Malcolm Barber and Leann Barber v. Leo C. Mercer, Jr., M.D. ( 2009 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-08-079-CV
MALCOLM BARBER AND APPELLANTS
LEANN BARBER
V.
LEO C. MERCER, JR., M.D. APPELLEE
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FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY
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OPINION
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Appellants Malcolm and Leann Barber sued Leo C. Mercer, Jr., M.D.,
appellee, and others for negligence in the treatment and care of Malcolm’s heart
condition during a heart bypass procedure. Dr. Mercer was the general surgeon
who assisted the lead surgeon by harvesting a saphenous vein from Malcolm’s
leg. This case currently involves only Dr. Mercer. The Barbers challenge the
trial court’s dismissal of their claim against Dr. Mercer for failure to comply with
the expert report requirements of the civil practice and remedies code. We
reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Barbers sued numerous defendants, including Dr. Mercer, for
negligence in connection with the diagnosis and surgical treatment of Malcolm’s
heart condition (an interlocutory appeal between the Barbers and several of the
other defendants is currently pending in this court under cause number 2-07-
353-CV). Malcolm underwent a multi-vessel coronary artery bypass graft
(CABG) procedure at United Regional Health Care System in Wichita Falls,
Texas, in early 2004. The surgery lasted over six hours, and afterwards,
Malcolm suffered numbness, pain, and weakness in his left upper arm that led
to a diagnosis of left ulnar nerve lesion and ulnar cubital syndrome. He required
additional surgery and therapy and ultimately sued the physicians, nurse
practitioners, and the hospital involved in his care for damages resulting from
the padding and positioning of his arm. Dr. Mercer, a general surgeon, had
assisted Mikko P. Tauriainen, M.D., a cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon, in
performing the CABG procedure on Malcolm; Dr. Mercer was responsible for
harvesting the left saphenous vein from Malcolm’s leg.
In the Barbers’ original petition they alleged multiple basis of negligence
including specifically that the various defendants negligently failed to timely,
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properly, safely, or adequately supervise or care for Malcom’s condition during
the CABG procedure and postoperatively, particularly relating to his “left upper
extremity difficulties.” Furthermore, the Barbers alleged that several of the
defendant doctors failed to adequately train or supervise others who were
assisting in Malcom’s procedure.
After they filed suit, the Barbers timely filed their expert reports. Dr.
Mercer objected to the Barbers’ first expert report dated August 5, 2006 on the
grounds that their expert, Jeffrey Alan Wagner, M.D., M.B.A., a board certified
anesthesiologist, was not qualified to provide the report and that Dr. Wagner
failed to provide a fair summary of his opinions in accordance with section
74.351(r)(6) of the civil practice and remedies code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 74.351(r)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2009). After a hearing on the issue
in July 2007, the trial court specifically overruled Dr. Mercer’s objections to Dr.
Wagner’s qualifications to opine, but it sustained his objections as to the
report’s failure to provide a fair summary of the applicable standard of care,
breach of that standard as to each defendant, and causation under section
74.351.
On September 25, 2007, the trial court entered an order giving the
Barbers thirty days to correct the defects in their first expert report as to Dr.
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Mercer.1 The order stated, “[O]bjections to the Expert Report of Jeffery Alan
Wagner, M.D. are hereby OVERRULED to the extent that such Objections
challenge Dr. Wagner’s qualifications to opine as an expert, pursuant to
Sections 74.401 and 74.402 . . . .” However, the trial court denied the
Barbers’ oral request to supplement with a new expert as to defendants Mercer,
Robert Lee Moss, M.D., United Regional Health Care System, Inc., and Shellie
Barnett-Wright, PA-C. The Barbers immediately filed a more extensive report
by Dr. Wagner, particularly expanded as to standard of care, breach, and
causation as to each named defendant since the trial court had denied Dr.
Mercer’s objections to Dr. Wagner’s qualifications.
After the Barbers filed their amended report through their same expert,
Dr. Wagner, Dr. Mercer filed a second motion to dismiss, which the trial court
granted on the sole ground that the expert was not qualified “to opine as an
expert against Dr. Mercer.” 2 In all other respects, the trial court determined
that the expert’s amended report, dated September 28, 2007, “satisfies the
1
… The trial court dismissed some of the named defendants due to the
insufficiency of the report, but the Barbers were given an opportunity to amend
their report as to Dr. Mercer and some of the other defendants.
