Guillermo Cintron Ortiz v. State of Texas ( 2012 )


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  • Opinion filed March 8, 2012
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    __________
    No. 11-10-00303-CR
    __________
    GUILLERMO CINTRON ORTIZ, Appellant
    V.
    STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 54th District Court
    McLennan County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2009-1455-C2
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The jury convicted Guillermo Cintron Ortiz of five counts of indecency with a child by
    contact. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (West 2011). The jury assessed punishment for each
    count at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    for a term of twenty years and a fine of $2,000. The trial court ordered the sentences to run
    consecutively and entered a judgment of conviction on each count. We affirm the trial court’s
    judgments on all counts.
    Ortiz presents two points of error for review. In his first point, he contends that the trial
    court egregiously and erroneously commented on the weight of the evidence in violation of
    Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In his second point, he asserts that the
    evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for five counts of indecency with a
    child by contact.
    Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge shall
    deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case; not
    expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the testimony,
    discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or
    excite the passions of the jury.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007). Ortiz
    asserts in his first point of error that the trial court egregiously and erroneously commented in the
    jury charge on the weight of the evidence by adopting the State’s version of the events.
    Specifically, Ortiz argues that the trial court endorsed the State’s version of the events when it
    wrongfully inserted nonexistent and contested facts into the jury charge that substantiated the
    State’s case. We note that Ortiz did not object to the trial court’s charge. The portion of the
    charge that he challenges on appeal is as follows:
    The Defendant is on trial solely on the charges contained in the indictment
    in Count 1, Count 2, Count 3, Count 4, and Count 5.
    To prove the offense alleged in the indictment in Count 1, the State has
    elected to proceed on the alleged event that occurred at 2117 Gurley, McLennan
    County, Texas, in [B.A.]’s bedroom when [E.N.] was not at home, in which the
    Defendant, Guillermo Cintron Ortiz, allegedly committed the offense, if any.
    To prove the offense alleged in the indictment in Count 2, the State has
    elected to proceed on the alleged event that occurred at 2117 Gurley, McLennan
    County, Texas, in [B.A.]’s bedroom when [E.N.] was not at home, in which the
    Defendant, Guillermo Cintron Ortiz, allegedly committed the offense, if any.
    To prove the offense alleged in the indictment in Count 3, the State has
    elected to proceed on the alleged event that occurred at 2117 Gurley, McLennan
    County, Texas, in [B.A.]’s bedroom when [E.N.] was at home, in which the
    Defendant, Guillermo Cintron Ortiz, allegedly committed the offense, if any.
    To prove the offense alleged in the indictment in Count 4, the State has
    elected to proceed on the alleged event that occurred at 2117 Gurley, McLennan
    County, Texas, in [B.A.]’s bedroom when [E.N.] was at home, in which the
    Defendant, Guillermo Cintron Ortiz, allegedly committed the offense if any.
    To prove the offense alleged in the indictment in Count 5, the State has
    elected to proceed on the alleged event that occurred at 2400 Kendall, McLennan
    County, Texas, in the master bedroom, in which the Defendant, Guillermo
    Cintron Ortiz, allegedly committed the offense, if any.
    2
    Counts One and Four of the indictment alleged that Ortiz engaged in sexual contact with B.A. by
    touching the breast of B.A. on or about June 1, 2002, and February 3, 2003, respectively. Count
    Two alleged that Ortiz engaged in sexual contact with B.A. by touching the genitals of B.A. on
    or about June 1, 2002. Counts Three and Five alleged that Ortiz caused B.A. to engage in sexual
    contact by causing B.A. to touch the genitals of Ortiz on or about June 1, 2002, and February 3,
    2004, respectively. The counts as alleged in the indictment were included in the trial court’s
    charge.
    Ortiz argues that the elections made by the State do not match B.A.’s testimony because
    B.A. only testified that sexual contact between her and Ortiz occurred, at most, four times and
    that only two of those events occurred at 2117 Gurley. Thus, Ortiz contends that the jury charge
    assumes the truth of controverted issues because the charge endorses the State’s version of the
    events. We do not agree.
    “A charge that assumes the truth of a controverted issue is a comment on the weight of
    the evidence and is erroneous.” Whaley v. State, 
    717 S.W.2d 26
    , 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
    The portion of the jury charge at issue here does not assume the truth of controverted issues. The
    election language used in the jury charge is neutral. As to the State’s election for Count 1, the
    jury charge provides, “To prove the offense alleged in the indictment in Count 1, the State has
    elected to proceed on the alleged event that occurred at 2117 Gurley, McLennan County, Texas,
    in [B.A.]’s bedroom when [E.N.] was not at home, in which the Defendant . . . allegedly
    committed the offense, if any” (emphasis added). This same language is used in each of the
    State’s elections on the other four counts. Nothing in this language suggests that the State’s
    version of the events must be true. Instead, this language sets out the specific place and
    circumstance that the State alleged Count 1 occurred. Thus, for the jury to convict Ortiz on
    Count 1, the jury was required to find that he engaged in sexual contact with B.A. by touching
    the breast of B.A. on or about June 1, 2002, at 2117 Gurley, McLennan County, Texas, in B.A.’s
    bedroom when E.N. was not at home.
