Byron LaRue Barefield v. Lone Star Beef Product, Herman Aguilar and Nat Leon ( 2012 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-12-00329-CV
    Byron LaRue Barefield, Appellant
    v.
    Lone Star Beef Product, Herman Aguilar and Nat Leon, Appellees
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY, 391ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. D110235C, HONORABLE THOMAS J. GOSSETT, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Byron LaRue Barefield appeals from a final district-court order granting a summary-
    judgment motion filed by appellees and denying his cross-motion in a suit he filed seeking money
    damages from a former employer and co-workers. We will affirm the district court’s judgment.
    Barefield is currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    and has represented himself throughout the proceedings. Prior to his incarceration, Barefield was
    employed by appellee Lone Star Beef Processors, L.P. In July 2011, Barefield sued “Lone Star Beef
    Product” (i.e., Lone Star Beef Processors, L.P.), and various Lone Star employees1 seeking to recover
    for alleged damages to his 2002 Land Rover that, according to Barefield, occurred while the vehicle
    1
    Barefield alleged that appellee Herman Aguilar was Lone Star’s “Safety Manager” and
    appellee Nat Leon its “Hiring Manager.” Although Barefield named other Lone Star employees as
    defendants, there is no indication in the record that these individuals were served, answered, or
    appeared.
    was parked in the Lone Star employee parking lot on September 28, 2008. Following this incident,
    Barefield further pled, he requested or demanded that Lone Star voluntarily provide him a security
    camera videotape that purportedly showed the damage-causing incident, his request was refused, and
    these exchanges led to his termination a few days later, on October 1 or 2, 2008. Barefield prayed
    for a total of $100,000 for “damages to vehicle” and “wrongful termination,” including both “mental
    anguish that occurred to my vehicle,” and “mental anguish because of the wrongful termination.”
    Appellees answered with a general denial, pled the affirmative defense of limitations,
    and specially excepted on the basis that Barefield had not pled facts or legal theories that would
    constitute a cognizable cause of action. Appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment on
    the grounds that Barefield, in essence, had pled himself out of court: his causes of action were
    predicated on alleged injuries occurring in September or October 2008, and he did not file suit until
    July 7, 2011, well beyond the applicable two-year limitations period. Appellees also asserted that
    Barefield had failed to plead facts that would establish a duty or breach that could be the basis for
    either of the asserted causes of action. In response, Barefield filed a “first motion for summary
    judgment and answer” that consisted solely of argument. Appellees countered with a response to
    Barefield’s motion that, in part, attached evidence demonstrating that Barefield had filed a parallel
    federal lawsuit that was dismissed as frivolous.
    The district court granted appellees’ summary-judgment motion without stating the
    grounds and denied Barefield’s cross-motion. Barefield appeals both rulings. However, he does not
    challenge appellees’ limitations ground, that ground is sufficient to support the judgment, and we
    must, accordingly, affirm. See Carr v. Brasher, 
    776 S.W.2d 567
    , 569 (Tex. 1989); Jack v. Holiday
    2
    World of Houston, 
    262 S.W.3d 42
    , 49-50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Britton
    v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 
    95 S.W.3d 676
    , 681-82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
    no pet.). In any event, Barefield’s own pleadings conclusively establish that his claims are barred
    by any conceivably applicable statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
    § 16.003(a) (West Supp. 2012); Tex Lab. Code Ann. § 21.256 (West 2006); see also Tex. R. App.
    P. 47.1(a). We affirm the district court’s judgment.
    __________________________________________
    Bob Pemberton, Justice
    Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Henson
    Affirmed
    Filed: August 31, 2012
    3