2
… Although it was the same expert supplying the amended report whom
the trial court had previously found qualified, this time the trial court ruled that
the expert was not qualified to render the report and limited its ruling to Dr.
Wagner’s lack of qualifications alone.
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requirements of section 74.351 . . . as to Dr. Mercer, and all other objections
by Dr. Mercer are overruled.” The trial court then granted Dr. Mercer’s motion
to dismiss him with prejudice. The Barbers appealed. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(10) (Vernon 2008).
Issue on Appeal
In the Barbers’ sole issue on appeal, they contend that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting Dr. Mercer’s second motion to dismiss on the
basis that Dr. Wagner was not a qualifying “expert” sufficient to give an opinion
on whether Dr. Mercer departed from accepted medical care under the civil
practice and remedies code. Dr. Wagner’s complete amended report is
attached to this opinion as appendix “A.”
Standard of Review
Although the Barbers ask us to reevaluate the standard of review for
expert report challenges, Texas courts and our supreme court, in particular,
agree that review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss under
section 74.351 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Am.
Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex.
2001) (applying abuse of discretion standard to predecessor statute); Craig v.
Dearbonne, 259 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.); San
Jacinto Methodist Hosp. v. Bennett, 256 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Tex.
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App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Lal v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth,
230 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). We have
previously declined the opportunity to apply a de novo standard of review to
this issue and therefore decline the Barbers’ invitation now. Ctr. for
Neurological Disorders, P.A. v. George, 261 S.W.3d 285, 291 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2008, pet. denied). Furthermore, a trial court’s decision on whether a
physician is qualified to offer an expert opinion in a health care liability claim is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Mem’l Hermann
Healthcare Sys. v. Burrell, 230 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide
whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or
principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–
42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986). Merely because a trial
court may decide a matter within its discretion in a different manner than an
appellate court would in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an
abuse of discretion has occurred. Id. at 242. A trial court does not abuse its
discretion if it commits a mere error in judgment. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995).
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Applicable Law
In a health care liability claim, a claimant must serve on each defendant
an expert report that addresses standard of care, liability, and causation no later
than the 120th day after the claim is filed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 74.351(a), (j). If an expert report has not been served on a defendant within
the 120-day period, then on the motion of the affected defendant, the trial
court must dismiss the claim with prejudice and award the defendant
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Id. § 74.351(b). A report “has not been
served” under the statute when it has been physically served but it is found
deficient by the trial court. Lewis v. Funderburk, 253 S.W.3d 204, 207–08
(Tex. 2008). When no report has been served because the report that was
served was found to be deficient, the trial court has discretion to grant one
thirty-day extension to allow the claimant the opportunity to cure the
deficiency. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(c).
A report is deficient (therefore subjecting a claim to dismissal) when it
“does not represent an objective good faith effort to comply with the definition
of an expert report” in the statute. Id. § 74.351(l). While the expert report
“need not marshal all the plaintiff’s proof,” Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878, it must
provide a fair summary of the expert’s opinions as to the “applicable standards
of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care
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provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that
failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 74.351(r)(6).
To qualify as a good faith effort, the report must “discuss the standard
of care, breach, and causation with sufficient specificity to inform the
defendant of the conduct the plaintiff has called into question and to provide
a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit.” Palacios, 46
S.W.3d at 875. A report does not fulfill this requirement if it merely states the
expert’s conclusions or if it omits any of the statutory requirements. Id. at 879.
The information in the report “does not have to meet the same requirements as
the evidence offered in a summary-judgment proceeding or at trial.” Id. When
reviewing the adequacy of a report, the only information relevant to the inquiry
is the information contained within the four corners of the document alone. Id.
at 878; see Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002).
This requirement precludes a court from filling gaps in a report by drawing
inferences or guessing as to what the expert likely meant or intended. See
Austin Heart, P.A. v. Webb, 228 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007,
no pet.) (citing Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53).
An expert report concerning standards of care for physicians “authored
by a person who is not qualified to testify . . . cannot constitute an adequate
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report.” Moore v. Gatica, 269 S.W.3d 134, 140 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008,
pet. denied); In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004,
orig. proceeding); see Ehrlich v. Miles, 144 S.W.3d 620, 624–25 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). To be an “expert” on the departure from
a physician’s standard of care (therefore qualifying the submission of an expert
report), a person must be a physician who
(1) is practicing medicine at the time such testimony is given or
was practicing medicine at the time the claim arose;
(2) has knowledge of accepted standards of medical care for the
diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition
involved in the claim; and
(3) is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an
expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of medical care.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(r)(5)(A), § 74.401(a) (Vernon
2005). In determining the third element of this standard, courts must consider
whether the physician who completed the report (1) is board certified or has
other substantial training or experience in an area of medical practice relevant
to the claim, and (2) is actively practicing medicine in rendering medical care
services relevant to the claim. Id. § 74.401(c). In other words,
there is no validity, if there ever was, to the notion that every
licensed medical doctor should be automatically qualified to testify
as an expert on every medical question. . . . [T]he proponent of
the testimony has the burden to show that the expert possesses
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special knowledge as to the very matter on which he proposes to
give an opinion.