    In addition, Ortiz’s argument that the State’s elections do not match B.A.’s testimony
    and, thus, the charge endorses the State’s version of events is misguided. Even if the State’s
    elections do not match B.A.’s testimony, the jury charge does not endorse the State’s version of
    the events or comment on the weight of the evidence. “[T]he election requirement protects
    fundamental rights such as notice and unanimity, insuring both that the defendant is aware of
    3
    precisely which act he must defend himself against, and that the jurors know precisely which act
    they must all agree he is guilty of in order to convict him.” Phillips v. State, 
    193 S.W.3d 904
    ,
    910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Here, the State’s election required the jury to unanimously agree
    that Ortiz committed a specific act at a specific place with certain surrounding circumstances.
    Had the trial court not included the State’s election language in the jury charge, the jury could
    have possibly convicted Ortiz of indecency with a child by contact without unanimously
    agreeing on which act of indecency he committed for each count. If indeed the State’s elections
    do not match B.A.’s testimony, the evidence may be insufficient to uphold Ortiz’s convictions.
    But, the trial court did not comment on the weight of the evidence when it included the State’s
    elections in the jury charge. We overrule Ortiz’s first point of error.
    In his second point of error, Ortiz argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
    conviction for five counts of indecency with a child by contact. We review a sufficiency of the
    evidence issue, regardless of whether it is denominated as a legal or as a factual sufficiency
    claim, under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    (1979).
    Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 
    337 S.W.3d 286
    ,
    288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we examine all of
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that
    evidence and any reasonable inferences from it, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    ; Isassi v.
    State, 
    330 S.W.3d 633
    , 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
    Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the indictment, when read with the State’s
    elections, alleged that Ortiz engaged in sexual contact with B.A. or caused B.A. to engage in
    sexual contact at 2117 Gurley. Ortiz argues that these four alleged events were not supported by
    B.A.’s testimony because B.A. only testified to two events that occurred at 2117 Gurley. While
    Ortiz is correct in stating that B.A. only testified to two “events,” he fails to recognize that,
    within each “event,” B.A. testified to multiple criminal acts of indecency. Although the criminal
    acts may have taken place in the same encounter (on the same day at roughly the same time and
    in the same house), each act is separate and may be prosecuted as a different offense. See
    Pizzo v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 711
    , 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“A person can engage in sexual
    contact by touching the anus, by touching the breast, or by touching the genitals with the
    requisite intent. Each one of these acts represents a different offense.”).
    4
    B.A. was seventeen years old at the time of trial. She testified that, from kindergarten
    until fifth grade, she lived at 2117 Gurley. For a period of time when she was nine and in the
    third grade, she and her family moved in with her grandmother and her step-grandfather, Ortiz, at
    2400 Kendall. Her uncle J.Q., who was one and one-half years older than B.A., also lived at the
    Kendall address. Ortiz would take care of B.A. and the other kids while they were living there.
    Her grandmother worked at Clayton Homes and would not get home until four o’clock. Ortiz
    took B.A.’s grandmother to and from work each day even though she had a car she could have
    driven. B.A.’s mother worked at Time Warner Cable and would usually get home late. B.A.’s
    two younger brothers were in daycare, and Ortiz would pick them up after he picked up her
    grandmother from work if B.A.’s mother was working late. Ortiz remodeled homes for a living,
    including the house on Gurley, and thus did not have to be at work at certain hours.
    B.A.’s first memory of something happening with Ortiz was at the house on Kendall.
    She testified that he came and got in the guest bed with her while she was sleeping one night.
    Her grandmother came in the room and asked what he was doing in there. Ortiz fell on the floor
    and then got up and walked out. He did not touch B.A. during this first incident.
    B.A.’s next memory was during the summer while she lived at 2400 Kendall. She went
    inside to get a Band-Aid out of her grandmother’s restroom because J.Q. had hurt himself
    outside. Ortiz followed her into the master bedroom and locked the door. He told her to take off
    her clothes, and he took off his clothes. They both removed only their pants and shirts. B.A.
    could not remember whether Ortiz touched her breasts during this incident, but did remember
    that he kissed her mouth and that, as he was lying on top of her on the bed, she could feel his
    penis moving back and forth on her thigh. Afterward, he told her to put her clothes on because
    he had to pick up her grandmother. He gave her twenty dollars and told her not to tell anyone
    because they would hate her and would not believe her because she was a bad kid. He also told
    her that he loved her. B.A. said that she did not tell anyone about this incident after it happened
    because she was scared. J.Q. and B.A.’s brother, E.N., were outside during this incident.
