Christopher Lawrence Athey v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                                  NUMBER 13-13-00073-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE ATHEY,                                                             Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                      Appellee.
    On appeal from the 54th District Court
    of McLennan County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
    Appellant, Christopher Lawrence Athey, was indicted for burglary of a habitation,
    with intent to commit theft. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West, Westlaw through
    2013 3d C.S). In the indictment, the State included an enhancement paragraph, alleging
    that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony, to-wit: burglary of a habitation,
    1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to
    an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2005).
    which, if true, would enhance the offense to a first degree felony. See 
    id. § 12.42(b)
    (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S). Following a trial, a jury found appellant guilty of
    the offense. After finding the enhancement paragraph true, the jury assessed appellant’s
    punishment at forty-seven years’ imprisonment.
    Concluding that there are no errors that would result in the reversal of the judgment
    of the trial court, appellant’s counsel filed an Anders brief in which he reviewed the merits,
    or lack thereof, of the appeal. We affirm.
    I.      ANDERS BRIEF
    Pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967), appellant’s appellate
    counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief with this Court stating that he has found
    no reversible error committed by the trial court and no arguable ground of error upon
    which an appeal can be predicated. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders
    as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds
    to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error
    if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural
    history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 340
    ,
    343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    ,
    510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    In compliance with High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
    Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has explained why, under controlling authority, there are
    no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he
    has complied with the requirements of Anders by (1) examining the record and applicable
    law and finding no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) serving a copy of the brief
    and motion to withdraw as counsel on appellant, (3) informing appellant of his right to
    2
    review the record and to file a pro se response raising any ground of error or complaint
    which he may desire. See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510
    n.3; see
    also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.23.                  More than an adequate period of time
    has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response with this Court. 2                      See In re
    
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n. 23.
    II.      INDEPENDENT REVIEW
    Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
    proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, counsel’s Anders brief, the State’s
    brief, and appellant’s pro se brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support
    an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due
    to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues
    raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court
    of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509
    . There is no reversible error in the record. Accordingly, we affirm.
    III.    MOTION TO WITHDRAW
    In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for
    permission to withdraw as counsel.               See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; see also In re
    
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408
    n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 
    903 S.W.2d 776
    , 779–80 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must
    withdraw from representing the appellant.                  To withdraw from representation, the
    2 Appellant has filed multiple motions for extension of time to file a pro se response. Following his
    last motion to date, we issued an order, on September 12, 2013, granting appellant’s motion “insofar as
    appellant is ORDERED to file his pro se response to the Anders brief with this Court within twenty days of
    the date of this order” and denying the motion “insofar as the Court will not allow an extension until October
    10, 2013.” The order also stated, “NO FURTHER EXTENTIONS WILL BE GRANTED IN THIS MATTER.”
    As noted above, appellant has still not filed a pro se response.
    3
    appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
    appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered
    to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and advise him of his right to file
    a petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412
    n.35; Ex parte Owens, 
    206 S.W.3d 670
    , 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    ___________________
    ROGELIO VALDEZ
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the
    8th day of May, 2014.
    3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
    by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
    review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
    within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
    for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
    discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See 
    id. R. 68.3.
    Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules
    of Appellate Procedure. See 
    id. R. 68.4.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-13-00073-CR

Filed Date: 5/8/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015