Ehrlich, 144 S.W.3d at 625 (quoting Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148,
152–53 (Tex. 1996)). For this reason, the offered report (along with the
physician’s curriculum vitae (CV)) must generally demonstrate that the expert
has “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific
issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that
particular subject.” Id. at 625 (quoting Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d
113, 121 (Tex. 2003)).
However, “there are certain standards of medical care that apply to
multiple schools of practice and any medical doctor.” See Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d
741, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Therefore, a
physician “who is not of the same school of medicine [as the defendant] . . . is
competent to testify if he has practical knowledge of what is usually and
customarily done by a practitioner under circumstances similar to those
confronting the defendant.” Ehrlich, 144 S.W.3d at 625; see also Marling v.
Maillard, 826 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no
writ).
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Analysis
Whether Law of the Case Applies
After the next hearing on the adequacy of Dr. Wagner’s amended report,
this time the trial court determined that Dr. Wagner, a board certified
anesthesiologist, was not qualified to give an opinion on Dr. Mercer’s care but
that all of Dr. Mercer’s other objections to Dr. Wagner’s report were overruled
and that in all other respects the report had met the requirements of a section
74.351 expert report. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351. Because
the only basis for the trial court’s dismissal of the Barbers’ claim against Dr.
Mercer was based on its new determination that Dr. Wagner “fails to meet the
qualifications to opine as an expert against Dr. Mercer,” we too will focus on
this ground.
Importantly, the trial court’s initial order regarding Dr. Wagner’s first
report as to Dr. Mercer specifically overruled the defense objections to Dr.
Wagner’s qualifications to opine regarding Dr. Mercer’s alleged negligence.
Therefore, we must first decide the impact, if any, of the trial court’s prior
ruling that actually approved Dr. Wagner’s qualifications and found his report
lacking only on standard of care, breach, and causation.
Generally, once an issue has been litigated, that issue may not be
relitigated. See generally Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. John
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Zink Co., 972 S.W.2d 839, 845–46 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet.
denied). And, in this particular case, Dr. Mercer filed an interlocutory appeal to
this court challenging the trial court’s denial of his objections to Dr. Wagner’s
qualifications and its alleged denial of his motion to dismiss based upon Dr.
Wagner’s qualifications. This court dismissed that appeal in a memorandum
opinion for lack of jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal of a trial
court’s failure to rule on a dismissal motion based on the inadequacy of an
expert report and its grant of an extension of time to cure. See Barber v.
Barber, No. 02-07-00353-CV, 2007 WL 4461411, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Dec. 20, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). In doing so, we noted that the trial
court had not ruled on Dr. Mercer’s first motion to dismiss. Id. Dr. Mercer had
tried to appeal “only the denial of his objections and motion to dismiss based
on [Dr. Wagner’s] lack of qualifications to opine against Dr. Mercer.” Id.
At the hearing on the sufficiency of the amended report, the Barbers
argued that Dr. Mercer had waived his current right to challenge the expert
report because this, in essence, gave him two attempts to appeal. The unique
posture of this case, however, is that our court dismissed the first interlocutory
appeal for want of jurisdiction. Thus, there really has been no review of the
trial court’s initial overruling of Dr. Mercer’s objection to Dr. Wagner’s
qualifications while at the same time sustaining Dr. Mercer’s objections to the
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report for failure to adequately set forth the standards of care, breach, and
causation. In other words, the Barbers modified their first report to address the
defects specifically enumerated by the trial court—those that went to the
adequacy of the report regarding standard of care, breach, and causation—as
opposed to the qualifications of their expert. They made virtually no changes
to the initial report regarding Dr. Wagner’s qualifications because the trial court
had already overruled Dr. Mercer’s objections to Dr. Wagner’s qualifications.