    The third incident that B.A. testified about occurred in her bedroom at her home on
    Gurley. Ortiz came in her room and told her to take her clothes off, and he took his clothes off.
    She kept her panties on but was not wearing a bra, and Ortiz did not have on any clothing. Ortiz
    lay on top of her and kissed her on her mouth, neck, breasts, and stomach. B.A. described that,
    when Ortiz was kissing her breasts, it felt “[l]ike he was sucking on them or biting them.” She
    5
    could feel his teeth biting, and it hurt. She could also feel his penis on her vagina; he moved it
    back and forth. B.A. testified that it “felt nasty.” When he got up, sperm came out of his penis,
    and he wiped it on his shirt. Her brother, E.N., was not at home when this incident occurred
    because he had tutoring.
    B.A.’s testimony regarding this incident supports Counts One and Two. Count One of
    the indictment, when read with the State’s election, alleged that Ortiz engaged in sexual contact
    with B.A. by touching the breast of B.A. in B.A.’s bedroom at 2117 Gurley when E.N. was not at
    home. Count Two of the indictment, when read with the State’s election, alleged that Ortiz
    engaged in sexual contact with B.A. by touching the genitals of B.A. in B.A.’s bedroom at 2117
    Gurley when E.N. was not at home. Ortiz points out this testimony by B.A. in his brief, but
    argues it is inconsistent with the allegations because it did not happen on separate occasions. As
    we discussed above, this argument is without merit. Thus, B.A.’s testimony is consistent with
    the allegations.
    The next specific incident that B.A. could remember occurred at 2400 Kendall. B.A.,
    E.N., and J.Q. were all sitting in the living room watching television when Ortiz told B.A. to
    come into the master bedroom. Ortiz told her to sit on the bed, and he put a videotape in the
    VCR. E.N. and J.Q. remained in the living room. Ortiz closed the bedroom door. The video
    showed a young white girl giving a young white boy oral sex. While Ortiz showed her the video,
    he told her that one day she would be able to do that. This made her want to die. Ortiz kept her
    in the room for about twenty minutes and then told her she could go. He also gave her twenty
    dollars.
    B.A. testified that, at another time on Kendall, Ortiz made her touch his penis. Ortiz told
    her to come into the master bedroom and pulled down his pants and underwear.                      She
    remembered that he was wearing white underwear. He made her take her clothes off and told her
    to touch his penis. She was standing beside the bed, and he was standing beside her. His penis
    “was sticking out . . . straight” and pointing toward her. She did not want to touch it, but he told
    her it was okay and grabbed her hand. She put her whole hand around his penis for a second.
    He told her she could go and gave her money.
    B.A.’s testimony regarding this incident supports Count Five of the indictment. Count
    Five of the indictment, when read with the State’s election, alleged that Ortiz caused B.A. to
    engage in sexual contact by causing B.A. to touch the genitals of Ortiz in the master bedroom at
    6
    2400 Kendall. Ortiz states in his brief that “[i]t is conceivable that this Count may be supported
    by B.A.’s testimony.”     He also cites to the portion of B.A.’s testimony that supports this
    allegation. The State argues that Ortiz has waived his sufficiency argument as to Count Five.
    We agree. However, even if Ortiz did not waive this argument, B.A.’s testimony supports
    Ortiz’s conviction on this count.
    The next specific incident that B.A. recalled occurred at the house on Gurley. B.A. and
    E.N. had just come home from school and were in their separate bedrooms. Ortiz was there
    working on the house. B.A.’s two younger brothers were in daycare, and her mother was at
    work. Ortiz told E.N. goodbye and then went into B.A.’s room and told her he was about to
    leave. He locked the door, took his clothes off, and told B.A. to take her clothes off. B.A.
    removed all of her clothing, and Ortiz lay on top of her. She felt his penis between her legs and
    could feel it on her skin. He was moving it back and forth, rubbing it on her crease between her
    legs. Ortiz kissed her on her neck, breasts, and mouth. When he kissed her breasts it hurt. Her
    eyes watered, and she got a bruise on her breast. B.A. did not know what made him stop, but he
    just stopped. Sperm came out of his penis and went on her left thigh. Ortiz wiped it off with his
    shirt and then left to go pick up B.A.’s grandmother.
