. Again being unconstrained by the sufficiency review, we
hold this juror could have found appellant’s assurance that he would not “hurt any of the
girls at this college” to undermine a finding that appellant threatened or intended to scare
his audience; after hearing evidence that the TWU student body was predominantly
female, this juror would be reasonable in interpreting the assurance as a general one
rather than as a subtle threat to men. This juror could conclude appellant’s diction
28
reflected a threat and intent directed at the federal government and expressly away from
the classroom and campus public.
Under this jury charge, these two jurors could convict appellant for the same
offense. The charge enabled the State to overcome the potential evidentiary challenges
by not requiring the jurors to agree on which direction the evidence pointed. These two
factors weigh in favor of finding egregious harm. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 752 (holding
harm was egregious because the State lumped three offenses under the same charge
and, “given the state of the evidence, we . . . cannot determine that the jury was, in fact,
unanimous in finding appellant guilty of one specific . . . offense.”).
3. Other Relevant Information
In its closing argument, the State highlighted the jury charge’s allowance for
non-unanimous finding:
In the TWU incident we list out four different ways that Christopher
Gillette committed a terroristic threat on March the 1st of 2011. And in
between each of those paragraphs in the jury charge, there’s the word “or.”
And so there doesn’t have to be jury unanimity, meaning that all 12
of you do not have to agree on one of each of these four different ways.
Theoretically three of you could agree it was committed in one of the
paragraphs and then three on each of the next three paragraphs.
Thus, the State heightened the potential for a non-unanimous verdict. See
Mathonican v. State, 194 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding
that a prosecutor’s emphasis of a jury-charge allowance for a non-unanimous verdict
contributed to the harm, which the appellate court found egregious). This factor weighs
in favor of finding egregious harm. See id.; see also Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 752 (finding
29
egregious harm because prosecutor and trial court made misleading statements about
unanimity during jury voir dire).
4. Summary
After reviewing the relevant factors, we conclude that the submission of the two
offenses for a single verdict actually and egregiously harmed appellant, denying him the
valuable right to a unanimous verdict. See Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 490; Allen, 253 S.W.3d
at 264.
We sustain appellant’s first and second issues. Having sustained these issues,
we need not address appellant’s remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
GREGORY T. PERKES
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
29th day of May, 2014.
30