However, the law of the case doctrine is limited to questions of law determined
by a court of last resort. See generally City of Houston v. Jackson, 192
S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. 2006); Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714,
716 (Tex. 2003); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Robertson, 89 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). Thus, we will consider Dr. Wagner’s
qualifications to opine in this appeal.3
3
… We note some disparity with this determination: if the trial court had
originally determined that Dr. Wagner was both unqualified to opine and that
the report was inadequate, the Barbers likely would have modified their
explanations of their expert’s qualifications. Now, however, they have
apparently used up their one-time extension, and the trial court has totally
changed its mind regarding their expert’s qualifications. Thus, the Barbers have
been denied an opportunity to amend this aspect of their report even once. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(c).
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Qualifications to Opine
“[A] physician ‘who is not of the same school of medicine [as the
defendant] is competent to testify if he has practical knowledge of what is
usually and customarily done by a practitioner under circumstances similar to
those confronting the defendant.’” Gatica, 269 S.W.3d at 141 (citing Ehrlich,
144 S.W.3d at 625). In other words, such a physician may not be practicing
in the “exact same field as the defendant physician, but instead must . . . be
actively practicing medicine in rendering medical care services relevant to the
claim.” Kelly v. Rendon, 255 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, no pet.). According to the Texas Rules of Evidence, which also
provide guidance, we may look to “whether the offering party has established
that the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding
the specific issue before the court.” Gelman v. Cuellar, 268 S.W.3d 123, 128
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. denied) (citing Tex. R. Evid. 702;
Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 121). Furthermore, the court must ensure that the
experts have expertise concerning the actual subject about which they offer
opinions. Reed v. Granbury Hosp. Corp., 117 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
Dr. Mercer’s specific objections to Dr. Wagner’s qualifications as set forth
in his amended report and CV are based upon the allegation that Dr. Wagner is
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unqualified to testify on the particular subject matter as required by sections
74.401(a) and 74.403(a) of the civil practice and remedies code. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 74.401(a), 74.403(a) (Vernon 2005).
In the trial court, Dr. Mercer objected to the fact that Dr. Wagner is an
anesthesiologist as opposed to a general surgeon—as is Dr. Mercer—and simply
stated that because Dr. Wagner is an anesthesiologist whereas Dr. Mercer is a
board certified general surgeon and the case involved a surgical procedure, the
Barbers failed to establish Dr. Wagner’s qualifications with regard to the care
provided by Dr. Mercer. Merely referencing paragraphs in Dr. Wagner’s
amended report however, without providing some analysis as to why they are
insufficient, is not enough. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (requiring party
to object with sufficient specificity to make trial court aware of particular
complaint); Maris v. Hendricks, 262 S.W.3d 379, 384–85 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2008, pet. denied) (holding that objections to adequacy of timely filed
report are subject to preservation rules); see also Gatica, 269 S.W.3d at 141
(reiterating that physician of another specialty may be competent to testify
about standard of care if he or she has knowledge of what is usually and
customarily done by a practitioner under similar circumstances). Dr. Mercer did,
however, continue with his objections, which he also raises on appeal.
15
Dr. Mercer challenges Dr. Wagner’s CV, which admittedly does not show
that he is a general surgeon but a board certified anesthesiologist, a fact already
established. Dr. Mercer instead complains that Dr. Wagner’s CV fails to show
how Dr. Wagner has gained any “knowledge, training, or experience that would
qualify him to opine on the standard of care of a general surgeon harvesting a
vein.” While it is true that Dr. Wagner’s CV might not reveal such information
when read in isolation, we are allowed, if not instructed, to consider the four
corners of the report along with the CV when evaluating the expert’s
qualifications to opine on a particular subject. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878;
Hansen v. Starr, 123 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
Because we do not view Dr. Wagner’s CV in isolation, this objection alone is
an insufficient basis for the trial court’s determination on Dr. Wagner’s
qualifications.
While Dr. Mercer then acknowledges that Dr. Wagner’s amended report
shows that he has “administered and managed medical anesthesia care and
treatment to over 10,000 patients undergoing surgeries in a supine position,
and . . . between 300 and 400 patients undergoing cardiac surgery,” Dr.