    B.A.’s testimony regarding this incident supports Counts Three and Four. Count Three
    of the indictment, when read with the State’s election, alleged that Ortiz caused B.A. to engage
    in sexual contact by causing B.A. to touch the genitals of Ortiz in B.A.’s bedroom at 2117
    Gurley when E.N. was home. Count Four of the indictment, when read with the State’s election,
    alleged that Ortiz engaged in sexual contact with B.A. by touching the breast of B.A. in B.A.’s
    bedroom at 2117 Gurley when E.N. was home. Ortiz points out this testimony by B.A. in his
    brief, but again argues that it is inconsistent with the allegations because the individual acts of
    indecency did not happen on separate occasions. As we have discussed, this argument is without
    merit. Although B.A. did not testify that Ortiz caused her to touch his genitals with her hand
    during this incident, she did testify that he caused her body to touch his genitals when he rubbed
    his penis back and forth between her legs. The definition of sexual contact includes “any
    touching of any part of the body of a child, including touching through clothing with the anus,
    breast, or any part of the genitals of a person.” Section 21.11(c)(2) (emphasis added). B.A. also
    testified that Ortiz kissed her breasts.    Therefore, B.A.’s testimony is consistent with the
    allegations in Counts Three and Four.
    7
    B.A. also remembered a time on Gurley where she was playing on her mother’s piano
    and Ortiz came in the room and kissed her on her mouth with his tongue. She said it made her
    feel nasty. B.A. could not remember any other specific incidents of a sexual nature that occurred
    with Ortiz. She testified that he touched her or made her take her clothes off almost every other
    day. It happened more than thirty times and stopped when she was about eleven years old. B.A.
    believed it stopped because she got her period.
    B.A. testified that Ortiz called her his baby and gave her more money than any of the
    other kids. She did not tell anyone what was going on because she did not want to get in trouble
    and did not want to hurt her grandmother. The first person she told was her first boyfriend. She
    told him during the fall of her freshman year in high school because they were talking about
    secrets and because she trusted him. In May of her sophomore year, she told her mom, her
    principal, her vice principal, and the security guard at her school what happened. These were the
    first adults that she ever told.
    E.N. testified that he saw B.A. and Ortiz go into rooms and close the door. He said that
    they would lock the door and would not come out for a while. When B.A. would finally come
    out, she always looked depressed and stressed out and would be carrying money in her hand.
    Ortiz gave B.A. more money than he gave E.N. or J.Q. E.N. remembered a specific time that he
    and J.Q. were on the couch in the living room at the house on Kendall when B.A. and Ortiz went
    into the bedroom together and would not come out.
    B.A.’s boyfriend from high school testified that, while they were dating during B.A.’s
    ninth grade year, B.A. told him on the phone one night that her grandfather touched her
    inappropriately when she was younger.        It was very clear to him that B.A. meant sexual
    touching. He was the first person that she ever told, and he encouraged her to tell the authorities.
    B.A.’s mother testified that she saw Ortiz give her daughter money. She also saw B.A.
    jerk away and ignore Ortiz when he showed her affection. At the time, she thought B.A. was
    being disrespectful to Ortiz and scolded her for her behavior. She testified that she should have
    noticed the amount of money Ortiz was giving B.A. and that she should have asked B.A. why
    she tried to avoid being around Ortiz instead of scolding her.
    B.A.’s grandmother testified that Ortiz kept pornography in their bedroom that depicted
    young-aged women having oral intercourse with young-aged men. She did not approve of the
    pornography and threw it away sometime in 2004. Ortiz told her that he gave more money to
    8
    B.A. than to the other kids because little girls need to buy more things. She did not believe that
    Ortiz was guilty and said that he was not that kind of person.
    Ortiz testified that he did not molest B.A. and gave three reasons for why B.A. would
    make up the allegations against him: (1) because he teased her about having a boyfriend; (2)
    because he told her mother not to put her on birth control; and (3) because he and his wife
    (B.A.’s grandmother) scolded B.A. for not being ready to leave the movie theater when his wife
    arrived. He also testified that he calls all his female relatives “[b]aby.”
    Although Ortiz denied ever touching B.A. and several witnesses testified on behalf of
    Ortiz, the jury, as the trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the
    weight to be given their testimony. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007),
    art. 38.04 (West 1979). As such, the jury was entitled to accept or reject any or all of the
    testimony of any witness. Adelman v. State, 
    828 S.W.2d 418
    , 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). As
    discussed above, B.A.’s testimony was not inconsistent with the allegations in the indictment or
    with the State’s elections.        The complainant’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a
    conviction for indecency with a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (West Supp.
    2011); Chapman v. State, 
    349 S.W.3d 241
    , 245 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d). In
    addition, E.N., B.A.’s mother, and B.A.’s grandmother corroborated parts of B.A.’s testimony.
    We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we hold that a
    rational trier of fact could have found the elements of indecency with a child by contact for all
    five counts beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule Ortiz’s second point of error.
    The judgments of the trial court on each of the five counts of indecency with a child by
    contact are affirmed.
    JIM R. WRIGHT
    CHIEF JUSTICE
    March 8, 2012
    Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
    McCall, J., and Kalenak, J.
    9