Mercer contends this experience is insufficient because it “does not establish
how he could legitimately be qualified by training or experience to opine as to
the scope of Dr. Mercer’s duties and responsibilities as a general surgeon
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harvesting a vein, or what Dr. Mercer should have known as a general surgeon
harvesting a vein.” However, excerpts from Dr. Wagner’s amended report
show otherwise. For example, in paragraph six, Dr. Wagner states, “I am
familiar and experienced in . . . proper patient positioning to prevent peripheral
neuropathies in the upper . . . extremities of patients . . . including cardiac
surgical procedures.” Dr. Wagner additionally says in paragraph seven,
I have substantial personal knowledge and experience in the
medical diagnosis, care, and treatment of adult patients undergoing
general anesthesia for cardiac surgical procedures, and I am familiar
with the management of such procedures, including the positioning
and padding of the patient and the patient’s extremities in the
prevention of perioperative peripheral neuropathies under
circumstances like or similar to Malcolm Barber[‘s]. . . . I am
familiar with the management of such procedures, including the
positioning and padding of the patient. . . . My medical
management of adult patients undergoing general anesthesia for
cardiac surgical procedures, and familiarity with the management
of such procedures, including the positioning and padding of the
patient . . . has included approximately 300 to 400 patients.
And in paragraph eight, Dr. Wagner further states,
I also have substantial knowledge of the causal relationship
between an anesthesiologist’s [and] general and traumatic
surgeon’s . . . failures to meet the reasonable, prudent and
accepted standards of medical [and] health . . . care and
supervision in the diagnosis, care and treatment of patients
undergoing general anesthesia for cardiac surgical procedures, . . .
including the positioning and padding of the patient and the
patient’s extremities in the prevention of perioperative peripheral
neuropathies under circumstances like or similar to Malcolm
Barber[‘s] as of 2004. . . . Furthermore, I have substantial
knowledge of the effectiveness or potential effectiveness of such
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standards of medical [and] health . . . care for . . . general and
traumatic surgeons . . . in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of
patients undergoing general anesthesia for cardiac surgical
procedures in the positioning and padding of surgical patients’
extremities, and I am familiar with the management of the
positioning and padding of the patient . . . .
And, finally in paragraph nine, Dr. Wagner says,
I have substantial knowledge of reasonable, prudent, and
accepted standards of medical, health, nursing, and physician’s
assistant care applicable to anesthesiologists, [and] general and
traumatic surgeons, . . . for the care and positioning and padding
of the patient and the patient’s extremities . . . . My knowledge of
such standards of medical, nursing and physician’s assistant care
is based upon my above-described education, training and
experience, my familiarity with the applicable medical literature, my
familiarity with the applicable standards of medical and health care
. . . that were applicable to all general and traumatic surgeons . . . .
[Emphasis added.]
There is a repeating theme to Dr. Wagner’s qualifications; he continually
ties his education and training not only to his knowledge of anesthesia care
during a cardiac procedure, but also to the medical and health standards of care
for general surgeons like Dr. Mercer, who perform cardiac procedures that
involve positioning and padding of a patient. He clearly identifies that he has
acquired training and experience in studying, learning, and observing the
appropriate standards for general surgeons with regard to their obligations for
the positioning and padding of their medical patients. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 74.401(a)(3).
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In this case, it is also important to note that the alleged medical
negligence does not relate to a particular failure regarding the cardiac or general
surgeons’ performance of the actual operating techniques. Here, the alleged
breach relates specifically to the padding and positioning of the patient and his
extremities during the procedure. The padding and positioning of a patient
during surgery is common to surgeries generally, and Dr. Wagner quite clearly
and repeatedly makes clear that he has knowledge, training, and experience
regarding the medical and surgical management duties of the general surgeon
during surgical procedures.4
For all the foregoing reasons, we believe that the trial court’s initial ruling
denying Dr. Mercer’s objections to Dr. Wagner’s qualifications was correct. We
therefore conclude that the Barbers’ expert, Dr. Wagner, is qualified to render
an opinion under section 74.401(a) and (c), as well as section 74.403, as to a
general surgeon’s duty regarding the proper positioning and padding of a
cardiac surgical patient. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 74.401(a), (c),
74.403(a). We therefore also determine that the trial court abused its
4
… Although Dr. Mercer notes allegations against him that go beyond the
positioning and padding of the extremities in a surgical procedure and requests
that we affirm the dismissal as to those allegations, it is quite clear that the
Barbers’ complaints regarding Dr. Mercer in the appeal relate only to his failure
to manage the positioning and padding of a patient’s extremities as shown by
their concession in their reply brief.
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discretion in sustaining Dr. Mercer’s objections to the qualifications of the
Barbers’ expert upon the filing of their amended report. We sustain the
Barbers’ sole issue and reverse and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
JUSTICE
PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and MEIER, JJ.
CAYCE, C.J. concurs without opinion.
DELIVERED: October 15, 2009
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